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ABSTRACT 
“Valuing the Air: The Politics of Environmental Governance  
from the Clean Air Act to Carbon Trading” 
 
George Charles Halvorson 
 
 
In 1970, the United States Congress and President Richard Nixon created a federal regulatory 
regime to meet public demands for improved environmental quality. As it happened, the formation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the enactment of the first national environmental standards 
coincided with the disruption of the postwar prosperity that had helped fuel the environmental movement. 
Valuing the Air provides the first sustained historical study of policy making at EPA during the formative 
period between 1970 and 1990, when the embattled agency preserved its original mission to protect 
Americans’ right to clean air. To justify strong regulations in an era of rising inflation and unemployment, 
EPA officials turned to the new field of environmental economics, funding pioneering research that 
concluded that the benefits of environmental protection outweighed the costs. Such pecuniary evidence 
allowed EPA to shield its regulatory interventions from business lobbying and to rebut rhetorical 
campaigns in which corporate executives threatened communities across the country with the loss of 
industrial jobs if they supported strong environmental health regulations. While this dollars and cents 
valuation proved persuasive to policy makers, it ran contrary to environmentalist notions of priceless 
nature and environmental advocates fought doggedly to prevent EPA from fully adopting a cost/benefit 
approach to policymaking. As environmentalists recognized, EPA’s embrace of economic measurement 
elevated the stature of economists at the agency, raising the possibility that recently established natural 
rights to clean air and water might be undercut by a dehumanized pricing of externalities. Regulatory 
reforms enacted by the Carter administration, such as emissions trading and the bubble policy, signaled a 
new willingness among liberals to use economic incentives and markets approaches in place of direct 
regulations – a development that environmentalists regarded warily. In 1981, the Reagan administration 
upset a bipartisan consensus for market based reforms with the announcement of drastic budget and 
staffing cuts at EPA. Reagan’s attack on EPA marked the ascent of a new conservative ideology that held 
unrestrained free enterprise to be the greatest social good, irrespective of the actual economics of 
	
regulatory interventions. Finding environmental economics to be a powerful, if imperfect, ally against such 
assaults, many environmental organizations softened their critiques of economic valuation and began to 
borrow the language and logic of economics to make their case. With this growing support from 
environmental organizations, EPA ushered in the commodification of pollution rights in the era of cap and 
trade. The inflection of contemporary environmental advocacy with economic measurement and value 
demonstrates the political utility of economics while also underscoring the foreclosure of an earlier 
environmentalism’s more radical questioning of the desirability of an unbounded market economy. At the 
same time, EPA continues to resist economists’ efforts to derive public preferences from market 
exchange, insisting that fundamental choices about underlying environmental value be made through the 
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 Our modern model of environmental governance dates to 1970, the year Congress 
passed the Clean Air Act and President Richard Nixon created the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to implement the burst of legislation inspired by the environmental movement. 
Over the next few years, Congress gave EPA a staggering array of responsibilities. Municipal 
sewers, toxic waste dumps, harmful noise, and much more became EPA’s charge. But EPA’s 
rapid expansion came at the tail end of a long period in which the federal government used 
administrative agencies to govern how individual companies abided by national laws. Though 
no one knew it in 1970, that model of direct regulation would soon be tested and transformed by 
a souring economy, an organized deregulatory campaign by businesses, and a neoclassical 
revolution in economics that convinced many policymakers that freeing businesses from 
government mandates would raise overall social welfare. Within the first decade of its creation, 
EPA became a key battleground in the war over the administrative state, with environmental 
quality and public health hanging in the balance.  
Valuing the Air focuses on EPA’s air pollution program as the site where the ambitions of 
modern environmentalism underwent their most severe and important test. Facing stiff 
resistance from regulated industry, EPA’s leadership practiced the art of the possible, making 
compromises to achieve remarkable improvements in environmental quality and public health. 
The most important of these compromises was EPA’s embrace of an economic framing of its 
objectives and successes despite environmentalist protests that nature and human health were 
priceless. Under pressure from business executives, who blamed environmental regulations for 
shuttered factories and skyrocketing inflation, and White House administrations made nervous 
by such claims, EPA built a persuasive case that protecting environmental quality made good 




markets in which firms could buy and sell emission rights, EPA officials defended the agency’s 
authority to ensure that every American could enjoy clean air.  
Historians have long been attracted to the modern environmental movement, fascinated 
by its colorful counterculture and intrigued by its mainstream acceptance. Samuel Hays 
provided one of the first accounts, linking a surge in concern for environmental protection with 
the rising prosperity of the postwar generation.1 Hays’ book continues to stand out in the 
scholarship because of the range he accords to the environmental movement and the policies it 
helped create. From environmental activists to regulatory bureaucrats, national legislators to 
businessmen, Hays demonstrated the breadth of environmental politics. Of the historians that 
followed Hays, most have focused on deepening our understanding of individual actors, 
especially environmentalists.2 Like these more narrowly drawn portraits, the few historians who 
have attempted holistic accounts share a fascination with environmental activism.3 In a 
																																																						
1 Samuel Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
2 Environmental history as a field emerged in conjunction with the growth of the environmental movement in the 
1970s and 80s; many of the first monographs are inseparable from that activism, including Carolyn Merchant, The 
Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980). The 
historiography has maintained a focus on environmentalism ever since, even as historians subject the privilege and 
prejudice of that movement to critical investigation. Significant events, figures, and landscapes in the environmental 
movement make favorite subjects. See for example Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl 
and the Rise of American Environmentalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Mark Lytle, The Gentle 
Subversive: Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, and the Rise of the Environmental Movement (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), Adam Rome, The Genius of Earth Day (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013), and Christopher 
Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature and the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century America 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012). Historians have also focused on environmental activism 
left out of Hays’ account, especially the environmental justice movement. Two early examples are Robert Gottlieb, 
Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement (Washington: Island Press, 1993) 
and Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana, 1945-1980 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). Environmental historians have also been interested in working 
people’s relationship with environmentalism, especially following Richard White, “So Are You An Environmentalist or 
Do You Work for a Living?: Work and Nature,” in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, edited 
by William Cronon (New York: W.W. North & Company, 1995), 171-185. One of many more recent examples of this 
interest is Chad Montrie, Making a Living: Work and Environment in the United States (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2008). 
3 Hal Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2000). A wider gaze is offered by Richard Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A 




historiography rich with histories of environmentalists, the stories of other actors in the making 
of American environmental politics remain frustratingly thin.  
One area that is especially threadbare is in the history of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). Hays accorded EPA a full historical treatment as a complex and central actor in 
the history of American environmental politics. But subsequent accounts have largely ignored 
EPA or treated the agency as a regulatory automaton, even as EPA’s regulations remained 
central points of contention for those historians favored environmentalist subjects. My 
dissertation demonstrates that understanding environmental governance since 1970 requires a 
deeper investigation of EPA and the people that made it work. In the 1980s, Hays made what 
turned out to be a neglected appeal for histories of regulators as fully formed human beings.4 
My dissertation intends to satisfy that request.         
Valuing the Air offers the first sustained historical study of EPA, which from its formation 
in 1970 quickly became the center of environmental politics in the United States.5 As both 
regulated industries and environmental advocates quickly realized, the decisions made by EPA 
in implementing laws like the Clean Air Act were at least as important as the original Act itself. 
																																																						
modern environmental policy back into the Progressive Era yields a survey level overview at the expense of depth in 
any one part. 
4 Samuel Hays, “Political Choice in Regulatory Administration,” in Regulation in Perspective, ed. Thomas McCraw, 
124-154 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). Aaron Wildavsky was another early petitioner for histories that 
situated regulators in their contemporary cultural milieu – in his case, popular perceptions of risk. Aaron Wildavsky, 
Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979).  
5 The few monograph length treatments of EPA take the form of either political science modeling of the agency’s 
performance against a static set of criteria or critiques from first hand observers lamenting EPA’s failure to achieve 
one or another of its founding principles or mistakes in carrying out a particular policy. While helpful in their detailing 
of EPA’s bureaucratic changes and their description of specific problems facing the agency over the years, these 
accounts fail to make sense EPA within a wider political, economic, and cultural context. James Conant and Peter 
Balint, The Life Cycles of the Council on Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency, 1970-2035 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) exemplifies the modeling approach. Marc Landy, Marc Roberts, Stephen 
Thomas, The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 
exemplifies a lament of EPA’s failure to live up to its principles. Richard Liroff, An Issue Report: Reforming Air 
Pollution Regulation: The Toil and Trouble of EPA’s Bubble (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1986) 




Environmental organizations, think tanks, business associations, and environmental 
consultancies were among the many non-state actors that helped to develop and police the 
nation’s environmental regulations by interacting with EPA staff, local regulators, and White 
House advisors through both collaborative and antagonistic channels. Environmental 
governance thus functioned in part through a delegation of power to non-state actors that Brian 
Balogh has labeled the associational state.6 Picking up on this idea, historians and political 
scientists have provided excellent studies of environmental organizations’ use of the courts to 
gain a seat at the policymaking table.7 Yet despite the influence of outside parties, EPA itself 
remained a distinct and critical actor, with the agency’s leadership and staff giving their own 
direction to the nation’s evolving environmental policy. As Daniel Carpenter shows in his history 
of the Food and Drug Administration, regulators dedicated to the mission and reputation of their 
agencies create powerful entities possessed of their own momentum and purpose.8 
EPA’s independence was implicitly recognized in the lengths to which regulated 
industries went in trying to outmaneuver EPA within the executive branch. In a pattern that 
Gabriel Kolko first identified in the 1960s in his study of the railroad industry, American 
businesses tended to embrace EPA as an improvement on overlapping and contradictory state 
and federal policies.9 But EPA’s robust regulations also cast industry back on its heels, part of a 
																																																						
6 Brian Balogh, The Associational State: American Governance in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 
7 Robert Lifset, Power on the Hudson: Storm King Mountain & The Emergence of Modern American 
Environmentalism (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014) describes how environmental groups in New York 
won standing for the public interest in regulatory decision making – a legal victory codified in the National 
Environmental Policy Act. Environmental advocates successes and failures within that system was detailed by 
George Hoberg, Pluralism by Design: Environmental Policy and the American Regulatory State (New York: Praeger, 
1992). 
8 Daniel Carpenter, Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 




surprising turn of fortune that David Vogel described in his classic account of American 
business.10 Concentrating power in trade groups like the Business Roundtable, regulated 
industries quickly regained their footing and pushed back against EPA’s rules.11 As Paul Sabin 
points out in a recent article, business interests met the surge in regulatory rulemaking by 
helping to create an executive branch innovation known as regulatory review, which allowed 
White House economists to weigh in with increasing authority on the rules made by EPA and 
other agencies.12 Yet the subsequent leap taken by other historians who describe EPA’s 
increasing monetization of environmental objectives as a form of corporate capture misses 
EPA’s volition in negotiating the existing political climate.13  
EPA’s adoption of economic valuation gained further urgency from fundamental 
economic shifts in the 1970s that lent support to business claims that environmental regulations 
imperiled American prosperity. No sooner had EPA been formed to address the pollution 
pouring out of steel plants and other industry than the heavy manufacturing targeted by EPA’s 
new regulations began leaving the country. A multitude of factors were to blame, from 
capitalists’ unending quest for cheap labor mapped by Jefferson Cowie to tax policies that 
																																																						
10 David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 
11 The importance of groups like the Business Roundtable to this business pushback is described in Benjamin 
Waterhouse, Lobbying America: The Politics of Business from Nixon to NAFTA (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014). Business resistance also took the form of challenging (or obscuring) the public health threats that EPA 
and other regulatory agencies like the Occupational Health and Safety Administration had been created to address, a 
pernicious history explored by David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, Deadly Dust: Silicosis and the Politics of 
Occupational Disease in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
12 Paul Sabin, “‘Everything has a price’: Jimmy Carter and the Struggle for Balance in Federal Regulatory Policy,” 
Journal of Policy History 28, no. 1 (2016): 1-47. 
13 Joe G. Conley, “Environmentalism Contained: A History of Corporate Responses to the New Environmentalism” 
(PhD diss., Princeton University, 2006) describes EPA’s adoption of cost-benefit analysis as a triumph of business, 
who, by getting EPA to accept economic costs as the terms of debate, accomplished a rhetorical version of the 
“agency capture” that has preoccupied public choice economists since George Stigler articulated the idea in 1971. 
George Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 




Judith Stein argues allowed American manufacturers to depart with little financial penalty.14 The 
benefits of cleaning up the air (including a decrease in health care spending for lung ailments) 
consistently outweighed the costs to businesses in installing new technologies to limit the 
pollutants blowing out of smokestacks and tailpipes. But those compliance costs were 
nonetheless high, and probably factored into the decision of some manufacturers to leave the 
United States for less regulated countries.  
My dissertation participates in a historiographical turn toward the 1970s as a pivotal 
point in American politics. Reagan’s neoliberalism was not autochthonous but rather built on 
widespread belief that freeing competition would sustain economic growth.15 As Eduardo 
Canedo has shown, the deregulatory movement grew up alongside the administrative state it 
critiqued, gaining political traction in the 1970s long before Reagan took office.16 My dissertation 
argues that Jimmy Carter’s presidency represented a moment of bipartisan consensus around 
the need to check the growth of regulations and that EPA became a center for Carter’s 
regulatory reforms. It was during the Carter administration, for instance, that EPA developed the 
first policies that allowed firms to buy and sell emission offset rights in limited local markets. But 
my dissertation also argues that Carter’s interest in market based policies needs to be 
distinguished from what came after.17 Carter saw market approaches as an opportunity to 
																																																						
14 Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1999); Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 
15 For an example of a (now fading) tendency to date the advent of neoliberalism to Reagan’s election in 1980, see 
Monica Prasad, The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Policies in Britain, France, Germany, and the 
United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).  
16 Eduardo Canedo, “The Rise of the Deregulation Movement in Modern America, 1957-1980” (PhD diss., Columbia 
University, 2008.  
17 New scholarship on neoliberalism by and large gives Carter his due while distinguishing Carter’s neoliberalism from 
Reagan. For an example of this longer and periodized treatment, see Daniel Stedman, Masters of the Universe: 




safeguard ambitious national standards by lowering the cost of compliance to business. 
Reagan’s preference for deregulation rather than market based regulation was revealed by his 
neglect of the reforms he inherited from Carter. That neglect accompanied a lack of planning 
Jefferson Decker has described as characterizing much of the Reagan revolution, tripping up 
Reagan’s deregulatory ambitions.18  
Revealing EPA to have been both a stalwart of the regulatory techniques associated 
with the New Deal and the Great Society and a critical testing site for neoclassical economics 
and public choice politics allows my dissertation to suggest important unifying threads for a 
splintered contemporary debate about whether it is acceptable to monetize environmental 
objectives as well as whether markets should be used to allocate pollution. My dissertation 
interweaves a genealogy of academic theories on regulatory costs with a history of their 
application through research contracts and hiring decisions that brought fledging environmental 
economists and their valuation techniques into environmental policymaking. This approach 
shows how the real world application of such ideas changed both economic thought and EPA’s 
approach to environmental protection.  
Beginning in the 1990s, a new group of environmental advocates calling themselves free 
market environmentalists have proclaimed the virtues of using markets not just to comply with 
environmental regulations but to ascribe value to underlying resources like clean air or 
untrammeled wilderness.19 Rejecting such market valuation as unethical, other contemporary 
environmentalists mistake it as a reactionary and inherently pro-business response to the 
																																																						
18 Jefferson Decker, The Other Rights Revolution: Conservative Lawyers and the Remaking of American Government 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
19 A leading book for this new movement was Terry Anderson and Donald Leal, Free Market Environmentalism, (San 




modern environmental movement.20 My dissertation offers a long history of market approaches 
and economic valuation that reveals the conjoined origins of environmental economics and 
environmentalism in the 1960s. A few historians have begun paying attention to “free market 
environmentalism” and “green liberalism” as important schools of thought in contemporary 
conversations about environmental degradation.21 But the full history of environmental 
economics and especially EPA’s role in fostering the growth of the field remain unknown. Back 
in the 1960s, environmental economists began insisting that the environment had irreplaceable 
value. Those economists’ framing of environmental degradation as a pecuniary loss through 
things like diminished crop yields helped spur the federal interventions of the 1970s. By 
establishing the contributions of environmental economists to robust federal legislation and 
enforcement, I hope my dissertation will suggest common ground for environmentalists and 
economists in the present. 
The creation and administration of environmental polices generated an enormous 
amount of archival records, only a fraction of which could ever be read by a single historian. By 
necessity, my dissertation does not discuss every regulation or every law with a bearing on how 
EPA governed and valued the environment. Nor do I recount every bureaucratic reorganization 
and institutional change at EPA. Instead, my dissertation focuses on a series of policies, 
enforcement actions, and cultural shifts that reveal how EPA developed a model of 
environmental governance that favored uniform national standards designed to protect the 
																																																						
20 See for example, Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the 
Value of Nothing (New York: The New Press, 2004). 
21 Brian Drake, Loving Nature, Fearing the State: Environmentalism and Antigovernment Politics Before Reagan 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013), discusses the cultural milieu of the authors who wrote the canonical 
articles and books in the field but does not explain how environmental economics entered into policymaking through 
contracts with agencies like EPA. Ted Steinberg, “Can Capitalism Save the Planet?: On the Origins of Green 
Liberalism,” Radical History Review 107 (2010): 7-24, also favors the cultural at the expense of the political in a 
thoughtful account of how a radical turn toward the local among some economists and cultural critiques presaged the 




public health and how EPA adopted market based valuation techniques and compliance 
strategies to protect that model.  
My research spans a wide variety of archives and source material to capture both the full 
complexity of environmental policymaking and the wider significance of environmental policy in 
American political history. EPA’s implementation and enforcement of environmental laws left a 
large but uneven collection of records at the national and state level. Many important policies 
have extensive paper trails in these collections. But discrepancies in record preservation within 
different offices at EPA’s headquarters and between the ten regions have resulted in large 
holes.22 The records documenting EPA’s interactions with various White House administrations 
are better organized and more complete. Domestic policy and economic advisors were closely 
involved in almost every one of EPA’s important rulemakings and the presidential libraries of 
Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush are full of 
candid memos detailing that involvement. The White House was also where regulated 
businesses and their representatives attempted to shape environmental policy, a record marked 
in letters to and from the administration and copious economic reports commissioned both by 
White House advisors and business representatives like the United States Chamber of 
Commerce.  
Environmental organizations also lobbied presidents and their advisors. Two of the most 
important environmental groups for regulatory policymaking were the Natural Resources 
Defense Council and the Environmental Defense Fund, both with publicly open archives that I 
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thousands of feet of records in the National Archives facility in San Bruno, California describing a range of activities in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Region V (which covers the Midwest) deposited in the National Archives facility in Chicago only 
a set of automobile emission certifications from the early 1970s. A similar unevenness characterizes the records from 
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consulted in my research. Congress passed the laws that became environmental policies, a 
critical role that my dissertation explores both in the excellent records of Senator Edmund 
Muskie, who was a principal author of the 1970 Clean Air Act, and in the many hearings held by 
various Congressional committees in passing and amending the 1970s Act. Finally, my 
dissertation also draws on a wide variety of published sources, from trade journals produced by 
regulated industries to books and journal articles published by environmental economists.  
Policymaking took place in meetings, memos, phone calls, public hearings, and court 
cases across the country. The few instances where legal scrutiny forced EPA staff to account 
for the input they received on a specific rulemaking make it clear that paper records (however 
voluminous) describe only a part of the research, conversations, and political maneuvering 
behind the final regulations that appeared in the Federal Register. As a result, some of the 
factors behind any given policy will remain unknown. But to recover a portion of this history, I 
conducted approximately twenty oral histories of individuals who played important or illustrative 
roles in the policymaking process. I chose a range of interview subjects, from an economic 
advisor in the Carter Administration to the president of the national association of local and state 
regulators, gaining further subjects by referral as I went. That variety helped me to see how 
policymaking operated at different levels and how a range of people understood the changes in 
policy that I explore. The interviews help my dissertation capture something of the range of 
influences on environmental policy and helped guide my archival research later in the process. I 
intend to deposit the transcripts from these interviews in an appropriate library when I am 
finished with my manuscript, allowing other scholars to take advantage of the narratives.   
  Valuing the Air begins by revisiting the history of the popular environmental movement 
to reveal its intertwined origins with the new field of environmental economics. Chapter One 
explains how new evidence about the monetary damages of pollution helped prompt Congress 




economics into account in setting the first set of national air quality standards. Chapter Two 
describes EPA’s formation and the critical decisions the agency made in negotiation with 
environmental groups about the implementation of the Clean Air Act. EPA’s establishment of 
strict regulatory standards surprised Nixon and his business allies, prompting a struggle in the 
executive branch to assert White House control over EPA’s decision making. Chapter Three 
recounts that struggle and contextualizes it within in a moment of rising inflation, growing 
unemployment, and mounting energy prices.  
The economic malaise of the 1970s gave regulated industries political and social traction 
to oppose regulations, which pushed EPA to invest in its own economic expertise. Chapter Four 
explores the spread of a neoclassical opposition to regulatory interventions among diverse 
segments of the policy making community in the middle of the 1970s. Chapter Five pairs EPA’s 
experimentation with market-based regulatory reforms during the Carter administration with the 
agency’s resistance to allowing economic considerations into the setting of the national air 
quality standards – a juxtaposition that reveals both the extent and the bounds of that bipartisan 
embrace of neoliberal ideas. Chapter Six positions the Reagan revolution as a break with this 
careful reform, explaining how the president’s overt hostility to environmental protection and his 
disinterest in substantive reform provoked a damaging backlash to his deregulatory ambitions.  
Over the 1980s, market approaches gained further support among think tanks, 
Congressional offices, and environmental organizations as well as a select group of businesses. 
Chapter Seven describes the development of the first cap and trade program in the sulfur 
dioxide trading system developed by the Bush Administration in the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990. Rather than harbingers of further deregulation, sulfur dioxide trading fits within EPA’s 
long history of borrowing techniques from environmental economists to reduce the costs of 




Strong regulatory standards have dramatically improved air quality over the past half-
century. Ambient levels of dangerous pollutants like particulate matter are half what they were 
when the new Environmental Protection Agency began implementing the Clean Air Act in 1970. 
Americans breathe easier and live longer because of EPA’s regulations.23 Valuing the Air tells 
the story of how environmental advocates convinced the country to clean up the air and how 
EPA protected that national consensus into the present. Having provided a basis for 
understanding how environmental policy has been made, my dissertation offers scholars and 





























23 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 (Washington, 
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CHAPTER 1: THE COSTS OF POLLUTION 
 
 
On January 1, 1970, President Richard Nixon officially launched the environmental 
decade. Public interest in environmental protection had been building since the 1960s, as an 
increasingly affluent American society ran up against the compounding detritus of that 
prosperity. Congress and President Nixon responded to growing environmental concern with a 
flurry of legislation. Signing the National Environmental Policy Act into law on New Year’s Day 
1970, Nixon declared that the country was “determined that the decade of the seventies will be 
known as the time when this country regained a productive harmony between man and nature.”1 
The first year of the environmental decade set a blistering pace toward that harmony. Congress 
established the Council on Environmental Quality to advise the White House on policy 
objectives and Nixon created the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the 
Environmental Protection Agency to implement new legislation in the executive branch. On 
December 31, Nixon signed the landmark Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 into law.  
 Explaining the federal government’s surge into protecting environmental quality, the 
standard history of the environmental decade points to the ascendance of the widely popular 
environmental movement.2 But while environmentalists (and national politicians courting their 
votes) were a central factor, the creation of a federal pollution control regime was also driven by 
a new set of economists preoccupied by the monetary costs of pollution. In the 1950s and 
1960s, economists studying agriculture and natural resources at universities and then think 
tanks began speculating that pollution posed a threat to continued American prosperity. Some 
of these economists worried that the increase of airborne pollutants in smoggy cities would drive 
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more and more Americans into emergency rooms with lung ailments. Others focused on the 
degradation of vital inputs like clean water. Collectively, these economists started estimating the 
costs of pollution to society. And as those costs grew, elected officials and policymakers began 
paying attention.       
This chapter revisits the roots of the environmental decade to reveal the shared origins 
of the environmental movement and the field that came to be known as environmental 
economics. Both environmentalists and environmental economists worried a great deal about 
environmental quality. But they differed dramatically on what quality meant, including whether 
degradation and pollution could be expressed as monetary costs. Debates between these two 
perspectives surrounded the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970, baking contradictory notions 
of environmental value into the law that soon became the foundation of the new federal pollution 
control regime. 
 
Putting a Price on Pollution 
 
At first, air pollution was a local problem. In industrializing cities in the nineteenth 
century, an explosion of coal-fueled manufacturing generated thick clouds of particulate matter 
that darkened the sky, choked lungs, blackened textiles, and blanketed cities in dust. As David 
Straddling describes, captains of industry and the growing American middle class viewed those 
emissions ambivalently: puffing smokestacks embodied prosperity but that same smoke also 
came to symbolize the dirty, disorderly urbanism that accompanied industrialization. 
Progressive reformers sought controls on smoke as part of their campaign for beauty, order, 
cleanliness, and the efficient use of resources. Proposals for nuisance abatement failed from an 
absence of feasible technological controls and because of protests from industry – from which 
labor heard the first notes of the enduring refrain that restrictions on pollution would cost them 




1930s and 40s, as the emergence of health sciences as a professional field pried open 
business’s stranglehold on air pollution research and new smog disasters in Donora, 
Pennsylvania and London, England galvanized public fears about polluted air.3   
 By the mid 1950s, national concern over air pollution was sufficient to prompt a federal 
response. In 1955, Congress passed the Air Pollution Control Act, instructing the Public Health 
Service (PHS) to determine the extent of the air pollution problem and provide technical 
assistance to the states as they went about addressing it. Allocating a five million dollar annual 
budget to PHS to manage air pollution in the 1955 Act, Congress instructed the Service to issue 
grants to support research into the health effects and control of pollution and to develop 
technical expertise of its own to share with the states through training programs and loaned 
experts.4 To disseminate all this new information, PHS sponsored the first national conference 
on air pollution in 1958, which firmly established both the health risks posed by routine exposure 
to air pollution and the rise in pollutant emissions across the nation.5 
In addition to detailing the growing threat of air pollution, the 1958 conference introduced 
economic costs as a new measure of the magnitude of the air pollution problem. As conference 
attendees settled into lunch on the opening day, they listened to a short address from Dr. 
Reuben Gustavson, a chemist who had served on PHS scientific advisory committees and was 
																																																						
3 David Stradling, Smokestacks and Progressives: Environmentalists, Engineers, and Air Quality in America, 1881-
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4 Lynne Snyder, “The Death-Dealing Smog over Donora, Pennsylvania”: Industrial Air Pollution, Public Health, and 
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now the president of the Washington, DC think tank Resources for the Future.6 Departing from 
the usual subjects of lung disease, automobile emission controls, and federal research funding, 
Gustavson’s title asked of pollution: “what are the costs to society?”7    
Gustavson’s address on the costs of pollution built on longstanding interest among 
economists in environmental degradation. Nineteenth century economists understood 
degradation as a depletion on the natural resource and agricultural base of the economy.8 In the 
early twentieth century, economists’ investigation of environmental degradation expanded to 
include the waste generated by industrial society. Pittsburgh, where coal fired industry and 
natural atmospheric inversions led to terrible air quality, was the focus of a novel 1913 study by 
the Mellon Institute of Industrial Research that estimated the annual cost of air pollution to the 
city to be nearly ten million dollars.9 In 1920, English economist Alfred Pigou coined the term 
“externality” to describe the noxious byproducts that industrial producers freely dumped into 
streams and the air to the detriment of the public welfare. Pigou recommended that polluting 
																																																						
6 Gustavson’s biography was given in “Dr. Gustavson To Speak At Commencement,” The Kent Stater Summer 
Bulletin August 27, 1954, accessed March 1, 2017, http://dks.library.kent.edu/cgi-
bin/kentstate?a=d&d=kssb19540827-01.2.6 
7 Reuben Gustavson, “What Are Air Pollution’s Costs to Society,” U.S Public Health Service National Conference on 
Air Pollution, Washington, D.C. November 18, 1958. U.S. Public Health Service, Proceedings, National Conference 
on Air Pollution, (Washington, D.C.: 1958), 41-43.  
8 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, classical economists led by David Ricardo argued that the natural 
resource base on which economic growth depended diminished over time through use. Ricardo’s fellow Englishman 
Thomas Malthus drew a famously dire portrait of that diminishment, warning that expanding populations and 
increasing prosperity would eventually be checked in brutal fashion by the fixed carrying capacity of the land to 
support agriculture, provided humans did not regulate their own reproduction. Downplaying the likelihood of a 
Malthusian crisis, John Stuart Mill nevertheless argued that natural resources (and even land itself) were growing 
scarcer and forecasted the end of economic growth in his writings in the middle of the nineteenth century. Erhun 
Kula, History of Environmental Economic Thought (London: Routledge, 1997). At the time Mill was writing, 
industrialization was driving rapid economic growth, aided in no small part by jurisprudence that, as Morton Horowitz 
described, favored economic development at the expense of inalienable property rights by awarding financial 
compensation to landowners where the activities of industrial neighbors damaged their property rather than granting 
injunctions to end the nuisance. Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1979). 




firms pay compensatory taxes according to the costs their externalities imposed on society.10 So 
called Pigouvian taxation received little interest from state or federal authorities. And with 
nuisance suits against polluting industries having largely stalled by the twentieth century, the 
only checks on pollution were local ordinances relegating particularly noxious industry like horse 
rendering to the urban periphery.11 So while economists were becoming increasingly aware of 
the economic costs of pollution, the problem itself continued to grow unabated in the 1930s and 
1940s.  
 By the 1950s, the pollution problem spurred a new set of economists to call for 
government intervention. H. Scott Gordon was among the first economists to argue that rules or 
regulations were needed to restrain the selfish behavior of firms and individuals. In a 1954 
article, Gordon laid out the case for protecting what he called “common-property resources.” 
Hypothesizing a fishery with a limited supply of fish and no rules governing behavior, Gordon 
argued that the inherent self-interest of each fisherman would eventually drive the fishery to 
exhaustion. The individual fisherman had no incentive to conserve some of the catch for a future 
date since his fellow fishermen would simply expand their current haul to include any fish he 
might save. In order to protect the fishery from extinction, some form of binding rules limiting the 
behavior of the participants would be required.12  
Gordon’s assumption that firms and humans naturally and singularly pursued their self 
interest is worth dwelling on because it served as a key premise of both environmental and 
neoclassical economics. As Elizabeth Blackmar has noted, that assumption was not yet 
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universally accepted among social theorists or even economists, but the intellectual work that 
eventually applied microeconomic equilibrium models to macroeconomic policies in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century had begun.13 The emergence of environmental economics amid 
the first stirrings of neoliberalism was not a coincidence. Allegorical fisheries provided the 
perfect habitat for homo economicus, whose relationship to his peers was by nature one of 
competition over limited resources. While Gordon called for regulations to temper that instinctual 
acquisitiveness, the profit maximizing human subject he and other environmental economists 
helped to naturalize later served to rationalize an ideology that erased any notion of 
responsibility for one’s fellow humans.   
Back in the 1950s, Gordon’s article helped drive support among economists for 
government regulation. In 1954, Paul Samuelson produced a mathematical proof of the inability 
of markets to protect what he called “public goods,” which opened the theoretical argument up 
to mathematical testing and debate.14 And in 1958, economist John Kenneth Galbraith 
published the widely read The Affluent Society, in which he argued that government regulation 
of things like highway billboards was needed to protect the high quality of American life from the 
prosperity that fueled it.15 
Simultaneous to Gordon, Samuelson, and Galbraith’s writing, a separate set of 
economists took on the efficiency of government spending by calculating the financial return on 
federal expenditures. Since the 1930s, Congress had hired economists to estimate the 
pecuniary costs and benefits of federally funded dams, canals, and other development projects. 
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Laying out all the expected costs (from the labor needed to dig the diversion ditch to the 
replacement costs for the pickaxes those workers were bound to break along the way) and all 
the expected benefits (from cheaper electricity to the additional wheat crop a farmer would get 
from a field that escaped flooding), economists could produce a neat ratio of total benefits to 
total costs. If that ratio was greater than one, then federal money could be justifiably spent on 
the project. Over the next thirty-years, those economists refined the techniques of this cost-
benefit analysis, developing best practices on such subjects as the discount rate for future 
benefits, as they supplied an eager demand from legislators concerned about mushrooming 
federal spending. In the 1960s, economists like Otto Eckstein began encouraging the federal 
government to use cost-benefit analysis to decide between projects at the conceptual stage, 
rather than simply evaluating projects that had already been proposed.16 In the 1970s, 
economists’ faith in the usefulness of cost-benefit analysis as an evaluative guide would find 
new material in the expanding administrative state.    
The 1950s also witnessed the development of a third new line of economic inquiry into 
the economics of pollution that consisted of corporate sponsored studies of narrowly focused 
areas where a business or industry feared they might be held legally liable for their pollution. A 
1956 guide to ongoing economic research on air pollution listed five universities conducting this 
business guided research. At the University of Illinois-Urbana, for example, the Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Company paid for an economic assessment of the costs of removing sulfur dioxide from 
smokestack emissions. At the University of Wisconsin, funding from an unspecified industry and 
unspecified private foundations supported research on the health effects of fluorine on cattle.17  
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At the local and state levels, regulatory agencies also sponsored research to identify 
causal connections and damages for which particular businesses might be held responsible. In 
Los Angeles, the University of California-Riverside studied the costs of the region’s notorious 
smog in tandem with the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District’s efforts to force oil refineries 
and automobile manufacturers to control the hydrocarbon emissions that contributed to that 
smog.18 Research into the feasibility of oxide controls helped state and local authorities in 
California and elsewhere determine how far to push refineries and automobile manufacturers to 
reduce their emissions.  
Collectively, the three lines of study into the economics of air pollution built up an 
assemblage of local studies over the 1950s. New sources of federal funding from the Public 
Health Service retained a local focus, such as a study in Pittsburgh on the feasibility of sulfur 
dioxide controls in coal powered industry. While this research supported interventions at the 
local level, it failed to provide a holistic account of the economics of pollution at the national 
level, one that might inspire federal intervention. 
 
Resources for the Future 
 
The founding of the think tank Resources for the Future in 1952 created a foundation for 
the first national accounting of the costs of pollution to American society. As its name suggests, 
Resources for the Future (RFF) sought to encourage federal policy makers to protect the 
country’s natural resources for future use – a guiding philosophy that placed RFF in line with 
conservationist efforts dating back at least half a century to Gilford Pinchot and the creation of 
the Forest Service.19 But whereas conservationists had focused on minimizing waste in the 
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extraction and processing of natural resources, RFF used economic analysis to decide between 
alternative uses of natural resources on the basis of the monetary costs and benefits.20 With 
nearly three and a half million dollars in Ford Foundation funding for its first five years of 
operation and support among Washington policy makers at the highest levels of government, 
RFF quickly became the institutional base for economists who hoped to translate their ideas 
about natural resources into federal policy. With the arrival of additional funding from the Ford 
Foundation for a new urban economics program later in the 1950s, RFF staked a leading role in 
the economics of pollution.21  
 When RFF President Rueben Gustavson chose to frame pollution as an economic 
menace during his address at the 1958 Public Health Service conference on air pollution, he 
was leading a shift in how national policymakers understood pollution as a social problem. The 
social effects of air pollution were typically measured in rates of illness and mortality. Gustavson 
pointed instead to the corrosion of metal roofs from the sulfuric compounds released by the 
burning of coal, corrosion that represented one of many costs of the industrial age. Estimates 
had been offered as to the sum of those annual costs, Gustavson noted, with the figure of seven 
and a half billion dollars representing as good as estimate as any.22 
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 Gustavson’s charting of air pollution as a great if uncertain economic threat was 
promptly met by PHS officials with an expansion of the federal research agenda. Following the 
conference, the Surgeon General convened an Ad Hoc Task Group of pollution control officials, 
public health researchers, and business leaders to establish priorities for PHS funded research. 
In a 1960 report, the Task Group reiterated that research up until that point had focused on 
acute health effects, while the full effects of air pollution were much broader, including 
“economic losses due to damage to vegetation and livestock, corrosion of materials, soiling of 
surfaces, and reduction in visibility.” Citing Gustavson’s 1958 speech, the report stated that the 
cost of those losses amounted to somewhere between four and eight billion annually – a 
worrying estimate in both its magnitude and its uncertainty. In response, the Task Group report 
called for a tripling of funding for research into the agricultural damages resulting from air 
pollution – asking industry, PHS, and state and local communities to collectively spend one and 
half million dollars annually on such research. The report also declared that policy makers 
needed new “techniques for the measurement of economic losses due to corrosion and other 
damage to materials, soiling, and reduced visibility,” as well as “reliable cost estimates on both 
local and national bases.” Further research could explore “potential by-product use, economic 
motivation techniques (such as rapid tax amortization), and the social effects of polluted air on 
people and communities.” To pay for all that new knowledge, the 1960 report called for a nearly 
six fold increase in funding from the federal government, the states, and polluting industries, to 
approximately $600,000 per year.23  
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In 1960, PHS created a Division of Air Pollution, continuing a pattern of organizing 
pollution control by environmental medium that had begun in 1954 with the consolidation of 
water pollution control and eventually served as the blueprint for the Environmental Protection 
Agency.24 Over the next few years, PHS cited the economic costs of air pollution to justify the 
Division’s work. At its 1962 National Conference on Air Pollution, for instance, PHS dedicated 
an entire session of its to the subject of “agricultural, natural resource, and economic 
considerations.” A summary of the proceedings made explicit what the National Goals of Air 
Pollution Research had intimated two years earlier: establishing the costs of air pollution would 
help convince the public that the pollution controls pursued by local, state, and federal 
governments would yield benefits that justified the upfront costs of those programs.25 
RFF, meanwhile, was fueling research into the economics of pollution with steadily 
increasing funding. At the beginning of the 1960s, RFF still saw its primary mission as 
conserving scarce natural resources such as copper for future generations. But as RFF 
expanded its research into the management of water, a new group of scholars began to see 
contamination of rivers from sewage and industrial and agricultural effluent as a major threat to 
the future supplies of water on which industry, agriculture, and growing cities all depended. 
Those new scholars were led by Allen Kneese, an economist who joined RFF in 1961 to 
develop the organization’s pollution studies. In his first year, Kneese completed a survey of 
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existing research on water pollution, writing in RFF’s Annual Report about the great deal of 
uncertainty surrounding economic understandings of pollution as well as the high likelihood that 
controlling pollution would entail significant new spending on infrastructure. Echoing 
assumptions about the inevitable mismanagement of commonly held resources that Gordon and 
others had raised in the 1950s, Kneese argued that “market processes tend to induce inefficient 
combinations of pollution-control measures,” since upstream polluters had no incentive to 
protect rivers for downstream users. Furthermore, since the river could not be parceled out and 
sold, users had no incentive to pay for the protection of the river, since anyone could enjoy the 
benefits of clean water regardless of whether she or he had paid for the protection.26  
In rejecting the capability of private enterprise to protect the public welfare from pollution, 
Kneese’s research helped define the new field of environmental economics in opposition to 
neoclassical theory. Neoclassical economists like Robert Solow rejected the need for 
government intervention in the environment, arguing that technological innovation would always 
allow manufactured capital to be substituted for natural capital, obviating any risk of a resource 
crisis. Like other budding environmental economists, Kneese maintained that this faith in 
substitutability ignored the real and irreplaceable contributions made by the environment to the 
value of goods and services.27 This new cohort disagreed about whether the value of the 
environment could be fully captured in dollars and cents.28 But environmental economists were 
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united in insisting that the environment did have economic value that was being systemically 
disregarded by contemporary policy.   
The rapid ascension of environmental quality among RFF’s research priorities made 
pollution and its control the primary focus of the new field of environmental economics.29 RFF 
funded new research on water pollution on the Ohio and the Potomac rivers and studied the 
Ruhr River in Germany for its successful coordination of industrial production and pollution 
control through a regional authority.30 In 1965, the Ford Foundation gave RFF an additional one 
million dollars to form a research program in environmental quality and RFF’s board chose 
Kneese to head the new effort. In addition to further studies of water quality – including a grant 
to Harvard to improve techniques of cost-benefit measurement – Kneese’s program began 
funding research into air pollution, including studies into how the ill effects of urban pollutants 
might be measured in pecuniary costs to public health.31 1966 saw RFF’s first Forum on 
Environmental Quality, a two day conference in Washington, DC in which twelve presenters 
made the collective point that improving environmental quality forced policy makers and 
researchers to move past quantitative assessments of the resource base to take on qualitative 
questions without ready answers. Looming large among those new questions was how to 
balance environmental quality and other social goals. “In view of the progressively higher costs 
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of ascending degrees of purity,” an introduction to the conference noted, “how clean do we 
really want out air and streams to be?”32 
RFF’s turn toward environmental quality fit within a larger environmental awakening that 
has been well documented by historians. In the 1960s the newly prosperous American public 
began to depart from the postwar belief in economic growth and development as unalloyed 
successes. As Samuel Hays first described it, middle class Americans increasingly saw further 
development as threatening the quality of life they had recently secured and many joined 
fledging environmentalist organizations and campaigned for new legislative protections in 
response.33 In 1964, RFF’s president drew attention to those shifting attitudes toward the 
physical environment, declaring that the American public was no longer satisfied with securing 
resources in ever increasing quantities and increasingly demanded improvements in and 
protections for environmental quality.34 Across the country, environmental quality was quickly 
becoming a major policy issue and RFF scrambled alongside other policy experts and elected 
officials to explain and shape the new concerns.  
 
The Tampa Hearings and Two Remedies for Pollution 
 
While economists and environmentalists both recognized pollution as a national problem 
by the mid 1960s, the control of emissions (if it occurred at all) continued to be managed at the 
local level. The scale and even the existence of pollution control departments depended on the 
extent of local concern and thus varied widely across the country. Los Angeles, which had long 
battled the smog trapped by its eastern mountain ranges had the country’s largest and most 
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sophisticated air pollution control operation; the Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control 
District had over four hundred employees in 1963, as many as worked in air pollution control in 
the entire federal government. 35 Other cities like Pittsburgh, New York, and Chicago with long 
histories of industrial manufacturing and attendant air pollution problems had also established 
control authorities to set and enforce local regulations on emissions. But such local pollution 
control authorities remained relatively scarce in the 1960s – especially in the western and 
southwestern United States, where rapidly growing cities like Denver and Phoenix had weak or 
nonexistent programs.36 Wide discrepancies existed at the state level as well. Only fourteen 
states had passed legislation to create a pollution control authority in 1963, leaving thirty-six 
states with limited or nonexistent state controls.37   
Even where state and local programs existed, rising industrial emissions often 
outstripped pollution control efforts. In the lush country outside Tampa, Florida, the rapid growth 
of phosphate fertilizer mining and manufacturing in the postwar period frequently clouded the air 
with toxic fluorine gases.38 With building acrimony, local citrus growers and cattle ranchers 
blamed stunted orange trees and enfeebled cows on phosphate mines and processing 
factories. With the help of the Florida state government, Polk and Hillsborough Counties formed 
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a pollution control district with a $50,000 budget and four full-time staff in 1961 to address the 
problem.39 But even this relatively robust response proved unequal to the pollution problem. As 
fluorine emissions worsened in the 1960s, local residents and agriculturalists formed the Tampa 
area Citizen’s Committee on Air Pollution, mirroring aggrieved communities across the country 
in banding together to amplify their complaints.  
Local organizing drew the attention of national politicians. In the spring of 1964, Senator 
Edmund Muskie decided to include Tampa in a series of Field Hearings on air pollution that his 
Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution planned to hold in a dozen cities across the 
country. A Democrat from Maine, Muskie had recently helped write the Clean Air Act of 1963, 
which created the first federal office dedicated to assist the states in addressing air pollution. 
With Senator Jennings Randolph, who headed the Public Works Committee from which the 
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution had been formed, Muskie intended to use the Field 
Hearings to get a sense of the national pollution problem and its local variations. As historian 
Dan Carpenter has noted, the 1960s represented a golden age of investigative Congressional 
hearings in which committee chairs enjoyed considerable autonomy and influence compared to 
other periods.40 The Field Hearings and other attention from Muskie’s Subcommittee created a 
prominent national stage from which private citizens, public health experts, state pollution 
control authorities, and representatives of new, local environmentalist organizations could voice 
their concerns about pollution and their suggestions about how it could be controlled. In keeping 
with the local jurisdiction over pollution in this period, the Field Hearings tended to focus on the 
specific problems germane to each venue. In Los Angeles, the Senate Subcommittee heard 
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about the smog generated by automobiles, while in Chicago the discussion centered on 
particulates and sulfur oxides emitted by coal fired industry.41  
 In Tampa, phosphate manufacturing dominated the hearings. Paul Huff, Chairman of 
Polk County Farm Bureau’s Air Pollution Control Commission, joined representatives of the 
Florida Citrus Mutual and the Polk County Cattle’s Association in testifying about the damages 
of phosphate mining and manufacturing to trees and cattle. Phosphate mining had also raised 
concerns about public health and a member of the Citizen’s Committee on Air Pollution from 
Lakeland joined local political leaders and public health officials in testifying before the 
committee. The phosphate industry, meanwhile, maintained that the damages were not nearly 
as great as those critics charged. To that end, the Florida Phosphate Council joined the 
proceedings to attest to the industry’s cleanliness and importance to the local economy.42    
 Eager to augment their testimony with real life observation, the Florida Phosphate 
Council and the Citizen’s Committee each organized tours of the phosphate operations for the 
senators and the Subcommittee staff. The morning after a full day of hearings, the senate party 
boarded a chartered bus with members of the Citizen’s Committee and spent the first half of the 
day driving around the Tampa area, visiting damaged citrus groves and meeting with 
agricultural researchers who were studying the effect of fluorine on cattle and citrus trees. At 
noon, the bus deposited the senate party at the International Mines and Minerals Park for a 
lunch organized by the Florida Phosphate Council, after which the senators and staff spent the 
afternoon touring several of the area’s phosphate manufacturing plants with Florida Phosphate 
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Council representatives.43 With little pollution visible during the afternoon tour, Floyd Bowen, the 
manager of one plant and the Chairman of the Florida Phosphate Council, felt confident enough 
to remark that his operation “was as clean as a Candy Factory.”44 The bright, clear, cool 
weather on that Friday represented something of a stroke of luck for the phosphate 
manufacturers, limiting naturally occurring visibility impairment and ensuring that any emissions 
quickly rose and dissipated.  
But according to the Citizen’s Committee, the manufacturers had left little to chance, 
scaling back their processing operations and thus their emissions in anticipation of the tour. 
Paul Huff, the Chairman of the Polk Country Farm Bureau’s Air Pollution Committee wrote to 
Senator Muskie to insist that Senator Randolph’s party had witnessed deceptively high air 
quality – the result of particularly clear atmospheric conditions and that temporary shut down of 
the phosphate plants. Concerned that nature and the phosphate manufacturers had conspired 
to disguise the real damages of the fluorine pollution during the Field Hearings, Huff enclosed 
photographs, which he informed Muskie that he had taken less than a day after the 
Subcommittee was back in Washington, when the humidity had returned “and the phosphate 
plants were back to full operation.” On the back of each photograph, Huff described the contrast 
between the clean skies that the subcommittee had seen and the normal polluted conditions to 
which the photographs bore witness.45  
In Tampa and elsewhere around the country, the Subcommittee’s Field Hearings raised 
unanswered questions about the federal government’s responsibility to control air pollution. 
																																																						
43 E.N. Lightfoot to John Mutz, February 16, 1964, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Senate Office Staff and 
Committee Staff Files, Series V.C. US Senate, Box 58, Folder 1, EMP.  
44 Paul Huff to Senator Edmund Muskie, March 2, 1964, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Senate Office 
Staff and Committee Staff Files, Series V.C. US Senate, Box 58, Folder 1, EMP. 
45 Paul Huff to Senator Edmund Muskie, March 2, 1964, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Senate Office 





Figure 1: “24 hours after Senator Randolph rode on this highway,” Huff wrote on the back of this  
photograph sent to Muskie’s subcommittee, “super structure of this plant is 50% obscured by the fumes.”46  
 
Intended by Senator Muskie to generate information about the national scope of the air pollution 
problem as well as its local variations, the hearings also inadvertently fostered the perception 
that the federal government intended to do something to reduce that pollution. Private citizens 
and fledging local organizations like the Citizen’s Council took the hearings as evidence that the 
federal government might be prepared to intervene in areas where local and state efforts had 
been ineffective. And they wrote to Senator Muskie before and after the hearings to share their 
particular problems and ask for help. 
Following the hearings, Jane May of Hillsborough County wrote Senator Muskie to 
inform him that she had watched as the Subcommittee party toured her neighbor’s damaged 
citrus groves from the chair where she spent much of her time after health problems ended her 
career as a schoolteacher. May told Muskie that she had had no explanation for her own twenty 
six acres of damaged trees or her ravaged lungs until the Farm Bureau’s Paul Huff informed her 
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that the nearby mines of the Smith Douglas Phosphate Company were to blame. She might 
have sold, May confided, but buyers knew the land was worthless because of the mine. So May 
“began conferences, phone calls, letters to the various authorities. All to no avail.” She sued 
Smith Douglas Co. in Federal Court, but a decision had yet to be reached. Although Smith 
Douglas told May and other growers that they had installed “the most expensive equipment to 
prevent the escape of gases,” May stated, “the local men tell us confidentially…that they had 
not used the equipment.” “This happens over and over,” May protested, “we call, or write the 
authorities and we get no relief.” Calling on the federal government to intervene to protect 
citizens like her from the pollution, May pleaded “do they have the right to take away the life 
savings and chance of independent livelihood from people who are so helpless in defending 
their helplessness?”47 Exemplifying the uncertainty surrounding the federal responsibility he was 
helping to define, Muskie replied: “control measures are under the jurisdiction of the state health 
department, however, I am hopeful that the hearings held in Tampa will have the effect of 
stimulating accelerated activities in air pollution control measures.”48 While that vague answer 
may have given cold comfort to May’s immediate concern for her damaged lungs and trees, the 
hearings and the strong public demand for federal intervention they elicited had already begun 
laying the foundation for a vast expansion of the federal government’s authority over the 
nation’s environmental health.   
 Following the Tampa hearings, the Public Health Service (PHS) launched a study of the 
monetary damage that phosphate mining and manufacturing was doing to cattle ranchers and 
citrus growers. In 1965, Tom Crocker, a young economist, traveled on a PHS grant to Winter 
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Haven, a small town forty miles east of Tampa with angry agriculturalists and a local office of 
the State Board of Public Health. Laboring in the summer heat, Crocker used the new technique 
of hedonics to dissect shifts in real estate values around phosphate mines and manufacturing 
plants, corroborating complaints that mining and manufacturing reduced the value of 
neighboring land.49 Whether measured in the anecdotes collected by Muskie or in Crocker’s 
PHS funded calculations, the costs of air pollution appeared to be rising, underscoring the pleas 
of citizens like Jane May for the federal government to address the problem. 
Crocker’s research in Florida came at a formative moment in the field of environmental 
economics. Growing recognition of the high monetary costs of pollution called into question the 
sustainability of an industrial society that was growing in leaps and bounds. Phosphate fertilizers 
perfectly embodied this puzzle, fueling a “green revolution” of skyrocketing agricultural yields 
while simultaneously damaging human lungs, cattle bones, and citrus trees. Escaping the 
Malthusian trap of resource shortages that had preoccupied economists since the nineteenth 
century, humanity seemed poised to strangle itself with the detritus of its success. At Resources 
for the Future’s 1966 conference, economist Kenneth Boulding delivered what would become a 
famous treatise among economists and lay audiences. In “Economics of the Coming Spaceship 
Earth,” Boulding argued that waste was an inescapable byproduct of industrial society. Trapped 
on earth, humanity would have to figure out how to satisfy its needs with a minimum amount of 
material inputs to minimize the problematic waste.50 In dispatching one set of natural limits, 
humanity confronted another in the absorptive capacity of the environment. 
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Resources for the Future (RFF) helped fund economists who took Boulding’s 
observations as a call for government intervention. Allen Kneese represented this cohort of 
environmental economists who believed that government institutions needed to be created to 
force firms to deal with pollution since the market alone could not be relied on to adequately 
incorporate the social costs of pollution into the prices of consumer goods. Another RFF 
economist, John Krutilla, developed a novel economic case for protecting pristine environments 
in perpetuity based on the premise that prices could never capture the well being that 
undeveloped natural environments would bring to future generations as recreational resources, 
founts of new biological discoveries, and simply through their sheer untrammeled existence.51 
By the late 1960s, Kneese and other RFF researchers had theorized the economic concept of 
residuals – the inevitable, often noxious byproducts of production – and called for the formation 
of cooperative agencies or government authorities to use regulations to force firms to 
incorporate the control of such residuals into their production processes.52 As Garrett Hardin 
wrote in his famous 1968 essay that popularized the notion of “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 
the alternative was environmental collapse brought on by the inherent self-interest of 
individuals.53   
But not every economist who examined pollution in the 1960s came away convinced that 
governmental regulation was the best means of protecting environmental quality from selfish 
individuals. In 1960, Ronald Coase published “The Problem of Social Cost,” a seminal essay 
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that suggested that an expansion of property rights to environmental resources could allow 
competing users to arrive at a socially optimal allocation of those resources. Coase used a 
series of court decisions on nuisance claims to demonstrate that aggregate economic output 
would be raised if individuals and firms could own environmental inputs like unsullied air, since 
those resources would be put to their most efficient use where competing users bid for their use. 
One example cited by Coase concerned a textile weaver, whose products were being 
discolored by a nearby chemical manufacturer. Rather than a court issuing an injunction against 
the chemical manufacturer, Coase preferred the chemical manufacturer to move away, to 
construct new controls on the harmful emissions, or to pay the textile weaver for the damage. 
Since the chemical manufacturer’s decision would be guided by the maximization of profits, the 
end result would be a more efficient use of the clean air in question than would be the case if 
the manufacturer was simply prohibited from operating. Coase himself warned that this 
transactional approach to resource allocation would run aground on debilitating transaction 
costs in any attempt to scale it up to municipal pollution control. The social benefits of protecting 
clean air and water were higher than the profits to be made polluting those resources, but 
hundreds or thousands of individuals could not be expected to band together to buy and protect 
those resources.54  Despite Coase’s caution, the fantasy of markets replacing government 
directives in assigning value to the environment caught an enduring hold on the neoliberal and 
neoconservative imagination.  
 In Winter Haven, Tom Crocker’s interest in the phosphate manufacturing problem soon 
expanded beyond the falling prices of grazing acreage and orange groves. As Crocker would 
later write, far from avoiding phosphate manufacturing, some citrus growers and cattle ranchers 
appeared to be moving toward the pollution. The Public Health Service contract had said 
																																																						




nothing about such behavior and it ran contrary to the narratives collected by Muskie in his 
hearings the year before. But in casual conversation around town, Crocker heard of citrus 
growers choosing to planting trees and ranchers deliberately grazing cattle right next to the 
settling ponds where phosphate manufacturers extracted phosphate from the clay matrix in 
which was embedded.55 
Crocker’s life experiences and academic training made those seemingly inexplicable 
location decisions appear perfectly logical. A Maine native, Crocker spent his teenage years 
working as a surveyor for lumber companies in his home state as well as the Canadian 
Maritimes and Washington. This work let Crocker observe first-hand how different 
compensation models affected the way in which timbering crews treated the forest. As Crocker 
described, crews paid by the hour cut only the trees they were supposed to harvest while crews 
paid by the yard foot tended to cut everything, marginal trees included. Crocker followed his 
interest in the environment to a PhD in Economics at the University of Wisconsin, where the 
Land Economics field founded by Richard Ely in the 1920s had broadened its focus from soil 
conservation and other strictly agricultural topics to the economics of air and water pollution.56 
Crocker trained with Mason Gaffney, a well-known economist who studied the inefficiency of the 
existing system of water rights in the American West – where the doctrine of prior appropriation 
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granted usage rights on a first come, first served basis, regardless of the economic gain that 
different future uses of the water might have attained under a more liberal system of property 
rights. Crocker also spent time at the Wisconsin Water Resources Institute, where he met Jacob 
Bucher, a legal scholar who taught Crocker to think broadly about what constituted a property 
right in practice.  
From these various experiences and teachers, Crocker personally gathered the 
components of the emerging neoclassical revolution in economics. Popularized by economists 
like Milton Freidman at the University of Chicago, neoclassicism imagined a world of self-
interested individual actors, rationally seeking the greatest personal gain based on the specific 
incentives of whatever system of social organization they happened to find themselves. In free 
competition, such actors would maximize social welfare by putting everything from air to labor to 
its most efficient usage. The prices of various inputs would perfectly signal their value. 
Neoclassicists called on the government to enforce private property rights – ideally extending to 
as wide a swath of activity and materials as possible – and then refrain from any other 
intervention in the affairs of individuals.57 Prior to traveling to Florida, Crocker had begun to 
wonder about the possibility of extending property rights to the atmosphere, allowing profit 
minded individuals to make the most efficient use of a resource that was otherwise free and 
thus poorly managed.   
 In Winter Haven, Crocker believed that citrus growers and ranchers were moving toward 
the phosphate pollution because courts in torts cases had directed phosphate manufacturers to 
pay damages to the agriculturalists that often exceeded what they could earn from oranges or 
beef. Conceiving of individuals as profit minded and incentive driven, Crocker could readily 
understand such behavior. The courts’ damage assessments had created a perverse incentive 
																																																						




to plant trees and raise cattle in unsuitable locations. By deliberately locating near phosphate 
mines and manufacturing plants, agriculturalists were hurting overall social welfare since the 
damages that phosphate manufacturers were being forced to pay raised the price of fertilizer for 
consumers without yielding any higher quality of beef or oranges. In Tampa, Crocker saw a 
perfect opportunity to apply his system of atmospheric property rights. If agriculturalists could 
own property rights to the air, they would create areas of citrus growing and cattle ranching 
where the air they owned was kept free of pollutants. Phosphate manufacturers, meanwhile, 
could buy up the air rights over their manufacturing areas to insure that they could emit fluorine 
and other pollutants without any threat of lawsuits.  
Receiving what Crocker described as enthusiastic response to this scheme from Kneese 
at an early conference on environmental economics, Crocker put down his ideas in a 1966 
paper. Bucking contemporary enthusiasm for Pigouvian taxes, Crocker argued that taxes 
required a central authority to be omniscient in order to continuously adjust the tax rate to 
capture the changing social cost of various pollutants. A market, on the other hand, would 
generate the same, or better, information on social costs from the expressed preferences of its 
participants.58 In later writings, Crocker acknowledged the problem of transaction costs that 
Coase had identified in his 1960 article as the most serious constraint on the use of private 
property rights to protect large resources like the air. But Crocker maintained that a careful 
assignment of property rights could help minimize these costs and make a property rights 
system the best route toward maximizing social welfare.59 
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It would take a full decade, an energy crisis, and an ailing economy before Crocker’s 
idea for tradable atmospheric rights gained traction with policy makers. In the meantime, 
Crocker published his original research showing that pollution from phosphate manufacturers 
had driven down the property values of nearby citrus orchards and cattle grazing land by as 
much as forty percent – an alarming decrease for a citrus industry that produced over thirty 
million dollars in annual sales and a cattle industry with over a hundred thousand head.60 To 
local agriculturalists as well as concerned officials like Senator Muskie, those falling property 
values marked yet another cost of pollution – a problem that more and more Americans 
believed only the federal government could address.   
 
A National Pollution Control Regime 
 
Into the late 1960s, Congress remained content to play an advisory role on air pollution 
to the states, where responsibility for defining and enforcing environmental standards continued 
to be based. Senator Muskie’s Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution steadfastly supported 
state power to set standards. Leon Billings, a Muskie staffer who became the Subcommittee’s 
Staff Director, ensured that new environmental legislation kept principal authority over rules and 
regulations with the states. In the Air Quality Act of 1967, Congress maintained state control 
while increasing federal support in the form of funding for research and to assist state and local 
governments in purchasing new pollution control equipment. The 1967 Act did give the 
Secretary of Health and Human Welfare (HEW) responsibility for developing scientific definitions 
of five prevalent air pollutants – the “criteria” documents that served as the official record on the 
atmospheric characteristics and medical risks of each pollutant. But the legislation left it up to 
the states create their own standards for the permissible ambient concentrations of each 
																																																						





“criteria” pollutant and to develop their own plans for enforcing those limits.61 Muskie, who was 
one of the 1967 Air Quality Act’s principal authors, defended this approach as allowing each 
state to focus on the particular pollutants that posed the biggest problems in their areas. 
California could create standards to reduce smog producing oxidants spewing from cars in Los 
Angeles, while Pittsburgh could concentrate on the sulfur dioxide generated by its coal fired 
industry. Furthermore, as Muskie explained to one inquiring constituent, developing a national 
bureaucracy to administer a set of national standards would simply be too expensive.62 Over the 
next few years, Muskie and the Subcommittee continued to insist that states not the federal 
government should set air quality standards, at one point even critiquing the criteria documents 
issued by HEW in 1969 as being so prescriptive in their recommendations as to establish de 
facto national standards.63    
 While Muskie continued to resist an expansion of federal authority, private citizens and 
fledging environmentalist organizations raised their demands that the federal government 
intervene to protect what those claimants declared to be national rights to clean air and water. In 
the late 1960s, proponents of federal pollution control gained a boost when the consumer 
advocate Ralph Nader decided to take up their campaign. Fresh off a stunning victory over 
General Motors regarding unsafe vehicle design, Nader was enjoying a meteoric rise as the 
fresh-faced star of a new group dedicated to protecting the public interest from profit-minded 
businesses. 
Drawing on the energy of law and medical school students and other volunteers who 
flocked to his Center for Responsive Law, Nader and John Esposito founded the Summer Task 
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Force in 1969 to investigate Congress and the National Air Pollution Control Administration’s 
effectiveness in reducing air pollution. Nader’s Raiders, as they became publicly known, 
chastised the existing system for protecting corporations rather than the general pubic by 
confining federal activity to research that primarily benefited polluters while avoiding any 
regulatory responsibility. In a widely publicized report, (published in 1970 as Vanishing Air but 
reported on in the press before) the Task Force pointed out that as of 1969, not a single state 
had submitted air quality standards as required under the Air Quality Act of 1967. The reasons 
for delay ranged from the tardiness of the National Air Pollution Control Administration in issuing 
scientific criteria on each pollutant to the uncertainty surrounding existing monitoring technology, 
but the effect was the abject failure of the state led pollution control program.64  
Along with the challenge from these upstart public interest advocates, the state centered 
approach to air pollution control faced growing opposition from many business executives, who 
complained about the difficulty of complying with an unwieldy array of different laws and 
regulations. In 1968, for instance, the vice president of the Continental Can Company (operating 
143 plants across the country) wrote to the United States Conference of Mayors advocating 
federal standards for air and water pollution to replace local and state “standards that vary all 
over the map.”65 Continental’s aluminum can factories, like almost every industrial 
manufacturing process, emitted fine particulate material, which had a nasty tendency to lodge 
inside human lungs and damage tissue. The Air Quality Act of 1967 designated particulate 
matter as one of the five “criteria” pollutants deemed especially dangerous to public health but 
left it to the states to determine the quantity of matter that sources of particulate emissions 
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would be allowed to loft into the air as well as how that limit would be calculated. Thus, 
Continental’s plant in Mankato, Minnesota might be allowed to emit up to 100 tons of 
particulates per year while its plant in Stockton, California could emit no more than one ton per 
calendar month – a variation that made it difficult and expensive to standardize pollution control 
equipment.66 For business executives like Continental’s vice president, a single set of federal 
standards would come as a welcome consolidation of regulations that they believed were here 
to stay.67     
The Nixon administration eventually came around to supporting a new set of strong 
national standards as part of a larger effort to prevent environmentalism from challenging the 
president’s reelection prospects. As the historian J. Brooks Flippen has shown, Nixon had little 
personal interest in environmental protection, especially the substantive reconfiguring of 
humanity’s relationship to nature proposed by the more radical elements of the environmental 
movement.68 Meeting with his environmental advisors in July 1970, for instance, Nixon quipped 
that “man as a savage is not a particularly wonderful thing to behold,” instructing his advisors to 
make that point “when the kids tried to make no-growth and the establishment the whipping 
boy.”69 But within the administration, environmental advisor John Whitaker insisted that 
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environmental quality had become a popular concern of such magnitude that Nixon could not 
afford to ignore it if he hoped to be reelected. The first Earth Day in April 1970 featured 
hundreds of teach-ins across the country in which the participation of millions of Americans 
literally embodied the ascendance of environmental protection as a major political issue.70 
Whitaker urged Nixon to position himself as a friend (or at least not a foe) of environmental 
protection. Toward that end, Whitaker maintained long lists of new national parks or other 
environmentally sensitive areas across the country that Nixon might squeeze into already 
scheduled trips. These possible appearances ranged from a trip to the Oklawaha River (“without 
a tie on”) in central Florida, where Nixon could announce the cancelation of the controversial 
Cross Florida Barge Canal to a short visit to the new and innovative Blue Plains Sewage Plant 
at home in Washington, D.C., timed to coincide with Nixon sending his Environmental Message 
to Congress.71 In other calculated displays of environmental concern, Whitaker aimed for a 
more intimate indication of Nixon’s supposed environmental sympathies, such as one instance 
in June 1970 in which Whitaker sought to have the president casually drop by an interview that 
Whitaker was scheduled to give to Life Magazine on the administration’s environmental 
record.72 
Whitaker came to be the Nixon administration’s chief environmental advocate from a 
career in natural resources. Born in Victoria, Canada in 1926, Whitaker was raised in Baltimore 
before enlisting in the U.S. Navy as a weatherman. After World War II, Whitaker attended 
Georgetown, graduating in 1949. After completing his PhD in Geology at Johns Hopkins 
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University, Whitaker worked in petroleum exploration before becoming a vice president for an 
aerial photography company specializing in airborne geophysical prospecting. In 1960, Whitaker 
joined Nixon’s first presidential campaign, remaining an advisor to Nixon through his second 
campaign later that decade. When Nixon was eventually elected president in 1968, Whitaker 
joined the new administration as the domestic policy advisor responsible for natural resources 
and the environment.73 The late 1960s were a period in which environmental advocacy had 
remarkably few of the partisan divisions we experience today. Throughout his tenure in the 
Nixon administration, Whitaker took counsel from Joe Browder, a member of the environmental 
group Friends of the Earth, which was founded by former Sierra Club leaders dissatisfied with 
the moderation of that organization. Whitaker routinely passed Browder’s ideas and concerns 
along to other advisors with humorous asides regarding his source but with no caveats 
regarding the importance or quality of the information.74  
In addition to friendly relationships with Browder and other environmentalists, Whitaker 
forged a connection with Resources for the Future, whose president offered the Nixon 
administration free access to his staff’s environmental economics expertise.75 RFF’s research 
on the costs of environmental pollution must have appeared especially attractive to Whitaker, 
who as a trained scientist could recognize on his own the growing need for regulatory 
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intervention. Writing to Nixon’s schedule director in June 1970 to recommend that Nixon attend 
the dedication of the new Rachel Carson Park in Wells, Maine, Whitaker noted that the director 
might remember Rachel Carson as the author of Silent Spring, on the dangers of pesticides. 
“Events have proved her right,” Whitaker remarked, in what would be an almost unthinkable 
endorsement of a popular environmentalist in a contemporary Republican administration.76  
Whitaker’s accompanied this public relations work with an effort to get Nixon to support 
the strong federal intervention that environmentalists increasingly demanded. As J. Brooks 
Flippen and other historians have recounted, Nixon’s suspicions that Senator Muskie would run 
as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate in 1972 eventually spurred the president and 
his top advisors to heed Whitaker’s advice and support new environmental regulation – at least 
in part.77 
 In addition to forcing Nixon to evince environmental concern, surging popular support for 
stronger government interventions obligated Muskie and his fellow environmental advocates in 
Congress to respond to Nader and other critics of the existing air pollution control system. In 
spring 1970 Muskie’s Subcommittee began considering new legislation to strengthen federal 
responsibility for environmental quality. As the Subcommittee held hearings on legislative 
proposals in March, Nader reveled in the role of the outsider critic, gleefully sparring with Muskie 
and his Staff Director Leon Billings, who had to respond to the popular young lawyer.78 In a 
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press conferences Muskie held following the publication of Nader’s highly critical Vanishing Air 
in May 1970, Muskie defended the Subcommittee’s continued preference for state level 
standards while admitting that implementation had been slower than expected and that better 
laws would need to be written.79  
By summer 1970, the environmentalist campaign for expanded federal responsibility had 
eroded Muskie’s defense of state administered standards. The Subcommittee had already 
endorsed the federal government’s duty to protect the public’s interest in clean air, including for 
the minority of the population whose age or infirmity led them to suffer most acutely from air 
pollution. Rejecting the suggestion of one lobbyist who testified before the Subcommittee in 
1968 that air conditioned indoor retreats could be created for the most acute victims of air 
pollution, Billings wrote that the proposal seemed to point toward an “‘assimilative capacity’ 
approach to air pollution control,” that raised serious ethical and legal questions. Besides, 
Billings noted, the primary pressure for pollution control came not from the sick but “from the 
urban, upward-striving, middle class who are offended by the aesthetic insults of smog, smut, 
and filth.”80 In the face of the failure of the state-led program, the Subcommittee gradually 
accepted national standards for ambient air. Nader pushed onward, seeking federal authority to 
directly control the emissions of individual firms. Denied on that account, Nader and 
environmentalists had nonetheless spurred Muskie to support a significant expansion of federal 
authority over environmental quality.81 
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By June, the Subcommittee staff had moved on questions of how the national standards 
would be configured. How many pollutants would be covered? How long would states have to 
comply? And how would the standards balance feasibility with the health risks posed by 
pollutants?82 Over the next month, the Subcommittee settled on using the preexisting criteria 
documents to select and define the pollutants to be controlled. The earlier Air Quality Act of 
1967 had identified five air pollutants deemed the most pressing threats to human health 
because of their prevalence and risk – carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, ground level ozone, 
particulate matter, and nitrogen dioxide – and tasked the National Air Pollution Control 
Administration with devising a criteria document describing the health effects for each pollutant. 
When the legislation that became the Clean Air Act of 1970 was voted out of committee and 
onto the Senate floor, it included the new concept of National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(colloquially referred to by their acronym and pronounced “knacks”). The NAAQS would draw on 
the criteria documents to create national standards for each of the “criteria” pollutants. The 
federal government was to set a primary and a secondary standard for each criteria pollutant. 
The primary standard would set a permissible concentration of the pollutant below the threshold 
that the criteria document had established as a threat to public health. And the secondary 
standard would be set at a stricter level to protect the public welfare from degradation like 
damage to plant foliage. While the states retained responsibility for devising plans to comply 
with the NAAQS, the setting of the standards would now take place at the federal level. The 
Clean Air Act bill gave the federal government six months to set the NAAQS and the states five 
years to comply with the primary standards.83  
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 In addition to the NAAQS, the proposed Clean Air Act created New Source Performance 
Standards for any major new source of emissions. Drawing on technical assessments from 
engineers, federal officials would set New Source Performance Standards for each industry that 
specified the permissible emissions from different types of industrial activity (the pounds of 
particulate matter released per Btus of coal burned in a steam generator, for example) that 
businesses would have to meet for any new factories or other major sources of emissions. The 
New Source Performance Standards were intended to force businesses to install the best 
available controls, regardless of whether their particular air quality area was in compliance with 
the national air quality standards.84     
While the New Source Performance Standards in the proposed Clean Air Act allowed for 
the assessment of an industry’s capacity to install a given control technology, the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) provision of the legislation explicitly prohibited any 
consideration of compliance costs or feasibility. Nader had recommended such a prohibition in a 
telegram to Muskie in late June 1970 that instructed the Senator to delete any mention of 
“economic or technical feasibility” from the bill. In a testament to the importance of 
environmental protection as a political issue, Nader’s telegram provoked a young Nixon aide 
named Chris DeMuth to protest to another advisor that the President had already removed 
economic considerations from its proposals for the Clean Air Act without getting the credit he 
deserved from Nader or the environmental community.85  
Defending his claim as the nation’s environmental champion, Muskie supported a 
prohibition on considering economic costs in the NAAQS when the Clean Air Act came up for 
debate in the Senate in September 1970. The duty of Congress, Muskie declared from the 
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Senate floor, was not to make technological or economic considerations but rather to “establish 
what the public interest requires to protect the health of persons.”86 So that there would be no 
mistaking the intention of Congress regarding the NAAQS, Muskie took the floor again the next 
day, declaring “I would like to reemphasize that the concept of this bill as it relates to national 
ambient air quality standards and the deadlines for the automobile industry is not keyed to any 
condition that the Secretary [of Health and Human Welfare] finds technically and economically 
feasible. The concept is of public health, and the standard are uncompromisable in that 
connection.” Acknowledging the ambition of that concept, Muskie appealed to American 
ingenuity and perseverance in the face of great challenges, citing the country’s recent moon 
landing and its building enough airplanes to defeat the Axis in World War II.87 Calling for a 
similar heroism in defending the public health, Congress deliberately left the relative difficulty or 
cost for private enterprise in complying with the national standards off the table. 
Setting national air quality standards based solely on human health criteria marked the 
temporary triumph of one strand of environmental economics over another. The Clean Air Act 
affirmed the belief of Kneese, Krutilla, and other economists that environmental quality and 
public health could not be fully measured in terms of pecuniary costs and benefits. Furthermore, 
by creating a federal regulatory program, the Clean Air Act followed those economists’ 
conclusions that strong governmental intervention was needed to protect public welfare from the 
inherent self-interest of individuals. For Eckstein, Crocker, Coase, and other economists who 
believed that costs and benefits could be could be fully valued in economic terms and who 
envisioned approaches to pollution control that avoided the creation of an interventionist 
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government, the Clean Air Act represented a defeat. In the era of Spaceship Earth, it seemed, a 
majority of Congress and the general public no longer believed that a high quality of life could 
be maintained without robust government controls on private enterprise.    
In debating the Clean Air Act, Congress clearly recognized that a strong government 
intervention would raise the price of consumer goods and services. The Air Quality Act of 1967 
required the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to make an annual accounting to 
Congress of the costs to both industry and government in complying with the legislation.88 By 
the time Congress was debating the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970, the legislators had 
received the first report and could see that expanding the nation’s environmental regulations 
would increase already significant compliance costs. Senator Jennings Randolph, a Democrat 
from West Virginian who chaired the Public Works Committee, declared on the Senate floor that 
“this legislation will test the willingness of the citizens of this Nation to control and abate 
environmental pollution. Ultimately every individual citizen would be called on to pay the 
increased costs associated with the achievement of an environment that protects and improves 
the public health within this country.”89  
Proponents of the Act were equally forthright about the anticipated expense of the Clean 
Air Act in speeches and other communication with the public. Senator Muskie’s letters to 
constituents on the subject noted that the public would eventually pay for pollution controls – 
whether in the form of higher taxes or higher consumer prices.90 When a radio broadcaster 
wrote Muskie in 1969 to pass along a series of editorials in support of pollution control, Muskie 
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thanked him for educating the public about the problem, since that awareness would be crucial 
in creating a “willingness to pay for abatement.” “If we are going to succeed in building a 
wholesome environment,” Muskie informed the broadcaster, “everyone will have to pay a share 
of the cost.”91 Muskie’s insistence on the high costs of pollution control was informed by careful 
analysis. Amidst the flurry of environmental legislation in 1970, Muskie’s staff calculated the 
expected costs of the new standards to the federal government and the general public, 
concluding that federal spending requirements under the many new laws would exceed $15 
billion over four years.92 Despite those high costs, Muskie was convinced that a properly 
educated public would gladly support strong pollution controls. What was needed, Muskie 
thought, was a reordering of national spending and perhaps national principles, away from 
wasteful projects like the Super Sonic Transport project and toward quality of life improvements 
like the Clean Air Act.93   
Many of Muskie’s colleagues in the Senate and House echoed Muskie’s handling of the 
costs of pollution control in their speeches on behalf of the Clean Air Act. While higher prices 
would be painful and easily attributable to the new regulation, the Act’s supporters argued, the 
public would bear the increased cost of living in exchange for the benefits of cleaner air. 
Drumming up the confidence of the Act’s supporters on the Senate floor, Senator Gaylord 
Nelson (Democrat – Wisconsin) warned potential detractors that the public supported strong 
environmental protection. “Would-be polluters are forewarned,” Nelson declared, “A livable 
environment is more important to man and his survival than all the marketable gadgets 
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produced by our economy to make our life easier.”94 Nelson’s claim shared the language and 
philosophy of Boulding’s spaceship earth: the postwar generation, raised in comfort in the 
suburbs, was nonetheless willing to see that prosperity as a threat to the underlying 
environmental quality on which a fuller conception of the good life rested.  
For all the speech making about the inevitable costs of protecting the public interest in 
clean air, Congress spent very little time on the specific economic implications of the NAAQS. 
Not one senator or representative, for example, asked what would happen if a state could not 
meet the standards within the five years allotted under the Clean Air Act. That neglect can be 
explained by Congress’ preoccupation with the fate of the automobile industry under the new 
mobile source standards included in the Act. While all industrial producers were subject to the 
New Source Standard and state implementation of the NAAQS, the Act singled out the 
automobile industry for additional controls.  
Automobiles had been a primary subject of air pollution debates since the 1940s, when 
local environmental advocates in places like Los Angeles determined that the sickly white smog 
that increasingly shrouded their cities could be blamed on the internal combustion engine. Air 
pollution experts discovered that refining oil into gasoline and burning that fuel in cars released 
nitrogen dioxide and hydrocarbons, which reacted with volatile organic compounds (which occur 
naturally but are also expelled by industry) to produce photochemical oxidants. Oxidants react 
with and disintegrate living tissue, from the leaves on a plant to the lining of a human lung.95 In 
high concentrations, oxidants also produce visible smog. For most people, smoggy days were 
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merely an aesthetic nuisance, or, at worst, a cause of watery eyes and itchy throats. But for 
asthmatics, the elderly, and others with compromised lungs or for people who lived in cities 
where the smog increasingly lasted for weeks, oxidants were dangerous – even deadly. Since 
the 1950s, when air pollution experts recognized that automobiles produced two-thirds of the 
hydrocarbons and an even greater percentage of nitrogen dioxides, regulators had focused their 
efforts to combat smog on automobile manufacturers.96 Deflecting demands from state and local 
regulators to reduce the pollutants coming out of their cars, automobile manufacturers claimed 
that no control technology existed or that control devices were infeasible because of their costs. 
Absent strong laws, automobile manufacturers delayed investing in devices such as catalytic 
converters that could reduce their emissions. The Department of Justice eventually sued the 
four largest automobile manufacturers in 1967 for anti-trust violations in preventing catalytic 
converters from coming to market.97  
This long experience with resisting pollution controls prepared automobile manufacturers 
for the Clean Air Act of 1970, and their organized protests dominated the attention of legislators. 
As a result, both the supporters and critics of the Clean Air Act focused on cars when it came to 
the feasibility of the Act’s requirements and its likely economic effects.98 In a testament to the 
preoccupation of the Clean Air Act’s critics with the implications for the automobile industry, 
Senator Robert Griffin, a Republican from Michigan, emerged as the most vociferous opponent 
																																																						
96 According to historian Hugh Gorman, a 1954 Stanford study found that automobiles released 1,000 tons of 
hydrocarbons per day while refineries, gasoline transportation, and filing stations released just 440 tons daily. Hugh 
Gorman, Redefining Efficiency: Pollution Concerns, Regulatory Mechanisms, and Technological Change in the U.S. 
Petroleum Industry (Akron: The University of Akron Press, 2001), 236-237. 
97 In fact, General Motors, the largest automobile manufacturer in the world, was directly deterred from such 
investment as a result of its ownership of the Ethyl Corporation, producer of lead additives that ruined such 
converters, until 1962. Gorman, Redefining Efficiency, 311.   
98 Many historians have chronicled the jockeying and lobbying of automobile manufacturers around the Clean Air Act. 
One of the best accounts is Tom McCarthy, Auto Mania: Cars, Consumers, and the Environment (New Haven: Yale 




of the Act in the Senate. Deeply concerned about his home state’s most important industry, 
Senator Griffin assailed the Act as risking catastrophic shutdowns and the loss of up to fifteen 
million jobs in the event that manufacturers could not develop the requisite emissions controls 
before the deadline. “This bill holds a gun at the head of the American automobile industry in a 
very dangerous game of economic roulette,” Griffin declared. Questioning the wisdom of 
attaching such severe repercussions to pollution control, Griffin continued “President Kennedy 
announced a goal when he said we would go to the moon by a certain date but no one 
suggested a law that would have put space industries out of business if we had fallen short in 
developing the needed technology.” To mitigate catastrophic dislocations that might result from 
the fixed deadlines mandated by the Act, Griffin called for an ongoing review of the feasibility of 
emissions standards in light of manufacturers’ progress (or lack thereof) toward a technological 
solution.99 
Despite Muskie’s continued insistence that Congress’ responsibility lay in protecting 
public health rather than considering the economic situation of any particular industry, Griffin’s 
critique did force the Act’s defenders to engage in a debate about whether the proposed 
automobile controls were in fact feasible. Muskie’s Subcommittee had previously held hearings 
on the subject, collecting extensive testimony from representatives of all the major automobile 
manufacturers as well as other engineering experts. Griffin, Muskie, and others rifled through 
that testimony, debating the product development process and entering copious technical 
evidence into the Congressional Record.100 Debate over the automobile standards consumed 
the vast majority of the time allotted to the Act. Though Griffin at one point noted that little 
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consideration had been given to stationary sources, the Act’s proponents declined to expand 
their inquiry to the feasibility of the NAAQS.101 So while Congress intentionally left economic 
considerations out the national standards, supporters of the Clean Air Act paid less attention to 
the full implications of that decision than they might have had automobile emissions not 
dominated debate over the Clean Air Act. In September, the Senate voted 73 to 0 to pass the 
Clean Air Act legislation and send it into conference with the House.102 
Within the Nixon White House, new regulations on automobiles also dominated the 
attention of administration officials and advisors who evaluated the Clean Air Act. In November, 
a Nixon advisor outlined the administration’s priorities in shaping the final bill that Senate and 
House members would soon come together in conference to hash out. Various issues related to 
the new automobile standards compromised five of the fourteen priorities. The remaining 
concerns focused on new provisions for citizen suits, national security exemptions, and 
compulsory sharing of patented pollution control technology. The advisor did include a provision 
for the extension of implementation deadlines where feasible technology could not be found. But 
the NAAQS themselves did not make it onto Nixon’s list of priorities. Discussing the likely 
outcome of the conference, the Nixon advisor stated that while the tougher provisions from the 
Senate bill would probably prevail over the House bill, the administration should not try to 
intervene on behalf of the weaker House bill because of the remarkable degree of support for 
the stronger legislation in Congress and among the general public. Despite hundreds of millions 
of dollars in expected federal expenditures under the strongest Clean Air Act, the same advisor 
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cautioned against intervening on spending provisions as well, since doing so would “too easily 
lend itself to characterization of ‘soft on air pollution.’”103  
Some voices within the Nixon administration warned against such blanket support for the 
proposed legislation. Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans sent a list of particularly worrisome 
provisions in the Senate bill to Nixon advisor John Ehrlichman, including citizen suits, 
automobile emission controls, mandatory patent sharing, and “unrealistically short statutory 
deadlines,” for achieving the NAAQS.104 Rejecting a full scale attempt to revise the legislation, 
the Nixon administration opted for a narrow appeal to ease the automobile standards in a letter 
to the Senate and House conferees. Even that limited request managed to provoke an outcry 
from several Senators, who critiqued the president for improper interference.105  
Meeting in conference in early December, the Senate and House conferees produced a 
final bill in which the stronger Senate provisions prevailed in nearly every important account.106 
By the middle of December, both the House and the Senate agreed to the conference 
legislation and sent the Clean Air Act to Nixon. Eager to seize the mantle of environmental 
champion away from Senator Muskie, Nixon’s advisors organized a grand signing ceremony for 
the Clean Air Act.107 On the last day of 1970, reporters gathered in the Roosevelt Room to 
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watch Nixon sign the Clean Air Act into law. Pointing to the room’s namesake as a precedent for 
making environmental protection a national goal, Nixon claimed responsibility for the passage of 
the legislation. If 1970 had been the year in which the nation finally began to address the 
problems of clean air and water, Nixon declared, “1971 will be known as the year of action,” 
above all else in controlling automobile emissions, a “plague” to not only Nixon’s “native area of 
southern California but all the great cities of this nation.”108  
Though Nixon did not to mention it, the new Clean Air Act had also created a binding set 
of national air quality standards for the first time in United States history, promising to clean up 
the air across the country so that residents in Tampa and elsewhere could quit worrying about 
stunted trees, sickly cows, and damaged lungs. Commerce Secretary Stans and other Nixon 
officials and advisors who warned about the attendant costs of enforcing a monumental new 
national air quality program had been ignored for the time being. But as the Nixon administration 
quickly found out, keeping the Clean Air Act’s promise to meet the NAAQS within a half decade 
proved enormously expensive. So expensive that elected officials from both parties soon joined 
regulators at EPA, representatives of regulated industries, environmentalists, and many others 
in questioning what price society ought to pay for clean air. Having spent the previous decade 
developing a means of answering that question, environmental economists quickly made 
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Chapter 2: EPA and the Costs of Pollution Control 
 
 
When Congress took up the legislation that became the Clean Air Act in the spring of 
1970, it was assumed that the existing National Air Pollution Control Administration would 
implement the end law. By the time the bill entered conference that fall, the National Air 
Pollution Control Administration was gone, absorbed into a new executive branch agency of 
remarkable breadth. The new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was put in charge of 
implementing the Clean Air Act among a bevy of other responsibilities. Though few recognized it 
at the time, the choices that EPA would have to make to turn the Clean Air Act and other 
legislation into functional policy would soon make the agency one of the most powerful offices in 
the federal government.     
Ironically, Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency not to strengthen 
environmental protection but rather to consolidate disparate and proliferating regulatory 
functions in a single, more manageable executive entity. Nixon intended EPA to function simply 
as the implementer of environmental policy, which would continue to be created elsewhere in 
the executive branch. But under EPA’s first administrator, William Ruckelshaus, the agency 
claimed considerable autonomy to interpret a Clean Air Act that proved more rigorous and 
complex than Nixon had imagined. Environmentalist victories in the courts and the 
environmental sympathies of EPA’s own staff were responsible for much of that rigor and 
complexity. As Ruckelshaus and others soon recognized, the shape of the Clean Air Act would 
be determined in its implementation.  
EPA was cobbled together from more than a dozen preexisting offices. For the first time, 
a majority of the federal employees whose professional duties and personal sensibilities lay in 
environmental protection worked for the same agency. An unforeseen consequence of this 




protecting the environment and safeguarding human health. Environmental organizations 
played to that enthusiasm for regulatory protection among EPA’s staff, building trust and helping 
to make critical early decisions. And where relationships with sympathetic staff failed to get the 
desired results, environmental organizations turned to new citizen suits provisions in the Clean 
Air Act to block several early attempts by Ruckelshaus and EPA officials to moderate the Act’s 
ambitious objectives. 
As a result of this strong internal culture and outside environmentalist pressure, EPA 
proved far more aggressive in implementing the Clean Air Act than Nixon or even members of 
Congress like Senator Muskie had envisioned. A seemingly benign consolidation of authority 
had instead created a powerful new institutional agent for environmental protection. Back when 
the Clean Air Act was being debated, concerns about the economic effects of the legislation 
centered on the contentious issue of automobile emissions. But as environmentalists pushed 
EPA to insist on national air quality standards capable of protecting the public health, concern 
over the costs of the legislation increasingly focused on those standards together with the 
implementation plans created by the states to achieve them. As the fight over the state 
implementation plans underscored, the breadth of the Clean Air Act raised interpretive 
questions, the answering of which placed EPA at the center of environmental policymaking. By 
the end of the agency’s first year in operation, it was clear to all that debates over environmental 
governance would be focused on EPA.  
 
Consolidating and Coordinating Environmental Policy in the Nixon Administration 
 
The creation of the Environmental Protection Agency was the outgrowth of the ongoing 
contest between Congress and the White House over the weight that Nixon put behind 
environmental policy. Continuing to believe that environmental concern was a passing fad, 




Instead, Nixon issued an executive order in May 1969 creating an advisory group called the 
Environmental Quality Council.1 But aside from complaining that their original name was “too 
test tuby,” the Environmental Quality Council failed to accomplish much in its first few months, 
fueling the ire of members of Congress who advocated for a stronger federal role in pollution 
control. One of these environmental advocates, Senator Henry Jackson, included provisions for 
a more substantial executive branch office in his proposed National Environmental Policy Act. 
Though Nixon’s advisors dismissed Jackson’s proposal as redundant, the continued 
ineffectiveness of the Environmental Quality Council seemed to confirm Jackson’s insistence 
that a new group was needed.2 In December 1969, Congress passed the National 
Environmental Policy Act by an overwhelming majority, establishing the Council on 
Environmental Quality tasked with administering the new Environmental Impact Statement 
program and issuing a yearly report on the state of the environment.3  
 Eager to co-opt popular interest in environmental quality, Nixon signed the National 
Environmental Policy Act into law in what he touted as his first official act of the 1970s. 
Meanwhile, Nixon’s advisors considered the role that the Council might play in coordinating 
policy. A young Nixon advisor named Chris DeMuth suggested that the Council could 
coordinate environmental policies that were currently being formed in several different offices, 
including the Department of Transportation and the Department of the Interior. Furthermore, 
DeMuth argued that the Council could serve as a needed check on the pro-development 
tendencies of offices like the Army Corps of Engineers by reviewing all federal agency activities 
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to ensure that they took environmental quality into account.4 Affirming DeMuth’s 
recommendations for the Council, Nixon’s advisors turned to staffing the new Council. 
 In selecting members for the Council, the Nixon administration aimed to confer 
environmental and scientific credibility on the new group while also choosing members with at 
least some allegiance to the administration’s conservative policies. Consulted on possible 
members, Russell Train, the Under Secretary of the Interior, argued that Nixon should choose 
“environmental generalists” of “real stature” to demonstrate Nixon’s commitment to 
environmental quality as well as to give the Council’s reports credibility and its 
recommendations “muscle.” Train recommended Dr. Luna Leopold, a senior scientist at the 
Geological Survey in the Department of the Interior and the son of the famous naturalist Aldo 
Leopold.5 Choosing Leopold, Train noted, would ensure that “there would be no further need for 
appeal to the conservation or ecology group.” The only problem, Train wrote, was that Leopold 
was probably a Democrat, though fortunately not “in any way a political activist.” Train also 
discussed several other possible members, including the increasingly popular ecologist Paul 
Ehrlich (who Train eventually dismissed as too much “gloom-and-doom”).  
Searching for a woman to serve on the Council, Train struggled, coming up with only 
one candidate, Ann Louis Strong, an attorney and the Director of the Institute of Environmental 
Planning at the University of Pennsylvania. All the other possibilities, Train declared lacked 
“sufficient stature to justify eliminating one of the other men on this list.”6 Train’s problem was 
not unique; Nixon’s chief domestic advisor John Ehrlichman had written a memo to his staff 
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back in October 1969 seeking a woman to participate in environmental policy planning.7 Though 
a staff member turned up two candidates, both had done their PhDs in Political Science and so 
chief environmental advisor John Whitaker was forced to report back to Ehrlichman that they 
simply “couldn’t find a woman with solid science credentials.”8 Throughout Nixon’s tenure, the 
ongoing and increasingly pathetic search for women to serve on the Council reveals the 
perceived need to have a woman at a high position on the environment as well the casual 
sexism by which women were evaluated. Recommending Dr. Beatrice Willard, a botanist, 
Whitaker remarked with relief to another advisor that she was “not a kook – not a militant [and] 
able to maintain credibility with environmentalists.” Still, Whitaker “wish[ed] she was prettier,” a 
criterion none of the male candidates for the Council seems to have ever faced.9 
By the middle of January 1970, Nixon’s advisors had selected the three members of the 
first Council on Environmental Quality. Robert Cahn, a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter, was 
chosen to “spot the strong controversial issues.” Dr. Gordon MacDonald, a geophysicist and 
administrator at the University of California at Santa Barbara, would “cut through the scientific 
data in each agency,” and prevent an environmental analysis group inherited from the Office of 
Science and Technology from “studying things to death.” Finally, as Chairman of the Council, 
the Nixon administration chose Train himself, deeming him ready to “fight the bureaucrats, cut 
through red tape, sell the Congress and get things done.”10  
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Train fit the criteria of a respected conservative conservationist that he himself had laid 
out. Born to a politically well-connected family in Rhode Island (his grandfather had been a 
Congressman and his father served as a Rear Admiral in the US Navy), Train attended 
Princeton University and then served as an artillery officer in the US Army during World War II. 
Following the war, Train attended and graduated from Columbia University’s Law School before 
going to work on Capitol Hill – eventually becoming an advisor to the powerful House 
Committee on Ways and Means. In the 1960s, Train helped found a series of conservation 
organizations, including the African Wildlife Leadership Foundation and the World Wildlife Fund. 
After a stint as the head attorney in the Treasury Department, Train left government to become 
the president of the Conservation Foundation. By 1969, Train was back in government, as the 
Undersecretary of the Interior, which was where he was when Nixon tapped him to be the 
Council on Environmental Quality’s first chairman.11 A statesman of conservation, Train lent 
stature and authority to the Council while at the same time affirming Nixon’s conservative 
outlook on environmental policy.  
With the three initial members chosen, the Council on Environmental Quality quickly 
staffed up and set to work. The National Environmental Policy Act granted the Council twelve 
employees and a $300,000 budget; with the staff set to grow to thirty and the budget to $1 
million by 1972. As was typical, underneath the three politically appointed members, career civil 
service personnel comprised the Council’s workforce, with jobs that included the Report Editor, 
who would produce the annual environmental quality report for Congress, and the Senior Staff 
Member, whose expertise in a particular field would help identify trends in environmental 
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management and opportunities for intervention.12 In addition to the annual report and the 
administration of the Environmental Impact Statement program, the Council coordinated 
regulatory policy proposals by different federal agencies, following the blueprint that Chris 
DeMuth had created the year before. Picking three initial priorities, the Council set about 
researching oil spill prevention, how the administration might deal with the upcoming first Earth 
Day teach-ins, and the possibility of new regulations against excessive noise.13 In addition to 
managing all that, Train served as the administration’s official representative on international 
environmental matters – a role he enthusiastically embraced beginning with a trip to Japan.14  
One of the first things Train had to accomplish as the Nixon’s administration’s 
environmental statesman was to convince important allies in the business community that the 
Nixon administration was still receptive to their concerns. In January 1970, the Republican 
National Committee sent word to Whitaker that representatives from Dow Chemical and other 
industrial titans including Republic Steel and Monsanto were upset that appointees to the new 
Council seemed to entirely consist of conservationists. Deflecting a request to meet with these 
disgruntled business representatives, John Whitaker told his aide to “just ignore [the request] – 
don’t say no – yet.”15 Such important supporters could not be completely neglected, however, 
and by February, Whitaker was coordinating the appearance of Train and other Council 
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representatives at a conference on environmental regulation organized by paper manufacturers 
in order to demonstrate the administration’s commitment to industry led solutions to 
environmental degradation.16 In what turned out to be a largely symbolic gesture, Nixon also 
created a National Industrial Pollution Control Council comprised of business representatives as 
a supposed counterweight to the Council on Environmental Quality.17     
 
A “Doer” and a “Thinker” 
 
Having centralized environmental policy making in the new Council on Environmental 
Quality, the Nixon administration considered how it might also bring together the various offices 
and groups that implemented and enforced that policy. Beginning in 1969, a committee led by 
industrialist Roy Ash surveyed the executive branch, looking for areas to increase efficiency 
through consolidation. Environmental policy – with responsibility split between Department of 
the Interior, the Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, and several other offices – 
was one of the areas the Ash Council singled out for reorganization. Ash recommended that 
Nixon aggregate enforcement and implementation responsibilities in a new Environmental 
Protection Agency reporting directly to the president. Nixon liked the idea and set his advisors 
about considering various ways of structuring the new agency. One option was to abolish the 
Council on Environmental Quality and replace it with EPA. Another was to retain EPA and have 
the agency report to Nixon through the Council. For his part, Train recommended that the 
Environmental Protection Agency be put under the direction of the Council and that he, as 
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Chairman, should serve as the Agency’s first Administrator, the title given the agency’s chief.18 
Ultimately, Nixon decided to keep the Council as the administration’s policy advisor and create 
EPA as a separate executive branch agency to implement the policy that the Council created. 
As Nixon himself described the arrangement, EPA was to be the “doer” while the Council would 
continue to be the “thinker.”19  
In June 1970, Nixon circulated his plan to create the Environmental Protection Agency. 
The proposal quickly gained support from influential Congressional representatives, several of 
whom (including Senator Ed Muskie) had recently proposed bills to consolidate implementation 
and enforcement functions.20 The proposal also won the support of public health advocates like 
the American Medical Association (who saw better prospects for comprehensive protections in a 
consolidated agency) as well as of environmental groups like the Conservation Foundation.21 
Though wary of any new regulator, the business community embraced the consolidation of 
regulatory authority that EPA’s creation promised. As political scientist David Vogel described it, 
most businesses understood EPA’s creation as a shuffling of bureaucratic functions within the 
executive branch rather than as an expansion of the federal government.22 Some business 
leaders seem not to have anticipated much of a change at all, including the electric power 
industry, whose monthly trade journal ran frequent articles on the dangers of overly stringent 
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environmental regulation throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s without a single note of 
caution about EPA’s creation.23  
The acquiescence of American business to EPA’s creation also owed to a campaign by 
Nixon’s advisors to drum up support for the plan. In early July, Doug Costle of the Ash Council 
held a private briefing on the new agency for executives from the eight largest chemical 
manufacturing companies, whose emissions of hydrocarbons and other pollutants would soon 
be regulated by the new agency. Costle and other Nixon advisors explained the reasoning 
behind the reorganization and discussed how it would affect the manufacturers’ stakes in the 
burgeoning pesticide industry.24 Less than a month later, the National Agricultural Chemicals 
Association (the trade group representing those eight firms’ pesticide operations) retracted its 
early criticism of EPA’s proposed creation and issued a statement supporting the new agency. 
Among other anticipated benefits, the National Agricultural Chemicals Association looked 
forward to the streamlining of a permitting process that it claimed had swelled into an onerous 
mess. Sending along news of the endorsement to the White House, a representative of W.R. 
Grace wrote that he was “quite certain that our environmental get-together with the chemical 
industry went a long way in developing this position.”25  
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In July 1970, Nixon formally proposed the Environmental Protection Agency under 
Reorganization Plan Number 3.26 Under an existing law, EPA would automatically come into 
existence at the beginning of October if Congress did not take negative action against the plan. 
That summer, both houses of Congress held hearings on the proposed reorganization. 
Representing the Nixon administration at those hearings, Council on Environmental Quality 
Chairman Russell Train was repeatedly asked why Nixon had not created a cabinet level 
department as well as to explain the division of responsibility between EPA and the Council and 
the justifications for retaining the latter.27 Train and other witnesses convinced Congress not to 
oppose the reorganization and in early October 1970, EPA came into existence. The agency 
was given an additional sixty-days to get organized before it began operations, setting off a mad 




 Getting the new Environmental Protection Agency up and running represented a 
daunting challenge. EPA cobbled together fifteen preexisting offices along with their staffs and 
budgets into a new agency with 5,743 employees and a budget of $1.4 billion for its first year of 
operations in 1971. From the Department of the Interior came the Federal Water Quality 
Administration with a $1 billion dollar budget (mostly earmarked for sewage treatment plant 
construction) and a staff of 2,650. EPA’s water program also inherited the Bureau of Water 
Hygiene from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) along with its $2.3 
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million budget and 160 employees. HEW sent its Bureau of Solid Waste Management, with a 
staff of 180 employees and a budget of $15 million to make up EPA’s solid waste program. 
Meanwhile, EPA’s pesticides program collected 425 employees and a budget of $5.1 million 
from the Department of Agriculture’s Pesticide Regulation Division, pairing them with 275 
employees from the Federal Drug Administration’s Office of Pesticide Research and 9 
employees from Interior who studied the effect of pesticides on fish and wildlife. EPA also 
received responsibility for the quickly evolving area of radiation, with 350 staff from HEW’s 
Bureau of Radiological Health joining the four person Federal Radiation Council and three staff 
from the Atomic Energy Commission to make up the new radiation program. Finally, to create 
EPA’s air program, HEW transferred the National Air Pollution Control Administration from the 
Public Health Service along with its 1,100 employees and $110m budget.28 In addition to its new 
programs in Air, Water, Solid Waste, and Radiation, EPA collected ten national research 
laboratories scattered throughout the country.  
Along with existing staffs and budgets, EPA inherited all the institutional dynamics, 
quirks, and politics of those various bureaucracies. As an Ash Council memo laid out, these 
included a water pollution office that was “independent even of own top staff,” an air pollution 
office that was “traditionally weak on enforcement” and “very independent,” a solid waste 
program that had “great public expectations” but “little money,” and a pesticides office that faced 
“tricky politics” as a result of “wide scientific dispute,” “heavy public pressure,” and “great 
resentment in FDA.” No wonder then that the Ash Council’s Doug Costle recommended that 
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Nixon grant EPA’s first leaders wide latitude in appointing officials and hiring managers to bring 
cohesion to the new agency.29     
Facing an overwhelming array of responsibilities and looming deadlines, the Ash Council 
and EPA’s first leaders chose to keep intact the various program offices that the agency had 
inherited and focus on staffing and organizing the headquarters office in Washington, D.C. The 
result was an agency that retained many of the characteristics of its component parts. Staff from 
the various program offices remained organizationally and even physically discrete, while the 
political appointees that ran the air, water, solid waste, pesticides, and radiation programs 
worked with their personal staffs out of the headquarters office. That arrangement supported a 
sense of autonomy along program lines. Eager to minimize disruption, the Ash Council kept 
most of the air office in North Carolina’s Research Triangle Park, in the same offices that they 
had inhabited as the National Air Pollution Control Authority. To this day, that geographical 
distance from the Washington, D.C. headquarters fuels the air office’s independence.  
 Compounding the sheer difficulty of organizing all those different offices, EPA inherited a 
vast set of responsibilities that seemed to expand weekly as Congress passed one bill after 
another in response to surging public concern for the environment. In the realm of garbage, for 
instance, the 1970 Resource Recovery Act spearheaded by Senator Muskie authorized $460 
million to be used by EPA to upgrade local disposal sites and fund recycling research.30 An 
even larger expansion of responsibility loomed under the Clean Air Act, which was making its 
way through conference committee as EPA came together.  
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 Adding one more layer of complexity, EPA’s formation came during the new federalism 
movement, which called for the physical dispersal of federal power across the country, among 
other things.31 Following that philosophy, EPA’s organizational structure split the country into ten 
regions, each with its own Regional Office and Regional Administrator reporting to the 
Administrator in the headquarters office. With an eye to a public relations victory, Whitaker and 
other advisors even considered locating the headquarters office outside of Washington, D.C. 
entirely. In September 1970, Whitaker wrote Ehrlichman to recommend that EPA be 
headquartered in a state suffering from low population growth like Maine, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, or Wyoming. Doing so, in Whitaker’s estimation, would bring thousands of badly 
needed jobs to one of those places and thus a public relations coup for Nixon.32 Ehrlichman and 
Nixon himself liked the idea, which made it as far as the White House’s Office of Management 
and Budget, which promptly squashed the proposal for diminishing EPA’s authority and 
dramatically shrinking the talent pool the agency could draw on.33 Though OMB’s put an end to 
the dream of an EPA headquartered in Augusta or Laramie, the diffusion of EPA’s authority into 
the regional offices proceeded apace.  
Nixon’s reorganization plan called for the president to appoint approximately twenty 
officials to oversee an agency staffed by career civil servants inherited from the predecessor 
agencies in the program offices and newly hired in the headquarters office. At the top was the 
Administrator, assisted by a Deputy Administrator who ran the day-to-day operations. Four 
Assistant Administrators oversaw agency-wide offices focused on research, policy evaluation, 
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Legal Counsel, and Public Affairs. A series of Commissioners headed each program office and 
reported directly to the Administrator. Finally, ten Regional Administrators managed the regional 
offices, also reporting directly to the Administrator. To assist each Assistant and Regional 
Administrator, the president appointed a Deputy Administrator.34   
With popular interest in the environment at a fever pitch, especially among young 
people, EPA had no trouble attracting talented employees to staff the headquarters office. The 
Civil Service then included a Management Intern program through which promising young 
candidates were selected for junior management positions across the federal government. As a 
former intern named Kerry Clough described to me, 200 applicants were selected for the 
government-wide program in 1971. And of those 200, Clough estimated that 180 hoped to be 
placed in one of the ten positions available that first year at EPA.  
Up against fellow applicants with PhDs from prestigious universities, the twenty-three 
year old Clough figured that his Masters in Physical Geography gave him little chance of 
obtaining one of the coveted spots at EPA. But in the quixotic early 1970s, Clough’s interview 
took a fortuitous turn courtesy of Howard Messner, the director of the White House task force 
assembled to do the initial hiring. Clough had a summer job building sewage treatment plants in 
Virginia and had recently been painting black creosote on the insides of trickling filters. 
Underneath the hot Virginian sun, Clough had slowly rotated his body along the contours of the 
pipe as he painted, acquiring a spectacular sunburn down the entire right side of his face, arm, 
and body. Leaning far over his dais at the beginning of the interview, Messner inspected Clough 
in silence before asking him what was wrong with him. Having heard Clough’s explanation of 
the chemical reaction that had created his striking appearance, Messner dismissed the young 
applicant without any additional questions. Figuring his prospects were sunk, Clough was 
																																																						




shocked to receive an offer letter. When Clough finally gathered the courage to ask about it 
later, another colleague told him that Messner had been so taken by Clough’s apparent 
familiarity with the work EPA would soon be doing that he decided to hire him on the spot. 
Clough would go on to become a trusted aide of two Administrators and eventually a Deputy 
Regional Administrator in his own right.35 Though most hiring stories lacked such literal color, 
EPA attracted a cadre of bright, enthusiastic employees when the agency first opened its doors. 
Recognizing the importance of knitting together those disparate offices and managing an 
enthusiastic young staff, Nixon advisors aimed to appoint officials with bureaucratic experience 
to run the agency. Considering two different candidates for Deputy Administrator, Whitaker told 
John Ehrlichman that “both men know the bureaucratic game and are by now, old Washington 
hands.” Behind the charismatic administrators, the White House tried to select Deputy 
Administrators who were “tough,” and “professional ‘no’ men,” capable of restraining the 
enthusiastic career staff.36 Throughout the fall of 1970, a White House task force vetted possible 
candidates. Douglas Costle’s diligent work as a member of the Ash Council and the task force 
earned him consideration for a top position as the Assistant Administrator for Planning and 
Management (responsible for overseeing the program offices, and managing EPA’s budget).37 
But despite Costle’s “know[ing] more about EPA…than anyone else in Washington,” in the 
words of one recommender, he did not get the job, likely because EPA officials were political 
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appointees and Costle was a Democrat.38 Throughout the fall, Nixon’s advisors vetted a wide 
array of possible candidates to run the new agency. 
Eventually, Nixon’s advisors settled on William Ruckelshaus, a precocious young 
attorney who had quickly risen through the ranks of state politics in Indiana to a senior position 
in the US Attorney General’s office. Ivy League educated, with a B.A. from Princeton and a law 
degree from Harvard, Ruckelshaus had started working in the Indiana State Board of Health 
(the state’s environmental agency), representing the state in pollution control litigation and 
helping to draft the Indiana Air Pollution Control Act in 1963. In the mid 1960s, Ruckelshaus 
entered Indiana state politics, rising to Republican Majority leader of Indiana’s House of 
Representatives at the tender age of thirty-five before becoming the U.S. Assistant Attorney 
General two years later in 1969. When Nixon’s advisors tapped Ruckelshaus to be the first EPA 
Administrator, he was thirty-eight years old, a decade younger than his nearest competitor.39  
On November 6, 1970 Nixon, Whitaker, and Train met with Ruckelshaus to announce his 
nomination to the press and reiterate their expectations for the new agency. In a private meeting 
before the press announcement, Nixon emphasized that Russell Train’s Council on 
Environmental Quality would continue to be the chief source of policy advice on environmental 
matters, while Ruckelshaus’s EPA would be the new operating agency. Nixon and his advisors 
also emphasized that in implementing the administration’s environmental policy, Ruckelshaus 
was expected to tread lightly on the administration’s allies in the business community. As 
Whitaker put it, Ruckelshaus’ job was “to get industry cooperation in cleaning up the 
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environment without outright harassment of industry.”40 Whitaker recommended that the 
president swear in Ruckelshaus to emphasize his commitment to environmental protection and 
while Nixon demurred, he did attend the ceremony.41               
 
Figure 2: With President Nixon looking on, thirty-eight year old William Ruckelshaus takes the  
oath as the first Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency in December 1970.42  
 
Having assumed for his agency the duty of translating the nation’s environmentalism into 
policy and tasked with the responsibility of making a vast new bureaucracy operational, 
Ruckelshaus set off at a feverish pace. In his first year as Administrator, Ruckelshaus typically 
worked a six-day week, with his days invariably starting at 8am and ending no earlier than 6pm. 
In addition to making fundamental decisions about how to organize and staff the new agency, 
Ruckelshaus served as EPA’s official figurehead – a role that demanded daily appearances on 
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behalf of the agency and the Nixon administration, interviews with the national press, and never 
ending meetings with a seemingly everyone with a stake in the nation’s environmental policies. 
Taking the first week of February as a representative example, Ruckelshaus began his Monday 
with an 8am briefing, offered opening remarks for the Air Pollution Advisory Board at 9:30am 
before slipping away to a 10am appointment with the Senate Public Works Committee. Just 
before lunch with the Air Pollution Advisory Board Ruckelshaus squeezed in one last meeting, 
with Senator Bob Dole. After lunch, Ruckelshaus met with a representative of the new National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, sat for a courtesy call with astronaut Wally Schirra, 
met with a speechwriter, and then attended the Mayor’s Dinner at the International Club, which 
began at 7pm. Tuesday and Wednesday were no easier, with continuous meetings from 8am 
into the evening. Thursday began with Oversight Hearings before the Public Works Committee 
after which Ruckelshaus boarded a flight for Indianapolis to give a speech in honor of Lincoln 
Day. Friday morning, Ruckelshaus left Indianapolis and flew to Cincinnati, where he spent the 
day touring one of the research facilities EPA had inherited before boarding a mid-afternoon 
flight back to Washington, D.C.43  
 
A Pirate’s Ransom 
 
In his first speech as Administrator, Ruckelshaus painted a bleak portrait of the nation’s 
environment. From dangerous pesticides to piling garbage to effluent fouled rivers to the 
terrifying threat of radiation, environmental conditions were deteriorating, dragging human 
health down along with them. But it was air pollution that represented perhaps the nation’s most 
urgent problem, because unlike water or soil, specific parcels or streams of air could not be 
cleansed before their consumption. Centuries of treating the air like a “gigantic sewer” had 
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created an array of problems. For the urban resident, the degradation took the form of “the 
sickening yellow smog that lands over his city, irritating his eyes and nose, filtering out the 
sunshine, and preventing his children from seeing what he used to see.” Ruckelshaus 
continued, for “the housewife it is the dirt that collects on her wash when she hangs it out to dry. 
And to her husband, it is what causes the paint on their house to discolor and peel more quickly 
than it used to.” As air pollution extended across the nation, those everyday irritants became 
shared national burdens, ones that could be measured in economic loss. “The 200 million tons 
of pollutants with which we in the United States infect our air every year extorts a pirate’s 
ransom in dollar costs,” Ruckelshaus declared. “The yearly total amounts to many billions, 
including $500 million in damage to crops and livestock and $800 million in added laundry 
bills.”44   
Ruckelshaus claimed for EPA a popular mandate to reduce those mounting costs. “For a 
century,” Ruckelshaus stated, “industrial smokestacks belching their poisons into the air were 
symbols of progress… celebrated by poets.” But in recent years, the American public had come 
to see the tradeoffs that such progress entailed. Out of this recognition had come an 
“environmental ethic – the discovery of a new reverence for all forms of life and their systems of 
support.” The present challenge, Ruckelshaus declared, was to enact “reasonable standards” of 
air quality, and to hold industry and the general public to those standards.45 Embracing the 
mantle of the environmental movement while counseling restraint in improving environmental 
quality was a difficult act. As Ruckelshaus later recounted, “the public was insistent on absolute 
purity,” and had little patience for appeals to moderation.46    
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The issuance of EPA’s first major regulatory proposal in January 1971 alarmed 
Ruckelshaus and the Nixon Administration, who began to worry about the agency’s interest in 
charting a moderate pace toward clean air. The Clean Air Act instructed EPA to promulgate 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for the nation’s five “criteria” pollutants. Prior 
to EPA’s formation, the National Air Pollution Control Administration had chosen five pollutants 
deemed most dangerous to human health in their relative prevalence and toxicity: carbon 
monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, total photochemical oxidants, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter. 
By their very definition, the criteria pollutants posed enormous challenges to control. The 
prevalence of each pollutant – the reason for its inclusion on the criteria list – owed to its being 
produced as part of one or another integral economic activity. The internal combustion engine, 
responsible for powering the nation’s transportation system, was the primary producer of carbon 
monoxide as well as nitrogen dioxide, the latter of which combined with volatile chemicals 
emitted by petroleum refineries and other industries to form a third criteria pollutant, total 
photochemical oxidants. Electric utilities and other industries that burned coal produced sulfur 
dioxide, the fourth criteria pollutant. The fifth and final criteria pollutant, particulate matter, may 
have been the most endemic, consisting of the tiny particles kicked up by activities ranging from 
powder coating of sheet metal to dump trucks pulverizing gravel roads. Microscopic in size, 
these various particulates lodged in the lungs, where they wreaked havoc on respiratory 
systems.  
In the late 1960s, the National Air Pollution Control Administration had convened 
Science Advisory Boards to study the health effects and atmospheric properties of each of the 
five criteria pollutants. Canvassing available research, the boards then produced a “criteria 
document” spelling out the particular dangers of each pollutant at different concentrations in the 
air. The Clean Air Act of 1970 instructed EPA to set a standard for each pollutant based on this 




different, depending on the relative danger of the criteria pollutant involved. But across the 
board, the standards were to be set at levels that, in the language of the statute, “allowing for an 
adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.” Mindful of earlier failures of 
the National Air Pollution Control Administration to issue its own standards, Congress wrote a 
tight deadline into the new Clean Air Act legislation. Proposed standards were due in January 
and the EPA had until the end of April 1971 to issue the final standards.47 
EPA’s proposal for the first national air quality standards in January 1971 upended 
Nixon’s assumption that the agency would play a moderating role in the nation’s expanding 
pollution control programs. Drawing on the public health research of the criteria documents, 
EPA set the NAAQS well below existing ambient emission levels in most of the country.48 
Violations of the carbon monoxide standard in its first year in operation in 1971 give an idea of 
the toughness of the new standards. In Los Angeles, pollution monitors in Long Beach County 
recorded 1,015 exceedances of the carbon monoxide standard, exactly 1,014 more 
exceedances than were permitted under the NAAQS. No city faced a harder road to controlling 
automobile emissions than Los Angeles, but even places like St. Louis (with barely a fifth of Los 
Angeles’ population and none of the topographic constraints) exceeded the carbon monoxide 
standard four times in 1971, each time by more than ten percent.49 The story was the same for 
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the other four criteria pollutants – cities and regions differed substantially in air quality but every 
city was well out of compliance with one or more of the NAAQS.  
Back in January 1971, Nixon’s advisors declared that the proposed standards portended 
doom. Ruckelshaus remembers John Ehrlichman telling him that the standards threatened to 
“shut the country down.” Having received assurances from the Air Office that economists in 
Congress and the White House had vetted the proposed standards, Ruckelshaus recounts that 
he was as surprised as the White House by the strictness of the NAAQS.50 With Ehrlichman’s 
assistance, Ruckelshaus set out to beef up EPA’s economic expertise to avoid similar surprises 
in the future.    
By Congressional directive and bureaucratic design, EPA came into being with some 
ability to assess the costs of its regulatory programs. The Clean Air Act transferred to EPA from 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare the duty of publishing an annual report for 
Congress on the economic costs of controlling air pollution for industry and government. In 
March 1971, EPA issued its first report, estimating that it would cost $15 billion to clean the 
nation’s air over the following five years – $1.2 billion in government spending, $6.5 billion to 
control stationary sources, and the remaining $7.1 billion to control vehicle emissions.51 In 
addition to fulfilling that reporting duty to Congress, the Ash Council saw economic expertise as 
a tool for EPA’s leaders to evaluate different regulatory alternatives presented by the program 
offices.52 In keeping with the Nixon Administration’s wariness about overly zealous 
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environmental regulators, members of the Ash Council also envisioned economic expertise as 
helping to “balance economics, health, aesthetics,” alongside other “competing, often conflicting 
considerations.”53  
To augment that base after the rude surprise of the NAAQS, Ehrlichman transferred to 
Ruckelshaus an economist named Robert L. Sansom, who had previously worked for Henry 
Kissinger in the White House.54 Under Sansom’s direction, EPA created several economic 
analysis programs within the agency to serve different purposes. First, Sansom created an 
Economic Analysis Division in the Office of Policy Planning and Management to provide quick 
feedback on the costs of particular EPA policies for EPA officials to use in discussions with the 
White House and regulated industries. The eight staff researchers in the Economic Analysis 
Division also set standards for how economic analysis would be conducted elsewhere in the 
agency.55 Cost/benefit analysis was particularly useful for these quick reports, and the 
Economic Analysis Division made developing those techniques a funding priority.56 Meanwhile, 
Sansom created a separate group in the Office of Research and Development with a $3 million 
annual budget to fund longer-term research on the broad macroeconomics of pollution control.57 
EPA officials also decided early on that program offices needed their own analytical capabilities. 
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In the Air Office, a Policy Analysis Staff consisting of three economists, two analysts, 
secretaries, and a consultant provided that capability.58 Elsewhere in the agency, a dozen 
additional professional staff studied various economic dimensions of EPA’s activities.59  
Congressional mandates and popular support for environmental protection put the 
NAAQS themselves out of reach for Sansom’s economic advisors. As Chapter 1 discusses, 
Congress instructed EPA to issue the standards with the singular goal of protecting public 
health, insisting that EPA ignore economic costs and technological feasibility in setting the 
standards. EPA’s status as an executive branch agency made Nixon’s treatment of the new 
agency critical to the vigor with which EPA fulfilled those Congressional directives.60 Fortunately 
for the Act’s supporters, wide popular support for strong regulatory protections meant that Nixon 
would suffer politically if he impeded EPA’s work. During debate on the Act, Muskie and other 
senators and congressional representatives had frequently appealed to Nixon’s own pubic 
claims regarding the importance of environmental quality to demonstrate the depth and the 
bipartisan nature of support for the Act and to tie Nixon’s public record on the environment to 
EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air Act.61 With public attention focused on the environment, 
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the perception that Nixon did not actually support regulatory protections could have severely 
constrained his chances at a second term in office in the 1972 election.62 The Act’s supporters 
made it clear that Nixon would face great political peril if he stood in the way of the mission 
Congress had given EPA. In case such admonishments fell short, Muskie had warned that the 
Senate would be reviewing EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air Act to ensure that the Nixon 
administration had not “watered down” the legislation.63 On April 30, 1971, EPA retained the 
strict limits of the proposed standards in the final NAAQS, setting an ambitious course for the 
country even as Ruckelshaus himself lamented the near impossibility of achieving the standards 
by the deadline Congress had specified.64 Though Sansom’s new EPA economists could not 
intervene to ease the standards, the battle over the costs of pollution and the costs of pollution 
control was just beginning.   
While Sansom’s beefing up of EPA’s economic expertise had the immediate goal of 
restraining the agency on future rulemakings, Ruckelshaus and other EPA officials soon 
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recognized that economic expertise formed a valuable shield against an array of competing 
complaints, including those of the White House itself. Beginning with the proposed NAAQS in 
January 1971, EPA found itself buffeted by complaints from business interests that the agency’s 
regulations would be ruinous to various industries, driving firms out of existence along with their 
jobs. From industry and soon the White House, EPA faced demands to reduce the costs to 
industry in complying with the NAAQS and the New Source Performance Standards. On the 
other side, environmentalists frequently demanded that EPA strengthen this or that regulation, 
often arguing that the attendant costs were not nearly as high as the agency claimed. Within the 
first two month of operations, it was clear to EPA’s leaders that defending the agency’s 
programs and navigating through fusillades of competing claims would require the agency to 
marshal convincing economic analysis of its own.  
As a March memo about the copper smelter industry in the American Southwest 
exemplified, one business after another began charging EPA with vastly underestimating how 
much it would cost industry to comply with its standards. EPA had determined that installing a 
particular control device capable of reducing pollution by 98% would cost the industry one cent 
per pound of copper. But the smelter industry claimed far higher costs of six cents per pound for 
a more modest 85% reduction in pollutants. Taking the industry’s estimate as accurate, one 
Nixon advisor cautioned Whitaker, “we should perhaps give some thought to what we are trying 
to achieve, and at what cost.”65 The exchange highlighted the growing importance of economic 
analysis in debates about the feasibility and thus the desirability of EPA’s standards.  
Within the Nixon administration, the Department of Commerce emerged as a vocal critic 
of the compliance costs of EPA’s regulations. Citing reports of excessive costs by industry 
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sources, Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans called for the business friendly National 
Industrial Pollution Control Council in the White House to estimate costs for proposed 
regulations through a new environmental quality control cost council.66 Stans also urged EPA 
and the Nixon administration to evaluate each and every regulatory proposal through 
cost/benefit analysis.67 The Nixon administration, while recognizing the hyperbole of industry 
complaints (included those funneled through Commerce), nevertheless pressured EPA to 
reduce the costs of its programs to business or at the very least to justify those costs through 
economic research. Roy Gamse – who joined the Policy Office’s Economic Analysis Division in 
1972 and was heading it by 1973 – described the importance of EPA’s knowing the costs of its 
programs: “if you don’t do the analysis and don’t know what the likely impacts are, when you get 
attacked from outside by people with extreme views that exaggerate the impacts by orders of 
magnitude, you just fare much worse politically.”68  
Already by April 1971, EPA had begun work on a study of the Economic Effects of 
Pollution Control on Industry, contracting with Chase-Manhattan bank to plan the research and 
drawing on the expertise of economists on the Council of Environmental Quality and elsewhere 
in the executive branch.69 As an EPA memo describing the study makes clear, economic 
expertise shielded EPA’s rulemaking from both environmentalists and regulated businesses. 
Laying out a calendar for the Chase-Manhattan study, an EPA staff member noted that while 
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the final report would not be ready until June, an interim draft would be available when Senator 
Muskie’s review of EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air Act began in May.70 
Environmentalists and their Congressional allies also encouraged EPA to develop its 
own analysis to counter anticipated claims from industry that complying with environmental 
regulations would cause widespread job losses. Though Muskie’s promised hearings were 
postponed until early 1972, the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution did hold 
hearings in May 1971 on how the federal government might soften the adverse economic 
effects of environmental protection on firms and individuals. While reiterating that attaining the 
national standards would involve a “hard crunch” for many firms, Senator Muskie emphasized 
the need for independent economic analysis to evaluate claims of economic hardship and pick 
out real economic dislocation from guile. Ralph Nader went even further, suggesting EPA 
hearings on any announced regulatory-driven plant closing affecting more than twenty-five 
workers to determine if environmental protections were really at fault.71 
Ruckelshaus also saw economic analysis as a critical means of adapting the Clean Air 
Act into a more feasible mandate for his agency. Shortly after the announcement of the NAAQS, 
Ruckelshaus told Senator Muskie and ranking members of the Senate Subcommittee that 
several aspects of the law would have sweeping economic consequences. Ruckelshaus 
proposed to the Senators that he administer the law as written to the best degree possible while 
making monthly trips up Capitol Hill to suggest changes that Muskie and the Subcommittee 
could make to mitigate those economic effects and administrative challenges. As Ruckelshaus 
recounts, “they couldn’t have agreed more quickly. I brought up several changes that I 
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recommended and in most every case, they recognized that what had been written into the law 
simply was not workable.” 72  Unfortunately, as the year wore on, changing political dynamics, 
including Muskie’s presidential candidacy, undercut that nascent coalition and most of 




In April 1971, with the NAAQS set, the action shifted to the states as the site where the 
standards would actually be implemented and enforced. The Clean Air Act required each state 
to submit a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to EPA detailing how the state planned to reduce 
emissions from automobiles and stationary sources such that each of the Air Quality Control 
Regions within the state could meet the five NAAQS by May 31, 1975.73 The Clean Air Act 
required EPA to evaluate those submitted plans and to reject any SIP that did not appear 
sufficiently vigorous to meet the NAAQS by the 1975 deadline. If a state failed to submit an 
acceptable SIP by January 1972, the Act required EPA to create its own plan for that state.  
In the early 1970s, states differed widely in their competence and enthusiasm for 
controlling air pollution. Cognizant that these disparities existed but without a sense of where 
any one state stood, Nixon’s environmental advisor John Whitaker wrote New York State’s 
Department of Environmental Conservation (one of the first such departments in the nation) to 
find out more. Commissioner Henry L. Diamond replied that only four states had a 
comprehensive environmental agency: New York, New Jersey, Washington, and Delaware. 
Diamond grouped the remaining forty-six states into three categories: the first included states 
with two departments, one for conservation and one for pollution control; the second group 
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consisted of states with independent departments for each medium (water, air, solid waste, 
wildlife protection, etc.); and a third group had only a few commissions or individuals assigned 
the responsibility of coordinated environmental protection, and then only in an advisory 
capacity.74 
In general, states with longer histories of industrialization like Massachusetts were more 
likely to have an established pollution control authority.75 Perhaps because the health effects of 
airborne pollutants remained uncertain even as they emerged as a concern at the state level, 
many of the states with defined air pollution control authorities housed those bodies in their 
health departments. Indiana, Nebraska, and Ohio were typical of states where air pollution was 
the responsibility of the Department of Health or the State Health Board.76 At the local level, 
cities with long histories of air pollution problems tended to have the most advanced pollution 
control programs.77 Strong local authorities in Pittsburgh and Los Angeles, more example, 
meant that Pennsylvania and California could draw on a much larger pool of experience and 
expertise in devising a plan to comply with the Clean Air Act than a state like Arizona, where 
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Diamond’s 1970 survey for Whitaker found only a Governor’s Commission on Beauty.78 In order 
to assist states with less experience, EPA selected ten private consultancies that states could 
hire to assist in preparing their plans and set aside $2 million to help states pay those fees.79    
 Of course, the same endemic pollution problems that built up control expertise in a state 
like California tended to make it that much more difficult to come up with a viable plan to meet 
the national air quality standards by the 1975 deadline. Recall that Los Angeles had more than 
one thousand violations of the carbon monoxide standard in 1973 – a predicament of geography 
and structural economic forces that no amount of expertise or staffing levels could resolve 
before the 1975 deadline. California’s SIP was subjected to close scrutiny by environmentalists, 
who repeatedly sued EPA to force the state to adopt more and more stringent controls.  
The outcome of the state implementation process hinged on how EPA headquarters 
evaluated the plans. With no precedent for a nation wide reduction in pollutant levels, the 
question of what constituted a realistic plan for attainment was open to interpretation. Industry, 
Nixon advisors, and environmentalist organizations all recognized that that the SIP process 
represented the critical point in translating the goals of the Clean Air Act into actual pollution 
controls. Business representatives used the Department of Commerce and other allies in the 
administration to cut new channels into EPA policy making through the White House’s Office of 
Management and Budget. But environmentalists fought back with sympathetic allies of their own 
in Congress and within EPA. 
The contest over the state plans coalesced in a fight over a set of guidelines issued by 
EPA. To provide the States some direction in preparing their SIPs, EPA proposed a set of 
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guidelines in April 1971. The guidelines were not binding on the states but state authorities, 
environmentalists, and businesses recognized that EPA’s suggestions of best practices 
effectively amounted to the criteria by which the agency would evaluate the implementation 
plans. When EPA opened the proposals for public comment, the agency received more than 
400 comments, making clear that all parties involved understood the guidelines to be a 
formative agent in shaping the nation’s air pollution controls.80   
Within the Nixon administration, complaints about EPA’s SIP guidelines often originated 
in the Department of Commerce, whose close ties with the business community made 
Commerce a conduit for industry complaints. In July 1971, Commerce’s General Counsel 
William Letson wrote Whitaker as well as the the Assistant Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget to complain that EPA’s proposed SIP requirements had effectively shifted 
responsibility for air pollution control from the states to the federal government. In Letson’s 
opinion, by creating a detailed set of criteria by which the SIPs would be judged, EPA had 
usurped authority that Congress had intended to reside in the states. In addition to that unlawful 
transfer of power, EPA had, by insisting on such stringent NAAQS, effectively condemned the 
country to “air rationing for large parts of the nation, with all of the coupon books spoken for.” 
Letson argued that EPA should accept any “reasonable” plans the states put forward so long as 
each governor certified that he would act in good faith to implement the plan.81  
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Despite his sympathies for the business community, Nixon was willing to bear some 
measure of business criticism for pollution controls that Whitaker and other advisors told him 
were politically popular. A November 1971 memo recounted Nixon laughing with Ruckelshaus 
about “all the flack” Nixon took from industry due to Ruckelshaus “being too zealous in getting 
industry to stop pollution.” The president jokingly inquired whether Ruckelshaus might consider 
holding a “be kind to industry week,” but congratulated the Administrator as “a fine strong man 
in an impossible job,” suggesting that Nixon anticipated some business criticism as both 
inevitable and tolerable.82  
State officials served as another conduit for complaints about EPA’s handling of the 
SIPs. In May 1971, an aide to California Governor Ronald Reagan wrote a Nixon advisor to 
warn that Ruckelshaus’s anticipated critique of the deficiencies of California’s SIP at news 
conference the next day would likely embolden the proponents of a far more disruptive plan 
then up for consideration in statewide referendum.83 Reagan’s aide took pains to avoid 
suggesting that Ruckelshaus ought to be pressured into silence regarding California’s plan – 
besides, the aide noted, “my impression is that Mr. Ruckelshaus does not respond readily to 
pressure anyway.” Reagan’s aide simply hoped that Nixon might impress upon Ruckelshaus 
that the ordinary citizen would not understand the “potential for economic dislocations… lurking” 
in the referendum proposal and thus he should take a positive tone in describing California’s 
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present efforts and accomplishments. Perhaps, Reagan’s aide suggested, Ruckelshaus could 
avoid bringing up California entirely until the press asked him about the state.84  
Within EPA itself, staff and officials held different opinions about how hard to push the 
states, with the Air Office leading the agency toward stronger plans. In December 1971, the Air 
Office’s George Walsh displayed this preference when he appeared on behalf of the agency at 
a public hearing in Montana on that state’s proposed SIP. Copper smelting produced the bulk of 
Montana’s sulfur dioxide emissions and the State Board hearings had been organized to 
consider a proposal by the smelters to substitute operational changes – whereby firms would 
curtail production on days with poor air quality – in place of a strict sulfur dioxide limit. 85 Walsh 
discouraged the operational method and testified that a simple limit on all smelters would be 
administratively simpler to enforce and more effective than trying to regulate when smelters 
operated. Furthermore, Walsh told Montana’s State Board of Health that the National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) represented only “minimum goals” and that the Board could be 
far more aggressive in reducing sulfur oxides if it wished.86  
Walsh’s testimony outraged copper producers, including Kennecott Copper Corporation 
and Anaconda Copper Mining Company, whose representatives wrote to EPA and the Nixon 
administration to protest what they declared to be Walsh’s urging of Montana’s Board of Health 
to follow EPA preferences rather than the letter of the Clean Air Act. Those copper producers 
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objected especially to Walsh’s remark that the market would capably absorb the 3-5% increase 
in copper prices that a uniform standard on smelters might bring, noting (in White House 
paraphrasing) that “Walsh was nowhere qualified as an economic expert,” and that this 
particular assumption was in fact incorrect. The copper smelter industry had also proposed an 
operational method of control in Arizona and Nevada – states, which together with Montana, 
contained nearly all the smelting activity in the country. Kennecott and Anaconda asked that 
EPA not testify at future hearings in any of those states and issue a formal letter withdrawing 
Walsh’s remarks from Montana’s public record.87  
Called in for a meeting with Nixon’s advisors, Ruckelshaus decided not to withdraw 
Walsh’s letter but to issue a clarifying statement that the NAAQS were an acceptable target for 
state SIPs, that operational changes could be used in place of uniform limits to meet the 
NAAQS, and that while EPA was interested in the costs to industry of the standards, Walsh’s 
statement reflected only information he had personally collected and did not represent the 
agency’s analysis.88 Forced to walk back Walsh’s claims about the industry’s financial situation, 
Ruckelshaus and EPA nonetheless refused to retract Walsh’s encouragement of Montana to go 
above and beyond the national requirements or Walsh’s cautionary note about the difficulty of 
meeting the NAAQS through operational adjustments. Still, the correction amounted to EPA 
headquarters undercutting Walsh’s exhortation to pursue a more robust reduction in air 
pollution.   
In the eyes of many environmentalists, Ruckelshaus’s addendum to Walsh’s testimony 
represented another manifestation of what they declared to be the erosion of EPA’s autonomy 
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under the Nixon administration. Using new legal tools and a sympathetic Congress, 
environmental organizations fought back against what they saw as EPA’s weakening of the 
Clean Air Act. In the 1960s, a major turn in jurisprudence gave environmentalists the ability to 
file lawsuits against public and private development projects where the public interest was 
threatened.89 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 established a statutory basis for 
that standing by creating the environmental impact review process, which to this day requires 
that all major developments with federal involvement (defined broadly as anything from issuing 
permits to securing loans) include a publicly reviewed study. Believing outside review to be a 
bulwark against industry capture of EPA, the authors of the Clean Air Act included provisions 
that allowed private citizens to sue any person or firm alleged to be in violation of the NAAQS 
and to sue the Administrator for failing to uphold any part of the Act.90  
Drawing on that new prerogative, environmental organizations patrolled EPA’s 
development of the SIP approval process. One of the most effective organizations was the 
newly created Natural Resources Defense Council. Formed in New York in 1970 with an initial 
staff of nine lawyers, NRDC was built on a substantial grant from the Ford Foundation to further 
the development of public interest law.91 NRDC’s strategy targeted areas in which grave threats 
to the environment had not received adequate attention from other environmentalist 
organizations and where legal statutes or jurisprudence presented an opportunity to establish 
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important legal precedents for environmental protection.92 A long term goal of NRDC was to 
secure a thorough and universal environmental impact review process such that businesses 
would come to consider the potential environmental effects of every major decision they made.93 
In order to finance what promised to be expensive litigation, NRDC immediately began 
successful fundraising mailings, receiving 1,500 individual contributions in the first year and over 
5,000 new contributions every year for some time thereafter.94 Yet despite this strong 
institutional and popular support, NRDC could hardly afford to take EPA to court over every 
single dispute. Nor did NRDC have the political clout to intervene in the agency’s rulemaking 
through a senator’s office, as well-connected business lobbyists often did.  
So, in addition to bringing lawsuits, NRDC lawyers built personal relationships with 
sympathetic EPA staff who shared NRDC’s goal of creating a robust set of regulatory 
protections. Dave Hawkins, a NRDC lawyer who was instrumental in building the organization’s 
air pollution control program, describes the strategy thus: “we tried to develop persuasive 
analyses to inject into the Agency’s thought process at the lowest level possible and at the 
earliest point in the process possible. You’re always advantaged if you can convince people that 
are writing the first draft of these things to embrace your ideas.”95 Surveying published literature, 
NRDC created technical and legal analyses that they distributed to EPA staff in the Policy Office 
and in the Air Office – a distribution faciliatated by NRDC’s opening of a Washington, D.C office 
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in its first year of operations.96 NRDC lawyers also lobbied attorneys in EPA’s Office of General 
Counsel, offering legal opinions that the EPA could pass along in response to questions from 
EPA staff.97 NRDC’s reputation for high quality analysis extended to EPA’s managers, including 
Ruckelshaus himself who recounts that NRDC’s analysis convinced him to reverse course on at 
least one regulatory decision.98 When that collegial approach failed, NRDC could and did sue 
the Administrator using that action-forcing provision in the Clean Air Act.  
That EPA rules often incorporated NRDC’ recommendations owes both to the trust that 
NRDC cultivated as well as to the fact that much of EPA’s staff shared NRDC’s desire for robust 
regulatory interventions. Personal investment in bureaucratic authority similar to what Daniel 
Carpenter found in his history of the Food and Drug Administration was also present at EPA, 
with career staff quickly developing a stake in the reputation of EPA as a strong regulatory 
agency.99 Insulated from the pressure that politically appointed officials and higher-level 
managers faced, EPA’s technical and legal staff were a receptive audience for NRDC lobbying, 
especially as they learned to trust the policy analyses that NRDC offered. In those instances 
where EPA staff disagreed with the decisions made by higher-level managers, NRDC proved a 
discrete and supportive ally. “They could be frank with me,” Hawkins recounted of EPA staffers, 
“knowing that I was not going to be repeating things in a context that would be embarrassing to 
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them.”100 That trust proved decisive in the fight over EPA’s SIP guidelines, when leaked EPA 
memos revealed a White House intervention in the agency’s rulemaking.  
 Back in April 1971, NRDC had assumed that EPA would review the public comments on 
the proposed SIP guidelines and then quickly issue final recommendations for the states. 
Instead, NRDC found itself waiting alongside state officials for months without a final set of 
guidelines. When Ruckelshaus eventually announced the final guidelines in August, NRDC was 
dismayed to see substantial revisions that they believed drastically weakened the potential of 
the Act to force a clean up of the nation’s air.  
Two internal EPA memos provided to NRDC by a source in EPA’s Air Office indicated 
that the revisions had come in response to suggestions made by the Office of Management and 
Budget in the White House. In June 1971, EPA had sent a revised set of SIP preparation 
guidelines to the Office of Management and Budget, where economic advisors joined officials 
from a number of other federal offices (including the Department of Commerce) in offering 
additional feedback. With the official comment period finished, EPA did not include these 
comments from the Office of Management and Budget review in the official record. And it was 
not until environmentalists cried foul later that fall that the agency even acknowledged that the 
Office of Management and Budget had reviewed the guidelines at all. The revisions to the 
guidelines and the process by which they had been made set a storm of criticism from 
environmental groups – including venerable organizations like the Izaak Walton League – who 
charged the Nixon administration with improperly meddling in EPA’s affairs and weakening the 
Clean Air Act.101 Whitaker and Ruckelshaus’s denial of the charges did little to mollify these 
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critics. Declaring the presidential intervention contrary to the intent of Congress in assigning 
EPA responsibility for implementing the Clean Air Act, NRDC used hearings held by the Senate 
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution to amplify their protest and spur EPA to insist on more 
robust air pollution controls than the Nixon administration had wished. 
In February 1972, the Subcommittee finally opened its long promised hearings on the 
Clean Air Act, eventually taking thirteen days of testimony on all aspects of EPA’s 
implementation of the legislation. Emphasizing the importance of the Subcommittee as a 
platform for environmentalist voices, the hearings began with the testimony of NRDC’s chairman 
Richard Ayres. Prior to the hearings, Ayres’ Project on Clean Air had studied the viability of 
twenty-four of the fifty-odd SIPs submitted to EPA.102 Ayres began his Senate testimony by 
lamenting that the plans, “which were to have been comprehensive blueprints for new action, 
have mostly become little more than weak-kneed apologies for each State’s present program.” 
Two thirds of the surveyed plans would not achieve the NAAQS by the 1975 deadline, Ayres 
reported, and “most of the rest are so hobbled by other infirmities that their promises to meet 
standards cannot be taken seriously.” “The major blame for this situation,” declared Ayres, 
“must be placed squarely on the Nixon administration,” which had reviewed the SIPs in secret 
and forced EPA to issue the “drastically weakened final guidelines.”103   
As evidence for the White House’s nefarious intervention, Ayres held up the two leaked 
memos sent by the Deputy Administer of the Air Office to Ruckelshaus in August 1971. 
Transmitting the final guidelines to Ruckelshaus, the memos described the revisions that had 
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been made in response to the review led by the Office of Management and Budget. That review, 
complained Ayres, had not been publically announced and occurred after the public comment 
period, preventing NRDC and others from responding to the claims made by the White House. 
Ayres argued that the Office of Management and Budget review had allowed opponents of 
strong regulation in the business community to effectively veto offending aspects of the SIP 
guidelines, using the sympathetic Department of Commerce as a proxy for their interests. 
Noting that Ruckelshaus had “vehemently denied” NRDC’s complaints about this unwarranted 
interference, Ayres asked why the final guidelines departed so dramatically from earlier drafts, 
and seemingly without any basis in the publically available information filed during the public 
comment period. While Ayres neglected to say how exactly he had obtained the memos, his 
source was almost certainly inside EPA, since the White House (as the only other party with 
access to the memos) had no incentive to make the review public.104   
Led by encouraging questions from Senator Thomas Eagleton, Ayres detailed the many 
specific ways that the Office of Management and Budget review had weakened the SIP 
guidelines and thus the plans put forward by the states. The final guidelines left out land use 
and transportation controls, and so most states had neglected to do anything about the 
automobile emissions that were a principal source of air pollution. The few that had included 
changes in transportation and land use were hardly encouraging in their scale: a ban on 
industry in one small corner of Louisville, a review process for parking garages in Portland, a 
proposal to use propane in New York’s taxis, and a carpooling incentive on the Bay Bridge 
between Oakland and San Francisco. The new guidelines also omitted requirements that states 
with good air quality create rules to prevent that quality from degrading. Perhaps most troubling, 
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the final guidelines encouraged states to consider economic costs and feasibility in deciding 
between alternative plans, effectively creating an avenue for industry across the country to 
successfully block pollution control requirements they deemed economically impossible. 
Questioning Ayres at length about this new economic language, Senator Eagleton repeatedly 
declared this final revision to be the most pernicious, since Congress had expressly omitted 
such considerations of economic costs from the Clean Air Act itself.105 Following Ayres, the 
Subcommittee heard from several other environmental and public health advocates, who 
painted a damning portrait of White House intrusion into the implementation of the Clean Air 
Act.106  
When Ruckelshaus appeared before the Subcommittee, Senator Eagleton and other 
members used the testimony of Ayres and other environmentalist critiques to grill the EPA 
Administrator about OMB’s interference. Welcoming Ruckelshaus, Senator Eagleton noted that 
the Subcommittee had heard testimony, “with rather strong supporting evidence, that serious 
compromises have occurred in the implementation of the Clean Air Act of 1970.” Reiterating the 
many specific accusations made by Ayres, Senator Eagleton asked for Ruckelshaus’s 
response. Rejecting all assertions that the White House had rewritten the guidelines or taken 
over the SIP implementation, Ruckelshaus laid out a narrowly defined interpretation of EPA’s 
duties under the Clean Air Act. The agency had only been given responsibility for ensuring that 
the NAAQS were met, Ruckelshaus asserted. How the states got there was their business. EPA 
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could no more insist on a fundamental rethinking of a state’s transportation system than it could 
insist that a state that already met the NAAQS prevent its air quality from degrading. Confronted 
with a flow chart that the Air Office had produced, which suggested that OMB had the final say 
on SIP approval, Ruckelshaus rather unconvincingly declared the chart a mistaken response to 
misinformation in the press. With the exception of a brief reprieve from Senator Bob Dole, who 
stopped by the hearings to offer his support for Ruckelshaus and take a swipe at Senator 
Muskie for being away from the hearings on the presidential campaign trail, Ruckelshaus bore 
relentless criticism for the SIP guidelines.107  
Repeatedly questioned about the newly added recommendation that states consider 
costs in deciding between different ways to reach the NAAQS, Ruckelshaus maintained that the 
Clean Air Act only prohibited cost considerations in setting the NAAQS – a requirement he said 
that EPA had followed. Telling states to then avoid unnecessary economic dislocations in 
reaching the NAAQS was just common sense, Ruckelshaus avered. Eventually growing 
exasperated with Eagleton’s repeated questions on the subject, Ruckelshaus declared “I can’t 
believe that we are unable to communicate… The law does not say, ‘Let’s do it the most 
expensive way we can figure out.’” Getting in the final word on the subject, Ruckelshaus 
concluded his testimony by summarizing, “we said to the States, ‘If you can come up with others 
that are enforceable and will meet the standard, let us see them.’ What we are telling them is do 
it in a way that has the least negative impact on your State.”108  
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Ruckelshaus’s testimony and the Subcommittee hearings took place within a larger 
debate over the economics of environmental protection. In a message to Congress, President 
Nixon warned against overly stringent regulations that would bankrupt the very firms whose 
profits the nation depended on to fund improvements in environmental quality. Nixon’s message 
was attached to a 1971 report from Council on Environmental Quality that estimated that the 
nation was enjoying $16 billion in annual benefits from pollution controls for which it was paying 
just $4.7 billion annually.109 Though he supported stronger interventions than Nixon, 
Ruckelshaus also worried about the economic costs of pollution control. In a May 1971 speech 
to the Audubon Society in Milwaukee, Ruckelshaus asked the environmental community for 
patience in restoring the nation’s environmental quality. Treating every act of moderation as a 
betrayal, Ruckelshaus warned, risked alienating the average American, who had recently been 
confronted with the high costs of pollution control and would be unlikely to “pay for ecological 
frills,” or to listen to “anyone who cries ‘wolf!’ too often.”110  
In December 1971, after a year on the job, Ruckelshaus told an audience of reporters 
that economic feasibility needed to be a consideration in evaluating regulations.111 EPA’s first 
report to Congress on the economics of air pollution control revealed the costs of complying with 
its regulations to be enormous.112 To get a better handle on those costs, EPA began the first of 
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many comprehensive studies of the economic effects of implementing the Clean Air Act. 
Contracting with the CONSAD Research Corporation, EPA produced reports on the seventeen 
industries most affected by the Act as well as two new macroeconomic models to use in 
assessing the broader effects of the SIPs across cities and regions.113 As EPA’s Robert Fri told 
Whitaker, EPA would use those models to assess the cost effectiveness of the state plans as 
well as to provide a comprehensive report on the costs of meeting the NAAQS to the Office of 
Management and Budget before the agency approved the final state plans.114  
Unsatisfied with the Subcommittee hearings and concerned about the creep of economic 
analysis into the NAAQS, NRDC and other environmental groups turned to the courts to spur 
EPA to strengthen the Clean Air Act at the state level. In the early 1970s, NRDC and other 
environmental groups filed a bevy of lawsuits against EPA that made many of the same claims 
that Ayres leveled before the Senate Subcommittee. In 1972, NRDC filed suit against EPA for 
approving the State of Georgia’s SIP, which included a provision allowing electric utilities to 
construct taller smokestacks to more thoroughly disperse emissions into the atmosphere 
instead of installing scrubbing devices on those stacks. The case was eventually settled against 
NRDC in 1976, but not before EPA issued a rulemaking in 1973 disallowing the use of tall 
stacks, demonstrating that the scrutiny and political pressure brought in a law suit could compel 
EPA to strengthen regulations regardless of what happened in court.115 In another important 
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piece of early litigation, a California environmental organization successfully sued EPA in 1972 
to compel the agency to include transportation controls in the California’s SIP.116 NRDC then 
defeated EPA’s attempt to allow California and other states to delay their required transportation 
controls in a 1973 legal victory.117     
With environmentalists putting pressure on EPA, the agency took a hard look at the first 
set of implementation plans submitted by the states in January 1972. As EPA sent one plan 
after another back to the states for revision, it became clear the agency would approve only 
those plans that contained sufficiently stringent measures to meet the 1975 deadline for 
attaining the national air quality standards. EPA broke down SIPs by criteria pollutant, reviewing 
and approving plans in parts. Thus, a given state could have its SIP for carbon monoxide 
approved but not its SIP for sulfur dioxide. Reporting on the review process to Whitaker in May 
1972, EPA’s Robert Samson noted that twenty states had not yet established satisfactory SIPs 
for controlling the emissions of one or more criteria pollutants emitted by stationary sources. For 
many of these, Samson stated that EPA would move forward by prescribing its own plans for 
the states. In addition, roughly half the nation’s states did not have an adequate plan for 
blocking future construction of major emission sources in the event that the standards were not 
met by the 1975 deadline as the Clean Air Act required. The same proportion also lacked 
sufficient plans for emergency pollution episodes. And thirty states had not made sufficient 
provisions for the pubic availability of emissions data, a necessity if organizations such as 
NRDC were going to be able to monitor their progress (and sue as necessary). However, 
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Samson concluded that the situation was changing rapidly as the states strengthened their SIPs 
in response to EPA’s complaints.118     
 On May 31, 1972 Ruckelshaus announced that the SIPs for eleven states and territories 
had been approved in their entirety. Unsurprisingly, the eleven states with fully approved SIPs 
largely lacked major industrial or automotive concentrations of pollutants. Endemic air pollution 
issues trumped pollution control expertise in states like California and New York, which did not 
have their SIPs approved. Nevertheless, Ruckelshaus stated that large portions of the SIPs for 
the remaining forty-one states and territories had been approved and EPA would soon 
promulgate its own regulations to fill in the remaining missing or deficient areas.119  
The Subcommittee hearings on EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air Act raised what 
would be an enduring question of EPA’s relationship to the White House. In an exchange during 
the Subcommittee hearings, Ruckelshaus flatly rejected any notion that the EPA cleared policy 
decisions with the White House.  
Sen. Boggs: Has there been any instance where you have been overruled by OMB or anybody else?  
Mr. Ruckelshaus: You mean has there been any time that I have acted illegally? 
Sen. Boggs: That is correct. 
Mr. Ruckelshaus: The answer is “No.120 
 
Ruckelshaus believed that long neglected pollution problems imposed a vast array of 
environmental costs on the American public and that his agency was a key component in a 
dramatic reframing of humanity’s relationship to the environment. The Administrator reacted 
strongly to assertions that he was undercutting that transformation by any counsel he happened 
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to keep with the White House. While that public disavowal obscured Ruckelshaus’s close 
workings with the Nixon administration, the Administrator nonetheless carved an important 
measure of autonomy for EPA in his personal posture.  
There was no precedent for the role of EPA Administrator and Ruckelshaus chose to 
play it large. For instance, while the Nixon administration intended Russell Train to serve as the 
nation’s international representative on environmental matters, Ruckelshaus made it widely 
known in July 1971 that he intended to travel to the Soviet Union that fall to discuss a 
coordinated environmental policy program. Urging foreign policy advisor Henry Kissinger to 
deny Ruckelshaus his trip, John Ehrlichman wrote “we have real problems in getting 
Ruckelshaus to clear things and track with the White House.”121 Though the Nixon 
administration did eventually choose Train and not Ruckelshaus to represent the country in a 
delegation to Moscow the next year, Ruckelshaus’s insistence on an international role for EPA 
led to other trips, including to Japan, where his presence underscored EPA’s rapid evolution 
from the mere implementer of environmental policy to a policymaker in its own right.122 
EPA’s federalized structure also contributed to the independence of different groups 
within the agency. As Walsh’s Montana testimony suggests, the location of the Air Office in 
North Carolina created a separate culture that EPA headquarters could not always tightly 
control – one that often advocated for stronger regulations than the Administrator might have 
preferred. In addition to the retention of discrete program offices, the federalized structure lent 
some autonomy to the regional offices. In a cheeky expression of that spirit, EPA’s Region III 
office once filed a complaint with the White House about the use of an open pit to burn 
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household trash at Camp David in November 1971.123 Establishing that even the president’s 
personal retreat was fair game for regulators, the Region served notice that it intended to 
vigorously enforce the Clean Air Act.  
At the same time, EPA was not technically independent of the White House as were the 
Federal Trade Commission and other independent regulatory agencies. The agency had been 
created through an executive branch reorganization and the Nixon administration asserted a 
right to influence agency policies. The contest over the SIP guidelines underscored the 
perception among White House advisors that they could check EPA rulemaking, while of course 
also highlighting the public relations mess that such interventions could create. In many 
instances, Nixon’s advisors decided to leave EPA’s policies unchallenged, intervening only to 
soften blowback from important allies, as when Whitaker asked Ruckelshaus to rewrite a letter 
the Administrator had drafted to reject Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater’s request for a 
deference of his state’s permit program. Implicitly acknowledging that Ruckelshaus was not 
going to grant Goldwater this deference, Whitaker merely noted that the draft had been “too cool 
and unresponsive,” and that Ruckelshaus ought to see Goldwater personally to deliver the bad 
news.124 
Conclusion: EPA at the Center 
 
 The fight over EPA’s review of the state implementation plans solidified the agency as 
the center of environmental governance. By the beginning of 1972, industry, environmentalists, 
and the Nixon administration had all realized just how much was at stake in the seemingly 
mundane decisions EPA made in implementing the Clean Air Act. Would the nation’s cities be 
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forced to transition away from the polluting automobile as the primary means of transportation? 
Would firms be required to install the latest pollution control technology regardless of the 
compliance costs involved? And that was just in regards to the air. Scores of other rulemakings 
determined how businesses, cities, and individuals treated their wastewater, disposed of their 
garbage, and tended their crops. Furthermore, EPA’s responsibilities appeared likely to expand 
further in 1972, with new legislation in the works pertaining to the degradation of clean air, the 
introduction of national water quality standards, the control of radioactive substances, and even 
regulations on noise.  
Spending several million dollars to install a state-of-the-art video conferencing system in 
EPA’s headquarters, regional offices, and laboratories, Ruckelshaus began 1972 with an 
agency-wide meeting of EPA’s nearly 6,000 employees. First and foremost, Ruckelshaus 
declared that EPA would continue to insist on strong regulations. That remark drew laughter 
from some watching the broadcast in the Denver Regional Office who believed that the agency 
had capitulated on automobile standards.125  
But the business community was not laughing, not with EPA’s budget soon to expand to 
nearly $2.5 billion dollars. Reporting on a February 1972 meeting with a group of business 
representatives, Nixon advisor Ken Cole noted that EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air Act 
represented one of the top four concerns of industry and business allies in the Department of 
Commerce.126 Thus far, businesses had been largely ineffective in limiting the expansion of the 
new environmental regulatory regime over which EPA presided. As it became increasingly clear 
that EPA determined billions of dollars in annual compliance expenses, industry scrambled to 
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find some way of influencing the new agency. In the early 1970s, with the surging popularity of 
environmentalism among the general public, groups like NRDC enjoyed far more influence at 
EPA than business representatives. And as the Subcommittee hearings suggested, Nixon faced 
political peril when he directly intervened in EPA’s decision making. So business and their allies 
turned to an alternate means of shaping environmental policy, creating a regulatory review 
























Chapter 3: A Balancing Act 
 
 
From the beginning of the environmental decade, almost anyone worried about the rapid 
expansion of regulations expressed their concerns by calling for “balance.” In 1970, the council 
that created the Environmental Protection Agency promised that there were plenty of checks in 
place to ensure that the new agency would “balance economics, health, aesthetics,” and other 
concerns.1 The next year, Nixon advisor John Whitaker instructed the President to conclude a 
meeting with his Council on Environmental Quality by stressing within earshot of the departing 
press the “need for a balanced approach to the whole environmental question so that the 
economy doesn’t suffer.” In 1972, Carl Bagge of the National Coal Association followed up on a 
meeting with Whitaker by stating that it was his organization’s “sincere hope that we have 
initiated a dialogue that may lead to a more balanced implementation program which will not 
result in economic dislocation and unemployment.”2 The Office of Management and Budget 
marked up a draft of President Ford’s 1975 State of the Union speech in an effort to better 
demonstrate the administration’s commitment to “balance development and conservation.”3 
Balancing was still the metaphor of choice in 1979 when Jimmy Carter’s economic advisor 
William Nordhaus circulated a memo that presented “some economic and legal background to 
assuring better balancing in the regulatory process,” – subject line: “A Balancing Act.”4  
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The repeated use of the language of balancing can be explained by the enduring 
popularity of environmental protection. High levels of public support for environmental protection 
made questioning the merits of protective regulation risky for elected officials. Balancing was 
useful as rhetoric because it provided cover for constraining environmental protection under the 
pretext of sober, clear-eyed policy making. With its connotations of fair dealing and 
reasonableness, balancing lent an unobjectionable guise to those who wished to scale back 
regulations. Only the immoderate would question the need for balanced policy. So thoroughly 
positive and principled were the associations with balancing that the supporters of strong 
regulations soon found that they had to affirm balancing as a basic goal before they could make 
a case for maintaining or expanding regulatory interventions.  
As rhetoric, balancing conjured up a scale with two starkly opposed abstractions: the 
environment and the economy. And it was the supposed tilt toward the environment that 
opponents of regulation used balancing to address. Businesses protested new environmental 
regulations by arguing that they would levy greater costs than benefits and that society would 
ultimately pay for the scale’s lopsidedness in higher prices, lost productivity, and increased 
unemployment. Deeply concerned about such economic woes, Nixon and then Ford expanded 
presidential authority over EPA’s rulemaking by insisting that White House advisors had the 
prerogative to evaluate the costs and benefits of proposed regulations before EPA issued them. 
In response, EPA doubled down on its own cost/benefit analysis to defend its regulatory 
policies. 
Critically, balancing also found supporters in the highest ranks of EPA. Administrator 
William Ruckelshaus believed that aspects of the 1970 Clean Air Act presented impossible 
mandates that prevented states from proposing realistic plans for environmental improvement. 
Deeply concerned about the possibility that compliance costs might cripple key industries such 




mainstream voters to turn against environmental protection, Ruckelshaus and other EPA 
officials appealed to the ideal of balancing to create new policies that acknowledged material 
realities and which could be enforced. Throughout the 1970s, environmental organizations won 
favorable rulings from the judiciary that prevented EPA from considering compliance costs in 
setting the national air quality standards. But by elevating compliance costs as a key variable in 
the application and enforcement of the standards, proponents of balancing managed to bring 
economic considerations into the heart of EPA’s air quality program.    
 
Regulatory Review – Devising a Means of Reigning in EPA 
 
EPA’s regulatory purview expanded in leaps and bounds during its first year, upending 
the assumptions of many Nixon advisors who had assumed that EPA would merely implement 
policies that those advisors devised. From the perspective of the Nixon Administration, EPA 
Administrator William Ruckelshaus and his agency had amplified the disruptive potential of the 
Clean Air Act by paying little attention to the economic consequences of setting and enforcing 
strict standards.  
In addition to writing regulations to implement the Clean Air Act and other legislation, 
EPA was responsible for ensuring that the states enforced those regulations. EPA discharged 
some of this responsibility to the states in the plans they submitted to implement the national air 
quality standards. But EPA headquarters also had an Enforcement Office headed by the 
Assistant Administrator for Standards and Compliance, whose duty it was to monitor state 
enforcement and intervene where necessary. Where the Enforcement Office found states 
unwilling or unable to enforce their state plan or federal regulations, EPA could turn to its 
Administrative Law Judges for an administrative order, with which the offending emission source 
in questions was legally required to comply, as well as a monetary fine. For serious violations, 




or criminal charges based on evidence that EPA collected.5 Recognizing that EPA’s legitimacy 
and his own credibility in the environmental community depended on the agency’s ability to 
actually reduce pollution, Ruckelshaus made enforcement one of his top priorities as EPA’s first 
Administrator. In his first two months, the former U.S. Assistant Attorney General from Indiana 
initiated five times more enforcement actions against polluting firms than the agencies EPA had 
inherited had ever undertaken over a similar time period. To magnify the resulting publicity, 
Ruckelshaus picked major corporations including Armco Steel (for polluting the Houston Ship 
Channel) and Union Carbide (for particulate emissions in West Virginia and Ohio). Ruckelshaus 
knew that such a brash beginning would upset the Nixon administration, but he gambled that 
the White House would not interfere in his development of a strong enforcement program with 
environmental champion Senator Edmund Muskie waiting in the wings as the likely Democratic 
challenger in the 1972 presidential elections.6           
Nixon’s advisors’ frustration with Ruckelshaus and his surprisingly robust EPA was 
tempered to some degree by the Administrator’s frequent expression of concern for the 
economic consequences of proliferating environmental regulations. But those advisors still 
considered Ruckelshaus and EPA to have unnecessarily privileged environmental protection 
over economic development. Writing in 1972, with a year’s perspective on EPA’s distressingly 
strong environmental advocacy, natural resources advisor Peter Flanigan declared to John 
Ehrlichman “I believe the President will wish to hold his environmental enforcers to a more 
balanced view of the public interest during his Second Term.” Forthcoming lead regulations 
“seem a good place to start,” Flanigan continued, “since they involve an area of basic energy-
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environmental-economic trade-off, where EPA has clearly opted for maximization of the 
environmental component.”7  
In May 1971, the White House Office of Management and Budget instructed EPA to start 
clearing the economic impact of its major rulemakings with the president. Established as part of 
the same 1970 executive branch reorganization that created EPA, the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) quickly became one of the most powerful voices in the Nixon administration. 
Under the pretext of coordinating the executive branch budget, OMB was given the final word 
on the reports and even the public pronouncements of other White House offices.8 In that May 
1971 letter to EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus, OMB’s director explained that the White House 
was concerned that EPA was failing to properly consider the full costs of its programs to the 
general economy as well as failing to provide an adequate defense of the benefits of many 
programs. Thus forth, EPA would be required to notify OMB of any proposed rulemakings that 
appeared likely to have a significant impact on the economy, and to send OMB an economic 
assessment of the costs and benefits of the rulemaking for businesses and the federal 
government.9  
Over the next several months, Nixon’s advisors moved to formalize the regulatory review 
process. In June 1971, Nixon’s Domestic Council undertook a study of different ways that the 
administration might ensure that regulations achieved a “balance of many interrelated Quality of 
Life variables -- particularly consumer and environmental interests, industrial requirements, and 
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safety aspects.”10 The study group recommended the creation of a new White House office. 
Nixon approved the recommendation and a month later, the Quality of Life Review Committee 
was quietly formed.11 
The Quality of Life Review allowed White House advisors to increase the weight of 
compliance costs under the pretext of safeguarding the public interest. The heads of each 
executive branch agency were required to inform OMB about any proposed rulemaking of 
“important consequences” and to provide OMB with a preliminary analysis of the effect the rule 
was likely to have on economic factors like employment and inflation.12 As Whitaker explained 
the process, the review “allows all other competing constituencies… to take a crack at proposed 
regulations prior to their being publically announced.”13 Furthermore, regular reports from EPA 
and other agencies would allow the White House to stay abreast of hundreds of rulemakings 
across the executive branch. Finally, by compelling the regulatory agencies themselves to 
produce the initial economic analyses of their proposed rules, regulatory review allowed Nixon’s 
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advisors to force those agencies to consider “alternative courses of action with a comparison of 
their relative benefits and costs,” as one advisor put it.14 
Though Nixon advisors publically denied any anti-environmental bias in the review, 
private confidences tell a different story. In 1972, Whitaker told fellow Nixon advisor Ken Cole 
that “largely because of concern that EPA was setting standards and making administrative 
decisions without a balanced view of costs of compliance as compared with benefits, we 
instituted last Summer the ‘quality of life’ review process.”15 In a 1974 memo, Jim Tozzi, an 
OMB economist who built a career reviewing EPA regulations, bragged that “practically all” of 
EPA’s proposed regulations had been reviewed since the process began.16 Looking back on the 
first five years of regulatory review, a 1976 article concluded that it had “been applied primarily, 
and some would say almost exclusively to EPA.” OMB officials interviewed for the 1976 article 
did not deny EPA’s centrality, explaining the tight focus as the result of EPA’s unparalleled 
impact on the economy and other regulatory agencies.17  
From the perspective of the environmental community, this focused attention on EPA 
deliberately limited the speed and thoroughness with which the agency could respond to 
identified problems. In 1972, the Natural Resource Defense Council’s Richard Ayres 
complained to the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution that all of EPA’s major 
rulemakings had been subjected to secret OMB review. Public interest organizations like NRDC 
had been shut out, Ayres complained, while “antienvironmental Federal agencies” like the 
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Department of Commerce used the review as an “effective power to veto EPA’s actions.”18 
Looking back on the origins of regulatory review from the vantage of the present, Dave 
Hawkins, the NRDC attorney who played a major role in air pollution policy in that period, 
suggested that Nixon’s top domestic advisors H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman created the 
review “as a way to fix regs that economically powerful interests didn’t like. It was a way for 
them to be able to call up EPA and say, ‘slow down, or change this.’”19 From the beginning, 
environmentalists recognized regulatory review as a critical threat to their hard won access to 
the rulemaking process and they fought back accordingly. Environmentalists repeatedly 
challenged the legality of regulatory review in court and, when the courts upheld the process, 
served notice through public complaints and Congressional hearings that the reviewers would 
be closely watched.  
How influential regulatory review was on EPA’s policy making depends on the specific 
regulation and the perspective of the observer. Ruckelshaus avers that the Quality of Life 
process could only delay EPA rulemakings, risking missed Congressional deadlines but never 
preventing the agency from eventually promulgating of the rules.20 Roy Gamse, who joined 
EPA’s Economic Analysis Division in 1972 (and was heading it by 1973), likewise dismisses the 
supposed potency of regulatory review, arguing that EPA’s biggest threat came instead from 
direct complaints from regulated industries.21 Bud Ward, a journalist whose weekly newsletter 
Environment Reporter was the authoritative news source on EPA from its founding in 1970, 
remembers the White House pressure as intense and influential. In Ward’s telling, EPA 
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employees were acutely attuned to White House scrutiny. “EPA regulators shook in their boots 
at a phone call from Jim Tozzi,” Ward said later, referring to the fearsome OMB staff member.22 
Kerry Clough, a key advisor to two Administrators (Russell Train and Doug Costle), argues that 
while direct White House intervention was very rare, the interventions that did occur were 
influential and discrete, targeting top political appointees at the agency and bypassing career 
executives like Gamse.23  
Informal White House interventions prior to the issuance of regulatory proposals were 
often more effective in tamping down EPA’s regulations than the formal Quality of Life Review 
process. Though such interventions left little evidence in the written record, anecdotal accounts 
shed light on the means and effectiveness of this informal pressure. Clough revealed that EPA 
officials discussed major rulemakings with Nixon’s advisors before the formal proposal and 
regulatory review process even began.24 Such confidential discussions were well within the 
letter of the law under the Administrative Procedures Act and sometimes found their way into 
writing, as when Nixon advisor Peter Flanigan noted in an October 1972 memo to Ehrlichman 
that EPA, at the Nixon Administration’s request, had delayed proposing regulations for the 
removal of lead from gasoline until after the presidential election.25 Aware that such requests 
could only be accommodated if the public remained ignorant of the potential rulemaking, EPA’s 
career staff sometimes leaked EPA proposals to the press before White House advisors had 
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had a chance to review them. Publicly revealing EPA’s position forced the White House to either 
accept the proposal or incur the political risks of publically overriding the agency.26 The 
possibility that OMB would delay a rule in lengthy review undoubtedly encouraged EPA to 
propose rules that would be likely to receive speedy approval, demonstrating an additional value 
of the process to the White House.  
 
Turning the Conversation to Costs 
 
Regulatory review privileged economic analysis as the most important measure of EPA’s 
regulations within the Nixon administration. OMB parsed the costs and benefits of every major 
regulation, which forced EPA to do the same. While EPA technically had the authority to ignore 
whatever critique OMB might offer and issue the final rules without making any of the changes, 
no political appointee wanted to flagrantly disregard the suggestions of advisors that clearly had 
the president’s ear. The preferred option was to minimize the chances that OMB would object to 
the rule or, failing that, to have an excellent economic defense prepared. Thus, even where the 
authorizing statute prohibited economic considerations, regulatory review pushed costs to the 
forefront, which naturally had a moderating effect on what EPA chose to propose. As Whitaker 
put it, the “system is working well to keep EPA from getting ‘too far out.’”27 
EPA had invested in economic analysis among its first orders of business, both to fulfill 
statutory responsibilities and because Ruckelshaus recognized economic prowess as a critical 
																																																						
26 At one point, Nixon advisors were so concerned about such leaks that Whitaker sent a chastising note about a lead 
removal proposal to Ruckelshaus at his home address, explaining that the odd postal routing had been become 
necessary because “I have lost confidence that there is such a thing as private communication in your shop.” 
Whitaker demanded Ruckelshaus take disciplinary action if he found the leak, noting that “big issues,” must remain in 
confidence so that they could be rejected by the White House without fear of political blowback. John C. Whitaker to 
Bill Ruckelshaus, January 21, 1972, folder, “EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] – 1971 [from CFOA 1139] [3 of 
3],” Box 63, JWF.  
27 Peter Flanigan to John Ehrlichman, October 16 1972, folder, “WHCF: Subject Categories GEN EX FG 298 




shield for the agency against business and environmentalist assaults. Blaming environmental 
regulation for plant closings and job losses emerged early as a favorite tactic of regulated 
industries to sap popular support for strong environmental protection. In January 1971, when 
EPA was barely a month old, the consumer chemical manufacturing giant Union Carbide 
Corporation publically accused the agency of imperiling over six hundred jobs at its Marietta, 
Ohio plant. In December 1970, EPA had rejected Union Carbide’s request for a three-year 
extension of a compliance deadline for installing fly ash pollution controls on the coal fired plant, 
prompting the company’s vice president to publically warn of “drastic…consequences” for the 
employees of the plant.28  
Environmentalists charged that Union Carbide’s warning amounted to “environmental 
blackmail,” as Ralph Nader put it in a letter to Senator Edmund Muskie, Chairman of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. As Nader described, EPA’s requirements for the 
Marietta plant would not force the factory to close, as Union Carbide had complained. Rather, 
the threat of job loss was but a further ploy by the company in a long running program of 
“duplicity and intimidation evidently designed to discredit the Environmental Protection Agency 
and frighten the people of the Marietta region into quiet submission.” Having failed in previous 
misrepresentations of the supply of alternative fuels, Nader wrote, “Union Carbide now raises 
the specter of massive unemployment – a standard ploy in the repertoire of corporate venality.” 
Agreeing with Nader’s critique, Muskie forwarded his letter to Union Carbide’s vice president 
and asked for his response. Muskie also sent Nader’s letter to Ruckelshaus in an attempt to 
bolster EPA’s resilience in the face of such threats.29 As it worked out, Union Carbide’s own 
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labor force called the lie on their firm’s blackmail attempts, refusing to support the company in 
opposing the regulations. In this and other instances, labor tended to reject business attempts to 
fight pollution control with threats of layoffs.30  
The political potency and growing incidence of environmental blackmail soon prompted 
EPA to create a new program to track announced plant closings and advise the White House as 
to whether or not pollution controls were to blame. The original idea may have come from the 
White House advisor Al Alm, who suggested a similar program to a fellow advisor in August 
1971.31 The White House was certainly eager for reliable information, as exemplified by a memo 
that Whitaker wrote to the heads of EPA, CEQ, and Commerce in July asking for “a memo on 
precisely what jobs have been lost by a plant closing down due to pollution enforcement.” “Not 
the threat to close a plant,” Whitaker clarified, “but actually being closed and the number of jobs 
lost.”32 Whatever the exact origins, the search for definitive information about pollution control 
and unemployment created another opportunity for economists to position themselves as the 
purveyors of true facts about the effects of pollution control.   
In November 1971, EPA and the Department of Labor entered into an agreement to 
develop the Economic Dislocation Early Warning System.33 With special attention given to 
economically depressed areas, EPA would flag imminent plant closures that might be due to 
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compliance with environmental regulations. The Department of Labor would then supply 
retraining and financial assistance programs to those workforces.34 Thus, the Early Warning 
System would both alert EPA and the White House to potential political controversies and 
preempt criticism of the agency with a ready-made response for displaced workers.  
The Early Warning System began operation in spring 1972. EPA issued quarterly reports 
that tallied the overall number and specific location of plants that had closed, significantly 
curtailed operations, or were likely to close or slow operations because of environmental 
regulations. The reports were broken down by EPA Regional Office as well as media type, 
industry, enforcing agency (local, state, or federal), and a variety of other variables. Appendices 
included a description of the economic context of each local community. For example, the July 
1972 report described the closure of the Big Bear Board Products Company in Redlands, 
California, noting that the plant was “already uneconomial [sic] and likely to close” due to “poor 
quality timber supply and thus a poor quality product.” Though the report noted that Big Bear 
might have “struggled by” using its marginal wood, the $60,000 that the firm needed to spend 
for a new particulate emissions incinerator had eliminated the firm’s meager profit margins. 
Though the plant only employed forty workers, the report noted that the “local economy will not 
absorb unemployment labor,” since the “company is within a designated Economicly [sic] 
Deorssed [sic] Area.”35 As Roy Gamse, the director of EPA’s Economic Analysis Division, later 
described, such detailed reporting on the fate of firms like the Big Bear Board Products 
Company enabled EPA officials to counter the frequent claims of businesses that environmental 
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regulations were spurring a national crisis in unemployment as well as to direct assistance to 
those workers who were actually displaced.36  
Ruckelshaus saw a clear eyed accounting of regulatory costs as a means of crafting a 
moderate and enduring model of environmental governance. In 1972, Ruckelshaus delivered a 
speech to the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce in which he assessed the entire regulatory 
program on its economic merits. Ruckelshaus reminded his audience how a popular “wave of 
environmentalism” had swept over the country, spurring regulatory protections that had already 
led to improvements in environmental quality. “But just as in physics there can be no action 
without a reaction,” Ruckelshaus continued, “in economics there can be no benefit without a 
cost.” And the costs of the environmental regulation were quite significant, so much so that “at 
first glance, pollution control looks like a prohibitively expensive proposition.” Anyone who would 
claim otherwise, Ruckelshaus said, or who would try to “remove every ounce of pollution from 
the environment is simply practicing the same old demagogy of overpromising, which 
guarantees underperforming and disappointment.” Putting himself at least partly at odds with 
the Clean Air Act’s cost-blind national air quality standards, Ruckelshaus stated that it had been 
his “belief from the very beginning that environmental, economic, social and aesthetic benefits 
of any government policy should be at least equal to its costs.” “We should undertake no 
action,” Ruckelshaus declared, “whose costs and benefits have not been carefully weighed and 
we should make every effort to predict the effects of a given policy on society as a whole.”37 In 
order to do so, Ruckelshaus reported that EPA together with the Council on Environmental 
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Quality and the Department of Commerce had “commissioned a task force of impartial 
consultants to get the answers.” The results, Ruckelshaus happily continued, suggested that the 
nation could “actually afford the costs of a major environmental renovation… we are going to get 
back much more than we pay out.”38 There was the rub, an EPA Administrator charged with 
implementing a Clean Air Act that declared clean air to be a national right regardless of the cost, 
evaluating his success in dollars and cents.  
 
Calibrating the Scales 
 
In debating the economic effects of regulatory interventions, EPA, regulated businesses, 
and the Nixon administration all confronted a basic lack of information about how much pollution 
control really cost. Businesses spent significant sums complying with regulations, almost $7.5 
billion in 1974 alone, according to historian David Vogel, who calculated that that amounted to 
nearly eight percent of total capital expenditures in 1974, double the share that went to pollution 
control in 1969. Vogel estimated that from 1967 to 1975, the productivity of American firms 
declined one and a half percent as a result of spending on pollution control.39 Plainly, 
compliance was expensive. But could industry afford it? Could the overall economy?  
Making those questions both more complicated and more pressing, the ramp up in 
pollution control spending happened to coincide with rises in unemployment and inflation.40 
Businesses blamed environmental regulation for those woes. EPA and environmentalists 
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disagreed. And the Nixon administration was stuck trying to figure out the truth – in part so they 
could decide where and how strongly they needed to intervene in EPA’s rulemaking.41 The first 
step lay in figuring out what information could be trusted.  
Although the Council on Environmental Quality and EPA both produced annual reports 
tallying the costs of regulations, Nixon’s advisors did not care to rely solely on estimates from 
sources they considered overly sympathetic to the environmentalist cause. Aware that 
economic analyses figured centrally in the Nixon Administration’s evaluation of EPA’s regulatory 
agenda, business interests invested in such research and enthusiastically offered it to the White 
House and EPA.42 Yet despite a cozy relationship with industry, the president’s advisors knew 
that businesses inflated the compliance costs they reported to the administration. Nixon’s 
advisors also viewed with skepticism the reports produced by agencies with a “developmental” 
bias – such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of Interior, and the Department of 
Transportation. In Whitaker’s words, those agencies had, “done a much better job of producing 
rhetoric than facts.”43 So while Nixon’s advisors did not lack for economic reports to sift through, 
each of their many sources provoked skepticism.  
Furthermore, many of Nixon’s advisors shared EPA’s opinion that environmental 
regulations brought real pecuniary benefits that, while difficult to quantify, nevertheless needed 
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to figure into an honest accounting of their economic merits. The challenge lay in how to 
quantify those uncertain benefits, both at the macroeconomic level and in evaluating proposed 
rulemakings. As environmental economists had long known, regulation was a difficult subject for 
cost/benefit evaluations because many of the costs and benefits of pollution control would only 
be experienced in the long term – over decades, or generations. But if those real long-term 
effects were to figure into the calculation, they had to be quantified in the present.  
For example, in 1971, Nixon’s advisors considered a number of options for measuring 
the inflationary effect of automobile manufacturers’ spending on pollution control, ultimately 
deciding that the health benefits from controlling pollution would increase the value of the cars 
to consumers and thus the expenditures should not be tailed as a contributor to rising inflation.44 
Some advisors disagreed, however, and commissioned their own studies to show that pollution 
controls might lower the value of the cars by decreasing consumer satisfaction, since the 
modified cars would likely be less powerful and less fuel-efficient.45 Who was to say on the basis 
of such results whether Nixon should try to force EPA to suspend its recently announced 
catalytic converter requirement?  
To gain a better perspective on the macroeconomic costs of pollution control, Nixon’s 
advisors solicited two reports on the subject – one from CEQ and another from the Department 
of Commerce, with the thought being that the environmental and business biases might cancel 
each other out. But upon receiving the reports in September 1971, the advisors were dismayed 
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to find themselves no closer to an answer.46 Critiquing the reports, Whitaker lamented that “the 
premise of the Commerce analysis was to take particularly egregious examples relayed to them 
through the NIPCC [National Industrial Pollution Control Council] and extrapolate those to show 
effects on the economy as a whole.” Not much better, the CEQ approach focused on boosts in 
employment from the emergent pollution control industry and then relied on “guesttimates” 
regarding the additional costs of pollution in terms of health care, cleaning bills, etc.47 Making 
“responsible policy decisions” from the two reports, one aide complained, was “extremely 
difficult in light of the wide divergence between the factual assumptions.”48 Rather than pointing 
the Nixon administration toward a moderate compromise, the two reports simply illustrated how 
little was settled about the economics of pollution control.  
Dissatisfied with both reports, chief domestic advisor John Ehrlichman commissioned 
another study later in 1971 with the dual objectives of providing a more accurate assessment of 
the long terms costs of environmental regulation and to identify the most effective analytical 
tools to generate such assessments. Overseen by economist Paul McCracken, the study 
contracted with consultancies to produce a dozen microeconomic surveys of various industries 
and one study on valuation methods. Tying it all together, the McCracken report concluded that 
pollution control “would not cause a recession or seriously threaten the long-run economic 
viability of the industrial activities examined.” The report indicated that prices would rise about 
two percent annually from 1972 to 1976 as a result of pollution control expenditures and that 
between 50,000 and 250,000 jobs would be lost over the same period, though these would be 
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nearly offset by new jobs created in the pollution control industry. Pollution control would also 
cause some upsets in manufacturing, where smaller firms might find it harder to find make 
necessary capital investments and where the added costs of domestic manufacturing could not 
be passed along to consumers because foreign competitors would undercut those prices.49  
The McCracken report also argued that the microeconomic industry studies perpetuated 
a common error in undercounting or ignoring the likely benefits from increasing regulatory 
protection – such as new jobs generated by the pollution control industry or added efficiency 
through the closure and absorption of inefficient firms. None of the studies, the report lamented, 
had even attempted to quantify the benefits of a cleaner environment, such as additional output 
from a healthier working population or increased crop yields. For that same reason, the 
McCracken report concluded, measures like GNP were a poor gauge of the overall costs and 
benefits of pollution control.50  
Perhaps as a result of that favorable assessment of strong regulations, the McCracken 
report failed settle the question of whether proliferating regulations posed a serious threat to 
jobs and corporate profits. CEQ praised the McCracken report for quieting unwarranted fears 
about job losses. The Department of Commerce conceded that the overall economic effects 
would not be devastating but emphasized that “serious dislocations” would be experienced in 
marginal industries.51 Competing claims on the subject continued to proliferate, with the Office 
of Science and Technology reporting in March 1972 that new research conducted under their 
auspices suggested that the benefits of EPA’s automobile emission standards did not outweigh 
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the costs. Ford Motor Company President Lee A. Iacocca was elated, declaring the report “the 
best news the public has had in years.” Ralph Nader took the opposite stance, calling the report 
a “mockery of scientific integrity and competence.”52 Nixon’s advisors still lacked an answer.  
In the absence of a definitive source of information on the economic impact of 
environmental regulation, EPA’s own analysis became increasingly important to Nixon’s 
advisors as they sought to get a handle on the costs of particular standards and rules. Nixon’s 
advisors aimed to improve the agency’s analytical capabilities in their political appointments to 
the agency. When the top job at EPA’s Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation opened up, 
Whitaker wrote Ehrlichman to recommend CEQ’s Al Alm for the post. Alm had managed all the 
economic analysis produced by CEQ, Whitaker informed Ehrlichman, analysis that had played a 
critical role in the Administration’s lobbying for less restrictive water pollution controls. The White 
House could expect sober, accurate analysis from EPA under Alm’s watch. Best of all, Whitaker 
continued, Alm’s “key role at EPA will be to manage the Quality of Life Review so that the 
product that arrives at OMB will really have inputs from the other agencies.”53 Alm got the job, 
providing high-level support for the development of economic expertise already underway at the 
agency.  
 For all their efforts to protect a national right to clean air, Senator Muskie and other 
Congressional supporters of a strong Clean Air Act recognized that the fate of the pollution 
control regime would be contested in dollars and cents. As early as 1971, Muskie was giving 
speeches in which he made the case for pollution control on its economic merits, telling the 
Florida State Senate that they ought to protect Florida’s environment as a means of maintaining 
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a key, revenue-generating asset for the state.54 During the Senate Subcommittee on Air and 
Water Pollution’s hearings on the Clean Air Act’s implementation the next year, Subcommittee 
members affirmed the testimony of environmentalists that Nixon’s Office of Management and 
Budget was improperly inserting economic considerations into statues that had been explicitly 
written to disallow such consideration of costs. But the Subcommittee also acknowledged that 
affected industries would make their case against pollution control on the costs that compliance 
entailed and that environmental agencies needed to be capable of responding in kind. As 
Senator Hale Boggs (Democrat – Louisiana) described it, “EPA and the State environmental 
agencies have their own capability for economic analyses…Whether it is presented by 
testimony before a hearing board or whether it is just news articles, economics is going to be 
involved.”55 In 1972, the Subcommittee solicited a report on the “costs and benefits of air 
pollution control” from the Congressional Research Service, underscoring the Subcommittee’s 
recognition that industry complaints and White House pressure on the costs of regulation would 
have to be engaged with rival economic claims.56 
 For his part, Senator Muskie’s interest in establishing the pecuniary benefits of 
environmental protection were also prompted by his emergence in the fall of 1971 as the 
Democratic Party’s frontrunner to challenge Nixon in the 1972 elections. As one of the key 
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proponents of the Clean Air Act and other landmark environmental legislation, Muskie had an 
obvious constituency among supporters of environmental protection and his campaign attracted 
enthusiastic support from environmental luminaries like David Sive, a founding member of the 
Natural Resources Defense Council who helped organize Environmentalists for Muskie.57 The 
Muskie camp anticipated that cost of environmental regulations would be a major issue in the 
campaign, as Nixon cast about for a scapegoat for the ailing national economy. As 
Subcommittee staffer and chief aide Leon Billings described Nixon’s argument, “their facts and 
their figures would show that you cannot have a clean and healthful environment and a 
productive economy at the same time.” To counter those claims, Muskie would have to engage 
Nixon on “the facts.” Taking the Nixon administration’s estimates of $100 billion in spending for 
pollution control, Billings sketched out a retort by calculating the benefits of that spending. 
Money spent on pollution control did not vanish, Billings argued, but instead “will buy cars, will 
buy clothes, will buy food and it will buy homes.”58 On the campaign trail, Muskie drew on such 
reasoning to challenge what he called Nixon’s meddling in the economically beneficial work of 
regulatory agencies like EPA.59 
 
The Politics of Balancing 
 
Nixon and Muskie did not trot out estimates of the specific dollars to be spent protecting 
the environment because they thought they could solve a mathematical equation yielding the 
ideal amount to be spent on pollution control. Rather, both candidates used pecuniary costs and 
benefits to lend an imprimatur of factual certitude to their arguments about how policymakers 
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ought to balance environmental quality and economic growth. And both candidates looked to 
surveys and polls to tell them whether their rhetorical portrayal of that balance jibbed with public 
opinion. What they saw was a voting public that favored government interventions to promote 
environmental quality but revolted from programs that imposed significant costs in their 
everyday lives. Nixon and Muskie took different approaches to the notion of a tradeoff between 
environmental quality and economic growth, especially in how each discussed questions of 
inevitability.  
As he had as a Senator, Muskie chose to explicitly acknowledge the inevitability of the 
tradeoffs, likely to the detriment of his campaign. On one issue after another – from strip mining 
in Kentucky to billboards in Florida – Muskie publically ruminated on the benefits and costs of 
regulatory intervention. Rather than a thoughtful consideration of complex issues, these 
deliberations looked like “waffling,” as his key advisor Leon Billings put it in a memo to his files. 
“It was extremely difficult to portray the gray areas of the environment issues,” Billings lamented, 
“especially in light of the fact that the majority of the environmental constituency sees only 
blacks and whites.”60 Though Billings counseled his boss to run as an uncompromising defender 
of the environment, Muskie chose the gray uncertainty of a moderate, losing what might have 
been a powerful constituency among environmentalists without any commensurate gain among 
moderate voters. 61 
 Having no personal interest in environmental protection, Nixon nevertheless followed the 
advice of his advisors and evinced just enough concern about environmental quality to 
neutralize the issue in the campaign. Though he signed many of the nation’s signature 
environmental programs into law, Nixon himself remained deeply skeptical of both the merits of 
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strong regulatory intervention and the public’s support for such measures. In July 1971, for 
example, a denouncement of environmentalist “delusionals” in a speech by Look Magazine 
editor Thomas Shepard caught Nixon’s ear.62 Nixon loved Shepard’s speech, prompting a multi-
month effort on the part of environmental advisor John Whitaker to debunk Shepard’s claims 
and keep the president from delivering a similar speech of his own.63 Whitaker’s task was a 
formidable one. Besides sharing Shepard’s hostility toward environmentalists, Nixon simply did 
not believe that environmental protection was a salient or lasting political issue. Whitaker had 
been fighting this attitude since he joined the administration and now turned to public polling to 
convince the president to forget Shepard and instead show support for environmental 
protection.   
In many memos on the subject, Whitaker cited the findings of electoral and public 
opinion pollster Robert Teeter and his Opinion Research Corporation (ORC). Teeter had been 
one of EPA’s first advisors, brought on by Ruckelshaus to help the agency stay abreast of public 
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opinion regarding the environment.64 Now, Whitaker used Teeter’s findings of strong support for 
environmental protection among key voting demographics to convince a skeptical president to 
tolerate EPA’s strong regulatory interventions.65 On the national level, Teeter had found more 
than three quarters of Americans supported forcing businesses to invest large amounts of 
capital in pollution control so long as that spending translated into a “small increase” in prices for 
consumer goods. But that ratio of support flipped to sixty percent against if the price increases 
were “large.”66 Wide popular support for pollution control, Whitaker argued, meant that Nixon 
would be harmed by a “Ding-A-Ling” condemnation. Rather, Nixon should strike “a balance 
between environmental and economic concerns.”67  
Nixon’s campaign by-and-large followed Whitaker’s advice, hewing toward a “balanced” 
middle ground regarding the environment. Teeter’s polling over the course of the campaign 
affirmed Whitaker’s counsel. While 74% of respondents in a January 1972 survey considered 
environmental issues “extremely” or “very” important, those same respondents were evenly 
divided as to whether promoting economic growth should be emphasized at the expense of the 
environment. Furthermore, despite Muskie’s strong environmental record, respondents 
considered Nixon only slightly less competent to handle environmental issues. While less than 
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1% of subjects polled considered environmental improvements to be an important 
accomplishment of the Nixon Administration, only 1% considered pollution to be a major 
failure.68 Nixon’s moderate approach to environmental regulation in his policies had effectively 
neutralized environmental concerns as campaign issues.  
Contrary to Teeter’s predictions, Vietnam and the economy continued to dominate 
voters’ attention as the election drew near. In the September polling, the environment had fallen 
off Teeter’s list of major issues, with roughly 6% of interview subjects reporting environmental 
issues among the top three most important facing the nation. By September, Teeter’s pollsters 
were tracking another issue – public awareness of a break in at the Democratic National 
Committee’s offices in the Watergate complex.69 On Election Day, facing only flickers of the 
Watergate firestorm that would soon consume his administration, Nixon won in a landslide, 
capturing over sixty percent of the popular vote and carrying every state except 
Massachusetts.70  
 A year earlier, when Muskie was still the front-runner, Leon Billings experienced 
something of the dirty politics that eventually brought down Nixon. On November 9, 1971 
Billings encountered mechanical problem with the phones in the offices of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. Staff who answered ringing phones suddenly found 
themselves connected to random offices. Except the connections did not appear random to 
Billings, who confided to fellow staffer Ann Garrabrant, “I may be paranoid, but it strikes me that 
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in the following list of offices reached in this way in the last two hours, there are enough 
connected to our activities to suggest a possible messed-up phone bugging.” The following day, 
Muskie’s suspicions deepened after representatives of C & P Telephone Company confirmed 
that the odd connections were confined to three Congressional offices with jurisdiction over 
environmental policy.71 The weird connections stopped that day and if Billings remained 
suspicious about tapped phones, he kept those concerns to himself, until news spread of the 
Watergate break in, conducted, it would later turn out, to correct another bungled phone 
bugging operation. Billings eventually testified in the Watergate hearings and though his 
bugging claims were never confirmed, Watergate operatives at the infamous Committee to Re-
Elect the President were found to have sabotaged Muskie’s campaign by planting fake news 
stories about the Senator.  
Among many others, the Watergate conflagration claimed EPA Administrator 
Ruckelshaus as collateral damage. With a reputation for integrity, Ruckelshaus found himself 
appointed Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and then Deputy Attorney 
General as part of Nixon’s increasingly desperate effort to contain the spreading scandal. In 
October 1973, Nixon made Ruckelshaus the second victim of the Saturday Night Massacre, 
firing him after Ruckelshaus echoed Attorney General Elliot Richardson in refusing to dismiss 
the special prosecutor appointed to investigate Nixon. By August 1974 Nixon had exhausted 
every option to contain the crisis and became the first president to resign the office, replaced by 
Gerald Ford.72 
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As President Ford set about governing after Nixon’s resignation, the domestic policy 
advisors who survived Watergate pressed forward with a new plan to elevate economic 
considerations in EPA’s rulemaking. Within Ford’s first month in office, Glenn Schleede, Nixon’s 
former Science Advisor, proposed a new group to collect and assess information from 
regulatory agencies, industry, academics, consultants, special interest groups, nonprofits, and 
others. Schleede called for the new analytical group to report directly to the Science Advisor and 
to be funded in large part by the National Science Foundation. Rather than interfere directly in 
agency rulemaking, the new analytical group would inform White House intervention.73 Ford’s 
chief domestic advisor Ken Cole (also inherited from Nixon) liked the proposal and presented 
the idea to the president in September 1974.  
Though Ford rejected the proposal as part of his pledge to forego executive branch 
spending, its promulgation exemplified the president’s thinking about environmental policy.74 
Three characteristics stand out. First, the proposal emphasized the inevitability of conflict 
between national objectives, such as improving environmental quality and increasing energy 
self-sufficiency.75 Unlike Nixon, Ford insisted on the impossibility of meeting all the nation’s 
objectives – at least immediately. In speech after speech, Ford reminded audiences that the 
environmental problems facing the nation had been created over more than a century and thus 
would require more than a decade to correct. Second, the memo proposed technically 
sophisticated analysis as a means of balancing these competing objectives. The group would 
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consist of approximately five members with a wide variety of technical training and an ample 
budget to contract additional research. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the memo reflected 
the Ford Administration’s conviction that public support for such balancing could be achieved by 
laying out the scientific and economic implications of particular regulations. The reports of the 
new group were to be distributed to Congress and other agencies as well as to the general 
public on request. Together, these three facets envisioned economic analysis as a science with 
wide legitimacy and as an approach that would moderate environmental regulation.   
The persistent mistrust of EPA’s own economic analysis was a major impetus behind 
Schleede’s proposal. Endorsing Schleede’s proposal for the new group, economic advisor Alan 
Pulsipher lamented that the current assessments available from EPA were of such poor quality 
that they contributed little to policy discussions. Pulsipher absolved EPA and CEQ from any 
need to improve their analyses, noting that they could hardly be expected to given their 
“clientele,” echoing old suspicions regarding EPA and CEQ’s supposed primary loyalties to the 
environmentalist community.76 
Business interests fanned concerns about the quality of EPA’s analysis and suggested 
that EPA required the help of outside review to achieve balance in its rulemaking. Trade 
associations often expounded on that critique by commissioning their own economic studies 
and offering them to sympathetic White House advisors. Such was the case with a 1975 report 
produced by the American Paper Institute that argued EPA’s proposed water pollution controls 
on the industry would be more inflationary than the agency had acknowledged.77 In a testament 
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to the soft touch that well connected lobbyists were able to employ, a memo describing the 
American Paper Institute’s complaint noted that “an acquaintance dropped off” the report in a 
visit to one advisor’s office, where it was promptly sent around the White House for review and 
comment.78  
Russell Train, who replaced Ruckelshaus as EPA Administrator, presented himself as 
acutely sensitive to these complaints. In his first meeting with the new president, EPA 
Administrator Train emphasized his commitment to balancing environmental goals with the 
economic costs of regulatory interventions. Distinguishing his tenure from that of his 
predecessor, Train noted that he had devoted a great deal of his time to meeting with business 
representatives.79 In short letters sent throughout the Ford Administration, Train made a point of 
reminding Ford of his sensitivity to business concerns.80 Train’s professions of cost sensitivity 
extended to informing Ford about the potential economic costs of regulations proposed by other 
agencies, as when his Assistant Administrator for the Air Program called the White House to 
warn that new vinyl chloride regulations promulgated by the Occupational Health and Safety 
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Administration had set a strict standard that EPA believed to be based on bad science and 
which would force EPA to issue unnecessarily expensive regulations of its own.81  
Some businesses took a more public and pugnacious approach to challenging EPA’s 
analytical prowess, betting that popular opinion might be sufficiently enflamed to force EPA to 
ease regulations. In the fall of 1974, American Electric Power (AEP), an electric utility holding 
company operating in the Northeast and Midwest, spent over $3 million on an advertising blitz 
attacking EPA’s requirement that coal fired electric power plants install flue gas desulfurization 
systems (known colloquially as “scrubbers”).82 One such advertisement in Newsweek typified 
AEP’s campaign to bury the scrubber requirement. Collecting every nail they could find for the 
regulation’s coffin, AEP declared that the supposed benefits of the technology had been 
reached through faulty cost/benefit analysis. Appealing to growing public concerns over energy 
supplies and prices, the Newsweek advertisement also warned that the scrubber requirement 
had created tremendous uncertainty in whether the nation’s coal reserves could be utilized. In 
conclusion, AEP asked, “isn’t it about time someone redirected E.P.A.’s energies into more 
constructive channels?”  
AEP’s question caught the attention of President Ford himself, who asked EPA officials 
for their response. Scrambling to answer the president, EPA drew on its own economic and 
technical studies to insist on the feasibility and necessity of scrubbers.83 Responding to Ford’s 
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Figure 3: American Electric Power attempted to bury the scrubber  
in this full page advertisement in Newsweek in 1974.84 
 
letter, EPA’s Mike Duval refuted American Electric Power’s claims point by point, apparently 
settling the matter since Ford declined to intervene further on American Electric Power’s 
behalf.85 As EPA’s response to the scrubber controversy demonstrated, quality economic 
analysis could protect the agency against a continuous onslaught of criticism from industry 
about the feasibility of agency mandates. In September 1975, however, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals sent EPA’s economists back to the drawing board when they rejected EPA’s 
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analysis that scrubbers were economically feasible, citing the electric power industry’s own 
studies as more convincing than the agency’s and ordering EPA to revise the scrubber 
requirement.86 
Funding New Economics Expertise 
 
The acrimonious debate about the costs of pollution control funneled millions of dollars 
into research on the subject, supporting the growth of environmental consultancies and the 
discipline of environmental economics. As with earlier research on the subject, the amount of 
information available to policymakers could be overwhelming. Canvasing just the White House, 
a Ford advisor found two different studies on inflation and transportation controls underway in 
separate offices.87 A 1974 Ford administration survey meant to get a handle on research into 
the economics of pollution at the federal level revealed that twelve agencies and departments 
had over three hundred ongoing studies on the costs of pollution control in 1974. The 
Department of the Interior led the way with ninety-eight studies underway. EPA was sponsoring 
sixty studies; CEQ another forty-one. NASA had fifteen, as did the Department of Defense. The 
Department of Urban Development had contracted twenty-one studies and several other 
agencies were each sponsoring a handful more.88 The tens of millions of dollars funding this 
research went primarily to consulting firms and new environmental economics departments in 
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universities across the country.89 This money fueled the growing prowess of a Stephen Sobotka 
& Co. (paid $30,000 to study the viability of the coal industry under the implementation of state 
pollution controls), or Oregon State University (paid roughly $115,000 to determine the 
economic impact of fluoride production on orchards).90  
In the 1960s and 1970s, economics departments across the country drew on federal and 
industry research funding as well as widespread public interest in the environment to build 
programs in environmental and natural resource economics. Tom Crocker, whose contributions 
to the field are discussed in Chapter One, charted many of these new programs in his 
professional career.91 Crocker began his doctorate at the University of Missouri, where the 
water resource specialist Mason Gaffney had created the nation’s first program in Natural 
Resource Economics. In the mid 1960s, Gaffney moved to the University of Wisconsin, helping 
to establish an environmental economics program there under the department chair James 
Earley. Crocker followed to Gaffney to Wisconsin, securing a series of contracts from the Public 
Health Service, one of EPA’s predecessor agencies, to research the costs of air pollution to 
agriculturalists in Florida. The longtime home of the Land Economics field, Wisconsin also came 
to be an early center for economists interested in pollution and environmental regulation, 
drawing prominent young stars such as Ralph D’Arge.  
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In the late 1960s, Earley brought Crocker and D’Arge with him to the University of 
California at Riverside, where he had been appointed the Dean of the College of Social and 
Behavioral Sciences. At Riverside, Crocker and D’Arge built an environmental and natural 
resource economics program with Maurine Cooper, a young economist from Cornell. The three 
scholars attracted graduate students with funding from EPA, which by 1971 was sponsoring 
several millions of dollars of environmental economics research each year.92 EPA funding 
supported studies such as D’Arge and Crocker’s 1971 work on the correlation between air 
pollution and property values in Chicago.93  
By the early 1970s, environmental economists had begun drawing borders around their 
discipline. Early participants had included scholars who questioned the dynamics and even the 
desirability of continued economic growth.94 Popular books by the economist E.F. Schumacher 
and the biologist Paul Ehrlich illustrate the continued public appetite for such radical stances in 
the early 1970s.95 But most environmental economists gathered around the consensus that 
taxes or other surcharges could address the social costs of pollution, allowing capitalism to 
continue apace without destroying the world.96 In 1973, Allen Kneese together with A. Myrick 
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Freeman and Robert Haveman published the first widely used textbook.97 Students in new 
environmental economics courses learned to make room in existing models for environmental 
externalities but encountered no radical rethinking of the desirability of continued economic 
growth.  
At UC Riverside, Crocker and D’Arge found themselves embroiled what Crocker 
describes as increasingly nasty personal disputes with Marxist economists in the department. 
By the mid 1970s, both Crocker and D’Arge made it known that they were ready to leave. 
Hearing of their desire, an enterprising president at the University of Wyoming offered Crocker 
and D’Arge substantial funding to bring a dozen graduate students to Wyoming and take charge 
of the small, moribund economics department there. By refocusing the department around 
environmental economics, the university president intended to capitalize on the growth of the 
exciting new field. That investment paid off, with Crocker and D’Arge building one of the premier 
environmental economics departments in the country in Laramie, Wyoming. Crocker established 
himself as an important distributor of EPA funding, serving as Project Director for grants worth 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, which he dispensed to economists at Wyoming as well as the 
University of New Mexico, the University of Colorado-Boulder, Cornell University, and the 
University of California – Los Angeles.98  
During the same period, environmental consultancies sprang up to assist agencies and 
businesses in compliance matters and positioned themselves as experts on the 
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microeconomics of pollution control in particular industries. A 1974 national directory of 
environmental consultancies listed hundreds of experts on air and water pollution, some of them 
individual proprietors but many already quickly growing firms like Arthur Little, Inc. States with 
long histories of pollution control efforts listed dozens of consultants working within their borders 
(California had over ninety). States where pollution control had begun only recently had far 
fewer: Arkansas listed two consultancies and Arizona had only one.99 Consultancies became 
such an important part of policymaking, according to a former EPA manager, that staff in EPA 
headquarters would have had little need for such a directory, since they knew offhand which 
firms to contact on any given issue.100 Consultants looking to drum up business “roamed the 
halls” of EPA during the 1970s, in the words of another former EPA manager, asking the policy 
managers they met what they needed.101  
In addition, a new White House directive began to generate reports from individual 
agencies on the inflationary aspects of their rulemakings. In November 1974, Ford issued 
Executive Order 11821, which instructed federal agencies to include a statement on the 
inflationary impact of any proposed major regulations. 102 In close consultation with the Office of 
Management and Budget, EPA developed a set of criteria that would trigger an Inflation Impact 
Statement.103 When EO 11821 expired in December 1976, Ford issued EP 11949, extending 
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and renaming the review the Economic Impact Statement Program to reflect the evolution 
toward broader economic concerns.104     
In the absence of a White House group dedicated to analyzing the economic and social 
impacts of new environmental regulations, the task of reviewing those incoming statements fell 
to the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS). The Council had been formed in August 
1974 as part of President Ford’s public campaign to reduce inflation and engaged in what 
policymakers called “jawboning” – the use of a public platform to critique businesses and public 
agencies in the hopes of browbeating the targeted firm or agency into changing their decisions 
about prices, wages, and regulations. COWPS was also given the authority to review the 
Inflation Impact Statements produced by EPA and other agencies. The cost/benefit framework 
employed in such review could be quite reductive in the hands of White House advisors, as 
exemplified by one memo that simply stated: “OMB/COWPS should see to it that E.P.A. prove 
benefit/cost = more than 1.0.”105 Against such a rubric, short term compliance inevitably loomed 
larger than the more difficult to estimate and quantify long term benefits. And, as Ford’s advisors 
intended, the evaluation of potential regulations through that prism made EPA more “inflation-
conscious” in its own deliberations.106 As with Nixon, Ford’s use of regulatory review further 
elevated economics in environmental policymaking. 
 
Appealing to Balance in Complaining About Costs 
 
No matter how “inflation-consciousness,” regulatory review might have made EPA, 
regulated businesses could hope for little relief from compliance mandates for regulations that 
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had already been enacted. Instead, many firms followed American Electric Power’s example 
and fought regulations by appealing to sympathetic elected officials and the general public. 
Those appeals frequently used the rhetoric of balancing, particularly in locales where much of 
the population was closely dependent on a particular industry or firm. In such places, looming 
compliance deadlines under the Clean Air Act standards provoked consternation and fear that 
business leaders could whip into a frenzy by claiming that enforcement of the deadlines might 
force them to shut down vital industries.  
Such was the case with the Kennecott Copper Corporation’s smelting operation in 
McGill, Nevada. Despite being located in a rural area, Kennecott’s McGill plant generated 
enough sulfur dioxide that the surrounding area violated the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard for the pollutant. Under the original State Implementation Plan submitted by Nevada in 
1972, Kennecott was to increase the height of an emissions stack and install an acid plant, 
together costing approximately twenty-three million dollars, in order to allow the area to meet 
the 1975 deadline for attaining the sulfur dioxide standard. In contrast to Kennecott’s smelting 
operations in Arizona and Utah, the company did not propose to remake its entire operations in 
McGill, explaining to EPA that the mostly exhausted copper reserves in Nevada could not justify 
such a large expenditure. Unconvinced, EPA disapproved Nevada’s state plan because of 
Kennecott’s failure to install the most advanced controls. Though Kennecott revised its plan and 
received EPA approval for more substantial controls, the firm soon lagged behind its approved 
compliance schedule and took to the courts and the public sphere to oppose EPA’s 
requirements.107  
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In 1974, with Kennecott struggling to meet the deadlines of the modified State 
Implementation Plan, Kennecott indicated to the residents of McGill and nearby Ely that it might 
have to close the McGill plant if an extension could not be secured. The threat of the region’s 
largest employer shutting down prompted widespread panic among local residents and officials. 
Underscoring the importance of the firm to the area’s livelihood, Nevada Governor Mike 
O’Callaghan successfully petitioned EPA to open hearings about whether the company should 
be granted an extension.  
W. Howard Winn, Kennecott’s General Manager for Nevada, set the tone for the 
hearings when he took up the rationale of Clean Air Act itself to argue that despite the pollution 
it generated, the McGill plant was essential to the public welfare of a county without viable 
economic alternatives. The hearings brought out nearly every elected official in the town and 
region, including the Mayor, the City Councilmen, the County Assessor, the County Recorder 
and Auditor, and the Board of County Commissioners. One by one, those officials painted a dire 
portrait of school closures and other wrenching dislocations that would result if the McGill plant 
shut down. As one official put it, “I’ve looked down this valley when there was no smoke coming 
from those stacks and it wasn’t a good picture.” Kennecott’s peril also drew the support of the 
local Labor Council (which saw workers’ livelihoods as well as a previously planned strike in 
peril) as well as the local branch of the Jaycees civic organization. Other business leaders, like 
the general manager of the local utility, testified that Kennecott’s closure would likely bankrupt 
their enterprises, dependent as the area was on the largest employer. 108  
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Although such complaints drew the attention from top EPA officials, the agency 
ultimately refused to grant Kennecott an extension. And so, in the summer of 1976, with the 
McGill plant still not in compliance, EPA shut down operations. Kennecott and elected 
representatives of Ely and Nevada appealed to the Ford Administration to reverse EPA’s 
decision. In so doing, Kennecott’s supporters likely took heart in the Administration’s earlier 
intervention in national copper smelter regulations proposed by EPA two years previous. In that 
case, OMB negotiated exemptions with EPA that allowed copper smelters to avoid the stricter 
new source review process for major modifications.109 Hoping for a similar intervention, 
Nevada’s Attorney General joined a US Congressman, Nevada’s governor, and the president of 
local Chamber of Commerce in petitioning President Ford to appeal EPA’s 1976 shutdown 
order.110  
But while the letters sent several of Ford’s advisors scrambling to assess the situation, 
the Ford Administration ultimately declined to intervene, citing court rulings that prevented 
exemptions that violated the national standards.111 Over the next six years, Kennecott waged a 
protracted legal battle with EPA over its Ely operations, whipsawing the fortunes of the local 
community as the smelter opened and closed and opened and closed.112 Legal battles and the 
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intermittent operations of the smelter continued until 1983, when Kennecott closed the McGill 
plant for good.113 
The efforts of the Ford Administration to scale back proposed EPA smelter regulations 
while simultaneously refusing to get dragged into the fight between Kennecott and EPA 
exemplified a larger pattern of White House involvement in environmental policy. When EPA 
regulations were the in drafting stage, White House advisors often campaigned with gusto to 
make the rules less burdensome on business. But once the regulations had been promulgated, 
presidential advisors tended to confine their response to disgruntled individual firms to a 
sympathetic forwarding of those complaints on to EPA. 
McGill’s expendability in Kennecott’s overall operations underscores the challenge that 
EPA faced in dealing with such controversies. Kennecott’s general manager stated the obvious 
in his opening testimony on the binding connections between the area’s livelihoods and the 
plant’s pollution control requirements. But in keeping with a larger asymmetry in industry’s 
relationship to local places, Kennecott Copper Corporation faced no such existential crisis. 
Kennecott owned and operated mines and smelters across the American Southwest as well as 
in Canada, Alaska, Chile, South Africa, and the Ozarks. Pollution control requirements made 
McGill and other US smelting operations increasingly expensive to operate. In 1976, the $1.4 
billion company reported less than $10 million in profits despite collecting nearly $1.8 billion in 
revenue – a poor performance that Kennecott’s President and CEO explained to the 
shareholders by citing $100 million in pollution control expenditures that amounted to three-
quarters of Kennecott’s total capital investments that year.114 Given that Kennecott’s reserves in 
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Nevada were already dwindling, it can hardly be surprising that the company found it more 
profitable to run the McGill smelter for a decade without the full pollution controls demanded by 
EPA than invest in the expensive comprehensive controls that would have enabled more 
sustained production within the limits of the national standards.115 Appealing to local livelihoods 
in court and the public sphere bought Kennecott that additional decade at McGill. Kennecott’s 
geographically diversified holdings permitted the firm to detach its own fortunes from Nevada 
(and the US more broadly) when that extra time ran out. Thus, the balancing to which Kennecott 
appealed amounted to compromises made by the local populace. When McGill ceased to 
generate sufficient profit margins, Kennecott simply left. Furthermore, while Kennecott might 
have left as a result of a wide range of business calculations, EPA’s pollution control mandates 
gave the company an easy villain for the closure, directing the blame toward the federal 
government and away from capitalist decision-making.  
Such blame created exactly the sort of political blowback that EPA had tried to counter 
by investing in sophisticated economic analysis. Roy Gamse, who directed the Economic 
Dislocation Early Warning System as part of his duties in overseeing the Economic Analysis 
Division, remained constantly aware of the political risks to which plant closures exposed the 
agency. In their reports, Gamse’s office erred on the side of flagging regulatory burdens to have 
been the principal factor behind shutdowns, allowing EPA officials to avoid any surprise 
accusations. While Gamse stated that EPA staff knew that shutdowns occurred primarily in 
marginal industries, agency officials strongly wished to limit the agency’s connections to any 
loss of employment. 116 As a result, even marginal industries used the threat to bring EPA to the 
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bargaining table.117 In a 1978 memo to Administrator Costle, Gamse noted that only fifteen 
percent of threatened closures had actually occurred. A full fifty-seven percent of the threats 
that EPA had tracked in the Early Warning System were ultimately resolved with the plants 
remaining open and meeting regulatory requirements, although Gamse noted, “some 
regulations may have been revised.” The remaining nineteen percent continued to threaten 
closure.118 Perhaps these hold outs were waiting for a better deal. 
Occasionally, EPA recognized that howls from businesses and the public could be 
directed toward its own ends. EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus had long expressed 
reservations to Congress and the general public about the states’ ability to achieve the Clean 
Air Act’s national air quality standards by the Act’s 1975 deadline but had found his calls for 
moderation repeatedly rebuffed. In the case of the state of California, reducing automobile 
emissions of criteria pollutants like carbon monoxide and total photochemical oxidants by the 
1975 deadline could only have been achieved by drastically reducing the number of cars on the 
road.119 As historian Tom McCarthy has described, a series of court victories for environmental 
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organizations in the early 1970s forced EPA to propose a transportation control plan for 
California.120  
Having lost the legal authority to avoid transportation controls, Ruckelshaus turned to 
public protest to seek relief for California and his agency. In 1973, EPA introduced a traffic 
reduction plan under which California could meet the 1975 deadline. The plan called for severe 
limits on vehicle use, especially in Southern California. In addition to some features that 
eventually survived (such as carpool lanes on highways) the plan called for gasoline rationing 
as well as surcharges on all new parking lot construction and the removal of parking lots from 
several downtown areas. In so doing, EPA aimed to make it so expensive to park that residents 
would be forced to use public transportation or carpools, thereby lowering automobile 
emissions.  
If the plan sounds politically impossible in the context of car crazy Los Angeles, that was 
Ruckelshaus’s intent. A memo written by Nixon advisor Ken Cole to the president in January 
1973 suggests that EPA’s proposed transportation controls were a careful strategy to raise 
public protest against the current Clean Air Act requirements and spur Congress to allow EPA 
more leeway around the transportation controls until a technological solution obviated the 
problem. As Cole laid out in the memo: 
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The EPA plan is unworkable. We know it and Ruckelshaus will say it. It would require an 80% traffic 
reduction in the Los Angeles area. Our intention is, of course, never to put such a plan into effect, but to 
ultimately amend the Clean Air Act to permit administrative discretion in achieving the legislative 
requirements so that we can permit the technology of the automobile industry to in effect solve the 
problem itself over time. To do so, we need to call the problem to the public’s attention. Public hearings 
will take place shortly after the plan is published. Ultimately we will move legislation to the Congress to 
amend the Act. 
 
To prevent the outcry from getting out of hand, Cole noted that Governor Reagan had been 
briefed on the real purpose of the announced transportation controls and that he had concurred 
with the plan.121 
Together with Ruckelshaus’s earlier complaints about the severity of the NAAQS, the 
transportation controls appear to have been one part of a wider strategy on Ruckelshaus’s part 
to create public support for a moderation of EPA’s responsibilities under the Clean Air Act.122 
Ruckelshaus recalls that he met with John Ehrlichman and convinced him to let EPA follow the 
letter of the law in order to “make it very clear what is unadministrable” to the public and “see if 
we can convince Congress to give us some adjustment.” With the much larger threat of the 
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emerging Watergate scandal dominating his time, Ehrlichman assented.123 Describing for Nixon 
the intent behind several of Ruckelshaus’s contemporaneous pronouncements, Ehrlichman 
noted that they were a “deliberate and calculated preconditioning” on Ruckelshaus’s part, 
“designed to sock the consumers into a realization that the cost of the environment will be very 
high and that the air quality laws are very impractical.”124 As Ruckelshaus describes his 
strategy, he figured that he could use the court mandate to help “both the people in California 
and the broader public to understand the implications of this law.” EPA would “be vigorously 
going after compliance but it had to be done on a more reasonable basis.”125 
As expected, Ruckelshaus’s proposed transportation controls succeeded in generating 
swift and angry reactions. Business representatives predominated among the complainants, 
writing to the White House to denounce the proposed parking lot surcharge and gasoline 
rationing as a threat to the survival of their enterprises. An owner of a packaging plant grossing 
$2 million in annual revenue summoned the apocalyptical imagery of the Great Depression, 
writing, “I believe that industry in California will be brought right down to its knees. I can see 
nothing but plants closing, chaos, unemployment, and a relief roll and an unemployment 
compensation roll… the like of which would stagger the imagination.”126 Also opting for a stark 
portrait of catastrophe, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce declared that the proposed 
gasoline rationing “would simply destroy this area and the way of life of our residents in an effort 
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to meet an arbitrary date.”127 A report commissioned by California estimated that the controls 
would cost the state some $1.5 billion per year in development and result in the loss of over 
150,000 jobs as eighty percent of the workforce found it impossible to commute to work.128 
Elected officials also denounced the proposed controls as an overreach of the federal 
government. The Mayor of the City of Santa Ana wrote Nixon to warn that “the powers 
delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency far exceed anything ever developed in our 
history,” and that parking lot surcharges would “disastrously affect this City’s economy.”129 
Despite their frustration, the majority of these various petitioners allowed that air pollution 
needed to be controlled – just not so drastically. Succinctly articulating that sentiment, the 
residents of Sunnyvale, California wrote in their petition that the parking lot controls would have 
disruptive economic effects so acute as to “have a greater deterrent upon the health and public 
welfare than the dirty air itself.”130  
Across the country, EPA announced similar transportation requirements in places like 
New Jersey that were also poised to miss the 1975 deadline. Ruckelshaus and EPA did not 
want to spur Congress so far that it might gut the Clean Air Act however, and so subsequent 
transportation control proposals emphasized aspects like parking surcharges rather than the 
more contentious gasoline rationing.131 Replacing Ruckelshaus as Administrator, Russell Train 
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found himself immediately besieged by real estate developers and construction unions over the 
possibility that parking lot controls would halt the building of suburban shopping malls and other 
car-dependent landscapes. Under Train, EPA backpedaled away from parking restrictions in 
California and from a similar plan to compel private employers in Boston to remove a quarter of 
their parking spaces.132 With outrage still simmering, Congress included an explicit prohibition 
against such controls in 1974 legislation designed, somewhat paradoxically, to safeguard 
adequate fuel supplies during the OPEC oil embargo.133 EPA finally had its reprieve from the 
statutory mandate to yank people out of their cars.134  
Prevented by the Clean Air Act from proposing standards that explicitly weighed 
economic costs, EPA’s transportation control plans show the agency’s capacity to manipulate 
public opinion as an alternate means to more reasonable standards. Facing unworkable 
mandates, EPA could sometimes generate a pragmatic solution by proposing regulations like 
parking lot controls that so obviously upset popular notions of balance.  
However, the unintended ricochet of inspiring outrage is worth dwelling on. Ruckelshaus 
believed in the merits of a substantive shift away from polluting cars, just at a more gradual 
pace than the Clean Air Act required. But many of the people enflamed by his parking lot 
controls and gasoline rationing plainly did not believe that they should have to change their 
behavior in the name of environmental protection. By amplifying those voices in response to 
such an incredibly disruptive plan, Ruckelshaus helped to politicize what had been a bipartisan 
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commitment to environmental protection.135 Telling ordinary Americans that they could not drive 
their own cars created a perfect specter of overreaching bureaucracy – providing delicious 
fodder for Reagan Republicans in their subsequent campaign against the liberal state. In 
addition to feeding this growing partisan divide, Ruckelshaus’s plan also dramatized the costs of 
regulatory intervention, contributing to a growing rhetorical tendency to dichotomize 
environmental protection and economic wellbeing – deepening an imaginary divide that 




 Regardless of whether the speaker was the Administrator of the EPA or the executive of 
a multi-national firm, the rhetoric of balancing increasingly depended on quantified costs and 
benefits – but especially costs. Quantification, in turn, became the province of environmental 
economists, who deployed ever more sophisticated models and theories to provide dollared 
figures that could be easily compared – an ease that is at least as important in policymakers 
growing preference for such analysis as any objective insight that those economists provided. 
But while economics did tend to emphasis short-term costs of regulations over the long-term 
benefits of protection, the growing influence of the field was not a straightforward coup for 
regulated industries. Most of the first practitioners of environmental economics had been drawn 
to the work out of a conviction that environmental protection was undervalued and institutions 
like Resources for the Future supported studies that found wide benefits in the sort of regulatory 
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protections that businesses angrily opposed. From the first months of EPA’s existence, senior 
agency officials funded research that further established the pecuniary benefits of protection.     
As a result, opponents of environmental regulation appealed to the pecuniary costs of 
such programs at their own risk. By the mid-1970s, environmental advocates had built their own 
expertise with economic calculations and could cite a wide range of research suggesting that 
regulatory protection was, on balance, an economic boon for the nation.136 Citing a specific 
dollared price for regulation was particularly risky, as President Ford found out the hard way 
when he claimed in an April 1975 speech that federal regulations cost the average American 
family $2,000 each year. As the Washington Post described the aftermath of that claim, Ford’s 
$2,000 figure “sent a number of people to their pocket calculators,” where they determined that 
Ford’s numbers added up to $125 billion in annual spending, or a clearly inaccurate one tenth of 
the country’s GDP. Critics such as California’s Congressman John Moss were quick to pounce, 
citing studies by the US Government Accountability Office and other sources that estimated far 
lower per family totals. The White House eventually had to admit that its analysis might have 
been inaccurate, an embarrassment OMB addressed by directing the National Science 
Foundation to fund further research on the subject.137 
Taking heed of such risks, most critics of regulation found it safer to claim that the rule in 
question upset a balance between economic and environmental objectives – a quotidian 
weighing of emphasis and priorities that had more to do with a guttural reaction to fewer parking 
spaces or plumes of smoke than cost/benefit analysis. Yet even the rhetoric of balancing 
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remained open to contest, appealing as it did to a pragmatic assessment of regulation that 
politicians could not completely control. Adding yet another letter to the pile that amassed 
around the fate of the Kennecott Copper Smelter, Ely resident Paul Knoblich exemplified how 
ordinary Americans could articulate their own balance between environmental and economic 
concerns that did not necessarily accord with what firms or politicians had in mind. Insisting on 
the imperative of keeping the plant open, Knoblich laid out a detailed compromise whereby the 
plant would close temporarily to come into compliance, with idle labor hired to build the control 
structures as quickly as possible and EPA granting a partial extension to minimize the 
unemployment. Calling on all the parties involved to sacrifice for the common good, Knoblich 
concluded, “past mistakes by the country as a whole, by the community, can not be overcome 
without the country and community paying for these mistakes.”138 Rhetorical calls for balancing 
appealed to the sensibilities of someone like Knoblich without ever fully controlling the 
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Chapter 4: The Allure of Markets 
 
 The proliferation of government regulation in the postwar period provoked frightful 
warnings from business interests that the heavy hand of the state would destroy capitalism and 
democracy along with it.1 Proponents of environmental regulation could largely ignore these 
diatribes in the 1960s and early 1970s because Americans broadly supported improving 
environmental quality through powerful new institutions like the Environmental Protection 
Agency. But despite being ignored for the time being, that stark opposition to regulation found 
refuge in think tanks, where it was refined in sophistication and moderated in tone. 
Simultaneously, neoclassical economists with their preference for freeing competition steadily 
gained influence among public policy experts. In the late 1960s, these pundits seized on 
expanding environmental regulation as a prime example of the distortions and inefficiencies 
caused by regulatory interventions. EPA’s directly applied standards and technological 
mandates became favorite targets of neoclassical economists and others opposed to what they 
considered dangerous government overreach.  
In the mid-1970s, a combination of economic woes created the perfect conditions for 
those incubating critiques of regulation to gain widespread attention and political traction. Critics 
of EPA’s direct regulation blamed the agency’s robust interventions for rising rates of 
unemployment and inflation as well as skyrocketing oil prices and lagging productivity. Many 
Republicans and some Democrats came to view the strict regulations that accompanied EPA’s 
implementation of the Clean Air Act as evidence of the unsustainable growth of the regulatory 
state. Relying on continued popular support for environmental protection, EPA officials and 
environmentalists fiercely resisted proposals to scale back regulations and even managed to 
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expand some of EPA’s responsibilities to protect pristine air from degrading in the Clean Air Act 
amendments of 1977. But the incentive-based alternatives to direct regulation that economists 
favored gained a foothold in environmental policy, to the dismay of environmental advocates 
who viewed such innovations as giveaways to industry.  
 The election of Jimmy Carter as president in 1976 signaled a bi-partisan embrace of the 
idea that targeted reforms could and should pull back the federal government’s regulatory hand. 
In environmental policy, regulatory reformers pushed EPA to create the first market for pollution 
rights. The emissions offset policy allowed firms in heavily polluted areas, where ambient 
emissions exceeded the national standards, to purchase the right to increase their own 
emissions in exchange for a corresponding decrease from the seller. This was a change in 
compliance strategy alone; the underlying standard and EPA’s sole discretion to set it remained 
intact. But for proponents of more fundamental reforms, a door had been opened. Having 
steadily expanded its hold over environmental governance for a decade, the regulatory state 
might begin to retreat.  
 
Visions of a Market Alternative  
 
In 1968, a Canadian economist named J. H. Dales helped spread economists’ 
longstanding complaints about the inefficiency of correcting externalities with direct regulations 
throughout the environmental policy community. As Dales wrote in Pollution, Property, & Prices: 
An Essay in Policy-Making and Economics, proliferating environment regulations were part and 
parcel of a new and troubling expansive administrative state that had saddled society with 
expensive and inefficient regulations while economists and their cheaper and more effective 
approaches sat on the sidelines. Like Garrett Hardin, who popularized the concept of the 
tragedy of the commons the same year Pollution, Property, & Prices was published, Dales 




property and public property for which users could be charged a fee. A new administrative state 
had been formed to address this unrestrained pollution, Dales continued, but direct regulations 
on pollution did not address the specific benefits and costs experienced by each user and thus 
were inefficient and potentially unfair. Pollution charges tailored to mitigate the costs of each 
resource usage were more fair and efficient but required constant, time consuming and 
politically difficult tinkering. In place of these suboptimal alternatives, Dales suggested the 
pollution “rights” be created for each region that users would be required to buy to generate 
pollution. A central authority would retain a reserve of unsold rights to limit sharp price increases 
and would possess the ability to buy back rights at a fixed discount to limit any sharp deflation. 
Thus, a predetermined level of pollution could be fairly and efficiently maintained with very little 
intervention.”2 It would take another eight years before the first pollution market began 
operation, but Dales had helped introduce environmental policymakers to the seductive 
prospect of fair and efficient pollution controls that firms could theoretically manage largely on 
their own.    
For neoconservative critics of regulation, the growing consensus among economists like 
Dales that directly applied uniform standards were inefficient and expensive served as proof that 
the regulatory state would soon bring the country to ruin. In the 1970s, The Public Interest (a 
popular public policy journal founded by conservative columnist Irving Kristol in 1965) began 
publishing economists’ critiques of EPA’s supposed inefficiency.3 In 1972, The Public Interest 
published an article written by Myrick Freeman and Robert Haveman, which complained that 
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EPA had adopted a standards-based approach to water pollution control that was very difficult 
to enforce when the agency should have chosen a far more efficient system of user charges.4 
The next year, the economist Lawrence White leveled the same argument against automobile 
emissions standards, holding out emission charges as a much better alternative.5 Even traffic 
jams and their noxious fumes could be handled more efficiently by a user charge system, 
argued Elliot Ward in a latter contribution.6 While continuing to hold up the regulatory state as a 
dangerous threat to democratic liberties, neoconservative organs like The Public Interest 
bolstered their assault on protective regulations by also including more sophisticated economic 
pieces that focused on the supposedly quantifiable superiority of incentive approaches to 
regulations. 
Liberals who showed little interest in the supposed threat to democratic freedom lurking 
in pollution controls nevertheless took economists’ inefficiency critiques as a reason to question 
the desirability of the expanding regulatory state. Among the most influential critiques of 
regulation in liberal circles was Alfred Kahn’s two-volume study, The Economics of Regulation, 
published in 1970 and 1971. In clear and cutting prose, Kahn dissected the economic 
justifications for regulating industries like trucking, airlines, and electric power. Arguing that 
consumers tended to be hurt by regulations that protected incumbent firms from having to 
compete on price or service, Kahn called for the opening of several industries to market 
competition. A Cornell professor of Economics at the time he wrote his book, Kahn’s ideas 
became influential enough that when the Democrats recaptured the White House in 1976, 
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President Carter chose Kahn to serve as chairman of the Council on Wage and Price Stability 
and then to lead the deregulation of the airlines as chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board.7   
 For liberal policy makers concerned with the mounting costs of environmental 
regulations, the think tank Resources for the Future (RFF) positioned itself as an institutional 
base of research and policy recommendations. While continuing to fund the costs of pollution 
research discussed in Chapter One, RFF also began studying the costs of pollution control. 
While previous RFF research had generally supported pollution control as an economically 
sound investment, new research in the 1970s suggested that regulation could constrain 
economic growth and that the costs and benefits of environmental protection were not evenly 
distributed across the population.8 RFF economist Allen Kneese and Brookings Institute 
economist Charles Schultze collaborated on a study that found that economic incentives could 
replace direct regulations, lowering the cost of environmental interventions while making them 
more effective.9  
Realigning Incentives 
 
 Emission taxes similar to what Alfred Pigou had recommended in 1920 were the first 
alternative to direct regulations to gain traction among policymakers. Nixon’s advisors bandied 
about ideas for a tax as early as January 1970, eventually settling on sulfur emissions from 
coal-burning electric utilities as their first target.10 As the Council on Environmental Quality 
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Report. 
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explained, a sulfur tax would not only reduce overall control costs but would actually lead to a 
quicker reduction in pollutants by incentivizing firms to invest research and development capital 
in new control technologies. Since every pound of emissions reduced was money saved under 
a tax system, profit-minded firms would naturally seek out the most efficient means of making 
reductions. Controlling pollution cheaply and effectively would become another area in which 
firms competed to gain a lower price and competitive advantage for their products. Furthermore, 
a sulfur tax would expose electricity consumers to the full environmental costs of power 
generation.11  
Economists loved Nixon’s proposed tax, with notable individuals like Allen Kneese of 
RFF, Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and 
James Tobin of Yale University all voicing their support. Many environmentalists liked the idea 
as well; several prominent organizations, including the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, 
even formed the Coalition to Tax Pollution in 1972.12 Here was an idea to reduce pollution 
without the expense and intrusion of regulatory intervention. What was not to like? 
 EPA for one resisted Nixon’s sulfur tax proposal (and other emission charges in general) 
as too difficult to graft onto the existing pollution control regime. Ruckelshaus himself was 
intrigued with taxes and other incentive based programs. But he recognized that EPA had little 
room to experiment with such alternatives under the mandates in the Clean Air Act and other 
statutes. Perhaps more importantly, Ruckelshaus recounted, public opinion strongly favored 
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direct interventions, “they didn’t want us horsing around balancing economic costs against the 
protection of public health.”13  
 Business interests also rejected the idea of taxing pollution, implicitly suggesting that 
many in industry found direct regulations more accommodating than a firm tax. Arguing against 
a 1971 proposal to tax the lead content of gasoline, the American Petroleum Institute (API) 
capriciously claimed that paying such a tax would siphon off funds that the industry would 
otherwise have devoted to researching and developing pollution controls. Instead of spurring 
cost-conscious firms to develop new control technology as a means of lowering their taxes, API 
claimed that a charge would dry up funding for new technology and thus halt progress toward 
pollution control. That logic was evidently as shaky in the early 1970s as it is today, because the 
API spokesperson followed up with another explanation for the industry’s opposition: the lead 
tax would create a precedent, the spokesperson said, from which the taxing of a wide range of 
other pollutants might follow.14  
From the perspective of businesses like petroleum refiners, direct regulations created 
more opportunities to delay compliance. For while direct regulations were intrusive and 
expensive, they were enforced by politically sensitive administrators from whom firms could 
seek extensions in compliance deadlines by threatening to close plants and lay off workers, 
possibly by claiming that adequate controls had not yet been invented. A simple tax was far 
more rigid. Incumbent firms could expect that some businesses would figure out new ways to 
control pollution in order reduce their taxes, demonstrating to regulators that economically 
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feasible control technologies did exist and thus denying their peers what had been a valuable 
excuse in petitioning for relief from regulatory mandates.  
 While the sulfur tax proposal died without every making it to Congress, Nixon’s advisors 
remained enthusiastic about the prospect of using taxes or other incentives in place of direct 
regulations and uniform standards.15 Nixon suggested a recycling tax credit in his 1972 
Environmental Message to Congress, which a representative of his National Industrial Pollution 
Control Council praised as the “first major environmental initiative which is not regulatory and 
restrictive in its impact but entirely positive in its thrust.”16 EPA and industry representatives 
stood behind this tax proposal, perhaps because it did not change any aspect of the existing 
pollution control system or impose any new charges on firms.  
Under Gerald Ford, White House advisors continued to dream of substituting taxes for 
directly applied regulations. In one effort to make that dream a reality, economic advisor Alan 
Pulsipher wrote to fellow advisor Alan Greenspan in April 1975 to recommend a tax based 
system to encourage technological innovation and to account for regional differences in 
compliance costs. Pulsipher noted in his letter that he had been prompted to write in part 
because of EPA’s intransigence in maintaining its existing uniform standards and directly 
applied regulations. EPA had a large economics division, Pulsipher noted, but the agency used 
that division only to evaluate the effects of its programs rather than to make new policy.17   
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 Despite Pulsipher’s depiction of an EPA with its head in the sand, some at the agency 
had begun to consider economic incentive and market approaches. Roy Gamse, who joined 
EPA’s economic analysis division in 1971, recalls Deputy Administer Bob Fri coming in during 
Gamse’s first year for a briefing on the possibility of instituting a sulfur tax.18 That EPA staff 
entertained alternative approaches to direct regulations can be assumed based on the growing 
popularity of such ideas in the public policy world. The historian Samuel Hays long ago made 
the often overlooked point that regulators are human beings and thus absorb ideas from the 
larger cultural milieu in which they live.19 While the screeds against the regulatory state that 
appeared in places like The Public Interest were likely of little appeal to EPA staffers like 
Gamse, thoughtful portrayals of regulatory alternatives sponsored by trusted organizations like 
Resources for the Future (RFF) probably did carry influence. In the early 1970s, RFF hosted a 
monthly “brown bag” luncheon for EPA regulators, RFF economists, and various others 
interested in reforming environmental regulations.20 As enthusiasm for economic incentives and 
other reforms caught on at RFF, they gained ground with some at EPA. In September 1973, 
EPA Administrator Russell Train reversed his predecessor’s position and endorsed the 
application of a sulfur tax, albeit as a compliment to the existing standards based approach.21   
While White House economists struggled to introduce taxes and incentives into 
regulatory policy, substituting such market approaches for directly enforced standards grew ever 
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more popular among economists. In 1975, RFF and the Brookings Institute published Kneese 
and Schultze’s joint study on replacing direct regulations with economic incentives in the quickly 
popular Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy. Trotting out the usual troupes of well-intentioned but 
misguided bureaucrats, Kneese and Schultze described how the air and water pollution control 
programs introduced in the early 1970s would soon grow so expensive as to forestall continued 
progress. The problem, Kneese and Schultze argued, lay in the impossibility of regulators trying 
to devise a detailed set of rules for every industry in the face of constant technological and 
economic change. Furthermore, an inevitable increase in marginal costs made each additional 
unit of pollution more expensive than the last to control. The nation was poised to spend half a 
trillion dollars on pollution control over the next decade, Kneese and Schultze warned. And 
under the present approach, much of this spending would be wasted as regulators attempted to 
force smaller and smaller reductions out of recalcitrant industries.22   
The solution, Kneese and Schultze declared, was to harness rather than fight the profit-
maximizing impulses of industry. Pollution was not the inevitable product of capitalist production 
but rather the unintended byproduct of a misaligned pricing system. If the price of consumer 
goods and industrial inputs incorporated their real environmental costs, businesses and 
consumers would soon figure out ways to reduce pollution. In the same way that rising labor 
costs had spurred the development of new technology to reduce labor inputs, rising 
environmental costs, if properly conveyed in new prices, would drive innovations in pollution 
control. Or as Kneese and Schultze put it, “the overwhelming weight of evidence to date is that, 
with careful management, we can have our cake and eat it too – we can reconcile economic 
																																																						





growth with a reasonably clean environment.”23 The incentives for industry had only to be 
realigned.  
The tool that Kneese and Schultze suggested for that realignment was a new system of 
effluent and emission charges to replace proscriptive regulations. The federal government 
would institute a series of stiff taxes on every unit of pollution emitted into the air and water. 
These taxes would be set at levels that were slightly higher than the cost of installing control 
technology and so firms would find it less costly to reduce their emissions than to pay the 
charge. Over time, the charges could be adjusted upward to make polluting more expensive and 
so drive technological innovation. Since it relied on incentives rather than directly applied 
mandates, the system would also be less costly to administer. And by constantly promoting new 
innovation, Kneese and Schultze promised that their system would be more effective, resisting 
the complacency and industry capture that turned well-intentioned regulatory interventions into 
shields for incumbent firms.24 
Faithfully reflecting the philosophy of most economists, Kneese and Schultze offered 
their solution as apolitical – a technocratic expression of unalloyed rationality. Improving 
economic efficiency would maximize social welfare. The distribution of the costs and benefits of 
pollution control might be uneven under a new system of pollution charges on every last 
consumer good, Kneese and Schultze allowed, but policy makers should not overly trouble 
themselves about that. Those who were concerned about how the poorest would fare should 
concentrate on making regulations as efficient as possible.25   
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Actual experiments with introducing economic incentives into pollution control took place 
initially at the margins of these Beltway conversations. While economists and public policy 
experts in Washington, DC theorized ideal regulatory configurations, a select number of 
regulators at state agencies experimented with using incentives to lower the compliance and 
enforcement costs of reaching regulatory standards.  
In Connecticut, frustration with existing enforcement tools prompted the Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) to experiment with a new approach. As in other states across 
the country, Connecticut’s DEP found early enforcement mechanisms ill-suited to dealing with 
noncompliance. If DEP found a firm in violation of a requirement, the only recourse available to 
the regulators was to ask a court to issue an injunction against the continued operation of the 
plant or emission source in question. The economic ramifications and political fallout from 
shutting down major employers and sources of tax revenue effectively prevented Connecticut’s 
regulators from using that mechanism, especially with the large firms that tended to be the 
biggest sources of emissions. Cognizant of that political constraint, a few recalcitrant firms 
bucked pollution control requirements with impunity. 
In 1972, the Connecticut DEP Commissioner formed a task force to consider alternate 
enforcement mechanisms, choosing William Drayton, a young management consultant from the 
management consultancy McKinsey & Company, to direct the task force. Working with funding 
that EPA had supplied in the hopes of generating new enforcement techniques, Drayton and his 
staff decided to use sophisticated economic analysis to figure out how much a particular firm 
was saving by not complying with a given standard and then charge the firm that amount as a 
noncompliance penalty. The task force called this approach “Economic Law Enforcement.” 
Conducting such complex analysis for every violator across the state was infeasible, so 




control equipment that regulators could use to easily calculate the appropriate penalty.26 In 
1973, the task force introduced a bill into the Connecticut State Legislature granting DEP the 
authority to assess those penalties. Despite impassioned opposition from some representatives 
that such authority usurped the prerogatives of the judiciary and denied firms the right to a fair 
trial, the Act passed and was signed into law.27 Douglas Costle, DEP’s new Commissioner, 
made implementing the Economic Law Enforcement program a priority during his tenure.28     
The Connecticut DEP’s celebrated success with Economic Law Enforcement made the 
program a darling with economists and other public policy experts who hoped to bring forward in 
EPA’s policy a similar reckoning with the relative costs and benefits of pollution control among 
different firms. During hearings in the Connecticut State Legislature on the program, Princeton 
economist William Baumol and Harvard law professor Richard Stewart were among several 
nationally prominent proponents of regulatory reform who praised Connecticut’s model for its 
“economic rationality” and for offering “maximum enforcement flexibility with limited 
administrative discretion.”29 Drayton and the task force published a guide to the program, which 
touted how Connecticut regulators could now quickly bring firms into compliance, saving the 
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state funds that might have been expended on litigation and improving environmental quality.30 
As the guide and news of the program circulated, Drayton and Costle gained national 
reputations as innovative regulators, which they later rode into senior positions at EPA during 
the Carter Administration.  
In California, by contrast, regulators at the nation’s largest air pollution control agency 
had plenty of enforcement resources and political muscle. But they faced seemingly intransigent 
air pollution in Los Angeles, with little hope of meeting the national ambient air quality standards 
anytime in the near future. So it was that an economist at California’s Air Resources Board 
named William D. Carson, Jr. proposed an emission charge system in 1976. Under the 
proposed plan, regulators would enact a tax on sulfur dioxide emissions in the South Coast Air 
Basin. As Carson, Jr. explained, such a tax would have several benefits, including incentivizing 
firms to continue reducing emissions, eliminating the economic savings enjoyed by recalcitrant 
firms in delaying compliance, and allocating the greatest pollution control costs to the largest 
sources of emissions. The tax would start at 20 cents per pound and incrementally increase to 
50 cents by 1983, levels that would net the state revenues of between $50 million and $125 
million annually, to be used in administering the program. Such a charge, Carson Jr. explained, 
worked by “using the market system more or less to allocate this air.” Noting that firms might 
resist paying a tax on their full scope of emissions, Carson Jr. noted that regulators could 
compromise by setting a threshold below which emissions would not be taxed, and then slowly 
adjusting that limit downward over time. Despite all those purported benefits, California 
Governor Jerry Brown rejected the plan.31 Crafting a new approach to enforcement found 
																																																						
30 Connecticut Enforcement Project, Economic Law Enforcement, Volume I, Overview (Washington: U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, September 1975).   
31 Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., “California Air Resources Staff Weighs Pollution Tax as SO2 Control,” Environment 




support among state officials, but substituting economic incentives for direct controls remained 
beyond the pale. 
 
Environmental Protection in the Context of Regulatory Reform 
 
 In 1975, the Ford administration met rising inflation with an effort to scale back many of 
the regulations that economists blamed for rising prices and falling productivity. Initially, Ford’s 
regulatory reform program concentrated on the industry-specific regulations that animated 
popular academic economists like Alfred Kahn. In the spring of 1975, Ford’s advisors formed 
the Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory Reform and set about drafting legislation to 
remove regulations in airlines, trucking, finance, and natural gas. Yet even as the Review Group 
discussed strategies for deregulating trucking and air travel, the group had its sights on the 
 
Figure 4: Ford’s Domestic Council Review Group of Regulatory Reform in its weekly meeting.32 
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cross-industry regulations overseen by agencies like EPA.33 Memos and newspaper articles 
collected by chief domestic advisor James Cannon suggest that his attention was increasingly 
on EPA and other executive branch agencies.34 Cannon and other advisors also compiled lists 
of all the regulations placed on particular institutions and professions.35 
Environmentalists rejected the notion implicit in Ford’s Review Group that the efficiency 
of environmental protections could somehow be assessed alongside regulations governing 
airlines or trucking. Writing in The Yale Law Journal, Ralph Nader and a coauthor drew what 
they said was a vital line between rules that limited competition in specific industries and health 
and safety protections that extended across industries. Regulatory reform ought to use a 
“scalpel, not a scythe,” Nader and Green argued, to protect environmental and safety 
regulations that could not be met by “a market system incompetent or uninterested in fulfilling 
certain social needs.”36   
As enthusiasm for regulatory reform spread, distinguishing environmental from industry-
specific regulations became a critical matter for environmentalists fighting to pull hard won 
environmental protections from the yawning maw of deregulation. In June 1975, Nader 
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expounded on the distinction before the Senate Committee on Commerce, which had convened 
a special symposium on “Regulatory Myths.” In front of that friendly audience, Nader warned 
that business interests like the American Enterprise Institute and its hired gun economist Murray 
Weidenbaum were deliberately conflating “wasteful cartel regulation with life-saving consumer 
regulation,” and provoking the Ford Administration into a misguided attempt to scale back both 
types. Consumers could decide between air fares in a deregulated airline industry, Nader 
exclaimed, but they could not “taste the cancerous pesticides that went into the production of 
their food,” or avoid purchasing “the air pollution given off by local steel mills.”37 On the same 
day as the hearing, Nader and Mark Green made their case to a popular audience in an article 
in The New York Times. Deregulating airlines, Nader and Green noted in one example, would 
benefit consumers by lowering prices, thus helping to reduce inflation nationwide. But removing 
controls on air pollutants promised no analogous benefits for consumers, because the general 
public could not go out into a marketplace to buy the health and safety protections they 
required.38 
For his part, EPA Administrator Train fought the creep of regulatory reform into Ford’s 
environmental policy. In a meeting with James Cannon and other White House advisors in 
September 1975, Train argued that President Ford had tended to miss a major difference 
between regulatory reform in agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission “that were 
established to make the market mechanisms work right, and agencies, such as the EPA, FDA, 
and OSHA, which were established because the free market system didn’t work, for example in 
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reducing pollution,” as a summary of the meeting quoted him. “It is not the natural function of the 
market place to protect the public health and safety,” Train continued.39  
In other missives to the Ford administration, Train relied on polls as well as favorable 
news coverage to make his case to White House advisors that the general public continued to 
support a strong environmental agenda and thus that deregulation in the environmental realm 
would be politically unwise. Using polls to defend environmental protection was an old EPA 
strategy, and Train did not have to look far to find favorable reporting on public support for 
environmental protection.40 In 1975, Train sent economic advisor William Seidman a copy of a 
Philadelphia Inquirer article that reported from polling data that a majority of Americans believed 
that economic problems were not an acceptable reason to tolerate pollution.41 In a 1976 
meeting with George Humphreys, who oversaw environmental policy within the Ford 
Administration, Train disputed the notion that the public was increasingly frustrated with 
environmental regulation. Train followed up on the meeting by sending Humphreys a series of 
newspaper articles reporting on how well the environment was doing as a result of regulation as 
well as on the depth of public enthusiasm for those interventions.42 
That these missives may have achieved at least some of their intended effect is 
indicated by a poll that Train sent Ford’s advisors in September 1975. In a cover letter attached 
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to the survey, Train aimed to dispel the notion that environmentalists were out of touch with the 
general public on national issues, noting that the respondents who identified themselves as 
environmentalists were as likely as any other group to recognize a need for “maintaining a 
balance between environmental protection and employment.”43 Humphreys read Train’s letter 
and the survey and sent both along to chief domestic advisor Joe Cannon with a cover letter 
that declared the findings “a real eye opener,” for revealing that a remarkable sixty percent of 
the population was willing to pay more for environmental protection, including for emissions 
controls on cars and in higher electric bills. The survey should serve as a caution, Humphreys 
continued, that “environmental protection is not just a concern of a handful of zealots, fern 
wavers and liberal loonies.”44 If Cannon was as impressed by the survey, he did not show it in a 
curt response to Train.45 Nevertheless, the poll had impressed at least Humphreys, inspiring a 
defense within the Ford administration against claims that the public favored economic growth 
over environmental protection.  
While Train rejected the scaling back of environment regulation en masse as politically 
unpopular and economically unjustified, he was also quick to point out that he shared the Ford 
administration’s concerns about inefficient regulations. Writing to Ford in October 1975, Train 
described how over the past year EPA had reviewed existing regulations as well as the process 
for writing new rules to ensure that the regulations EPA put forth were intelligible and 
worthwhile. Train included in his letter a lengthy list of rules that EPA had singled out for 
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potential revision: from aircraft emission standards, which had been deferred for reexamination 
“in light of low environmental payoff,” to the registration of fuel additives, which was to be 
reexamined to see if consumers could be provided the information by other, less expensive 
means. Train also sent along a pile of memos detailing internal EPA review and reform 
meetings.46 Together, these communications implied that EPA was already reforming itself and 
did not need the help or attention of Ford’s advisors.   
 But if Train’s portrayed a nimble and reasonable agency, regulated businesses 
continued to paint a different picture of EPA as a rule-bound bureaucracy that stubbornly 
refused to make even minor adjustments to help American firms and workers. Ford advisors’ 
folders are full of letters from executives and sympathetic legislators, including a January 1975 
letter from Indiana Senator Vance Hartke, who asked for Ford’s help in keeping open a US 
Steel Plant in Gary, Indiana. Finding itself in violation of EPA’s standards for open-hearth 
production, US Steel agreed to a consent degree to install new pollution control equipment. But 
when US Steel fell behind the timeline it had agreed to with EPA, the agency refused to offer 
further relief and rejected the company’s offer to post a $200,000 performance bond. With 2,400 
jobs in the balance, Senator Hartke hoped that Ford might be able to find some means of 
“rectifying this miscarriage of equity.”47 As these complaints piled up, Train’s request to let EPA 
handle itself ran up against a growing conviction among Ford’s advisors that the agency 
required outside reform.        
EPA’s ascendance as a critical matter of concern for Ford advisors was due in large part 
to the agency’s real and growing power in the American economy. In 1975, Ford advisor Judith 
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Hope was assigned to write a special report on EPA to help the Ford administration get a 
handle on the responsibilities of the agency. Hope noted that EPA had not been intended by 
Nixon to play a central role in making policy but that subsequent legislation and executive 
orders had dramatically expanded the agency’s responsibilities until it had become effectively 
the center of environmental regulatory policy. EPA’s areas of responsibility had grown so vast, 
Hope noted, that the federal government published a “one inch thick index,” of all the statues 
and orders granting authority to EPA.48 Hope then went on summarize the many critiques of the 
agency – from environmentalists complaining about missed compliance deadlines to the 
National Association of Manufacturers, which directly blamed EPA for undermining industrial 
growth. By way of conclusion, Hope summarized the advice of a “number of experts,” who 
recommended that EPA substitute economic incentives for direct regulations to allow firms to 
clean up the environment according to their own economic circumstances. As Hope wrote, “the 
present EPA complex of statutes and Executive Orders is full of ‘sticks’ with very few ‘carrots.’” 
Unfortunately, substituting carrots for sticks required legislative changes, the prospect of which 
appeared doubtful to Hope given the current Congress.49 Convinced of EPA’s importance and 
believing they might overcome Congressional opposition, Ford’s advisors set out to reshape a 
central aspect of EPA’s regulatory regime – the Clean Air Act.   
 
Reforming the Clean Air Act 
 
 The Clean Air Act of 1970 had barely been passed before a cacophony of different 
interests began clamoring for its revision. Automobile manufacturers demanded extensions for 
mobile emission controls. Environmentalists sought new protections for the parts of the country 
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in which air quality was already high but threatened with degradation. The curtailing of oil 
imports in 1973 brought requests from the electric power industry for permission to reconvert oil-
fired generators back to coal. When he was president, Nixon had proposed a number of 
revisions, including the introduction of economic considerations into the setting of the national 
air quality standards and a prohibition against state air standards that were more restrictive than 
federal limits. By July 1974, Nixon was calling for a “sweeping review” of environmental and 
safety regulations with the aim of relaxing and scaling back pollution control so that firms could 
direct capital into productive investments.50 Though EPA officials rejected such blunt measures, 
they too lobbied for adjustments, particularly as the agency found itself forced by the courts to 
implement programs like transportation controls or non-degradation for which the mandate in 
the Clean Air Act was ambiguous at best.51 In response, Congress made several minor 
adjustments to the Clean Air Act in the first half of the 1970s. But by the middle of the decade, 
legislators recognized that a more substantial assessment of the Act was required.  
 Underscoring the enduring popularity of environmental protection, the legislation that 
Congress proposed to reform the Clean Air Act in 1976 called for an expansion of regulatory 
protections. The Democratic Party held sweeping majorities in both the Senate and the House 
and thus controlled the critical committees and subcommittees through which legislation was 
shaped before it went to the floor.52 Besides enjoying wide support among Democrats, 
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environmentalists still had support from many Republicans, for whom being seen as anti-
environmental was a political liability.53  
The Clean Air Act legislation introduced in 1976 proposed giving EPA two significant 
new responsibilities. First, as a consolation for extending the compliance deadlines for the 
automobile industry, EPA would oversee an assembly line audit system. Agency personnel 
could randomly inspect the mobile emission controls on cars of their own choosing, with the 
power to shut down production if the pollution control devices did not meet acceptable 
standards. Second, and more importantly, EPA would be given statutory responsibility for 
protecting areas around the country with high air quality from new sources of emissions that 
threatened that quality. Court victories by environmentalists had already pushed the agency to 
enact some rules against the degradation of clean air but now Congress was proposing a 
legislative mandate that would put EPA in the position of prohibiting industrial development that 
threatened things like visibility around the Grand Canyon and other scenic resources.  
While the proposed automobile extensions and assembly line inspections drew a good 
deal of Congressional attention and outside lobbying, it was the prevention of significant 
deterioration provision that provoked the most fervent engagement of environmentalists and the 
strongest opposition from businesses. The contours of the automobile emission control program 
had mostly been established and the debate there principally focused on how quickly the 
pollutant reductions would be made. Protecting clean air, on the other hand, represented a 
qualitative shift in the pollution control regime from reducing pollution as a means of protecting 
the public health to safeguarding wilderness and rural areas from aesthetic degradation. 
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Environmental advocates and businesses had sparred over the value of protecting urban lungs, 
now they were debating how much it might be worth to keep the view from the rim of the Grand 
Canyon clear from smog. 
The original Clean Air Act of 1970 called for the quality of the nation’s air to be 
maintained or enhanced. But while the Act clearly spelled out EPA’s duties in enforcing the 
health-based national air quality standards, the agency’s responsibilities for “maintaining” air 
quality were more ambiguous. Was EPA responsible for regulating industrial development in 
pristine places to prevent degradation of air quality? The influx of people and industry to the 
Intermountain West and Southwest in the 1970s added urgency to the question. Cities like 
Phoenix, Denver, and Los Angeles saw large increases in population, sending electric utilities 
scrambling to build new generating facilities to keep up with demands for electric power. Utilities 
hoped to mine and burn large reserves of coal in the region to power those new facilities.  
Historically, most of the Southwest and Mountain West had been light on population and 
heavy industry. So all these new coal fired plants would theoretically encounter fewer of the 
constraints under the national air quality standards than they would have in the more polluted 
Northeast. But the Intermountain West and Southwest also contained the majority of the 
nation’s national forests, national parks, and other federal lands that environmentalists held 
dear. As early as 1971, a senior official in the Department of the Interior warned the Senate that 
new protections were likely needed to protect national parks against the pollutants created by 
proliferating electric power facilities, particularly around the Four Corners region, where a pair of 
massive plants was under construction. Countering that claim, the chairman of the Federal 




new pollution controls in order to ensure that the region’s growing metropolises received the 
power they required.54  
 
Figure 5: In 1968, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory produced this photographic illustration of the  
degradation caused by a small increase in air pollutants in the sensitive Southwestern atmosphere.55 
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Under EPA’s first Administrator, William Ruckelshaus, the agency rejected 
environmentalists’ demands that the agency intervene to protect pristine air quality. Testifying 
before the Senate Subcommittee of Air and Water Pollution on EPA’s implementation of the 
Clean Air Act in February 1972, Ruckelshaus declared that he had only been given 
responsibility for ensuring that the states met the national air quality standards, Ruckelshaus 
told the Senators, and could no more insist on additional controls to protect clean air than he 
could tell states how they should go about cleaning up dirty areas. The notion of regulating 
clean air had no basis within that mandate – “I don’t know what nondegradation means,” 
Ruckelshaus declared.56  
Environmentalists and their supporters in Congress rejected that narrow construction, 
pressing EPA to write and enforce regulations to protect clean air. In 1972, the Sierra Club won 
a lawsuit in the Second Circuit that forced EPA to throw out all state implementation plans that 
did not include provisions to prevent significant deterioration, a decision that the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court upheld on appeal.57 In 1974, EPA announced a 
prevention of significant deterioration program (PSD) to begin in January 1975. The PSD 
regulations grouped areas across the country into three classes according to their air quality 
and prohibited additional industrial development that would worsen air quality in Class I pristine 
areas.58 Over the next two years, environmental organizations like the Natural Resources 
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Defense Council and Congressional advocates like Senator Muskie repeatedly pressed EPA to 
strengthen the PSD program, while the courts continued to hear a series of challenges to EPA’s 
authority to enforce such regulations.59 Environmental economists called for a more systematic 
survey and plan for accommodating industrial development and wilderness preservation in the 
Southwest.60 Though electric power companies were firmly set against new constraints, many of 
them came to see the uncertainty about how clean air would be regulated as perhaps more 
damaging than a limited new control program and so they too became supporters of a 
Congressional intervention.61 By the mid-1970s, it had become clear that a functional PSD 
program required a new Congressional mandate.  
Among other things, the ensuing debate over the shape of that new Congressional 
mandate revealed the newfound importance of economic analysis in establishing the value of 
clean air as well as the fact that such analysis came from a vast array of sources. Many 
business interests readily trotted out familiar rhetoric about the devastating impact the proposed 
regulations would have on employment and the national economy. Others decided to wage their 
case through specific economic claims. If Pennsylvania’s actions may be taken as 
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representative, individual states also saw a clear advantage in using economic analysis to 
promote their interests. Environmentalists showed a new willingness to debate the merits of 
regulatory protections using economics, though they still wrestled with the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of an economic defense of environmental protection. With a half-decade’s 
experience defending the economic merits of its programs, EPA showed no reluctance in 
turning to its economists to support the PSD program. Who benefited most from this turn was 
not immediately clear.  
   
Figure 6: Depiction of curtailed industrial development according to the Phoenix Chamber of  
Commerce. All areas depicted as white would be off limits to future development if the  
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Provisions passed in the Clean Air Act Amendments.62  
 
 The broad-brush condemnation approach was best exemplified by the Phoenix Chamber 
of Commerce, which published a report entitled “The Air Pollution Maze” that described the 
chaos and devastation that the proposed amendments would bring. As the Chamber explained 
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in both prose and illustration, the PSD provision would create whole swaths of the West and 
Southwest where industrial development would be prohibited. In August 1975, the National 
Association of Manufacturers began to distribute maps that depicted whole zones of the country 
blocked off against any further development.63 The Phoenix Chamber of Commerce included 
such a map in its own report, describing the resulting geography as a “plague of idiocy in the 
land.”64  
The electric power industry chose to make its case using more specific economic 
analysis. Beginning in 1975, the National Association of Electric Companies contracted with 
National Economic Research Associates, Inc. to research the specific rate increases that could 
be expected from the PSD legislation in front of Congress. Since the Clean Air Act was subject 
to a flurry of proposed amendments in this period, National Economic Research Associates 
issued a monthly report detailing the changing electricity rate implications for their utility clients. 
A representative of the National Association of Electric Companies dutifully sent each report to 
Ford advisor William Gorog, whose detailed handwritten summaries of each report 
demonstrated the political utility of investing in such careful economic analysis.65   
In Pennsylvania, a governor opposed to the PSD provisions made a similar investment 
in economic expertise to underscore the costs of the proposal. The Governor’s Energy Council 
contracted with the Center for the Study of Environmental Policy at Penn State University to 
assess the implications of the PSD provisions for the state’s economy. Pointing to further 
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restrictions on eastern coal and limits on where electric power companies could place 
generating facilities, the Penn State experts warned that the economic effects of PSD could be 
severe. In addition to presumably helping the Governor’s Energy Council in planning for future 
power needs, the Penn State report, with its gloomy portrayal of PSD, found its way into Ford 
advisor William Gorog’s files, suggesting the political payoff of such studies for state level 
opponents of PSD.66   
The debate over the PSD program came at a time when prominent environmentalists 
were of two minds about the utility and ethics of using economic analysis to assess regulatory 
protections. While the vast majority of environmentalists initially rejected the weighing of costs 
and benefits as a perversion of an ethical duty to protect the public health, some came to see a 
limited embrace of economic analysis as vital to the political survival of their favored initiatives. 
Writing the Ford administration in opposition to a bill the president had proposed that eliminated 
EPA’s PSD program, Richard Ayres of the Natural Resources Defense Council argued that 
economic analysis of the bill had hitherto focused only on the costs faced by industry, when “a 
systematic economic study would reveal a great many hard economic costs of allowing 
significant deterioration.” Ayres went on to enumerate a few examples of these costs, including 
a shift of industry westward that would deeply hurt many northeastern communities.67 For an 
environmental advocate like Ayres, establishing the pecuniary benefits of regulation (or the 
costs of not regulating) had become a necessary component of advocacy.  
Other environmentalists continued to reject economic analysis as inherently prejudiced 
against environmental protection. Leon Billings, senior staff member of the powerful Senate 
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Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, derided the notion that economic analysis had any 
benefits for environmental advocates in a 1975 memo to his files. The reason was intrinsic to 
the process itself, Billings declared, which demanded that known, near term costs be weighed 
against uncertain, often unquantifiable benefits that might accrue over decades or centuries. 
Thus, “as a practical matter cost[s] will always be greater than benefits because few 
environmental benefits have specific dollar values.” Billings wrote that cost/benefit analysis 
functioned as a sort of “witchcraft,” whose practitioners were lulled into considering only those 
aspects that could be neatly quantified. Since costs predominated among the quantifiable, “once 
you fall victim to believing in witchcraft, those who propose cost benefit analysis will be able to 
argue effectively that cost[s] clearly outweigh any known or anticipated benefits and therefore 
regulation should be compromised.”68  
Adding a legal argument against the practice, Billings wrote that Congress had 
specifically instructed EPA to develop regulations to protect the public health regardless of the 
costs.69 As an ethical matter, Billings believed that if Congress decided at some point in the 
future that economic analysis were to be applied to human health, Congress would have “the 
responsibility to either inform the American people that certain portions of the population will 
have to be written off in the name of economic stability,” or provide alternate means to protect 
those people. Americans had once been willing to sacrifice to protect the environment, Billings 
wrote in conclusion, and they had made great improvements in environmental quality as a 
result. Now, they needed to summon that willingness again to resist new efforts by the business 
community to “sacrifice that improvement on the altar of cost benefit analysis.”70 Less dramatic 
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but with a similar desire to protect environmental protection from the full intrusion of economic 
analysis, Ayres finished his own letter to the Ford administration by declaring, “who is really 
willing to decide how many dollars an unpolluted Grand Canyon is worth to those alive now, let 
alone those to come?”71 
 EPA officials avoided such moral compunctions, eagerly pointing to economic analysis 
generated by the agency to insist that the proposed Clean Air Act amendments would not be as 
disruptive as business interests had claimed. As EPA developed its fledging PSD program prior 
to the amendment’s passage, agency officials publically challenged industry claims that a lack 
of industry investment in new plants could be blamed on the program, citing the broader 
economic slump instead.72 Hearing word that Ford would veto any legislation that included a 
PSD program, Train wrote the president in April 1976 to insist that “an extensive series of 
industry impact studies,” conducted by the agency provided convincing evidence that PSD 
would not prevent further industrial growth. Conceding that PSD would have some influence on 
the location and characteristics of new industrial plants, Train argued that the economic effects 
for businesses and consumers would be minor. For the electric utility industry, which stood to be 
most affected by PSD provisions, capital expenditures would rise only three percent over the 
next five years, translating into only a two percent rise in consumers’ utility bills.73 Following a 
meeting between Ford and Train, Paul Brands, a deputy EPA official, bolstered Train’s case by 
sending detailed summaries of each of the EPA impact studies that Train had cited.74 EPA 
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officials also turned to its analytical prowess to combat claims made by other executive branch 
agencies, as when Brands wrote Ford advisor William Gorog in June 1976 to send along EPA’s 
critique of the economic assumptions behind a series of consultancy reports that the Federal 
Energy Administration had commissioned to illustrate the supposed disruptiveness of the PSD 
provisions.75  
 EPA’s comfort with the economics of the PSD program and other provisions 
underscored the extent to which investment in economic analysis had become the price of 
admission for policy making.76 EPA had funded or conducted hundreds of different economic 
studies by the mid-1970s, developing an expertise in the economics of environmental protection 
that the Ford administration acknowledged, even if they did so with a skeptical eye.77 EPA led 
the way in funding research on the pecuniary benefits of regulations, including a pioneering 
methodological study by Thomas Crocker, Ralph D’Arge, Allen Kneese and other prominent 
environmental economists begun in 1976.78 Recognizing this prowess, Senator Muskie sought 
EPA’s help in the midst of the Congressional debate about the Clean Air Act amendments to 
help him make sense of the economic implications of the many legislative proposals.79 And 
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Billings’ colleagues on the Subcommittee staff collected EPA’s reports to defend other 
amendments they had proposed.80 Ford advisors circulated EPA’s studies among themselves, 
comparing them to analyses produced by other agencies or within the White House, though 
those advisors did apply a discount to EPA’s claims to compensate for a perceived pro-
environmentalist bias at the agency.81 For his part, Train was equally convinced that the 
analyses generated by offices like the Federal Energy Administration were also biased, which 
resulted in Train eventually negotiating permission to publically dispute the Ford administration’s 
claims about the anticipated disruptiveness of PSD.82 While none of the parties assumed that 
economic analysis was somehow neutral or free from the political goals of its producers, nearly 
everyone turned to quantified costs and benefits to make their case about the shape the new 
Clean Air Act should take.  
A conversation conducted in dollars and cents created openings for regulatory reformers 
to introduce market mechanisms and economic incentives as cheaper, more efficient, and thus 
fundamentally better means of controlling pollution. Resistance to such ideas remained strong, 
with both environmentalists and many regulated industries rejecting what they respectively 
considered a dilution of pollution control or an unwieldy expansion of state interference. But 
many elected officials were drawn to the promise of equivalent results at lower prices. In the 
1976 presidential election, both Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter made regulatory reform a key 
aspect of their campaigns.    
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Regulatory Reform as a Bipartisan Project 
 
In late May 1976, President Ford was the keynote speaker at a three-day conference in 
Washington, DC that brought together the most important proponents of regulatory reform with 
officials from the regulatory agencies under assault.83 Ford’s participation in the conference 
came as his campaign battled a strong challenge from former California Governor Ronald 
Reagan for the Republican nomination. Reagan made reducing the size of the federal 
government a central component of his promise to restore American prosperity, forcing Ford to 
insist on his own commitment to scaling back regulations. Throughout the spring, Reagan 
traded victories with Ford in Republican primaries across the country, taking his campaign all 
the way to the floor of the Republican National Convention in August before Ford finally 
managed to secure the nomination.84  
 The specter of a bloated federal government persisted into the general election, where 
Ford faced a Democratic challenger who, like Reagan, positioned himself as a reformer who 
would cut through stifling bureaucracy and regulation. Jimmy Carter boasted of his success in 
streamlining the state government as the former Governor of Georgia and promised to make the 
regulatory state more transparent and accountable to ordinary citizens. Ford’s campaign paid 
close attention to Carter’s pronouncements on regulatory reform, underscoring the importance 
of the issue to the 1976 election.85 
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Carter also ran as a conservationist, attacking Ford as weak on environmental 
protection.86 Tying together those two positions, Carter often mentioned his work in stopping the 
Army Corps of Engineers’ Sprewell Bluff Dam, which he described as not only imperiling a 
scenic landscape and critical habitat but also as a wasteful example of unwarranted government 
spending.87 Reform with efficiency as its goal could promote environmental protection and vice 
versa. In November, Carter’s image of an outsider willing to take on Washington’s sacred cows 
carried him into office. 
 A Clean Air Act amendment bill, meanwhile, had made it out of conference in October 
before dying in a filibuster led by senators opposed to the inclusion of a program for the strong 
prevention of significant deterioration. The amendment’s failure heightened the uncertainty 
faced by the automobile industry, as it waited to hear about compliance deadline extensions that 
automobile manufacturers deemed essential.88 One of the first priorities of the new Carter 
administration was to secure passage of the amendments, creating an important first test for his 
campaign pledges to protect the environment and consumers while reducing the complexity and 
expense of the federal government. 
 Carter’s election in November galvanized proponents of regulatory reform, who saw in 
the new president an opportunity to replace directly applied standards with emission taxes and 
other market approaches. In December 1976, the Economics Department at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology convened a two-day conference on Air Pollution and Administrative 
																																																						
86 Carlton Neville, who ran Conservationists for Carter, compiled a long list of Ford’s failures in environmental 
protection, including his vetoing of several important pieces of legislation and his erosion of EPA’s independence, 
folder, "Ford's Environmental Record," Box 19, Carlton Neville Collection, Donated Historical Material, Jimmy Carter 
Library.  
87 Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., “Carter Record on Environment, Energy Praised by Conservationists, 
Businessmen,” Environment Reporter 7, no. 11 (July 16, 1976): 459-462. 
88 Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., “Senate Filibuster Kills S 3219, Fanning Controversy Over Auto Rules,” 




Control. Aiming to move past a theoretical discussion of the desirability of different types of 
regulation, the conference organizers solicited papers on the costs and benefits of the 
implementation of the Clean Air Act and how alternative approaches might be realistically 
substituted.89 The MIT conference attracted almost every notable environmental policymaker.90 
Among these was Karl Braithwaite, who handled the daily operations of Senator Ed Muskie’s 
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. The summary notes Braithwaite submitted to the 
Subcommittee following the conference reveal the embattlement felt by those who continued to 
defend direct regulations in a climate of reform. Braithwaite was highly skeptical of most of the 
presenters and the alternatives to directly applied regulations they offered.91 From a later 
vantage, Braithwaite reflected that the disconnect between his own understanding of 
environmental policy and that on display at the conference owed in part to the naïveté of the 
economists’ understanding of politics. For the economists, “rationality is economic rationality, 
Braithwaite wrote, “there is nothing like political rationality within their view of the world. It 
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became very obvious that when economists use the term rational it is automatically ‘objective’ in 
their eyes.”92  
 Despite all his frustrations, Braithwaite found some policy ideas at the conference worth 
considering. As his very presence attests, Braithwaite was interested in the selective adaption of 
market incentive approaches. Braithwaite had high praise for William Drayton, who had spoken 
about how a penalty fee approach might be applied to operation and maintenance of pollution 
control equipment. Among the papers Braithwaite took back to the Subcommittee was a draft 
copy of a lecture that Charles Schulze had given nearby at Harvard University.93 In “the Public 
Use of Private Incentives,” Schultze argued that by modifying price signals, institutional 
structures, and incentives of these alternative systems, policy makers could encourage private 
firms to reach a desirable level of pollution control on their own terms. Obviating the need for 
continuously writing new regulations to close loopholes opened by enterprising firms, such 
market regulations would reduce the costly burden of red tape on businesses and thus 
consumers.94  
  Schultze’s endorsement of incentives or markets in the place of direct regulations 
underscored a wider embrace of free market ideas among Democrats and liberal intellectuals 
with lasting significance for environmental and economic policy. Legislators like Edmund Muskie 
had spent the first half of the 1970s insisting on direct regulations and uniform standards. Now 
Muskie’s aides were soliciting the assistance of people like William Drayton to figure out how to 
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incorporate incentives into the Clean Air Act amendments. The Democratic President-Elect 
bragged about his cuts to state government. Ralph Nader, who had long needled Muskie to 
strengthen federal protection statutes for human health, cited the benefits of unfettered market 
competition in lowering prices for consumers when he endorsed proposals to deregulate of the 
airline industry. Muskie’s fellow Democrat, Senator Edward Kennedy, who eventually led the 
push for airline deregulation in Congress, had recently sponsored the Competitive 
Improvements Act, which instructed agencies to limit the anti-competitive features of their 
regulations to the greatest possible extent. Both Nader and Kennedy would insist that removing 
price controls or barriers to entry differed in important ways from environmental regulations that 
had been created precisely because the free market had not worked. But their regulatory reform 
proposals nonetheless helped create a climate in which scaling back the regulatory state was 
becoming a truly bipartisan project.   
 In addition to helping build a growing consensus around the efficiency of market based 
regulations (and the desirability of efficiency), Schultze’s Godkin lectures also served notice to a 
new generation of conservatives that the liberal state was up for reimagining. Brian Mannix, a 
young Masters student in public policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School at the time, remembers 
Schultze’s lectures as a hopeful indication that inventive strategies had finally won the support 
of Democrats. As Mannix described, “I sat in the lectures and thought it’s not that this stuff is 
new, the ideas have been around for a long time, but it was striking that this guy was a 
prominent Democrat… And was very articulate in describing them. And so that was 
encouraging.” Mannix spent the next summer interning at EPA before joining the regulatory 
review staff in Carter’s Council on Wage and Price Stability. Under Reagan, Mannix became the 
Senior Economist and Deputy Chief of the regulatory review office responsible for overseeing 
environmental policy. Following stints as Managing Editor of the American Enterprise Institute’s 




to EPA as Associate Administrator for Policy, Economics, and Innovation (the top policy 
position) under George W. Bush.95 Throughout his career, Mannix has fostered the sort of 
market-based regulations that Schultze endorsed back in 1976.  
Schultze delivered his third and final lecture on December 9, 1976 and began combining 
his lectures into a book, The Public Use of Private Interest, which became one of the most 
important treatises on regulatory reform when Brookings published it the next year. Already by 
the final lecture in December, Carter’s transition team had tapped Schultze to join the new 
administration as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. Describing Schultze’s 
appointment, Environment Reporter noted his support of effluent taxes and economic incentives 
in place of direct regulations.96 As the new Carter Administration prepared to take office, 
regulatory reform was on everyone’s minds, not least in the area of environmental protection.  
 
Regulatory Reform at EPA 
 
 As president-elect, Carter asked EPA to prepare a transition memo on possible 
alternatives to direct regulations in environmental protection. Roy Gamse, the director of the 
EPA’s economic analysis office, prepared the memo. “Non-Regulatory (Economic) Approaches 
to Environmental Problems” offered a thoughtful consideration of the theoretical advantages and 
practical obstacles to alternative approaches, principally a system of emission charges.97 
Though EPA had yet to enact any such alternatives, Gamse and his economics staff showed 
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familiarity and enthusiasm for many of the incentive approaches that environmental economists 
had long advocated.  
 Echoing the conclusions of economists like Schultze and Kneese, Gamse’s memo 
described how emission charges promised to be more equitable in allocating environmental 
costs than direct regulations, more effective in removing the incentive to delay controls, less 
expensive since firms with low abatement costs would reduce their pollution well below the level 
they would have under uniform standards, and easier to administer because regulatory 
agencies would have only to calculate the charge. Yet, beginning with Nixon’s sulfur oxides tax, 
Congress had never seriously considered enacting such a system. Indeed, despite considerable 
scholarship on the subject, very few incentive alternatives had ever been implemented around 
the world.98 As Gamse’s memo explained, the reason for this mismatch between academic 
praise and real world application lay in the failure of economists to demonstrate analytically that 
an emission charge would actually yield more effective and less costly control for a specific 
pollution problem. Seasoned in the practical challenges of administering a control regime, 
environmental advocates in Congress and at regulatory agencies worried that emission charges 
would be undone by technical issues with maintaining the necessarily precise national 
monitoring system as well as significant uncertainty regarding the social costs of environmental 
resources and the actual control costs firms would encounter. Theoretical work, Gamse’s memo 
noted, had yet to appreciate diversity in the size of firms as well as geographic diversity in 
atmospheric pollution features. Furthermore, even if these practical barriers could be overcome, 
																																																						
98 The few countries with some hybrid system of charges and direct controls consisted of Japan, Netherlands, 
France, West Germany, and Hungary plus the beverage container deposit program in the United States. U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, “Non-Regulatory (Economic) Approaches to Environmental Programs,” in 
Environmental Protection Agency Transition Papers to Incoming Carter Administration on Areas of Agency 






grafting a charge system onto existing controls risked halting or reversing the progress that had 
already been made by creating potentially contradictory incentives for firms.  
 Yet despite those obstacles, Gamse and his staff believed that the oft-touted benefits of 
alternative approaches might be finally realized if EPA were to develop test cases for 
environmental advocates. Sidestepping the many practical issues of transforming existing 
controls, these test cases should be conducted in new control areas, of which there were many 
thanks to EPA’s expanding responsibilities. For instance, under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, EPA might try leveling a sales tax on consumer products and packaging 
to cover the environmental cost of creating and disposing of toxic materials. Or, to address the 
newly discovered problem of chlorofluorocarbons eating a hole in the ozone layer, EPA might 
create a system of tradable chlorofluorocarbon production rights, which would be bought and 
sold by manufacturers as they transitioned away from the dangerous compound. With 
Congressional permission and funding, EPA could develop a test case that might finally 
convince environmental advocates that charges or markets presented a viable alternative to 
direct regulations.99 Though Gamse’s report expounded on the many difficulties to be faced in 
any shift away from direct regulations, his cautiously optimistic conclusions put him among a 
growing constituency at EPA for such reforms. 
 For EPA staff and officials in the mid 1970s, the gulf between interest in incentive based 
alternatives and public support for such alternatives was formidable, both because of the 
practical obstacles Gamse outlined and because environmental advocates closely scrutinized 
EPA’s commitment to the existing regime of direct regulatory controls. For example, EPA 
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Assistant Administrator for Air Roger Strelow waited until after he announced his departure from 
the agency following Carter’s election to endorse an emission charge system for automobile 
manufacturers in place of uniformly applied standards. Calculated to eliminate any profit made 
by avoiding the controls, the charge system promised in Strelow’s words to “put economic 
forces to work for rather than against cleanup.”100 Despite clearly sharing economists’ 
enthusiasm for the alternative, Strelow had to wait until he no longer spoke on behalf of EPA to 
advocate changes to the existing system.     
 In a testament to EPA’s political sensitivity to any critique that it had departed from the 
Congressionally mandated direct control approach, the agency downplayed the novelty of its 
first experiment with tradable pollution rights in the 1976 “tradeoff” policy. Under the terms of the 
Clear Air Act, if one of the roughly 150 air quality control regions around the country failed to 
attain one or more of the ambient air quality standards by May 1975, the control authority for 
that region was prohibited from issuing construction permits for any major new source of that 
pollutant. For example, California’s South Coast Air Quality Management District, which 
encompassed the area in and around Los Angeles, exceeded the national standard for 
photochemical oxidants 135 times in 1976.101 In response, the California Air Resources Board 
began denying permits to major new sources of photochemical oxidants, including a new 
petroleum pipeline in Long Beach, which Standard Oil of Ohio hoped to build to offload Alaskan 
crude. Under the California Air Resources Board’s interpretation, the Clean Air Act had 
effectively shut down economic development in the largest state economy by denying the ability 
of new firms to move into the area and for preexisting firms to invest in new productive 
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capital.102 Across the nation, regulators and policy makers confronted the same problem. Los 
Angeles had worse air than anywhere else but the photochemical oxidant standard had been 
set tight enough that most metropolitan areas could not meet the 1975 deadline. New York 
exceeded the photochemical oxidant standard 59 times in 1976. Dallas (65), Chicago (17) and 
most other major metropolises fared little better. Even smaller cities like Baton Rouge, LA (71) 
and Steubenville, OH (97) greatly exceeded the standard because of their oil refining 
operations.103 Regulators in each of those places scrambled to devise workarounds to allow for 
continued economic growth. In 1976, California, where severe pollution had long translated into 
sophisticated controls, EPA’s Region IV Office put forward an innovative solution.    
Confronted by seemingly intractable pollution and the California Air Resources Board’s 
refusal to issue new permits, EPA’s Region IV office devised a policy whereby firms that wanted 
to build new factories or other new sources of emissions could pay existing emission sources to 
reduce their emissions by a commensurate amount, thus “offsetting” the new emissions. The 
program included a discounting requirement whereby the new emissions source had to buy 
slightly more offsets than it required, slightly improving the overall air quality with every trade. 
The policy allowed existing sources to sell new sources the rights to emit photochemical 
oxidants and other pollutants, creating in effect the nation’s first cap-and-trade system for 
pollution control.104 The first application of the offset policy came in January 1976, when the 
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Region IV office denied PAKTANK Pacific Company’s application to build new oil storage 
facilities near Los Angeles – the first time that EPA had ever denied a permit because the new 
source was in a nonattainment area. Region IV offered PAKTANK the opportunity to resubmit 
the project with the provision that it would have no net increase in photochemical oxidant 
emissions, introducing the tradeoff policy into practice for the first time, although PANTANK 
eventually elected to pursue a different strategy.105 In any case, having the tradeoff policy on the 
books allowed California to bypass a showdown between continued economic grown and the 
Clean Air Act.   
EPA officials in Washington embraced the “tradeoff” or “offset” plan as a solution to the 
thorny problem of permitting new sources in polluted areas. EPA headquarters adopted the 
policy in 1976 as the Offset Interpretive Ruling for California and the agency extended the policy 
to the entire country later that year, tweaking the exact rules in a series of subsequent 
interpretive rulings and announcements. But while describing the program as a much-needed 
solution to a critical problem, EPA officials avoided pitching it as a major regulatory reform. 
Roger Strelow, the Assistant Administrator for EPA’s Air Office, noted that the tradeoff policy 
might inspire firms in the steel and chemical industries to search out and make additional 
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emission reductions they would otherwise have had little incentive to pursue.106 But Strelow’s 
comments were about as far as the agency would go, despite the fact that later observers credit 
the program as one of the first significant departures from the direct regulation model and an 
early precedent for the market trading of pollutant rights.107  
EPA’s reticence in depicting the tradeoff policy as a significant reform no doubt owes 
something to the widespread opposition that the plan aroused. Environmentalists like the 
Natural Resource Defense Council’s Dave Hawkins complained that the policy violated the 
Clean Air Act by enshrining the status quo of bad air quality in the most polluted areas, stifling 
further improvements.108 A state level regulator from Texas charged that the policy amounted 
selling a “repugnant” right to pollute.109 At the national level, the the Board of Directors of the Air 
Pollution Control Association overwhelmingly voted to condemn the tradeoff policy as 
unworkable and illegal, with the only dissenting vote coming from the EPA official on the 
board.110  
Business interests likewise warned that the policy stood on shaky legal grounds or 
complained of perverse capital investment incentives and new geographical constraints on 
industrial production. A representative of the American Petroleum Institute worried that the 
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policy could not be legally justified under the Clean Air Act and indicated that the refining 
industry would not support regulations that were likely to be soon overturned.111 At a public 
hearing on the plan in Dallas in which three hundred people testified, representatives of Sun 
Company and Dow Chemical Company warned that businesses would delay investments in 
control projects so that they could be sure to receive the rights to existing emissions. A member 
of Houston’s Chamber of Commerce complained that those businesses that had obediently 
reduced their emissions years ago were now being punished by losing out on the emission 
rights they would have gained if they were still belching that pollution. A representative from ICI 
United States, Inc. testified that his firm had recently been denied a building permit for a new 
site near Bayport, Texas because the existing industries in Bayport had already installed the 
best available pollution controls and so could not make any further reductions to generate the 
necessary offset rights for ICI. A member of the Greater San Antonio Chamber of Commerce 
worried that a similar fate would befall his community, where industries had few offsets to sell.112 
Against such a negative reaction, it is no surprise that EPA officials avoided touting the program 
as a significant departure from existing practice.  
 The tradeoff policy did have supporters, however, in sufficient numbers to allow EPA to 
go forward with the program. Dave Hawkins, the attorney from the National Resources Defense 
Council, eventually came around to the plan after EPA officials inserted conditions to ensure 
that traded offsets were enforceable and additional to what a firm would otherwise have been 
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responsible for controlling.113 Richard Ayres, NRDC’s president, publicly endorsed the program 
in March 1977, noting that he would give EPA the benefit of the doubt to work out remaining 
technical and legal issues.114 The White House’s Council on Wage and Price Stability, 
responsible for reviewing the economic implications of EPA’s proposals, also gave the plan their 
stamp of approval, recommending that EPA make the market for tradeoffs as liberal as possible 
by allowing firms to bank tradeoffs for future use and by permitting environmentalists to buy and 
retire tradeoffs as a means of improving air quality.115 Though many businesses remained wary, 
a small number began using the provision to build new plants, albeit with considerable 
assistance from state and federal authorities in locating the offsets.116 Meanwhile, many in 
Congress saw the tradeoff policy as a chance to avoid conflict between economic growth and 
environmental protection and repeatedly included some version of the policy in proposed 
amendments to Clean Air Act throughout the fall of 1976 and spring of 1977. This growing 
support for regulatory alternatives among select EPA officials and environmental advocates 
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Carter and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 
  
 The Clean Air Act amendments that Congress finally passed in August 1977 carried an 
ambiguous message on regulatory reform. Working until the wee hours of the morning before 
the summer recess, House and Senate conferees produced a conference bill on August 3rd, 
which Carter signed into law four days later.117 The bill came in the nick of time for automobile 
manufacturers, who had warned that they might be unable to produce their 1978 model lines if 
the emission standards remained uncertain for any longer. In keeping with that eleventh-hour 
drama, a big story was the moderate and anticipated loosening of those mobile emission 
standards. The amendments also provided a break for the states on the widely unattained 
national air quality standards, extending the deadline until the late 1980s for the most severe 
cases. To allow for economic growth in those nonattainment areas, Congress adopted EPA’s 
tradeoff policy, with a provision to allow states to develop their own means of coordinating 
growth and emissions reductions if they could convince EPA they had a viable plan. The 
amendments also extended technology standards deadlines for new sources in specific 
industries, including copper smelting and coal burning electric utilities.118 Though the ambitious 
goals of the original Clean Air Act had been tempered somewhat, the 1977 amendments 
effectively instructed EPA to stay the course. 
 The amendments did include some provisions that proponents of regulatory reform could 
view with cautious optimism. A new experimental technology program delayed compliance 
deadlines for firms that installed innovative control technology. The amendments also instructed 
EPA to conduct two studies for Congress on how economic incentives might be used in 
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environmental policy. The shorter study took up the advice of Roy Gamse’s transition memo, 
asking EPA to sketch out how a penalty system for stationary sources emitting nitrogen oxides 
might work. A second study paired EPA and the Council of Economic Advisors in a longer, more 
comprehensive survey of how economic incentives could be introduced to strengthen existing 
programs or expand into new areas not yet covered by controls. As Environment Reporter 
noted, the Council’s involvement was a deliberate effort to give Charles Schultze an opportunity 
to pursue the economic incentive approaches he had so enthusiastically supported as an 
academic.119    
But while providing a variety of ways by which EPA might reduce the compliance costs 
of its regulatory programs, the amendments also legislated a major expansion of EPA’s 
responsibilities by affirming the agency’s duty to prevent air quality in pristine areas from 
degrading. Beyond protecting public health from dangerous pollutants, EPA was now 
responsible for insuring that Americans could see across the Grand Canyon or gaze up at the 
Rocky Mountains. Prior to construction of a power plant or other source of emissions, 
businesses would be required to use air dispersion computer modeling to prove that the 
additional emissions would not deteriorate air quality in surrounding pristine (Class I) areas. As 
had been the case with the original Clean Air Act, the 1977 amendments offered EPA little 
assistance in negotiating the thorny political debates about economic development and 
environmental preservation that the prevention of significant deterioration program raised. As 
Allen Kneese and Resources for the Future argued in their survey of growth and environmental 
quality in the Southwest, EPA was now required to force states like New Mexico to insist on 
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expensive air pollution control devices or even ban new industry if sufficient control technology 
did not exist.120  
As a whole, the new legislation left Carter and EPA with an ambiguous message. The 
basic dimensions of EPA’s regulatory program had been affirmed (and even expanded) but 
Congress had also finally acknowledged the reality that the nation’s air quality could not be fully 
restored in the space of a half decade. For the first time, Congress had opened alternative and 
less expensive ways of dealing with what appeared to be endemic pollution problems. As with 
the original Clean Air Act, how those legislative goals translated into actual regulations would 




 Back in 1970, Congress had envisioned a powerful enforcement of national standards 
that would protect an American birthright to clean, breathable air across the country. Pushed by 
environmental advocates, EPA assumed the central position in a federal pollution control regime 
that brought the agency and the state regulators it directed deep into the operations of the 
nation’s businesses and the daily lives of its citizens. EPA told copper producers what 
smokestack desulfurization technology they had to purchase and told electric utilities where they 
could and could not build new plants. If ordinary Americans rejected limits on where they could 
and could not drive, they nevertheless encountered automobile showrooms in which every new 
model came equipped with a catalytic converter that hurt fuel economy and required unleaded 
gasoline.  
Environmental economists had always envisioned a different approach, whereby a much 
smaller EPA would concentrate on incorporating the social costs of pollution and other 
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environmental degradation into the prices of goods and services and then let firms and 
consumers allocate pollution controls through their own individual decisions. That incorporation 
might take the form of emission charges tacked on to a kilowatt of electricity. Or it could come 
as a higher price for a carton of milk for which a Florida rancher had paid a local phosphate 
fertilizer plant to reduce its emissions of dangerous fluorine gas.  
For most of the 1970s, the direct intervention approach to regulation dominated 
environmental policymaking. But the Carter administration took office amid signs of fracture. 
Environmental economists enjoyed new influence over policymakers worried about stubborn 
inflation, oil shortages, and a lagging economy. Environmental advocates in Congress and at 
some environmental organizations indicated a willingness to consider less expensive 
alternatives to direct regulations. EPA staff who had long harbored interest in market 
approaches finally had an example of such programs in the tradeoff policy. And the agency was 
now run by an administration that championed such approaches. The next few years would 















Chapter 5: Giving Americans Their Money’s Worth 
 
 
By the middle of the 1970s the notion that federal regulations had grown out of control 
had a bipartisan consensus. Yet what exactly comprised this overgrowth and how the federal 
government should go about trimming regulation remained open and contentious questions. 
Within the Beltway, policymakers generally agreed that industry-specific regulations governing 
the cargo that truckers were allowed to haul or the fares that airlines were allowed to charge 
had outgrown their usefulness and now protected incumbent firms at the expense of higher 
prices for the general public. Whether federal regulations on workplace safety and 
environmental quality should also be cut back or revised to reduce direct federal mandates 
sharply divided reform proponents and environmental and safety advocates. Newly elected 
President Jimmy Carter faced the difficult task of navigating this contentious debate. Facing a 
souring economy, Carter appointed Charles Schultze as Chairman of his Council of Economic 
Advisors and Alfred Kahn as his special “inflation czar”, elevating two economists who were 
major supporters of regulatory reform, broadly conceived. 
  Though Carter recognized that revising environmental and safety regulations would 
meet stiff opposition, he decided to do so anyway, convinced by Schultze and others that 
business compliance with expensive environmental regulations was pulling scarce capital away 
from necessary investments and thus hurting productivity and driving up unemployment and 
inflation.1 The nation needed to carefully evaluate its enormous expenditures on pollution 
control, Schultze and other reform proponents in the administration argued, paring back 
expensive federal mandates wherever possible. Regulations needed to maximize efficiency, 
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these reformers argued, and they proposed new market oriented policies designed to deliver the 
greatest return on the nation’s investment in environmental quality.   
At the same time, Carter remained personally committed to environmental protection. He 
had campaigned as a true friend of environmentalism. And he presided over an expansion of 
environmental regulation into new realms like the Superfund program. These dual commitments 
to environmental protection and regulatory reform were embodied in the officials Carter 
appointed to run the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). At the helm, Carter chose as his 
EPA Administrator Doug Costle, who had achieved national recognition for implementing an 
economically incentivized compliance system as Commissioner of Connecticut’s Department of 
Environmental Protection.2 Carter no doubt hoped that Costle would bring this same 
attentiveness to the economic effects of environmental regulation and a willingness to innovate 
to his new position. To direct EPA’s Policy Office, where regulatory reforms would be conceived, 
Carter appointed William Drayton, another Connecticut veteran who had devised the 
compliance policy and had also introduced a novel taxation system in New York City to reduce 
tobacco consumption. Drayton was by all accounts an enthusiastic proponent of policies he 
believed in; a Washington Post article once described Drayton as possessing a “penetrating 
gaze his friends call earnest and his critics call demonic.”3 With Costle’s support, Drayton turned 
that laser focus to finding areas in which EPA’s enforcement of direct, standardized rules could 
be replaced or supplemented by tradable emission rights and other market approaches that 
gave businesses more control over how they reduced their pollution.  
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Appealing to the environmentalist side of his constituency, Carter picked Dave Hawkins, 
an attorney from the Natural Resources Defense Council, to head EPA’s Air Office. Hawkins 
played a central role in shaping EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air Act, and he was wary of 
attempts to move away from the direct application of uniform standards. Over the next four 
years, Hawkins and Drayton repeatedly found themselves on opposite sides of proposals to 
introduce market approaches into EPA’s regulatory regime, demonstrating the difficult task 
Carter faced in his attempts to protect the liberal, interventionist federal government by pruning 
it back.     
While Carter succeeded in eliminating regulations in industries like trucking and the 
airlines, his efforts to reform environmental regulations ran into a series of obstacles. 
Democratic Party legislators like Senator Ed Muskie joined environmental organizations like the 
Natural Resources Defense Council and advocates of the existing model within EPA in fierce 
resistance to Carter’s proposed transformations of EPA’s regulatory program. Local and state 
regulators largely spurned the new market and incentive programs that EPA’s Policy Office did 
manage to introduce. Regulated industries proved reticent to embrace new policies with little 
support at the state level and uncertain legal legitimacy. Finally, Administrator Costle and other 
advocates of regulatory reform at EPA rejected the more fundamental changes proposed by 
Schultze and other Carter advisors. The result was an environmental program that changed far 
more on paper than it did in practice, leaving a promising but uncertain foundation for real 
transformation for the next president.  
This chapter explores two policy changes that together constitute the mixed legacy of 
Carter’s reform of environmental regulations. Building on the fledging program of emission 
offsetting, the bubble policy envisioned a new system of compliance in which decisions about 
pollution control technology and technique would be made not by EPA administrators but by 




of 1970 or its 1977 amendments. Rather, the bubble was the prime example of the Carter 
administration’s use of EPA rulemakings to shift the agency away from establishing and 
enforcing fixed standards of clean air and toward less costly and more flexible alternatives. 
Environmental advocates who wanted to keep decision-making authority within EPA repeatedly 
introduced constraints on where and when the bubble could be used. Simultaneous to that 
struggle, EPA undertook the first ever reevaluation of the national air quality standard for ozone. 
EPA’s reassessment created an opening for Carter’s economic advisors to use the controversial 
regulatory review mechanism to push EPA to introduce economic considerations into what had 
hitherto been cost-blind standards.  
 
Steel, Inflation, and the Case for Regulatory Alternatives 
 
In the 1970s, American steel producers ran into a perfect storm of foreign competition, 
labor strife, aging technology, and expensive new mandates from EPA to reduce pollution. The 
industry’s struggles to remain competitive with producers in Japan and Germany made it a 
principal focus of the Carter administration’s efforts to reform environmental policy to lower 
compliance costs and free up capital for modernization. Central to those efforts was EPA’s 
development of the bubble policy, a new compliance program that aimed to shift decision 
making about pollution control from regulators to corporate engineers and managers. Steel 
plants served as testing grounds for EPA’s formulation of the bubble policy and key firms in the 
industry became the policy’s loudest cheerleaders in the business world.  
American steel producers had enjoyed a halcyon period of prosperity following World 
War II, which devastated the capital stock of European and Japanese competitors and created 
vast reconstruction projects that undamaged American plants happily supplied. By the 1970s, 
however, foreign producers had largely rebuilt, incorporating modern technology that many 




labor in Japan made Japanese steel fifteen to twenty percent cheaper to produce than 
American steel, allowing Japanese firms to significantly undercut American firms on price. 
Carter responded with a fast track duty system, which together with the falling value of the dollar 
helped American firms to remain more or less competitive.4 But as profit margins tightened, the 
steel industry’s spending on pollution control loomed ever larger in the eyes of business 
executives, labor representatives, and elected officials. 
The steel industry was perennially among the nation’s worst air polluters. Steel plants 
spewed particulates that degraded the lungs of workers and nearby residents, sulfur oxides that 
contributed to acid rain, hydrocarbons that caused smog, and a host of other compounds that 
hurt human health and lowered environmental quality. From its inception, EPA had focused 
special attention on the pollution challenges of the steel industry, which would have to be 
dramatically cleaned up if the air quality in much of the nation was to be improved. To the 
chagrin of agency staff and officials, the steel industry developed a miserable record of 
compliance with the ensuing regulations. In 1975, EPA Administrator Russell Train fingered the 
steel industry along with electric power as the two most difficult industries to bring into 
compliance with the Clean Air Act. Not a single firm was in compliance, Train complained to a 
reporter, and the Administrator refused to hazard a guess as to when one might be.5  
Within that dismal overall showing, there were significant differences among firms, 
suggesting to regulators that compliance was possible if every firm pursued pollution control in 
good faith. A 1973 report from the Council on Economic Priorities lauded Armco Steel 
Corporation as the nation’s cleanest steel manufacturer, averaging just 4.1 pounds of particulate 
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emissions and 2.1 pounds of sulfur dioxide emissions for each ton of steel produced. Armco’s 
efforts toward compliance stood in stark contrast to those of National Steel Corporation, which 
emitted some 21.9 pounds of particulates and 15.2 pounds of sulfur dioxide for each ton.6 When 
the report was updated in 1977, Armco remained the nation’s best, while United States Steel 
Corporation had sunk to the worst. The 12.7 pounds of particulates that US Steel emitted to 
produce each ton was a significant improvement from the bottom of the barrel in 1973. But 
industry leader Armco had meanwhile shrunk its own particulate emissions to just 2.5 pounds 
per ton. What’s more, the updated report found that compliance improvement over the previous 
four years was strongly correlated with enforcement pressure.7 Regulators reading that report 
saw that the steel industry had the capacity to dramatically improve compliance and that 
existing enforcement tools were an excellent means of spurring firms to do so.    
Pushing the steel industry toward compliance was among EPA’s most taxing and 
politically contentious challenges. From its inception, EPA took a hard line toward the steel 
industry, initiating enforcement actions and leveling fines against dozens of firms. Steel 
executives were among the first business leaders that EPA had the Justice Department threaten 
with criminal charges as a result of continued noncompliance.8 The industry responded 
pugnaciously: firms like US Steel routinely threatened to close plants and lay off thousands of 
workers rather than comply with regulatory mandates.9 Such threats posed a political risk to 
elected officials concerned with unemployment, especially if where labor unions joined with their 
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employers in petitioning EPA to ease regulatory requirements to keep plants open.10 In a report 
to Carter in September 1977, EPA Administrator Doug Costle warned that the steel industry’s 
management was trying to turn their workers against environmental regulations, noting that top 
agency officials had scheduled meetings with steel union leaders to cut off any budding 
management and labor coalition against EPA.11 
 Maintaining EPA’s tough stance toward the steel industry became increasingly difficult 
for Administrator Costle in the midst of growing public concern over inflation. After peaking at a 
little more than 11 percent in 1974, yearly rates of inflation had fallen during Ford’s 
administration, only to rise again in the Carter years. In 1978, consumer prices were 7.6 percent 
higher than in 1977, building on a 6.5 percent increase from 1976 to 1977.12  Carter inflation 
advisor Robert Strauss echoed many businesses in 1978 when he singled out environmental 
regulations as a key driver of this worrisome uptick. Facing immediate criticism from EPA, 
environmental organizations, and Congressional environmental advocates, Strauss retracted his 
statement and made a series of public atonements.13 But the damage was done, with Strauss’s 
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initial comment having already joined a growing chorus of criticism, which EPA officials were 
repeatedly called to answer.14  
 
Figure 7: EPA officials cheerfully circulated this depiction  
of inflation as yet another scare tactic from industry.15 
 
Drawing on the agency’s own economic research, EPA leaders argued time and again 
that environmental regulations contributed only slightly to rising prices while at the same time 
reducing mortality, boosting new employment in the pollution control industry, and increasing  
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the quality of life.16 EPA’s officials argued that regulation driven inflation was just another 
boogieman dreamed up by industry to scare the public into abandoning its support for 
environmental regulations. However, Strauss’s aforementioned complaint was but one of many 
reminders that the Carter administration did not necessarily agree with EPA’s dismissal of 
linkages between inflation and environmental regulations. EPA leaders warily eyed any mention 
of rising prices in regulated industries out of fear that such information might drive the inflation 
obsessed Carter administration into scaling back regulations.17 
EPA officials themselves could not dismiss the steel industry’s continued flailing as mere 
scare tactics. Industry representatives could cite real plant closures as evidence that American 
steel could not afford both the modernization expenditures necessary to keep pace with foreign 
competitors and the pollution controls mandated by EPA. In 1975, the American Steel and Iron 
Institute commissioned a study from the consultancy Arthur D. Little Inc. that predicted the 
industry would spend $12 to 14 billion complying with environmental regulations through 1983 – 
a sum that would comprise more than twenty percent of total capital investment over the eight 
year period and would drive up the price of domestically produced steel. Firms with prices that 
were already on the higher end of what the market would bear would likely have to close, Arthur 
D. Little Inc. reported, threatening the loss of 90,000 jobs. US Steel Chairman and CEO Edgar 
Speer cited those dire forecasts in publically wondered whether Congress would have ever 
passed the Clean Air Act if legislators had known the economic effects would be so severe.18 As 
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it had many times in the past, EPA quickly summoned its own economic expertise to critique the 
study. In this case, however, chief EPA economist Al Alm noted that the predicted dislocations 
and tens of billions of dollars in compliance costs appeared worrisomely accurate.19         
With the fate of a major American industry in doubt, Congress and Carter set about 
figuring out ways to reduce the cost of pollution control for steel producers. In September 1977, 
Carter met with members of the newly formed “Steel Caucus” in the House of Representatives, 
hearing from fellow Democrats and Republicans alike that the industry could not afford to match 
Japanese modernization and at the same time comply with pollution control requirements. 
Carter in turn asked his advisors for a comprehensive report on the industry, including the 
obstacles that environmental regulation posed to modernization. Asked for his assessment in 
September 1977, Costle told Carter that the industry could have complied but had instead 
chosen to drag its feet, “stretching out all proceedings by maximum litigation and delay.” The 
industry needed to modernize, Costle conceded, and the steps of some firms in that direction 
indicated that the industry could do so under a coordinated national strategy, albeit with 
closures of marginal plants.20 EPA could assist the industry in coming into compliance, Costle 
declared, without radical changes to existing regulations.  
 
The Bubble Policy 
 
Convinced that larger policy changes were needed, Charles Schultze and the Council of 
Economic Advisors released a set of recommendations in December 1977 for how EPA might 
handle the steel problem. Perhaps firms could be allowed to temporarily idle plants without 
having to meet EPA’s rigorous standards for new sources if they restarted operations in the 
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future. Or EPA could allow firms to use aggressive emission reductions in one geographic area 
to offset continued emissions in another area. Firms could even bank emission reductions that 
exceeded regulatory requirements for later sale or to use in offsetting emissions from their own 
future expansions. Or, the Council suggested, EPA might just relax its regulatory standards. 
One last alternative let firms reduce emissions however they wanted so long as aggregate 
emissions from each factory remained below the total amount that would have been produced 
given existing limits on each of the smokestacks. This “bubble” concept lowered regulatory 
compliance expense because of differences in control costs between older and newer capital  
 
Figure 8: An EPA illustration of how an emissions bubble would function21 
 
stock. Old smokestacks tended to be much more expensive to retrofit with control devices than 
newer stacks. By going above and beyond regulatory requirements on newer stacks, a firm 
using the bubble policy could generate emission credits and apply those credits toward avoiding 
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expensive retrofitting on older stacks. In addition to lowering the costs of compliance, Schultze 
and the Council of Economic Advisors saw the bubble policy as a means of returning decision 
making to corporate managers. Devising compliance plans forced EPA to become closely 
involved in a firm’s decisions about capital investments, a worrisome trend in Schultze’s eyes 
and one he hoped the bubble would arrest.22  
As Richard Liroff, who was involved in the bubble’s creation and later wrote the most 
definitive history on the policy for The Conservation Foundation, explained, a large part of the 
bubble’s impetus came from the steel industry. In early 1978, Costle and other EPA officials met 
with representatives of Armco to discuss how the firm might finally come into compliance. 
Focusing on reducing aggregate emissions, Armco proposed a novel strategy. Instead of 
installing expensive scrubber devices to reduce particulate emissions from the smokestacks of 
an Ohio mill, Armco would invest a much smaller sum on water sprayers for the mill’s unpaved 
roads and on tarps to cover raw material piles, investments that Armco claimed would 
substantially reduce the particulates blown up into the air each day by the wind. The substitution 
would save the firm millions of dollars in capital and maintenance costs, Armco estimated, while 
achieving greater overall particulate reductions than would have been achieved with 
smokestack controls.23 Though EPA rejected Armco’s proposal, the company later applied for a 
bubble permit for the scheme, confirming the fears of environmental advocates that regulatory 
innovations like the bubble allowed businesses to brush off hard won smokestack controls.  
Individual firms and industries had often received special dispensations in complying 
with the Clean Air Act’s uniform standards. But while environmental advocates sometimes 
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tolerated these deviations from regulatory standards under specific circumstances, they fiercely 
resisted reformers’ attempts to introduce flexible, industry controlled plans for compliance into 
EPA’s basic template. When EPA introduced a precursor to the bubble policy in 1975, 
environmental advocates had immediately taken the agency to court. The contested policy 
change concerned EPA’s decision to revise the rules governing new additions to heavy metal 
smelters to allow firms to avoid stringent and expensive New Source Performance Standards if 
they made reductions elsewhere in the plant so that overall emissions did not increase. In 
ASARCO Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 
1978 that EPA did not have authority under the Clean Air Act to change its definition of an 
emissions source to permit such substitutions within a plant.24  
By this point, however, Costle and other reform advocates at EPA were firmly committed 
to creating flexible alternatives to direct, uniform standards and they treated the ASARCO 
decision as only a minor speed bump in developing the bubble and other reforms.25 Costle’s 
commitment to the bubble no doubt owed in part to Charles Schultze’s active interest in the idea 
(which extended to Schultze advising EPA to appeal the ASARCO decision), though Policy 
Office Assistant Administrator Bill Drayton was quick to note to his staff that Costle himself had 
developed a great personal interest and support for the policy.26 In any case, the bubble had 
sufficient support to go forward as EPA’s first major deviation from the direct enforcement of 
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uniform standards, though as the ASARCO challenge indicated, the road ahead would not be 
smooth. 
In 1978, Costle formed the Bubble Concept Task Force to study the policy’s viability 
within and outside of EPA. Led by the Drayton, the task force met with the heads of EPA’s many 
offices to solicit their support for the bubble and to uncover potential obstacles to the policy.27 In 
a testament to the bubble’s uneven reception within the agency, Drayton soon called on Costle 
“to reaffirm to the AAs [Assistant Administrators] your decision to actively encourage use of the 
bubble,” in the hopes of getting key offices on board.28 Reporting back to Costle later that fall, 
Drayton noted that all of the Assistant Administrators had given the policy their conditional 
blessing, including the Air Office’s Dave Hawkins, who was widely recognized as the bubble’s 
chief opponent.29  
The conditions Hawkins specified in eventually endorsing the bubble idea reflected 
problems he had identified as well as his astute calculations about how to manage the Carter 
administration’s shift away from enforcing uniform standards. Along with others in the Air Office, 
Hawkins believed that the bubble policy allowed industrial engineers (especially in the steel 
industry) to use their superior technical knowledge to take advantage of gaps in technology-
based controls that EPA itself would eventually have recognized and closed. Since the firms 
would have eventually been required to make those reductions once EPA engineers identified 
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them, the bubble policy let firms maintain a higher level of pollution than they would have under 
uniformly applied standards.  
As the Bubble Policy Task Force determined how best to implement the policy, Hawkins 
repeatedly introduced constraints. Shortly after the internal decision to proceed with the bubble 
policy in May 1978, Hawkins voiced his concern that EPA’s announcement of an expansive new 
bubble policy would disrupt the states’ ongoing revisions of their implementation plans, which 
the Clean Air Amendments of 1977 had forced the states to update. In a September 1978 
memo to EPA’s ten Regional Offices, Hawkins made clear that the January 1978 due date for 
the submission of those revisions would not be extended and that states should continue 
revising their plans under the terms of the 1977 amendments, in effect ignoring the proposed 
bubble policy.30 Then, in October 1978, Hawkins critiqued Armco’s proposed bubble for “fugitive 
dust” emissions, writing a memo to Costle in which he argued that unknown relationships 
between particle size and toxicity might make switching from stack controls to open dust 
controls more dangerous to human health. Hawkins also flagged the thorny problem of how to 
quantify reductions from open dust sources that were more disparate and thus more difficult to 
monitor than discrete smokestacks.31 When Costle made the decision to announce the bubble 
policy before the SIP revisions were completed, Hawkins went so far as to object to the wording 
of the announcement, advocating for language that connoted EPA’s “neutral position” toward 
the policy rather than Costle’s “more positive statement of encouragement.”32 
																																																						
30 Hawkins subsequently warned Costle that his directions might be construed by the steel industry as “an implicit 
rejection of the bubble concept,” though this was not the case. David Hawkins to Regional Administrator, Regions I-X, 
attached to Dave Hawkins to Doug Costle, September 1, 1978, folder, "Air & Waste (Jul - Sept),” Box 26, EPA Intra-
Agency Memos.   
31 David Hawkins to The Administrator, October 10, 1978, folder, “Air & Waste (Oct-Dec),” Box 28, EPA Intra-Agency 
Memos; Hawkins also made it clear that the Air Office would not support any change to emissions trading rules to 
permit open dust trades between firms. David Hawkins to Administrator, November 1978, folder, “Issue Memos 
Policies [2],” Box 45, DCP 




Hawkins’ repeated introduction of qualifications and constraints on the bubble policy 
reflected his astute understanding of regulatory politics. Throughout the bubble policy’s 
evolution, Hawkins focused his resistance to the policy on its expansion and liberalization rather 
than on the merits of the core idea. This strategy was born of Hawkins’ observation that the 
steel industry had too much political clout for his Air Office to simply kill the policy within EPA.33 
Instead, Hawkins embarked on a “strategy of trying to restrain, and condition, and limit its use 
as much as possible by negotiating all of these criteria conditions.” By weighing down the 
bubble with onerous requirements, Hawkins calculated that state agencies would spurn the 
policy as a drain on their limited budgets and staffs, since the states would have to evaluate 
whether various measures added up to full compliance. As EPA’s Policy Office started to reach 
out to state regulators to encourage them to embrace the bubble, Hawkins recounts that he 
aimed to tuck in the caveat, “oh by the way, you’re going to have to jump through seven hoops 
to do it.”34 
Costle’s decision to announce the bubble policy in December 1978 immediately aroused 
state level concerns about the bubble’s potential disruption to existing programs – exactly the 
sort of objections that Hawkins was counting on to limit the policy’s adoption. George Ferreri, 
the Administrator of Maryland’s Air Quality Program and a member of the State and Territorial 
Air Pollution Program Administrators wrote Hawkins in December 1978 to inform him that the 
bubble policy contained enough hidden problems that “to call it a can of worms would be a 
gross understatement.” Passing Ferreri’s note along to Drayton, Hawkins noted that Ferreri was 
upset about being pressured into adopting the policy “before he has figured out where and how 
																																																						
33 As Hawkins put it, “we never bought the intellectual proposition. But it was difficult to shut the door on the policy 
conversation all together. It just wouldn’t go away because there was a lot of political power.” David Hawkins 
interview with Charles Halvorson, September 18, 2015. 




to apply it.”35 EPA’s Regional Offices, which dealt most closely with the states, also reported in 
December 1978 that state regulators strongly wished for a delay in EPA’s announcement of the 
bubble policy so as to avoid interference with state submissions of SIP implementation revisions 
and to allow time to consider the policy in more depth.36 In public letters and complaints to the 
agency, environmental advocates like the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) warned 
that the policy was a delaying tactic designed by the steel industry and a ruse to take credit for 
emission reductions that would have been made anyway. NRDC also objected to the policy’s 
likely imposition on the financial and staffing resources of state and local regulators. Whereas 
firms previously had to demonstrate that they were in compliance with narrowly drawn rules, 
state and local regulators would now be required to evaluate and enforce a potentially 
bewildering array of compliance plans ginned up by corporate engineers.37 
While a few state regulators took to the bubble, many others rejected the proposed 
change. John Wise, who helped states formulate their implementation plans as part of his duties 
in EPA’s Region IV office, recalls that state regulators wanted nothing to do with offsets or 
bubbles because enacting such policies was “a hell of a lot of work.” Instead, states preferred to 
use “straight up regulation,” and the Region IV office helped them to do so. Wise recounted an 
additional objection raised by state and local regulators that bubbles and other emission 
offsetting schemes risked concentrating pollutants, “hot spots” that would probably fall among 
the most marginal populations. Furthermore, approving bubbles or emission trades put local 
regulators in the position of granting firms a right to those emissions in perpetuity. Often these 
																																																						
35 George Ferreri to David Hawkins, December 11, 1978, attached to Dave Hawkins to Bill Drayton, December 14, 
1978, folder, "Air & Waste (Oct-Dec)," Box 28, EPA Intra-Agency Memos.  
36 J. Edward Roush to William Drayton, December 15, 1978, folder, “Bubble Concept,” Box 5, DCP. 
37 Richard Liroff, An Issue Report: Reforming Air Pollution Regulation: The Toil and Trouble of EPA’s Bubble 




firms were electrical utilities or other heavy industries located in poor communities of color, 
where respiratory problems were becoming a target of the emerging environmental justice 
movement. By granting firms the right to produce emissions however they pleased under the 
bubble, the policy created a de facto stay against further reductions, since firms would have 
devised their own complicated compliance plans with the understanding that they would be 
permitted a certain total emissions limit. Such an implicit declaration that no further controls 
would be required from major polluters raised political objections as well as ethical issues for 
local regulators, Wise stated, further undermining support for bubbling or emission trading.38     
In addition to fearing the likely disruption that would accompany the bubble policy, many 
state level regulators recognized issues with the policy from their experience writing actual 
compliance plans, issues that Drayton and others in the Policy Office back in Washington 
probably never foresaw. Bill Becker, who in 1980 became the first president of the combined 
State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators and the Association of Local Air 
Pollution Control Officials, recounted one of these limitations. As Becker described, local and 
state regulators recognized a key error in the assumption among EPA’s Policy Office staff that a 
firm controlling emissions individually on each of its stacks and a firm controlling aggregate 
emissions under a bubble would produce the same amount of total emissions. As Becker 
explained, under a system of individual controls, a typical firm built a margin of error into each 
control device to ensure that it would achieve the legally required reductions on that particular 
stack. This margin of error was not required by law but businesses preferred to spend the extra 
money to hedge the risk that the control device would fail to deliver the promised reductions, a 
failure that would expose the firm to fines and expensive retrofitting. If a given stack had to meet 
an emissions standard of no more than 100 tons per year, the typical firm would install controls 
																																																						




that limited emissions to 80 or 90 tons. Since that hedge went more often than not unused, it 
yielded a ten to twenty percent bonus in improved air quality. Under the bubble policy, the risk of 
control equipment not performing up to expectations was spread over the plant as a whole. 
Engineers would still build overly stringent controls to hedge that risk but the hedge could be 
much smaller, since the chance of all the control equipment simultaneously failing to meet 
expectations was vanishingly slim. Under the bubble, that substantial air quality bonus would 
largely disappear.39 
Tracing a related line of critique, the contemporary observer Richard Liroff wrote that 
many state level regulators objected to EPA’s bubble policy because they were already 
bargaining with industrial polluters under their purview. They saw the promulgation of a formal 
set of rules as a constraint on their flexibility to use informal bubbles to find viable paths to 
compliance. As the parties responsible for actually writing compliance plans for individual firms, 
local and state regulators had always enjoyed some leeway in deciding what technical 
standards would apply to new and modified sources of emissions within their jurisdiction. Liroff 
collected several different commentators’ testimony that local and state regulators periodically 
allowed sources to exceed one of these technological standards in exchange for tightening 
controls in another part of their operations.40 EPA staff in regional offices and at headquarters 
could in theory identify and reject such accommodations through a careful review of the 
applications state agencies were required to submit for any proposed modification of their State 
Implementation Plan.41 However, the practical difficulty of such painstaking review and the 
																																																						
39 Bill Becker interview with Charles Halvorson, May 1, 2015.  
40 Liroff describes testimony from the Natural Resources Defense Council, the State and Territorial Air Pollution 
Program Administrators, and individual state regulators that small, informal bubbling took place across the country. 
Richard Liroff, An Issue Report: Reforming Air Pollution Regulation: The Toil and Trouble of EPA’s Bubble 
(Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1986). 
41 It is worth noting that a former regulator in EPA’s Region IV office explicitly rejected the notion that state regulators 




political consequences of rejecting all but impeccable state plans generally obviated against 
such intervention.42 As with the unrecorded air quality bonus from risk hedging, informal 
bubbling was another instance in which the actual control of air pollution at the ground level 
created entrenched interests in the existing control regime that then militated against the bubble 
proponents’ attempts to change the underlying rules.  
While state regulators, environmental advocates, and EPA’s Air Office worked to limit 
where bubbles could be used, proponents in the steel and chemical manufacturing industries 
sought to liberalize the policy. As Costle and EPA officials debated the conditions under which 
firms could bubble, representatives from the Manufacturing Chemists Association and the 
American Steel and Iron Institute pressed the agency to make the policy broadly applicable and 
easy to use.43 Hawkins and the bubble skeptics worried that making the bubble widely available 
would enshrine the status quo of poor air quality in much of the nation, besides creating 
unwelcome opportunities for abuse as a delaying tactic by the notoriously recalcitrant steel 
industry. Advocates in industry and in the Policy Office complained that an overly narrow bubble 
would be of no use in those problematic areas where a new, flexible approach was most 
needed. 
																																																						
2015. Despite this objection, Liroff’s collected testimony from state regulators and environmental advocates suggests 
that such accommodation did take place.  
42 There were, of course, many notable exceptions where federal authorities rejected state level accommodation, 
often due to the objections and litigation of environmental groups. Such objections – many of which are discussed in 
this dissertation – often established the limits to which state regulators could accommodate the individual 
circumstances of particular firms.  
43 John E. Barker to Roy Gamse, May 4, 1978, folder, “Issue Memos Policies [2],” Box 45, DCP; Bureau of National 
Affairs, Inc., “Offset Policy Revision Delayed as EPA Considers Industry Petition,” Environment Reporter 9, no. 28 
(November 10, 1978): 1277; The primary issues at stake were whether the bubble would be permitted in air quality 
control regions that did not appear likely to meet the national air quality standards by the 1982 deadline set by the 
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments; whether open dust trades of the sort originally proposed by Armco would be 
allowed; how different pollutants with unknown carcinogenic risks would be handled; and whether bubble applications 
would need to go through the time consuming State Implementation Plan revision process. The answers to these 
various questions determined whether the bubble would be readily available to industrial sources in the areas of the 
country with the most intransigent pollution problems. Richard Liroff, An Issue Report: Reforming Air Pollution 




Predicting legal difficulties and counseling an abundance of caution, Hawkins and his 
fellow skeptics at EPA convinced Costle to propose a conservative bubble in January 1979. 
Announced with great fanfare and the enthusiastic endorsement of prominent economists and 
advocates of regulatory reform, the initial bubble policy changed very little about how most firms 
actually complied with the Clean Air Act.44 Bubbles were only allowed in areas with EPA 
approved plans toward meeting the 1982 deadline, no open dust swaps were allowed, trading 
between pollutants was not allowed, and every bubble proposal was subject to EPA 
headquarters review as an official revision of that state’s implementation plan.45 Nevertheless, 
advocates of a more liberal policy from the steel and chemical manufacturing industries pressed 
on, hoping that Drayton and other regulatory reform advocates would prevail over Hawkins and 
other cautionary voices within the agency as EPA determined the shape of the final policy.46 
 
Bubbling in the Context of Wider Reforms 
 
Costle’s push for a viable bubble policy was intertwined with his emerging role as a 
champion of the Carter administration’s larger program of regulatory reform. Like Carter, Costle 
believed that the continued legitimacy of the liberal state depended on minimizing the costs of 
federal intervention to private enterprise through market based alternatives to direct regulations. 
Costle and other reformers saw that shift as especially vital as EPA expanded its regulatory 
																																																						
44 EPA’s Policy Office collected endorsements from prominent academic economists like William Baumol, influential 
think tank experts like Robert Crandall from the Brookings Institution, and well connected policy makers like Otto 
Eckstein, President of Data Resources, Inc., folder, “Orig. Bubble Policy - Press Conf. + Endorsements – Proposal." 
Box P, MLP. 
45 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Air Pollution Control; Recommendation for Alternative Emission Reduction 
Options Within State Implementation Plans,” Federal Register 44, no. 13 (January 18, 1979): 3740-3744. 
46 Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., “Industry Group Challenges Offset Rule in Petition Filed in D.C. Appeals Court,” 
Environment Reporter 9, no. 42 (February 18, 1979): 1958; AISI Position Paper, “The Bubble Concept,” attached to 




purview to new environmental problems such as toxic waste and new dangers to the global 
atmosphere.47  
Costle and Carter’s kindred vision prompted the president to turn to Costle to sell his 
regulatory reforms to the general public. In a 1979 speech entitled “Efficiency and Compassion: 
The Carter Regulatory Program,” Costle began with what was by now a standard litany of 
seemingly absurd mandates, like the public library in small town Iowa ordered to install 
handicap accessible ramps at the cost of nearly the entire operating budget even though no 
handicapped person lived there. But, Costle continued, there was another “story about federal 
regulation,” one that featured the introduction of protections like safety standards for infant cribs. 
Together, the two stories demonstrated that “some federal regulations are silly and that they 
ought to be thrown out,” but “that some federal regulations control individual and corporate 
behavior in socially beneficial ways that the market cannot, that they are saving lives, and that 
they must be retained.” The challenge was to differentiate between the two, Costle said, quoting 
Carter’s declaration that “if we are to continue our progress, we must ensure that regulation 
gives Americans their money’s worth.” Federal agencies like EPA and OSHA had already begun 
this work, Costle explained, but they needed new powers to go further. Carter’s recently 
proposed Regulatory Reform Act asked that agencies consider less expensive alternatives to 
existing regulations, conduct periodic reviews of existing rules, simplify public hearings, and 
submit rule proposals to the White House for review. As Costle explained it, goal of this reform 
was to “sort out our rules, not throw them out.”48         
																																																						
47 As early as 1977, when EPA began addressing the damage caused to the ozone layer by chlorofluorocarbons, 
Costle chose to pursue a marketable permits system to phase the dangerous pollutants out of production. Andy Mank 
to Jim Janis, August 26, 1977, folder, “Marketable Permits,” Box 47, DCP.  
48 Douglas M. Costle, “Efficiency and Compassion: The Carter Regulatory Program,” Speech in Los Angeles, 




In 1978, Carter asked Costle to chair the newly formed Regulatory Council, which 
collected together the heads of regulatory agencies. Historian Paul Sabin notes that Costle and 
other regulators hoped that by forming the Regulatory Council, they might head off increased 
White House oversight and retain control over reform.49 As EPA’s Bill Drayton described the 
vision, the Council would not review specific regulations but would rather be a tool to 
disseminate ideas for regulatory reform like the bubble policy. In addition, the Council would 
produce a master calendar of the regulations proposed by all federal agencies to identify 
redundant or contradictory mandates as well as excess stress on particular industries.50  
While Costle came to be the public face of Carter’s efforts to reform regulatory agencies, 
Bill Drayton in EPA’s Policy Office served as the intellectual and organizational force behind the 
introduction of market based policies at EPA. In addition to pushing for the continued 
liberalization of reforms like the bubble, Drayton and his staff tried to envision the wider 
economic realm in which such reforms would function, considering subjects that included how 
financial firms might be enticed into creating insurance policies for bubbles.51 In speeches and 
articles, Drayton explained the intricacies of the bubble and other reforms to educated 
audiences like the New York Environmental Planning Lobby.52 Like Costle and Carter, Drayton 
understood the political necessity of distinguishing good regulation from bad as well as 
																																																						
49 Instead of receiving instructions from the Council of Economic Advisors or the Office of Management and Budget 
as to what needed fixing, Costle and the leaders of other regulatory agencies proposed to identify and address the 
problems themselves. Paul Sabin, “‘Everything has a price’: Jimmy Carter and the Struggle for Balance in Federal 
Regulatory Policy,” Journal of Policy History 28, no. 1 (2016): 1-47. 
50 Bill Drayton to Doug Costle and Barbara Blum, November 2, 1978, folder, “Regulatory Council [1],” Box 53, DCP. 
51 Rick Tropp to Bill Drayton, December 12, 1979, folder, "Innovation - Carter Policies, OPE Work Group, etc. 1979-
81," Box P, MLP.  
52 See for example William Drayton, “Beyond Effluent Fees,” in Approaches to Controlling Air Pollution, edited by Ann 
F. Friedlaender (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978); and William Drayton, “Speech to New York Environmental 
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defending the basic premise of federal standards amid swirling calls that lilted more toward 
wholesale deregulation. To do so, Drayton ramped up EPA’s Economic Analysis Division and let 
out new research grants to academic economists – including a 1979 study led by Tom Crocker, 
Allen Kneese, and Ralph D’Arge that estimated the monetary benefits of decreased morbidity 
resulting from cleaner air in sixty of the nation’s largest cities.53 Like Policy Office directors 
before him, Drayton kept close tabs on the economic claims made by other executive branch 
offices, especially the Department of Commerce.54 Drayton and his staff also developed 
initiatives for the Regulatory Council, sketching out ideas that included promoting technological 
innovation through tweaks in the interpretation of the tax code that would change how business 
managers calculated return on investment.55    
In developing the bubble policy and other reforms, Drayton was able to draw on a 
preexisting basis for such reform within the agency. Drayton staffed the initial Bubble Concept 
Task Force with members of the Policy Office’s Economic Analysis Division, a logical work 
assignment that also revealed that members of the EPA’s own economic staff served as the 
architects for regulatory reform within the agency. While the appointment of reform advocates 
like Costle and Drayton was the most proximate cause of the bubble’s adoption, the 
development of such reforms depended on longtime EPA economic analysis staff like Roy 
																																																						
53 A Drayton staffer noted in a December 1978 memo to Costle that the Policy Office had hired eleven new staff 
members since Drayton took over, all of them “high calibre [sic] economists and business financial analysts.” Among 
the educational qualifications of the new hires, MBAs predominated, with a few Masters in Economics and public 
policy and two PhDs in Economics. Frans Kok to The Administrator, December 25, 1978, folder, "Planning & 
Management (Oct - Dec),” Box 28, EPA Intra-Agency Memos; Describing the 1979 economics study, Drayton noted 
that in addition to morbidity, the research had estimated the monetary benefits of increased productivity resulting from 
less sick days. William Drayton to The Administrator, January 15, 1979, folder, "OPM (JAN - MARCH)," Box 36, EPA 
Intra-Agency Memos.  
54 In 1978, Drayton protested a slate of recent Commerce studies that were “very derogatory concerning EPA’s 
legislation and regulations, and the impact of those regulations on the economy,” and asked a Commerce official for 
the opportunity to participate in future studies involving the environment. Bill Drayton to Barbara Blum and Douglas 
Costle, April 13, 1978, folder, "Office of the Admin. (Apr - Jun)," Box 22, EPA Intra-Agency Memos. 
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Gamse and Alan Carlin, who could now pursue longstanding interests in alternatives to direct 
regulation. Bolstering that core constituency, Drayton created the Regulatory Reform Staff in the 
Policy Office in 1979, hiring an attorney named Michael Levin as its first director. Though small, 
the Regulatory Reform Staff created an institutional advocate for market oriented polcies within 
EPA. A critical task for the new “Reg Reform” staff was promoting alternatives to direct 
regulations that were already on the books but from which state and local authorities had been 
reluctant to embrace.56  
In December 1979, Costle issued a final bubble policy that removed many of the 
constraints that the Air Office had fought to include. Fulfilling Armco’s request, emission sources 
could control fugitive dust in place of particulates emitted by smokestacks, provided they could 
establish through monitoring that the promised reductions were in fact occurring. Businesses 
could also draw bubbles across multiple plants in the same geographic vicinity and would be 
allowed to apply for extensions in the compliance deadlines. To make firms feel more secure 
about their right to use the emission reductions they created, the final policy deleted a provision 
from the original proposal that mentioned that regulators could always tighten standards in the 
future.57 EPA collected endorsements of the bubble from environmental advocates, business 
representatives, and public policy experts.58  
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and local control officials would ideally draw ideas from in devising new control plans. EPA Office of Planning and 
Management, “Checklist of Regulatory Alternatives,” (July 1980), Box K, MLP.  
57 Richard Liroff, An Issue Report: Reforming Air Pollution Regulation: The Toil and Trouble of EPA’s Bubble 
(Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1986). 
58 These included Conservation Foundation President William Reilly, Armco Chairman William Verity, and MIT 
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For all the fanfare around the bubble and despite further liberalization between the early 
proposal and the final policy, significant constraints on how bubbles would be permitted limited 
the new policy’s effect on how the majority of firms controlled pollution. As Hawkins and the Air 
Office had long insisted, firms that wanted to use the bubble still had to complete a State 
Implementation Plan revision with their permitting state authority. Official revisions to state plans 
were subject to review in EPA Regional Offices and in EPA headquarters, allowing regulators 
who were wary of the policy to closely interrogate each proposed usage. The review process 
could take a year or more, an unappealing prospect for firms that needed to build new facilities 
in response to market signals and did not want to hear eighteen months later that their 
application under the novel policy had been rejected.59 Though the potential savings from a 
bubble were substantial, most firms chose to avoid the high risk of depending on a new policy 
that many regulators plainly mistrusted. Among industry, enthusiasm about the new direction 
EPA seemed to be taking was soon replaced with disappointment. As National Steel executive 
Fred Tucker put it, “what we asked EPA to do was to legalize the bubble, not to qualify it so 
badly that nobody uses it.”60 Anticipating the challenges that would arise from the permitting 
requirements, New Jersey asked for permission in 1979 to approve bubbles sought by DuPont 
and other chemical manufacturers without revising its State Implementation Plan for each 
application – an arrangement that became known as a “generic bubble.” Wary of losing control 
over the process, EPA rejected New Jersey’s request in March 1980, prompting the 
Manufacturing Chemists Association to immediately file suit to have EPA’s rejection 
																																																						
59 Making matters worse, EPA’s existing review of state plans revisions to comply with the 1977 amendments to the 
Clean Air Act was hopelessly backlogged. Most of the states had not yet heard whether their own plans had been 
approved and so could not begin accepting proposals from firms to bubble. Richard Liroff, An Issue Report: 
Reforming Air Pollution Regulation: The Toil and Trouble of EPA’s Bubble (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation 
Foundation, 1986).  
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overturned.61 Environmental advocates including Senator Ed Muskie, meanwhile, continued to 
press for the greatest possible constraints.62 As the presidential election heated up that 
summer, Carter and his EPA reformers could point to hard won changes in official regulatory 
policy but few changes in actual pollution control.  
In summer 1980, the bubble’s proponents fanned out to promote the policy to 
businesses and state and local regulators. Mike Levin, Chief of EPA’s Regulatory Reform 
Office, hit the road with a slide deck explaining the mechanics and merits of the bubble to  
 
Figure 9: Slides from Levin’s presentation showing the ability of offsetting to allow new growth.63 
 
skeptical regulators. Levin’s presentation grouped the bubble together with such other market-
based reforms as EPA’s Controlled Trading Program. Together, the reforms promised to “put 
the profit motive to work for pollution control.”64 To convince regulators of the benefits of 
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(Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1986). 
62 Bill Drayton to Doug Costle, January 1980, folder, “Bubble Concept,” Box 5, DCP.  
63 U U.S. EPA, “Controlled Trading: Putting the Profit Motive to Work for Pollution Control,” (U.S. EPA, 1980), Box W, 
MLP. 
64 Michael Levin interview with Charles Halvorson, May 7, 2015; Slides reproduced in U.S. EPA, “Controlled Trading: 




adopting such reforms, Levin’s staff collected data from industry proponents like DuPont that 
showed significant economic savings to the company alongside improvements in air quality.65  
 
Figure 10: Levin slides showing savings to economy if firms marketed pollution rights.66 
 
In 1980, Drayton’s Policy Office formed a Bubble Clearinghouse to collect and 
disseminate similar positive descriptions for every proposed bubble in the country along with 
other promotional literature.67 Costle himself met with industry representatives like the Council 
of Industrial Boiler Owners to try to nudge them into proposing bubbles for new and expanded 
plants.68 Writing to the President in August 1980, Deputy EPA Administrator Barbara Blum 
touted the private economic windfalls promised under the policy, in particular DuPont’s 
projected savings of $12 million on its Chambers Works facility in New Jersey, Weyerhaeuser’s 
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cost 24 to 38% less than conventional control strategies, yielding savings of roughly $1.5 million annually, making it 
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68 “Talking Points for Meeting with the Environmental Coalition of the Council of Industrial Boiler Owners,” June 17, 




predicted $5 million in savings in North Carolina coupled with an annual reduction of 1 million 
barrels of oil, and 3M’s $3 million savings in Pennsylvania.69 
As EPA staff promoted the new bubble policy, proponents within the agency and the 
Carter administration continued to fight for further liberalization of the policy. In 1980, Roy 
Gamse put together a list of remaining constraints. In addition to the problem of delays in 
revisions of state implementation plan (for which Gamse singled out the Air Office’s Dave 
Hawkins as the principal obstacle) Gamse flagged restrictions on using bubbles in the areas 
that had not met the national standards and lacked a plan for compliance as especially 
debilitating.70 Drayton took Gamse’s analysis to Costle, emphasizing that the nonattainment 
prohibition, despite appearing legitimate at the time the bubble policy had been formulated, now 
revealed itself to prohibit nearly all the proposed bubbles for whole categories of pollutants. 
Though environmental groups would object, Drayton advised Costle to lift the restriction, for the 
economic and environment benefits as well as to counter suspicion among industry that the 
bubble had been only a “hollow gesture,” a growing sentiment that Drayton warned was keeping 
possible business candidates from proposing bubbles.71 Elsewhere, Drayton’s staff pushed 
Hawkins and the Air Office to accept other liberalizations of the bubble policy.72 Though 
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Hawkins did eventually give in on a number of fronts, he managed to protect key restrictions, 
including the nonattainment provision, withstanding even White House pressure.73  
 The hobbling effect of these remaining constraints on the bubble policy was made clear 
during a September 1980 conference on regulatory reform put on by EPA. Collecting together 
regulators, business executives, local elected officials, academic economists, union leaders, 
Congressional leaders, and EPA staff, the two-day conference focused on the implementation 
of regulatory reform initiatives to date.74 According to Richard Liroff (the first hand observer who 
wrote the 1986 history of the bubble), the results were not pretty. Conference participants 
expressed deep disappointment with EPA’s reforms, particularly the bubble policy. For all the 
hype, EPA had yet to approve a single bubble. Of the hindrances to the policy’s success, 
participants singled out the state implementation plan review requirement as the most 
pernicious. Liroff argued that the conference represented something of a turning point for 
Costle, with the avalanche of criticism convincing him that the promised benefits would never be 
realized unless EPA removed the bulk of the remaining constraints.75 Two weeks later, Costle 
announced that he had reversed his decision on the “generic bubble” proposed by New Jersey 
and that EPA would allow other states to submit plans for generic bubbles that did not require 
EPA review. Writing Carter economic advisor Stuart Eizenstat to inform him of the impending 
change, Costle noted that DuPont would be among the first companies to take advantage of the 
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change, finally realizing that $12 million in savings at the Chambers Works facility that EPA’s 
Blum had bragged about back in August.76   
On October 22, 1980, EPA announced its provisional approval of the nation’s first 
bubble. EPA’s press release explained that the bubble would allow Narragansett Electric 
Company of Rhode Island to burn high sulfur oil at one plant in exchange for shutting down 
another plant or converting it to natural gas. Behind the scenes, Drayton and others had tried 
and failed to speed through approval of 3M’s bubble to make it the nation’s first in place of 
Narragansett’s less politically appealing fuel swap.77 Nevertheless, EPA celebrated the 
“landmark regulatory reform action,” which promised to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by 
nearly 1,400 tons and imported oil by 600,000 barrels while saving the utility and its customers 
almost $3 million each year in projected costs.78 Another press release touted Armco’s soon to 
be approved bubble for open dust control at its Ohio plant, with anticipated savings of $14 to 16 
million and exciting prospects of reproducibility across Armco’s other facilities.79 In a private 
letter to two former colleagues of his from the business consultancy McKinsey & Company, 
Drayton pointed to the Narragansett and Armco bubbles together with the generic bubble 
program as the long awaited “clear commitment to making regulatory reform work.”80 But there 
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79 U.S. EPA, “EPA Plans to Approve Armco Steel ‘Bubble’ in Ohio,” October 20, 1980, folder, “Bubble Issues – 
General Issues, Memos, Policies – Post Promulgation,” Box 6, DCP.  
80 William Drayton to Dick Cavanaugh and Sandy Apgar, November 12, 1980, folder, “Bubble Issues – General 




again in December was Hawkins, articulating another set of qualifying conditions to Costle.81 
The contest was plainly not over.  
 
The Ambitions of the National Air Quality Standards 
 
Simultaneous to the fight over the bubble’s liberalization, Carter’s economic advisors 
impelled EPA officials to lower the costs of environmental protection by reevaluating the 
agency’s national air quality standards in light of the compliance costs faced by businesses. The 
bubble policy shifted decisions from regulators to private industry regarding the technology and 
techniques businesses used to meet air quality standards. The proposed introduction of 
economic considerations into the standard setting process envisioned a fundamental 
transformation in how regulators would decide where to intervene.  
When Americans thought about urban air quality in the 1970s, they thought about smog, 
the hazy white scrim of pollutants that shrouded cities and constricted lungs. Dawning 
awareness of the health risks and economic costs of smog helped propel the emergence of the 
modern environmental movement in the 1960s. The Clean Air Act of 1970 instructed EPA to 
establish national standards for five pollutants deemed prevalent and dangerous enough to 
threaten the public’s health. One of these was photochemical oxidants, which formed when 
hydrocarbons emitted by petroleum refining and the burning of gasoline in cars combined with 
the nitrogen dioxide emitted by cars and the volatile organic compounds released by industrial 
manufacturing and natural processes.82 As with the other four pollutants, Science Advisory 
Boards evaluated existing research on photochemical oxidants and produced a criteria 
document that spelled out the risks to public health. EPA took that criteria document and set a 
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National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for photochemical oxidants that, when 
achieved, would eliminate their threat. Congress deemed protecting the public health such a 
priority that the Clean Air Act explicitly prohibited EPA from considering economic costs or 
technological feasibility in setting the five NAAQS.  
EPA’s first set of standards fulfilled that Congressional mandate to protect the public 
health regardless of the costs involved. In the case of photochemical oxidants, EPA established 
a national standard of 0.08 parts per million (ppm).83 EPA based the 0.08 ppm standard on  
  
Figure 11: New York City in an archetypical shroud of smog, 1973.84 
 
existing scientific research indicating that asthmatics began experiencing increased attacks at 
0.10 ppm. Thus a 0.08 ppm standard would protect that most vulnerable population group, with 
the added margin of safety required by the Clean Air Act.85  
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Ambient photochemical oxidant levels five years later, when Carter was elected 
president and when the standards should have been met according to the Clean Air Act, give 
some idea of the ambition of that original standard. In 1976, every air quality region that 
included a major city (above 100,000 residents) had at least one day in which levels of 
photochemical oxidants rose higher than the 0.08 ppm standard (an exceedance in EPA’s 
terminology). Many of these cities notched far more than a single exceedance. Los Angeles 
faced the worst smog problem in the country, recording 135 exceedances in 1976. But New 
York (59 exceedances), Dallas (65), Chicago (17) and most other cities also went far beyond 
the national limits. Many smaller cities like Baton Rouge, LA (71) and Steubenville, OH (97) 
greatly surpassed the standard because of their oil refining operations.86 Failure to attain the 
oxidant standard was so pervasive that EPA declared in October 1977 that the agency would 
presume every air basin east of the Mississippi and every city in the country with more than 
200,00 residents to be in violation of the standard until proven otherwise.87   
As automobile emissions declined with the advent of the catalytic converter, regulators 
and environmental advocates concerned about the photochemical oxidant problem turned their 
attention to stationary sources, especially petroleum refiners.88 Widespread failure to achieve 
the photochemical oxidant standard by the 1975 deadline laid out in the 1970 Clean Air Act 
exposed states with “nonattainment areas” to an array of federal sanctions, including a possible 
ban on new sources of emissions. The bubble policy and emissions offsetting theoretically 
offered some relief in lowering the costs of compliance but petroleum refiners and local officials 
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increasingly demanded relief from the NAAQS themselves. Leading the way was the American 
Petroleum Institute (API), the refining industry’s primary trade association.  
In December 1976, API filed a formal petition with EPA to reevaluate the photochemical 
oxidant standard. Citing a half-decade of new research, API’s petition made a series of claims: 
background levels of naturally occurring oxidants often exceed the 0.08 ppm standard in some 
areas, public health experts believed that serious health effects did not kick in until much higher 
levels than the standard, EPA’s monitoring and modeling techniques were prone to great 
uncertainty, and the present standard was simply unattainable, “even with the imposition of 
drastic, socially disruptive control measures.”89 Only the public health and monitoring complaints 
were technically relevant to EPA’s reevaluation of the photochemical oxidant standard, which, 
following Congressional mandate, had been set without regard to the costs of attainment. But 
API’s claims about feasibility and the social consequences of nonattainment nonetheless 
became the key issues in EPA’s subsequent reevaluation of the standard.  
While gears turned at EPA to assemble a new Scientific Advisory Board to reassess the 
photochemical oxidant standard, the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977 created a statutory 
obligation for EPA to periodically review each NAAQS in light of new research.90 With the 
announcement that this review would start with photochemical oxidants, EPA attracted a 
number of divergent perspectives on how the standards should be set. Roy Gamse, who 
headed EPA’s Economic Analysis Division in the Policy Office, suggested a 0.12 ppm standard 
as a small increase in risk that would yield a large reduction in compliance costs. Gamse’s 
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recommendation articulated a widely shared sentiment among Policy Office staff that EPA 
should be forthright about considering costs that the agency was already implicitly taking into 
account.91 Many state level regulators, on the other hand, argued that the 0.08 ppm standard 
should be preserved because this ambitious goal was driving real progress toward cleaner air, 
even if most cities were moving more slowly than the Clean Air Act required.92  
In June 1978, after a year of research, the agency proposed loosening the standard from 
0.08 ppm to 0.10 ppm as well as a re-designation of the NAAQS to focus explicitly on ozone, 
the most prevalent oxidant and one that EPA already used as a proxy for the other oxidants for 
monitoring purposes. Per the terms of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, states would have 
until 1982 to attain the new 0.10 ppm target, though they could apply for an extension until 1987 
in cases of severe pollution. Discussing the proposed ozone standard with reporters, EPA Air 
Office chief Dave Hawkins noted that only 10 to 15 air quality areas appeared unable to meet 
the eased standard by the 1987 deadline, far fewer than the 30 to 60 areas that would have 
been unlikely to meet a 0.08 ppm standard in that same time frame. Hawkins also noted that 
aiming for the easier standard would save industry as much as $2 billion in avoided 
expenditures on pollution control equipment.93 As with all major rulemakings, EPA published the 
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proposed standard along with the supporting scientific evidence in the Federal Register, inviting 
public comments during a multi-month review period.94  
EPA’s proposed ozone standard acknowledged but did not attempt to resolve the 
problem of defining the public health and an adequate margin of safety without violating the 
Clean Air Act’s prohibition against considering economic costs. As the proposal noted, scientific 
uncertainty and great variability regarding health effects among the general population made a 
universal safety threshold very challenging to determine. In the absence of a discrete threshold, 
EPA’s proposal allowed that the agency would make an informed but ultimately uncertain 
determination. EPA’s proposal also acknowledged that any standard would incur significant 
compliance costs, concluding that “it is thus important that the standard not be any more 
stringent than protection of the public health demands.”95 In effect, EPA’s proposal merely 
shifted the prohibited consideration of compliance costs unto the process of defining the public 
health. Furthermore, by acknowledging that complying with the standard created significant 
costs, the proposal created an opening for regulated industries and Carter’s advisors to push 
EPA to forthrightly consider the economic effects of the NAAQS. 
 
Regulatory Review and the Case for a Marginalist Approach 
 
Perceiving the proposed ozone standard to be an important chance to reduce what they 
considered the inflationary effects of environmental regulation, Charles Schultze and other 
members of Carter’s Council of Economic Advisors turned to the controversial mechanism of 
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regulatory review to push EPA toward a more substantial easing of the standard. As Chapter 
Three discussed, Presidents Nixon and Ford created a regulatory review template through 
which White House economists gained the opportunity to reassess regulations proposed by 
EPA and other agencies.96  
As Paul Sabin has described, EPA officials made a major showing of canceling the 
agency’s regulatory review reporting after Carter’s inauguration, believing themselves finally 
free of a program that had singled out environmental regulations for delay and weakening.97 So 
it was with dismay that EPA staff and officials met Carter’s announcement in August 1977 that 
his Council of Economic Advisors would require EPA and agencies to submit economic impact 
statements detailing the compliance costs of their proposed regulations as well as the costs of 
feasible alternatives. The Council tried to differentiate the new process from Nixon’s Quality of 
Life Review and Ford’s Economic Impact Statements by insisting that the objective was only to 
arrive at the least costly means of intervening once a decision to regulate had been made, 
rather than debating whether the agency should intervene at all.98 Unconvinced, EPA officials 
bitterly opposed the program as a revival of old constraints that had left “deep scars” on the 
agency, in the words of EPA Administrator Doug Costle.99  
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In 1978, Carter created the Regulatory Analysis Review Group to evaluate a selection of 
the rules proposed by the various regulatory agencies. Sabin notes that the Regulatory Analysis 
Review Group (RARG) deliberately sought to bring regulatory agencies into the review process 
and included safeguards against earlier uses of regulatory review to systematically target 
environmental regulations.100 As with the Nixon and Ford reviews, Carter’s advisors hoped that 
their review would prompt regulatory agencies to incorporate better cost/benefit assessment into 
their own rulemaking.101 Toward that end, Carter issued Executive Order 12044 in March 1978, 
instructing EPA and other agencies to conduct their own economic analyses and forward to the 
White House for further review any proposals with compliance costs totaling more than $100 
million annually – a threshold that changing a national air quality standard, for instance, would 
easily meet.102 Environmental advocates remained deeply opposed.103 Environmental Defense 
Fund President Robert Rauch warned that RARG would perpetuate illegal back channel 
pressuring of EPA.104 Congressman Paul Rogers of Florida went further, denouncing RARG as 
the “son of quality of life,” a reinstatement of an illegitimate presidential veto over environmental 
protections under the “appealing cloak of anti-inflation.”105 
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While Carter’s advisors recognized regulatory review’s unpopularity with EPA and 
environmental advocates, they hoped the resulting criticism would be outweighed by popular 
support for fighting inflation. In September 1978, Schultze decided to send EPA’s newly 
proposed ozone standard to RARG. As with other RARG reviews, Schultze celebrated the 
review in a press release that touted Carter’s commitment to reducing inflation.106 In October 
1978, RARG reported that EPA’s standard lacked scientific support and thus saddled 
businesses and the overall economy with unnecessarily high control costs.107 Developing that 
critique, the RARG report examined the EPA’s research, cost estimates, and basic methodology 
– finding each wanting.  
In critiquing the scientific basis for EPA’s standard, the RARG report relied on research 
sponsored by the American Petroleum Institute (API). API had paid researchers at Harvard 
University and Johns Hopkins University to assess the scientific studies that EPA referenced in 
its criteria document, studies that both researchers concluded did not justify EPA’s original 0.08 
ppm standard.108 Though API’s sponsorship would seemingly raise questions about whether 
such research was compromised, RARG’s report made no mention of any bias. Demonstrating 
the payoff of such sponsorship, RARG’s report cited those API sponsored critiques to argue that 
EPA’s scientific basis was unfounded.109 Schultze had in his personal files an enthusiastically 
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underlined copy of one of these API sponsored reports, from which he had drawn the 
conclusion that EPA’s studies lacked scientific legitimacy.110        
In addition to misjudging the scientific research, RARG argued that EPA had significantly 
underestimated the compliance costs of a 0.10 ppm standard. RARG’s full accounting doubled 
EPA’s estimate – from about $3 billion annually to nearly $6 billion.111 RARG also challenged 
the purported benefits of a more stringent standard. At multiple points in its report, RARG 
reiterated that the health effects of ozone exposure at the proposed control levels amounted to 
merely temporary discomfort, with no lasting consequences. Alleviating some minor discomfort, 
the report implied, was hardly worth the extra billions of dollars in costs.112 
Alongside poorly interpreted research and underestimated costs, the RARG report 
argued that the basic methodology behind EPA’s standard was flawed. RARG argued that EPA 
had based its standard on protecting an asthmatic unlucky enough to find herself out of doors at 
the worst possible location during the height of an ozone episode.113 In place of that supposedly 
arbitrary definition of the public health, the RARG report offered a marginalist approach based 
on the costs and benefits of protection at each potential ozone level.114 Examining the marginal 
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cost of tightening the standard by one increment, policy makers should decide whether adopting 
a 0.10 ppm standard instead of a 0.12 ppm standard was worth an estimated $2,100 to $4,100 
per person hour of reduced health effects.115 Anticipating EPA’s rebuttal that the Clean Air Act 
prohibited such consideration of costs, the RARG report argued that by choosing not to control 
ozone so as to eliminate the risk of exposure entirely, EPA had already implicitly considered 
compliance costs.116 RARG’s report concluded that regulators ought to assess the relative costs 
and benefits of ozone control against the entire realm of possible environmental health 
interventions. From such a perspective EPA would see that the billions of dollars to be spent on 
a 0.10 ppm ozone standard could yield far greater health benefits elsewhere, perhaps in 
reducing lead.117  
Considering Costs 
 
While the RARG report envisioned a transformation of EPA’s guiding logic, Carter’s 
advisors were stuck negotiating within existing political limits. On October 16th, the same day 
RARG submitted its report, the public comment period on the proposed ozone standard closed, 
with EPA still recommending a 0.10 ppm limit.118 In spite of environmentalist opposition, White 
House economic advisors promptly began lobbying EPA to revise the ozone standard along the 
lines of the RARG report.  
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Within EPA, Costle encountered divergent opinions regarding the legality and desirability 
of raising the standard. Dave Hawkins and his Air Office had recommended maintaining the 
0.08 ppm standard and they strongly advised that EPA go no higher than 0.10 ppm.119 In the 
Policy Office, meanwhile, RARG’s urging of an open consideration of compliance costs found a 
receptive audience. Bill Drayton and Roy Gamse wrote Hawkins in November 1978 to argue 
that EPA was required to balance the health risks “against the nonhealth costs,” because no 
safety threshold existed. A chart included in that memo listed the estimated annual costs 
associated with different potential limits along with the estimated costs of other EPA initiatives 
like lead reduction.120 Whereas Hawkins advised Costle to ignore the economic implications 
insofar as possible, Drayton and Gamse seconded RARG’s opinion that EPA’s entire regulatory 
regime ought to be reassessed through a comparative approach to the costs and benefits of 
various possible interventions. Elsewhere, Drayton appealed to the political ramifications of 
EPA’s standard, informing Hawkins and Costle in November 1978 about a conference the 
American Petroleum Institute was planning for the coming spring to mobilize businesses behind 
its efforts to repeal the Clean Air Act. Easing the ozone standard was imperative, in Drayton’s 
logic, to blunt such attacks on the larger regulatory project.121 EPA’s General Counsel, 
meanwhile, reported to Costle that both the 0.10 ppm and 0.12 ppm standards could be 
justified.122  
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Throughout December 1978, Carter’s advisors continued to pressure Costle and other 
EPA officials to ease the ozone standard. Summarizing a meeting between Hawkins and senior 
White House officials, economic advisor Larry White pointed to the disagreement within EPA’s 
ranks as an exploitable opportunity. While Hawkins continued to recommend a 0.10 ppm 
standard, White believed other EPA officials might be willing to recommend a more lenient 0.12 
ppm. Echoing the RARG report, White argued that by not pursuing a 0.0 ppm standard for 
ozone, EPA had inherently accepted some risk for a portion of the population. “Once they have 
accepted that,” White averred, “they have implicitly accepted the principle that costs matter.” 
Recommending a course of action for the Administration, White stated that Schultze should 
meet with EPA Administrator Costle and push very hard for a 0.16 ppm standard. The annual 
compliance cost savings of moving from 0.10 ppm to 0.16 ppm, White stated, were at least $1 
billion and perhaps as high as $3 billion. Confidant that EPA would accept further loosening of 
the standard, White declared “we should absolutely accept nothing less than 0.12,” and given 
those considerable cost savings, “I believe that it is worth going to the President to try to get 
0.16.”123 
In a series of meetings between EPA officials and the White House in late December 
and early January, Carter’s economic advisors pressed on two fronts: the legality of an 
additional loosening and the scientific evidence to support it. At those meetings, Carter’s 
advisors reiterated the arguments laid out in the RARG report. According to a briefing memo 
prepared for one meeting, EPA had “implicitly acknowledged that costs matter.” And, the memo 
continued, the costs of enforcing a stringent standard were very high while the benefits 
consisted solely of relief from “temporary discomfort.” Furthermore, using an unjustified rationale 
and relying on the Science Advisory Board’s assessment of “very weak evidence,” EPA had 
																																																						




devised a methodology that neglected geographic and daily variations in ozone levels. Finally, 
the memo argued, even if EPA’s assessments were accepted, comparing the ozone standard 
with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s lead standard “indicates the absurdity 
of the former,” since the lead standard would yield “demonstrable reductions in serious 
diseases,” at a cost of $500 million per year while the more costly ozone standard promised 
much less in health benefits.124 Whether Hawkins protested at the meeting is unclear, but in the 
week leading up to it, he forwarded Costle letters from environmental advocates urging him not 
to raise the standard beyond 0.10 ppm and wrote his own critique of the scientific evidence that 
Schultze and Kahn had cited in support of a higher standard.125  
That Costle did in fact consider the economic and political implications of the new ozone 
standard is strongly suggested by documents in his personal files. In his “ozone” file, Costle had 
a chart of the nation’s cities, grouped according to their existing ozone levels. From that chart, 
Costle could easily see that adopting a 0.10 ppm standard would bring Miami, Columbus, 
Madison, Colorado Springs, and Tucson into attainment. Going up to 0.12 ppm would add 
Albuquerque, Rockford, New Orleans, and Des Moines. In addition to the chart, Costle also had 
maps depicting the cities that would be in attainment under a 0.10 ppm versus a 0.12 ppm 
standard and another chart that listed the states that would be required to institute expensive 
automobile inspection and maintenance programs at 0.08 ppm, 0.10ppm, and 0.12 ppm.126 
These maps and charts are hardly damning, since it is unreasonable to imagine that Costle 
might have ignored the intense political pressure from Carter’s advisors and set a standard that 
completely ignored the economic and social implications of compliance. But it is worth noting 
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that EPA’s top official was closely parsing such economic considerations even as he denied that 
they had any relevance on his decision. As it was, in the week following his meeting with Kahn 
and Schultze, Costle privately agreed to raise the proposed standard to 0.12 ppm.127 
In agreeing to further loosen the standard, Costle staked 0.12 ppm as the most lenient 
standard that the Clean Air Act and the public would tolerate. Explaining Costle’s reasoning to a 
Carter advisor, Deputy EPA Administrator Barbara Blum wrote that any further loosening would 
put the standard in conflict with EPA’s legal mandate to protect the public health. Addressing the 
Carter administration’s concern about the costs, Blum argued that loosening the standard above 
0.12 ppm would not reduce costs in the short term and thus would have “no real or symbolic 
impact on inflation.” Noting that most costs would be incurred in the future, Blum pointed to the 
implementation phase as the appropriate place to address concerns about inflation. Blum 
acknowledged that neither environmentalists nor the petroleum industry would be completely 
happy with the new standard. But, Blum argued, it could be sold to the public. Were the 
standard to be further loosened, EPA would in effect be telling residents of half of the nation’s 
cities that their air quality was acceptable and would not be improved.128 Throwing down the 
gauntlet, Blum wrote that Costle would not be able to justify anything higher than 0.12 ppm to 
the scientific community without “discredit[ing] the Administration’s environmental motives as 
well as the overall regulatory reform program.”129 Briefing notes for an eventual meeting with 
Carter reiterated Blum’s points about the Administrator’s integrity and public legitimacy, 
indicating that Costle was leveraging his importance to Carter’s regulatory reform program to 
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protect the 0.12 ppm limit. An additional note in that briefing memo captures Costle’s dance 
around the economic effects of the adjustment: “going to a 0.12 standard was not motivated by 
costs but nevertheless will accomplish a significant cost savings.”130   
For the time being, Carter’s economic advisors were not content to rest at 0.12 ppm, and 
sought the president’s personal intervention to further loosen the standard. Their subsequent 
memo to the president echoed RARG’s refrains. Depicting the costs of the regulation in terms of 
person hours of exposure, the memo argued that this exposure amounted to no more than 
temporary discomfort for a small portion of the nation’s most sensitive citizens. Endorsing a 
comparative approach to the pollution control regime, the memo argued that the benefits of a 
tighter standard were less than might be achieved by compelling businesses to spend a 
commensurate amount of money on an alternative environmental issue – such as newly 
proposed regulations on lead. Based on the scientific evidence and that marginalist approach to 
compliance costs, the memo argued that the standard should be set no tighter than 0.15ppm.131   
The continued push among Carter’s advisors for a looser standard was largely spurred 
by their concern that the administration needed to be seen as doing something about inflation. 
As the policy staff circulated the presidential memo, inflation czar Alfred Kahn wrote another 
advisor that the standard had “immense symbolic importance,” as the first major regulation to be 
proposed since President Carter had announced his anti-inflation program. For Carter to accept 
EPA’s 0.12 ppm standard would send “a clear signal of business-as-usual to the business 
community.” EPA’s earlier loosening would not establish the administration’s commitment to 
regulatory reform, Kahn wrote, since EPA itself accepted that the old 0.08 ppm standard was 
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not justified. However, Kahn complained, Carter could not press for a 0.15 ppm standard 
because Costle had “painted himself into an 0.12 corner,” refusing to speak privately with 
domestic policy staff without his own senior staff and thus forcing the President to directly 
overrule him in order to loosen the standard. Though the costs of the 0.12 ppm standard were 
high and unnecessary, Kahn concluded that he and other advisors were of the opinion that 
overruling Costle would diminish his effectiveness as an ally in the larger campaign against 
inflation.132 
As Carter’s advisors pursued a further loosening, they were careful to protect the 
Administration against environmentalist charges of improper executive interference. While the 
economic advisors prepared their case for Carter, Associate Director for Domestic Policy Simon 
Lazarus helped craft a procedure for presidential involvement. The resulting memo stated that 
White House science advisors and EPA would each submit memos to the President assessing 
the scientific basis of the standard, memos that would then become part of the public record. 
But, Lazarus continued, “separate confidential personal notes,” could also be sent to the 
President without their being placed in the record. Preventing a paper trail for any presidential 
intervention, the memo continued “the President will be given no boxes to check. Doug [Costle] 
will make the final decision, though he may take account of oral remarks made in the Oval 
Office.” Reassuringly, legal counsel had determined that should executive branch intervention 
become the subject of legal inquiry, any documents not placed in the record would not be 
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subject to discovery.133 In a subsequent meeting with all relevant parties, Carter affirmed this 
plan, asking both EPA and his science advisors to submit memos on the scientific evidence.134  
 The resulting memo from the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
restated RARG’s claims, especially EPA’s implicit acceptance that costs were a legitimate 
consideration. The memo also reported a “considerable dispute” between EPA staff and the 
agency’s Scientific Advisory Board, members of which were apparently reluctant to endorse a 
criteria document they believed to have overstated the dangers of ozone.135 A member of the 
White House science office subsequently made private calls to each member of the Science 
Advisory Board to solicit their personal assessment of the maximum level at which the standard 
could be set.136 Whether to rebut White House claims or to determine if any further adjustment 
could be justified, Costle had EPA staff conduct the same member-by-member canvassing of 
the Science Advisory Board.137  
As Carter’s policy staff continued to engineer a more lenient standard, environmentalists 
mobilized against what they saw as a threat to EPA’s authority. On January 18th, Robert Rauch, 
president of the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) sent Costle a letter alerting him to “certain 
irregularities in the conduct of the Agency’s rulemaking.” Rauch reiterated that recent court 
rulings made it illegal for the Carter administration to interfere in EPA’s rulemaking after the 
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public comment period. In this and other complaints, EDF representatives quoted directly from 
confidential memos exchanged between EPA and White House advisors and summarized the 
content of key meetings, demonstrating that at least one high-level EPA official had kept 
environmentalists well informed about the revision process. In order to ensure regulatory 
transparency, Rauch asked that a summary of these meetings be written for the public record 
and that EPA’s rulemaking on the standard be postponed until the information exchanged in 
private could be evaluated in another public comment period.138 The easing of the ozone 
standard was objectionable in its own right but environmental advocates were even more 
concerned that back channel negotiations might circumvent their hard won access to the 
rulemaking process. 
At about the same time, Charles Warren, the Chairman of Carter’s Council on 
Environmental Quality also wrote Carter to warn him off further intervention. The economic 
consequences of accepting the 0.12 ppm standard were minor, Warren argued, and did not 
merit Carter’s involvement, especially since interfering risked losing Costle as an ally in the 
larger fight to reform the rulemaking process.139 The same day Carter’s advisors received 
Warren’s letter, Schultze received a letter from Senator Ed Muskie informing the Chairman of 
Carter’s Council of Economic Advisors that the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental 
Pollution would be holding hearings on RARG’s involvement in the standard setting, for which 
Muskie asked Schultze to draw up a list of all contacts between the Administration and EPA.140        
In late January, Carter’s economic advisors tacked away from raising the actual 
standard and toward other means of reducing the enforcement costs of the proposed regulation. 
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On January 26th Costle publically announced the 0.12 ppm standard, claiming as he did that the 
decision was his alone and had been reached before he met with Carter’s economic advisors.141 
That same day, White House economic advisors Eizenstat, Schultze, Press, and Kahn sent a 
memo to Carter recommending that the President meet with Costle to express his continued 
concern for the regulatory costs. The advisors stated that Carter should not pursue a higher 
standard, since doing so would undermine Costle’s work in regulatory reform and probably 
provoke a revolt at EPA, including the possible resignation of Hawkins. Instead, the advisors 
noted that they had pursued a compromise with Costle whereby he would issue a 0.12 ppm 
standard but raise the number of days in which that standard could be exceeded and still be 
considered to have been met. Though Costle had rejected that compromise for the time being 
as subterfuge, the advisors believed a meeting with Carter might still be productive. In a 
handwritten response, Carter agreed and noted that he would meet with Costle in February.142    
In early February, before Costle met with Carter, EPA formally proposed the 0.12 ppm 
standard. Citing new scientific support for the easing, Costle denied the charge that the White 
House had pressured EPA into raising the standard.143 If not a full victory for Carter’s inflation 
conscious administration, the 0.12 ppm standard might have been spun as a partial success. 
The new standard represented a fifty percent easement from the original standard, a loosening 
that would allow the citizens of nearly twenty cities to avoid costly sanctions, including 
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expensive automobile inspection and maintenance programs.144 Furthermore, Carter advisors 
told the president, misinformed sources within EPA had indicated to the press that White House 
pressure had pushed Costle to propose the 0.12 ppm standard. Thus, “Doug’s decision may be 
perceived as a partial victory for the inflation program in the administration.”145  
Press coverage did in fact focus on the administration’s supposed intervention.146 But 
the businesses that benefited most from the easement paid few compliments to the president. 
Earlier in January, the American Petroleum Institute (API) had whipped up business anger with 
Carter’s EPA at its national conference on the Clean Air Act and in this bellicose atmosphere, 
Costle’s easement found no praise.147 API greeted the new standard by immediately filing suit, 
deflating any hope among the Carter administration that the easement would be appreciated by 
the business community.148  
Neither did the new standard find any support from environmentalists. Following news of 
the easement in January, a coalition of environmental and public health organizations criticized 
the new standard in a press release that linked the standard to the Administration’s larger 
project of regulatory reform and condemned both:  
With this action, a President elected with the support of people concerned about environmentally-
caused disease, and his EPA Administrator, will become the first to weaken a national health 
standard. This decision will not be based on any new understanding of the evidence…Rather, it 
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has been dictated by the new penny-wise and pound-foolish economics now ascendant in the 
White House that would rather wait until the damage is done than spend a penny on precaution.149 
 
Although EPA had presented the new standards as merely a technical readjustment in light of 
new scientific evidence, environmentalists recognized that the precautionary principle that had 
informed EPA’s initially cost blind protection of public health was under siege by a marginalist 
approach to risk.  
With the formal announcement of the new ozone standard on February 8th, the 
controversy swelled further as environmental advocates turned to Congressional allies to fight 
the change. On February 16th, EDF’s Rauch sent another letter to Costle, complaining of the 
White House interference in EPA’s rulemaking.150 Copied on that letter was Senator Muskie, 
who used his power in the Senate to amplify Rauch’s complaints. In subsequent meetings with 
the White House, Muskie and staff from his Environmental Pollution Subcommittee angrily 
accused Carter’s advisors of having forced Costle to loosen the ozone standard and linked that 
easing to a larger weakening of environmental protection as a consequence of the same 
regulatory reforms about which Drayton and Costle loved to boast.151 In an appearance on the 
television program Meet the Press in late January, Muskie charged that the ozone standard 
loosening was “based apparently upon economic factors and not the health factor, which the 
1970 Clean Air Act mandated as the basis for standards,” given that no research had emerged 
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to justify such a change.152 Speaking at the University of Michigan on February 14th, Muskie 
developed his critique further, warning the audience that “a group of economists has been set 
up in the White House to second-guess such regulations.” By focusing only on the costs of 
compliance, that group threatened to undo years of environmental progress by distorting the 
economics of regulatory protection and allowing industry groups to “second-guess, and third-
guess, environmental rules.”153  
In late February, Muskie’s Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution held two days of 
hearings on the Carter Administration’s regulatory review program. Noting that such review 
appeared to have an anti-environmental bias, Muskie declared that the hearings would 
determine whether inflation fighters in the Carter administration were singling out environmental 
regulations.154 The Subcommittee took testimony from Schultze, Kahn, and Costle as well as 
from environmentalist opponents of regulatory review like the Natural Resource Defense 
Council’s Richard Ayres. Though Muskie and his fellow Subcommittee members subjected the 
administration officials to tough questioning, the hearings failed to turn up any evidence that 
Costle or other EPA officials had violated the law in meeting with policy advisors after the close 
of the public comment period. And although environmentalists continued to denounce the new 
ozone standard, Costle maintained that he had made his decision before his meetings with 
Schultze and the president.  
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By the time the hearings closed, the country’s attention was on another energy crisis. As 
oil supplies tightened following the Iranian Revolution, Americans once again encountered gas 
lines at filing stations. More pressingly for EPA, electric power plants that had recently switched 
from coal to oil to reduce air pollution now faced severe fuel shortages. Simultaneously, 
automobile manufacturers raised their typical clamor as another control deadline approached. 
Chrysler in particular came to take up much of Costle’s attention as the company floundered on 
the edge of bankruptcy. In that context, controversy over the new ozone standard and about the 
administration’s role in setting it faded away. The D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s standard against 
the American Petroleum Institute’s challenge as well as one brought by the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, and the 0.12 ppm standard prevailed.155 The Carter administration had 
challenged one of the fundamental principles in the nation’s pollution control program and 
though they were able to push Costle to implicitly consider some of the costs of meeting the 
standards, the cost blind premise at the heart of EPA’s national standards remained intact.    
 
The Limits of Regulatory Reform 
 
As the bubble and ozone stories indicate, Carter’s decision to expand White House 
oversight while simultaneously empowering Costle to take a leading role in regulatory reform put 
the EPA Administrator in a conflicted position. As Chairman of the Regulatory Council, Costle 
stumped for the necessity of reform and championed examples for how to do so. At the same 
time, as EPA Administrator, Costle repeatedly confronted White House efforts to loosen 
regulatory standards or liberalize reform policies beyond what he, and especially his Air Office, 
deemed permissible. Furthermore, Costle had to account for the reality that the existing 
regulatory system could not be simply swapped out for a rationalized replacement. Existing 
																																																						




regulations had carefully built political constituencies that could be rallied to protect them. 
Absent vast new legislation, a whole cloth transformation was impossible. If the regulatory state 
was an unruly hedge, Costle trimmed with an eye toward future growth, recognizing that if he 
tore out a particularly gnarly section, there was a good chance that nothing would be planted in 
its place.  
About a year into Costle’s time as Chairman of the Regulatory Council, Chase 
Manhattan Bank launched a public attack on the regulatory state that epitomized the challenge 
regulatory reformers like Costle faced. In a full-page advertisement in the Washington Post, 
Chase portrayed the American businessman earnestly trying to clear one regulatory hurdle after 
another that had been placed in his path by the federal government. The accompanying page of 
text stated that Chase’s economists had estimated the total cost of regulations to businesses at 
over $100 billion per year, which worked out to 4.5 percent of the gross national product, or 
nearly $500 for every person in the country. Careful to emphasis its support for “reasonable 
regulations” protecting public and environmental health, Chase declared that the $100 billion 
was simply unjustified, particularly “at a time when we are having difficulty effectively competing 
in world markets and while our standard of living continues to be eroded by inflation.”156 Costle’s 
Regulatory Council responded with a letter to Chase asking the bank to justify the $100 billion 
figure, noting that economists’ estimates varied considerably and that Chase had omitted 
entirely any mention of the economic benefits of regulation. The letter also noted that the 
Council was presently engaged in improving the regulatory process.157 And in fact, Costle’s 
Council had taken on many of the hurdles that Chase’s ad citied, including improving the 
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cost/benefit analysis used by regulatory agencies, coordinating rulemaking and regulatory 
responsibility to avoid redundancies, and incentivizing compliance through reforms like the 
bubble policy. 
 
Figure 12: Chase Manhattan Bank advertisement in the Washington Post, 1979.158 
 
Yet while Costle enthusiastically supported reforms that created less expensive alternate 
routes to compliance, he could not support more fundamental overhauls like the introduction of 
cost considerations into the setting of the ozone standard. For one, Costle could not shift EPA’s 
resources or inaugurate new intervention programs without Congressional legislation. In a 
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period of skyrocketing inflation and stagnant economic growth, Congress was unlikely to 
authorize expensive new programs, even ones that promised to bring greater levels of health 
protection at lower costs. A cost-blind ozone standard, illogical according to a cost/benefit 
assessment of all the possible interventions to be made on behalf of public health, nevertheless 
had a statutory basis in the law. Pruning it back as far as Carter’s economists wished would not 
create new regulatory resources to invest elsewhere. So Costle worked with what he had – a 
pragmatism that often pleased no one.  
The difficulties that Costle faced in adjusting EPA’s regulations embodied the Carter 
administration’s larger challenge of enacting moderate reforms in the face of entrenched 
opposition and strident demands for radical change. As historian Carl Biven explains, Carter’s 
concern for inflation (which in 1980 rose to a stunning 13.5 percent) prompted him to restrain 
federal spending and pare back the social welfare state at a moment when employment was 
also stagnant and worker productivity was falling for the first time in the postwar period. For 
workers experiencing a drop in real wages, Carter’s cuts to the welfare state stung and many 
angrily abandoned the president, first in a bitter primary challenge by Senator Ted Kennedy and 
then in the general election for the huckster Ronald Reagan.159 Costle and other EPA officials 
continued to rebut criticism that environmental regulations were to blame for economic woes 
and they held out reforms like the bubble policy as adequate response to any crunch that 
regulations might create.160 But tweaks around the edges could not compete with the dark 
portrait painted by Chase Manhattan or Reagan’s promise to restore prosperity by getting the 
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federal government off the back of the American people. In November, that vision of prosperity 
through deregulation combined with the deeply damaging Iranian hostage crisis to secure 
Reagan’s election as the nation’s fortieth president.   
Even after Carter’s loss in the election, Costle and Drayton continued to actively promote 
the bubble and other regulatory reforms at EPA. In November, EPA held a conference on 
regulatory innovation to improve what was now called the Controlled Trading program, which 
encompassed both internal shuffling of emissions under a bubble as well as the trading of 
emission rights to other firms.161 And in December 1980, Costle convened a roundtable of key 
agency officials with the goal of “easing restrictions in the bubble policy.”162 The Natural 
Resources Defense Council’s David Doniger spoke for other environmental advocates when he 
registered his protest against this continued liberalization in January 1981.163 Unbowed, Costle 
announced in his last days in office that his successor would soon issue an Interim Emissions 
Trading Policy Statement and promised that the new policy would be the most liberal yet.     
Though senior reform advocates like Drayton would soon be replaced by new political 
appointees, regulatory reform staff like Mike Levin and John Palmisano could look to the 
incoming administration with optimism. During the campaign, Reagan had repeatedly stressed 
the need for a regulatory overhaul to put control back in the hands of corporate managers, 
exactly the objective of reforms like the bubble policy. As Reagan prepared to take office, the 
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first bubbles were finally going into effect and reformers like Levin were busy dreaming up ways 
to expand tradable emission rights into banking and other new realms. As a recently hired EPA 
employee later recounted of the mood among reform proponents on the cusp of the Reagan 
administration, “we had sugar-plum visions dancing in our heads of spreading better means of 
reaching regulatory goals.”164  
Yet Reagan’s tenure began with the underlying regulatory structure largely unchanged. 
Carter’s economic advisors nudged Costle into raising the ozone standard but failed in 
convincing EPA to bring explicit economic considerations into the standard setting process. 
Drayton and his staff created bold new reforms like the bubble policy, but as of 1981 only a tiny 
fraction of the nation’s emission sources had made use of them, turned off by the onerous 
conditions and uncertainty created by Hawkins and other skeptics of the policies. Whether 
Reagan could overcome those potent obstacles to further reforms remained unclear. That 
Reagan might not see anything in EPA’s regulatory program worth reforming soon became the 
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Chapter 6: Less Regulation – Whatever, However 
 
 
In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected president on the premise that the federal 
government was broken and the promise that he could fix it. Serious problems did, in fact, 
confront the new president. Sluggish growth coupled with skyrocketing inflation had produced a 
painful new malaise called stagflation. A second oil shortage following the Iranian revolution 
exposed the country’s debilitating dependence on energy supplies that it did not control. And the 
humiliating Iranian hostage crisis was entering its second year. To these afflictions, Reagan’s 
campaign added a meddling federal government that had supposedly hobbled the free 
enterprise system with burdensome regulations on everything from automobiles to pesticides.  
Reagan’s predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had also expressed deep concerns about federal 
regulation, expending energy and political capital on careful adjustments to existing regulatory 
programs to free competition between firms and return authority to business managers over 
how they met environmental objectives. For Reagan’s environmental policy transition team, 
expanding on Carter’s reforms was the logical starting point for the new president. Chaired by 
Republican conservationist Dan Lufkin, the team consisted of prominent conservative 
environmental advocates like William Ruckelshaus and Russell Train. In a statement of 
philosophy for the new president, the team declared that Reagan would promote economic 
growth alongside environmental quality, returning “the good name of balance” to environmental 
policy. People and their needs were to be treated as part of the environment rather than “as 
interlopers and enemies.” The team recommended that Reagan substitute economic incentives 
and marketable emission rights to achieve environmental protection in a cheaper and more 
flexible fashion. More authority would be returned to the states for administering national 
standards. And the new administration would avoid pursuing minute pollution reductions at very 




the transition team articulated a commitment to environmental protection as a “major concern” 
of Reagan’s presidency.1  
As it turned out, Reagan’s own ideas about environmental protection shared less with 
Republican conservationists and more with an anti-government protest rolling into Washington, 
D.C. from the Mountain West. Historian Jefferson Decker traces the roots of Reagan’s 
environmental policies to a loose coalition of conservative legal scholars in the states like 
Wyoming, Colorado, and Montana who in the 1970s began crafting legal arguments against the 
expansion of federal regulatory interventions as unconstitutional takings of private property. 
Seeing an opportunity to challenge the expanding regulatory state, business executives like 
Colorado brewing magnate and mineral rights investor Joseph Coors funded nonprofit 
institutions like the Pacific Legal Foundation and the Mountain States Legal Foundation to 
develop those arguments. Conservative leaders also fanned grievances among mountain west 
working class communities by warning that the federal government was a tyrannical colonizer 
trampling on individual rights. Holding up the cowboy as a totem of the hardworking American 
imperiled by overzealous federal regulators, what came to be called the Sagebrush Rebellion 
swept into office a set of libertarian politicians who demanded less regulation and the release for 
use and sale of millions of acres of federal land. As a presidential candidate, Reagan aligned 
himself with this anti-government rhetoric, at one point telling a crowd in Utah to “count me in as 
a rebel.”2   
																																																						
1 In a sign that that commitment might not extend very deep into the new administration, someone in Reagan’s office 
went through the transition report putting check marks next to points and policies with which they agreed. Devolution 
to the states, economic incentives, marketable rights, and nearly every other point pertaining to a scaling back of 
federal authority received an affirming check. The proposed commitment to environmental protection did not. Dan W. 
Lufkin and Henry Diamond to the President-Elect, undated, folder, “Environment – Reagan Task Force,” Box 75, 
Danny J. Boggs Files, Ronald Reagan Library (DBF hereafter) 
2 Decker writes that these first claims were inspired by the writings of corporate attorney Lewis Powell. Jefferson 
Decker. “Lawyers for Reagan: The Conservative Litigation Movement and American Government, 1971-87” (PhD 




 But while appealing to the Sagebrush Rebellion may have been good campaign 
strategy, putting contemptuous cowboys in charge of regulatory policy proved to be a major 
political miscalculation. Neglecting the market based reforms suggested by his transition team, 
Reagan missed the chance to build on bipartisan support for a market approach to 
environmental protection. Instead, Reagan’s first appointees to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Department of the Interior took an axe to the regulatory state they 
inherited, provoking an environmentalist backlash that ultimately damaged Reagan’s 
deregulatory ambitions. Back in 1981, that outrage was only a murmur as the new 
administration took office.     
Deregulation not Reform 
 
To reign in the federal government, Reagan’s administration set about expanding White 
House control over EPA and other administrative agencies. The first step was to centralize 
power within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), where a cadre of economists had 
periodically ventured into regulatory review under previous administrations but whose principal 
responsibility had been to assist the White House in evaluating the budget requests of different 
agencies.3 Reagan’s OMB director, David Stockman, won the job with his fiery critiques of 
intrusive government and his recommendations for sweeping cuts to health and safety 
regulations. In the months between the election and the inauguration, Stockman created a list of 
deregulatory priorities with the help of OMB’s longtime Environment Branch Director Jim Tozzi, 
whose sharp criticism of the costs of regulations to businesses had made him a familiar and 
feared foe of EPA’s staff. Tozzi and Stockman’s deliberations soon expanded to include James 
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Miller, an economist who Reagan appointed to a key OMB post and C. Boyden Gray, chief 
counsel to Vice President George H.W. Bush.4 Seeing a deregulatory ally in the president-elect, 
representatives of the coal companies and other business interests sent in recommendations for 
where the new administration should start making cuts.5 
Reagan’s initial actions as president demonstrated that he had made reducing regulation 
a major priority. On his first day in office, Reagan announced the formation of a Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief that would recommend changes to existing regulations as well as the 
regulatory proposal process. Chastising Jimmy Carter for issuing a rash of “midnight” 
regulations at the end of his presidency, Reagan also implemented a sixty-day freeze on the 
enactment and proposal of all new federal rules. EPA and other agencies were told to bring 
forward recommendations for reducing their own programs but otherwise sit on their hands.  
Unabashed in its deregulatory ambition, Reagan’s freeze exempted new rules that lessened the 
“regulatory burden.”6  
With the freeze in place, Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief launched into its 
work. Chaired by Vice President Bush, the Task Force took its senior managers directly from 
Reagan’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB).7 Taking stock of the regulatory state, the 
Task Force recommended cuts to rules and programs across the federal government, from the 
Department of Agriculture to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. But within 
that catholic deregulatory gaze, environmental protections drew extra scrutiny as especially 
																																																						
4 Jonathan Lash, Katherine Gillman, and David Sheridan, A Season of Spoils: The Reagan Administration’s Attack on 
the Environment (New York: Pantheon, 1984). 
5 Carl Bagge to Dave Stockman, January 13, 1981, Folder ID: 92043-005, C. Boyden Gray Files, Vice Presidential 
Records, Counsellor’s Office, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library (Gray VP Files hereafter).   
6 Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Memorandum to Executive Branch Agencies Ordering 60-Day Freeze on 
Regulations,” January 29, 1981, Folder ID: 92016-004, Gray VP Files.  
7 OMB’s Jim Miller was the Task Force’s Executive Director and Jim Tozzi was his Deputy. Boyden Gray served as 




burdensome to business and excellent candidates for the axe. Environmental rules, like new 
standards limiting the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emitted by electric utilities, 
predominated on a February 1981 list of the administration’s top 100 deregulatory priorities.8 
Aware of this focus on the environment, Acting EPA Administrator Walt Barber urged restraint 
when he delivered the deregulatory suggestions Reagan had demanded. Some programs could 
be reformed, Barber told the new White House, but the political consequences for other cuts 
would be dire and needed to be carefully weighed.9  
Despite his prescience, Barber’s advice went unheeded as Reagan’s advisors took their 
counsel from other quarters. The Task Force informally solicited recommendations for 
deregulatory actions from business representatives like the Chamber of Commerce, the 
Business Roundtable, and the American Bar Association.10 The Department of Commerce 
surveyed its business constituents and reported to the Task Force that large and small 
businesses alike identified environmental regulations and EPA as their top regulatory concern.11 
In March, Vice President Bush mailed a formal request for deregulatory proposals to hundreds 
of executives and other business representatives. Nearly three hundred replied, from major 
																																																						
8 Environmental regulations made up the largest share of the 100 regulations that OMB identified as the top 
deregulatory opportunities in February 1981, with EPA’s regulations accounting for 16 of those 30 environmental 
regulations. Glenn Schleede to multiple recipients, “Regulatory Fact Sheet & ‘List of 100,’” February 17, 1981, Folder 
ID: 92021-001, Gray VP Files; A preliminary survey of the regulatory relief program taken in April 1981 found that the 
biggest cost savings would likely come from EPA and the Department of Transportation. The survey noted that the 
relief program had targeted twenty-seven EPA regulations for reform or elimination, with $3.4 billion in one-time 
savings and $1.3 billion in annual savings (not including the relaxation of automobile regulations). Tom Hopkins and 
Tom Lenard to Jim Miller, April 24, 1981, folder, "Regulatory Reform Actions (1)," Box 7, Robert B. Carleson Files, 
Ronald Reagan Library. 
9 Walt Barber to Jim Miller, February 11, 1981, folder, “EPA: Issues (1),” Box 37, DBF.  
10 “Progress of the Task Force,” 1981, Folder ID: 92016-005, Gray VP Files.   
11 For large businesses, EPA and environmental regulations were the overwhelming focus of concern. For small 
businesses, EPA shared top billing with the Department of Labor. Department of Commerce, “Business Responses 
on Regulatory Burdens: An Initial Report Submitted to The Task Force on Regulatory Relief,” June 1981, Folder ID: 




chemical manufacturers to fast food chains.12 The responses confirmed what the Department of 
Commerce had found in its informal outreach: EPA dominated the concerns of large businesses 
and was matched only by the Department of Labor among small businesses.13 
 
Figure 13: Wendy’s founder and CEO Dave Thomas  
sent this illustration of regulatory excess to Gray after  
a 1981 meeting.14  
 
To control environmental rules issued after the freeze ended, the Reagan administration 
turned to the longstanding process of regulatory review. Begun under President Nixon, 
regulatory review allowed White House economists to look over and recommend changes to the 
rules issued by agencies like EPA. EPA was not technically an independent agency but 
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the easing of specific regulatory requirements. William G. Simeral to Malcolm Baldrige, James Miller, and C. Boyden 
Gray, April 30, 1981, folder, “Environment – General [Emissions],” Box 72, DBF.  
13 228 of the large businesses that responded singled out EPA as their primary concern, with the second place Health 
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previous presidents had faced sharp criticism from environmental advocates and congressional 
representatives when they intervened in EPA’s rulemaking. Nevertheless, each president since 
Nixon had taken steps to formalize and strengthen the review process. Recognizing that 
proposed regulations would be evaluated on their economic merits, EPA accompanied its 
proposals with a thorough accounting of the costs and benefits to businesses and the federal 
government to withstand such scrutiny.      
Once in office, Reagan consolidated Carter’s regulatory review staff into the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). Shuffling offices and responsibilities is a common practice for 
incoming presidents, who often use reorganization to promote fidelity to the new administration 
among career staff. Reagan’s reorganization placed the economists who were in charge of 
evaluating agency rules at the nerve center of the administration’s economic policy. As historian 
Paul Sabin has shown, Reagan also transformed one of Carter’s last initiatives as president into 
a potent deregulatory cudgel. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act signed by the departing 
Carter administration, the newly created Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) 
had been granted the power to limit the amount of physical paperwork that agencies like EPA 
could require companies to fill out. The new Reagan administration used OIRA and the 
Paperwork Reduction Act to assert the White House’s prerogative to review even the most 
minute rules made by EPA and other agencies if they happened to require paperwork.15   
The consolidation and strengthening of regulatory review came as part of Reagan’s 
efforts to bring economic considerations into the heart of EPA’s rulemaking. In February 1981, 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12291, which required agencies to submit a Regulatory Impact 
Analysis detailing the estimated economic costs and benefits to businesses and the federal 
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government of all major proposed rules to OMB for review. Carter’s own Executive Order 12204 
had demanded similar economic scrutiny. But Reagan’s EO 12291 added a significant new 
requirement: agencies could issue only those regulations for which the monetary benefits 
exceeded the monetary costs.16 Cost/benefit analysis was no longer an evaluative tool but a 
firm test for new policies. The application of cost/benefit analysis to environmental regulation 
had raised controversy from the beginning. Environmental advocates argued that the benefits of 
protections like emission standards (such as a reduced risk of lung cancer) tended to be long-
term, making them less certain, more difficult to monetize, and thus deprioritized against more 
easily calculable short-term compliance costs. Together, EO 12291 and the consolidation of 
oversight in OMB heightened concerns that environmental protections would be severely 
devalued by the new administration.  
Having asserted control over EPA’s rulemaking, Reagan made the unusual choice to 
follow through on his anti-government campaign rhetoric by appointing Sagebrush rebels and 
other fringe critics to head the offices and agencies they had previously attacked. Following the 
advice of Joseph Coors, who had become an influential advisor, Reagan chose a prominent 
rancher and Sagebrush Rebellion leader, Robert Burford, to head the Bureau of Land 
Management. The Mountain States Legal Foundation director James Watt became Secretary of 
the Department of the Interior. For EPA Administrator, Reagan chose Colorado state 
representative Anne Gorsuch, whose hostility to compromise and brash tactics had earned her 
a place in a group of anti-government legislators known as the “House Crazies.”17  
																																																						
16 Executive Order 12291 of February 17, 1981, Federal Regulation, https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12291.html. 
17 Jefferson Decker. “Lawyers for Reagan: The Conservative Litigation Movement and American Government, 1971-




Reagan’s embrace of the Sagebrush Rebellion’s hostility toward environmental 
regulations exemplified a perspective on environmental value at odds with a Republican 
tradition of conservation dating back to Theodore Roosevelt. One of the reasons that western 
ranchers had been excluded from portions of federal land was that they tended to put too many 
animals and thus too much stress on the ecosystem, degrading the natural resource. A long 
strain of conservationist thought held that where the short-term gains of such exploitation did not 
outweigh the long-term costs, it should be prohibited. By Reagan’s time, environmental 
economists had expanded that process of weighing costs and benefits to the assessment of 
economic activities that polluted the air and water. Though EPA and White House economists 
fiercely debated the estimated costs and benefits of regulatory proposals, the consensus among 
economists was that the environment had economic value that needed to be calculated. In the 
same way that the nation would want to secure the maximum economic output from a given 
stand of timber or vein of coal, the government should insure that companies did not freely 
dump pollutants into the air and water that society would end up paying for in public health costs 
and degraded environmental resources. In contrast to that consensus, Reagan’s indiscriminate 
attack on environmental regulations revealed a new strain of conservative politics that held that 
the environment ought to be freely exploited. In an odd way, that attitude refracted the belief of 
the some of the environmentalists Reagan so bitterly opposed that the environment ought to be 
priceless.    
Burford, Watt, and Gorsuch offered red meat appeal for the voters who had swept 
Reagan into office. In just one of many symbolic gestures, Gorsuch replaced her predecessor’s 
midsize Mercury Zephyr with a luxurious, full size Oldsmobile Ninety-Eight Regency Brougham, 




than the majority of new cars for sale.18 Gorsuch’s fancy new car signaled that the conservation 
urged by Jimmy Carter and his appointees had been replaced by a new focus on consumption.  
For environmental advocates, Reagan’s disquieting appointees and his expansion of 
White House authority over regulatory agencies represented a major threat to the nation’s 
environmental laws and to their own access to the policy making process. Environmental groups 
had complained under previous administrations that regulatory review opened a back door into 
rulemaking that business interests used to lobby White House advisors and EPA officials out of 
public view. But the privileges that Carter had claimed paled in comparison to Reagan’s 
consolidation of authority in the White House. When Congressman John Dingell asked that the 
Reagan administration keep a public log of all contacts involved in regulatory rulemakings 
(something Carter had been forced to do), Reagan’s advisors declined, noting among 
themselves that such a log “could have a chilling effect on their ability to meet with the outside 
world.”19 OMB’s Jim Miller was hardly more circumspect in his public response, telling 
Congressman Dingell: “I see no problem in off-the-record contacts,” and that if OMB returned a 
rule to the agency for changes, no paper trail would be established since “it will be 
communicated over the telephone.”20 In a meeting later that year with the public interest group 
the National Consumer League, Reagan advisor Chris DeMuth declared that he would refuse to 
even acknowledge whether a particular regulation was under review unless subjected to 
subpoena or Freedom of Information Act request.21  
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The ground rules introduced by the Reagan administration to (ostensibly) protect the 
integrity of EPA’s rulemaking did nothing to allay environmentalists’ concerns. When OMB 
released conduct guidelines for regulatory review in June 1981, the Environmental Defense 
Fund’s Chuck Ludlam denounced the policy as shockingly insufficient. In a letter to fellow 
environmentalists, Ludlam complained that OMB’s rules did not require material given to OMB 
staff to be placed in the public record, did not require disclosure of any conversations with 
private parties, and did nothing to limit OMB’s consultation of EPA officials. “It is hard to 
imagine,” Ludlam wrote, “OMB adopting guidelines imposing less meaningful protections 
against back-door manipulation of the regulatory process.”22  
Yet this criticism of Reagan from environmental groups did not penetrate very far into the 
new administration’s concerns. For one, supporters of Reagan’s efforts lined up to match his 
critics. In July 1981, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs offered a sincere if peculiar 
endorsement of Reagan’s actions when it solicited the advice of Boyden Gray for a nationally 
syndicated daily radio program on the costs and benefits of regulation that its members were in 
the process of producing – a program that they told Gray would help make the case that many 
regulatory interventions needed to be scaled back.23 More importantly, Reagan enjoyed wide 
support from the business community and he clearly intended his regulatory policies to please 
that important constituency.24     
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EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch’s first months in Washington spoke volumes about 
what she and Reagan had planned for EPA.25 Following her nomination in February, Gorsuch 
ensconced herself in a suite of offices in Watt’s Department of the Interior until the Senate voted 
to confirm her in May. In the interim, Gorsuch spurned invitations to meet with former EPA 
Administrators William Ruckelshaus and Doug Costle and turned down nearly all briefings with 
EPA staff. Instead, Gorsuch hunkered down with a cadre of advisors and planned how she 
would implement the budget and personnel cuts that OMB’s Stockman and other Reagan 
advisors had identified. As Gorsuch’s Deputy Chief of Staff later explained the logic behind this 
cloistering, “it’s a lot easier to fire people you don’t know.”26 Sure enough, once she did finally 
take the helm at EPA, Gorsuch began a process of severe workforce reductions and budget 
cuts.  
Yet for all this energy invested into gaining control over the rulemaking process to limit 
new regulations, Reagan lacked often a coherent plan for what he hoped to accomplish. In but 
one of many examples, Vice President Bush’s mass mailing to business leaders generated 
hundreds of recommendations for deregulatory avenues to pursue. But as the letters began 
piling up, junior advisors in the administration realized that there was no strategy in place for 
prioritizing those recommendations into actual policy goals.27  
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The absence of a coordinated strategy for environmental protection was certainly not 
helped by the dearth of environmental advisors in the new administration. Shortly after taking 
office, Reagan relegated the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which had functioned as 
an important source of policy advice for presidents since Nixon, to a merely ceremonial role. In 
his first year in office, Reagan cut CEQ’s staff from sixty to just six and even made the Council 
vacate the Jackson Place townhouse that had been its home since its inception.28 In prestige, 
influence, and function, Reagan’s CEQ was reduced to a shell of its former self, evacuating an 
important source of advice on environmental policy. As historian Richard Andrews noted at the 
time, the evisceration of CEQ removed what had been a historical counterweight to the Office of 
Management and Budget’s persistent push for fewer regulations.29 Without CEQ, Reagan’s only 
advice on environmental policy came from economic advisors looking for budget cuts and 
opportunities to reduce business spending on compliance. At the time, Reagan likely saw 
nothing wrong with CEQ’s absence. But, as Jeff Decker has argued about other areas of 
Reagan’s presidency, the lack of a cohesive strategy among Reagan’s appointees and advisors 
eventually revealed itself as a powerful hindrance to their deregulatory goals.30  
One key place in which indifference and haphazard cuts came back to haunt Reagan 
was in his handling of EPA’s regulatory reform program. EPA’s most enthusiastic proponents of 
market-oriented regulations saw Reagan’s election as a tremendous opportunity to expand 
reforms begun under the previous administration. When new president arrived at the White 
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House in January, Mike Levin and his Regulatory Reform Staff in EPA’s Policy Office were in 
the midst of an ambitious campaign to expand the agency’s fledgling emissions trading 
program, an endeavor they expected Reagan to support. Under Carter, EPA managed to put 
reforms like the bubble policy and emissions offsets into law. But while a handful of intrepid 
firms had experimented with such policies, Levin and other reform proponents recognized that a 
meaningful shift away from directly applied uniform standards would require much greater 
participation from industry and other private actors.  
Reagan’s professed enthusiasm as a candidate for the efficiency of markets raised 
reformers’ hopes that the new president would put his energy into removing constraints on 
market approaches like the bubble, allowing for much wider adoption. Shortly after he left office, 
former Assistant Administrator for Policy Bill Drayton sent Reagan’s advisors a thoughtful letter 
offering his advice that they appoint someone to head Enforcement Office who was 
sophisticated and sensitive enough to implement the bubble policy and other market-oriented 
reforms.31 Drayton also wrote an article for the Harvard Business Review urging business 
managers to come forward with bubble proposals and other counterproposals to direct 
regulations, which Drayton insisted had “the new administration’s strong support.”32  
To the dismay of Drayton and other supporters of regulatory reform, Reagan’s regulatory 
freeze and subsequent regulatory relief program failed to distinguish between directly applied 
uniform standards and the innovative, market oriented policies that reformers had worked so 
hard to offer as alternatives. Under the freeze, for example, all of EPA’s new initiatives were 
suspended – even those aimed at transforming the old system. Levin and his Regulatory 
Reform Staff found this out the hard way when they began mailing a primer on market 
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alternatives in January 1981. Developed by Drayton, Smarter Regulation had been intended to 
introduce reforms like the bubble and emissions trading to businesses and public policy experts 
across the country. Cover letters from prominent academics introduced the mailing to 
subgroups like 17,000 General Counsels at major corporations. When Reagan arrived at the 
White House, Acting Administrator Steve Jellinek had begun the release of the first set of the 
100,000 addressed and stamped packages, in all likelihood imagining as he did that this 
promotion of market oriented reforms was fully in keeping with Reagan’s plans for the agency. 
Before even five percent of the mailings had been sent, an abrupt hold came down from the 
White House. The mailing, it seemed, had run afoul of the prohibition on new activities. Though 
the White House later released the mailing, the episode revealed a disturbing inability or 
unwillingness on the part of key Reagan advisors to distinguish market oriented reforms from 
EPA’s older regulatory model.33 Three months later, Mike Levin was once again appealing to his 
superiors to make an exception to a printing freeze so that he could publish a series of 
promotional reports on marketable emission rights.34    
 Choosing to let EPA’s fledgling market oriented reforms languish, the Reagan 
administration proposed instead to overhaul the underlying Clean Air Act. Funding for the 
implementation and enforcement of the Act was due to expire in September 1981, requiring 
Congress to pass legislation to reauthorize the law. With widespread concerns among 
Republican as well as some Democratic legislators about the economic effects of certain 
mandates in the existing Act, the new Reagan administration saw an opportunity to scale back 
the statute on which the nation’s entire air pollution control regime was based. 
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In March 1981, the National Commission on Air Quality issued a long awaited report that 
came as an auspicious sign for Reagan’s deregulatory ambitions. The Commission, which had 
been created by the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, concluded that while the health-based 
national air quality standards were sound, compliance deadlines as well as automobile pollution 
controls should be relaxed and the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program (PSD), which 
mandated that areas with clean air protect that quality, should be eliminated.35 Representatives 
of the business community including the Business Roundtable and the National Association of 
Manufacturers proclaimed their hopes for even more sweeping reforms – including the creation 
of an independent scientific body to evaluate the air quality standards the EPA had developed, a 
simplification of the permitting process, and looser controls on the technologies that firms used 
to achieve compliance.36 For the steel and automobile industries in particular, loosening the 
obligations of the Clean Air Act was an urgent priority due to looming compliance deadlines.37  
Over the course of the spring, the Reagan Administration formulated a set of goals in 
keeping with what businesses had proposed. PSD would be eliminated, authority over 
inspection and maintenance programs and implementation plans would devolve to the states, 
permitting of new sources would be eased, and air and water pollution control would be 
coordinated. Perhaps most importantly, the air quality standards and other critical components 
would be reevaluated from the “realization and recognition that economic and energy 
development must enter the calculus of environmental improvement,” a consciousness raising 
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that would be in large part accomplished by injecting cost/benefit analysis, risk assessment, and 
cost-effectiveness considerations into “all regulatory actions.”38 Economists in the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) had long bemoaned the Clean Air Act’s prohibition against 
considering economic consequences in setting the national air quality standards. 
Acknowledging that introducing such considerations would produce a backlash from 
environmental advocates and their supporters in Congress, OMB nevertheless urged Reagan to 
try.39 As OMB economist Art Fraas argued, without a legislated cost/benefit mandate, Reagan 
would be stuck like his predecessors trying to twist in economic considerations during regulatory 
review.40 In June 1981, the Supreme Court found that administrative agencies could issue rules 
even if the costs outweighed the benefits, making it that much more important that Reagan 
amend the Clean Air Act to create a statutory basis for a cost/benefit test.41 During the spring of 
1981 and into the summer, the Clean Air Act Working Group – a new outfit of Reagan advisors 
and business representatives led by Administrator Gorsuch and Secretary of the Interior James 
Watt – laid out a plan for realizing those goals.42  
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Toward the end of June, Representative Henry Waxman, who chaired the House 
subcommittee on the environment and supported strong regulations, obtained a copy of 
Gorsuch’s plans and released them to the press.43 To the administration’s surprise, the 
deregulatory plans met with widespread public disapproval. A public opinion survey in July 
found that 86% of respondents opposed easing the requirements of the legislation. With the 
midterm elections looming, environmental deregulation suddenly seemed like a liability.44 The 
administration delayed sending legislation to Congress as Reagan’s advisors divided over 
introducing a proposal that might prove to be deeply unpopular with voters.45 By August, hope of 
introducing legislation before Congress recessed had faded and Reagan settled on merely 
suggesting guidelines for the next session. 
 As the possibility of significantly curtailing the federal government’s regulatory 
responsibilities faded, a more covert weakening of the regulatory state took on added 
precedence for the Reagan administration. Reagan officials at EPA, the Department of the 
Interior, and the Bureau of Land Management scaled back enforcement and other activities. If 
Congress could not be persuaded to amend underlying laws like the Clean Air Act, Reagan’s 
environmental officials would simply hobble the implementation and enforcement of such 
legislation.  
 At EPA, Gorsuch’s hobbling took the form of drastic cuts to the agency’s budget. In 
1981, Gorsuch’s first budget request made clear her intent to deprive EPA of the funding it 
needed to function. EPA’s responsibilities had dramatically increased with the creation of the 
Superfund program at the end of the Carter administration. But instead of seeking a bump in 
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funding and more employees to cover these new duties, Gorsuch asked for a significant 
reduction in the agency’s budget and staffing. When Reagan took office, EPA had been 
allocated $1.4 billion and 11,400 employees to conduct its work in 1981. For 1982, Gorsuch 
asked for $975 million and 8,300 employees. A cut of this magnitude was unprecedented for 
EPA and highly unusual for any federal agency expected to maintain the same workload with 
30% less funding and nearly 30% fewer employees, much less manage the significant 
expansion of work that EPA faced with the new Superfund program. Gorsuch’s budget cuts 
raised howls of protest from environmental advocates, and spurred her critics to coordinate a 
counterattack. 
The Perils of Contempt 
 
Before long, Reagan’s contemptuous approach to environmental protection and the 
abrasive personalities of his top environmental officials inspired a fierce resistance. As the full 
scope of Reagan’s deregulatory ambitions crystallized during his first year in office, 
environmental advocates, career EPA staff unnerved by Gorsuch’s mismanagement, and 
former environmental officials from both Democratic and Republican administrations gathered 
together into a potent opposition.  
Leading the charge was Carter’s former EPA Assistant Administrator of Policy, Bill 
Drayton. As a true believer in market-oriented alternatives to direct regulations, Drayton had 
helped develop the bubble policy and first emission trading program. But within Reagan’s first 
few months in office, Drayton realized from Gorsuch’s budget cuts that the new administration 
was interested not in reform but rather in dismantling EPA from within. The more Drayton heard 
from contacts still at the agency and elsewhere in the policy community, the worse the situation 
appeared. So, in fall 1981, Drayton formed an organization called Save EPA, which would 




Drayton built Save EPA on the logic that Reagan and Gorsuch’s program of small cuts 
throughout the agency would pass largely unnoticed by most observers unless someone drew 
attention to the existential threat those cuts posed in the aggregate. As Drayton explained the 
organization’s importance to the Washington Post in early 1982, Reagan was demolishing EPA 
while avoiding direct confrontation. To expose the real intent of the administration, Save EPA 
relied on a volunteer core of nine environmental advocates and former officials like Carter EPA 
Administrator Doug Costle, who worked on donated typewriters and a shoestring budget. 
Leaked information came pouring in from career staff at EPA, concerned staff at the Office of 
Management and Budget in the White House, environmental consultants, lawyers, and even 
trade association representatives. Save EPA’s volunteer staff turned those leaks into cohesive 
reports, which they disseminated to allies in Congress and throughout the Beltway.46      
Drayton’s first reports, distributed in fall 1981, were little more than sheets of figures and 
facts, cut and pasted from leaked budgets. But in the hands of concerned Congressional 
representatives and journalists, the basic figures and a short editorial about their importance 
proved sufficient to raise alarm.47 In September and October, newspapers across the country 
began reporting on the EPA budget cuts, with the help of leaked documents and colorful quotes 
from Drayton and Costle. In mid-October, The New York Times drew on leaked EPA database 
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printouts to show that Gorsuch had effectively stopped asking the Department of Justice to 
prosecute violators.48 In another article, Doug Costle helped the same journalist understand 
 
Figure 14: Perceptions of Gorsuch’s imperious disinterest in the environment  
made for an easy caricature of her as a villain in stories about the budget cuts.49  
 
the intent of the budget cuts, warning that the crippling cuts were not a matter of “saving money 
for the budget” but rather represented “a wrecking crew at work.”50 Elsewhere, Drayton told a 
New Jersey newspaper that the cuts represented a “radical bomb-in-the-basement budget.”51 In 
October 1981, Drayton appeared on behalf of Save EPA before the House Subcommittee on 
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Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources to convey concerns about EPA’s budget that were 
by now well-known across the nation.52  
The participation of business executives and Republican leaders in the growing critique 
of Gorsuch’s management frustrated her attempts to dismiss Save EPA and her opposition as 
merely partisan politics. Worry over disruptive budgetary cuts or drastic legislative revisions 
penetrated the boardroom, with the chemical industry weighing in with an October 1981 editorial 
on the necessity of dependable regulations.53 Also in October, Dan Lufkin, the former 
Connecticut environmental official who served as Chairman of the Reagan campaign’s Task 
Force on the Environment, wrote a stinging open letter to the president regarding his 
environmental policies. Describing himself as a lifelong Republican, Reagan supporter, and 
businessman, Lufkin bemoaned Reagan’s “extreme” and “bizarre” appointments of 
environmental officials like Watt and Gorsuch, whose conduct in office had upended the 
environmental ethic that Reagan had expressed as a candidate. Lufkin expressed special 
concern over Reagan’s proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act, which he described as 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater rather than trying to fix a fundamentally sound and 
popular statute.54 
With mailings and strategy memos, Drayton and Save EPA made sure that news 
coverage and Congressional attention continued throughout the winter. Drayton sent talking 
points on budget cuts to sympathetic Congressional representatives (including a young Senator 
Al Gore). In those letters, Drayton also argued that Reagan’s “extraordinary combination of 
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ideological blindness, special ineptness, special interest greed, and ignorance” offered a 
political gift to Democrats if they could take advantage of the president’s folly.55 Building off 
Save EPA, Drayton helped to organize a new group called the American Environmental Safety 
Council. Mailings from both organizations provided detailed updates on Gorsuch and Reagan’s 
actions at the agency and instructed readers to spread public awareness of the threat to EPA 
through local media outlets and appeal to their Congressional representatives.56 Feeling the 
pressure, the Republican National Committee circulated defensive talking points of Gorsuch and 
Reagan’s environmental policies to Republican Members of Congress.57   
 Over the course of spring 1982, Reagan’s critics refined their critiques. In February, 
Drayton and the National Wildlife Foundation published an alternative EPA budget, which 
juxtaposed the funds requested by Gorsuch against “EPA’s real program needs.” With bar 
graphs and reams of data, the report was a powerful tool for Reagan’s opponents, who could 
now question Gorsuch and the Reagan administration on every line of their proposed cuts.58 In 
March, the ten most powerful environmental advocates published a sweeping critique of 
Reagan’s environmental policies entitled Indictment: The Case Against the Reagan 
Environmental Record.59 Gorsuch’s EPA scrambled to rebut the many charges leveled against 
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her administration.60 If Reagan had hoped that budget cuts might hobble EPA before anyone 
important realized what was happening, Drayton and other environmental advocates ensured 
that the president would be held accountable for his actions.   
 Meanwhile, Reagan’s plans for amending major portions of the Clean Air Act found more 
opposition in Congress than the president had anticipated. Throughout the fall, opponents of 
Reagan’s proposed amendments emphasized the unpopularity of such legislation with the 
majority of Americans. Louis Harris, the pollster who had found a whopping 86% of Americans 
opposed to weakening of the Act condemned the proposed amendments before Henry 
Waxman’s environment subcommittee in the House of Representatives. “You mess around with 
the clean air and clean water acts and you’re in the deepest trouble in the 1982 elections,” 
Harris declared.”61 Costle sent Harris’ poll and testimony around to legislators and pundits as 
evidence that Reagan’s proposals should be rejected.62  
Some organized business interests – especially the Chamber of Commerce – did not 
cede the question of public support without a fight. In December 1981, the Chamber announced 
that its own poll found most Americans did support amendments to the Act.63 Along with the 
poll, the Chamber also sent Reagan’s advisors the results of a confidential detailed survey of 
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the opinions of key players including the National Governors Association and STAPPA-
ALAPCO, which represented local and state environmental regulators across the country.64  
After myriad delays, a bill approximating Reagan’s ambitions was eventually introduced 
in the House in December 1981. HR 5252 had bipartisan support, most notably from its 
Democratic sponsor John Dingell, the longtime representative from Michigan who hoped to 
stem the erosion of automobile manufacturing in his state. In coordination with the Reagan 
administration, representatives from the automobile companies and other industries 
campaigned on behalf of the bill.65 The National Environmental Development Association, which 
represented many of the nation’s largest industrial conglomerates and was chaired by former 
EPA official John Quarles, threw its weight behind HR 5252 with press releases and a one-day 
conference to persuade Beltway insiders of the bill’s merits.66 General Motors and other 
business representatives from Reagan’s Clean Air Act Working Group launched an educational 
campaign to drum up “grassroots” support for the bill, singling out labor unions as a primary 
target.67 Defying that effort, many labor representatives rejected a weakening of the Act as an 
unnecessary gutting of vital public health protections.68 Despite such opposition and polling 
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evidence indicating continued opposition to weakening the national standards, the Reagan 
Administration and HR 5252’s supporters held out hope that Congress could be persuaded to 
relax key aspects of the Act.69 
 Yet before HR 5252 could make it to the House floor, the bill first had to clear 
Representative Henry Waxman’s Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural 
Resources. Opening the first hearing in February 1982, Waxman made it clear that HR 5252 
would face a tough challenge. Waxman derided the bill for foregoing intelligent tweaks in favor 
of “a radical crusade to rewrite and weaken this law that has the broad support of the American 
people.” Lamenting the proposed relaxation of automobile standards, Waxman noted that the 
adjustment would make it impossible for many cities to meet the national air quality standards 
while netting only the meager “savings of $40 to $100 per car.” Questioning the larger value of 
that small reduction in price, Waxman continued, “I cannot believe that this pittance would 
reopen the closed assembly lines or put American workers back to work.”70  
With the help of a variety of environmental advocates, Waxman and his allies on the 
House subcommittee on the environment maneuvered to keep HR 5252 in subcommittee 
hearings until they had transformed the bill into un-passable legislation. Over the course of the 
spring and summer of 1982, Waxman took a bill that eased regulations for nearly every industry 
and turned it into a bill that granted relief to only some industries while imposing tougher 
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standards on others. What had been a unified industry coalition behind the bill fractured, and 
with it the bipartisan base of support.71  
To the consternation of business interests, environmental advocates largely controlled 
the public narrative around the Clean Air Act, portraying almost any effort to amend the act as 
countenancing a return to dirty, dangerous air.72 Despite the protests of supporters of HR 5252, 
that narrative prevailed.73 By August, Waxman was able to pass a motion to suspend 
consideration of HR 5252, effectively killing Reagan’s best chances of securing his desired 
amendments.74 In a last ditch effort, Gorsuch proposed enforcing drastic sanctions provided for 
in the existing Clean Air Act to drive legislators back to the drawing board. Under the 1977 
amendments, areas that had not met the air quality standards by the end of 1982 could face 
bans on the construction of new sources of emissions as well as a suspension of federal 
highway and sewer funding. Former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus had once pulled 
off a similar trick to avoid implementing transportation controls. But by the fall of 1982, Reagan 
advisors were no longer certain that Congress would respond to the threat of sanctions by 
weakening the Clean Air Act. Congress might instead call the administration’s bluff, a November 
memo warned, and so Gorsuch’s proposal was rejected.75  
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“Almost No Accomplishments” 
 
 In addition to enraging environmentalists and alarming Congress, Reagan’s blunt attack 
on environmental protection disappointed regulatory reformers who had hoped the president 
would lead a shift toward market oriented policies. Washington, D.C. think tanks and public 
policy centers had coalesced around the goal of replacing directly applied uniform standards 
with market based reforms like the bubble policy. This loose coalition included conservative 
organizations like The Heritage Foundation, which had formerly refrained from supporting new 
regulatory endeavors.76 But while Reagan and Gorsuch paid lip service to the transformative 
benefits of emissions trading and other market approaches, they neglected the substantive 
procedural work required for the continued development of those policies.77  
When Reagan took office, EPA was in the process of combining various experiments 
with market based reforms into a consolidated, easy to use policy. In January 1981, Carter’s 
departing EPA Administrator Doug Costle had promised that a consolidated policy would be 
released within weeks.78 Under EPA’s emissions offsetting rule, a firm that wanted to build a 
new plant or some other major source of emissions in an area where the air quality did not meet 
national standards could pay existing polluters in that area to reduce their own emissions and 
create space under the limit for the new source. A version of the offset had existed since 1976 
and proponents of the policy celebrated it as solving the thorny political problem of allowing 
economic growth to continue in the nation’s most polluted areas while improving air quality.  
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But while a small set of firms had used offsets to do just that, regulatory reform 
proponents believed that offsetting was only the beginning of a new regulatory paradigm in 
which firms across the country would buy and sell the right to emit pollutants as a matter of 
ordinary business. If an electric utility wanted to upgrade its transmission infrastructure but was 
being forced instead to invest its capital to meet an impending pollution control deadline, the 
utility could turn to an active offsets market to buy the temporary right to emit excess pollutants 
while it invested in transmission. Proponents of the policy imagined that buying and selling 
emission offsets would soon be no less exotic than using commercial papers for short term 
financing or buying a futures contract to hedge against increases in input prices.  
The key was an active market with many offsets offered for sale. Without a market, 
buyers faced the formidable task of cold calling neighboring firms to propose a novel and risky 
transaction. And would be sellers had to attract buyers for an untested, uncertain product. The 
few transactions that had taken place typically involved the active participation of local pollution 
control officials, who knew which firms could generate excess reductions and paired them with 
firms seeking to buy those emission rights. As an article in Industry Week in March 1980 pointed 
out, local control authorities often made the reductions themselves, as when the State of 
Pennsylvania switched to a new road paving material to reduce hydrocarbon emissions and 
create room under the state’s emissions cap for a new Volkswagen assembly plant.79 
Individually, such arrangements were heralded as great successes. But if trading was to 
become commonplace, a market needed to be created.  
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 Mike Levin and his Regulatory Reform Staff at EPA saw banks and brokers as key 
components of a new market and they were busy coaxing both into existence when Reagan 
came into office. Less than a week after the new president had arrived, EPA held its first 
Conference for Potential Brokers of Emission Reduction Credits in Washington, D.C. Intended 
to attract and educate entrepreneurs, the one-day conference covered the fine points of 
financing offsets, analyzing markets, and paying taxes on the handsome profits that brokers 
could be expected to reap.80 Levin welcomed the participants by pointing to the auspicious 
timing of holding the conference on the “first Monday of a new administration committed to free 
enterprise, the market system, [and] getting government off the backs of the people.” EPA, 
Levin continued, was rolling out policies to make pollution control “quicker, simpler, cheaper,” 
while simultaneously “making large profits for brokers too.” Though Levin cautioned later in his 
remarks that an active market did not yet exist, he urged the audience to create one by getting 
out there and negotiating some trades.81 If participants failed to take adequate notes at the 
conference, they could refer to Brokering Emission Reduction Credits: A Handbook, which 
Levin’s Regulatory Reform Staff published that same month.82  
 In a parallel project, Levin and the Regulatory Reform Staff set out to build local banks 
where firms could deposit credits for their excess emission reductions, which other business 
could purchase to expand their own emissions. Although some local control authorities had 
already begun facilitating trades by pairing prospective buyers and sellers, very few had 
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established a formal registry of such opportunities and fewer still had created a banking 
mechanism whereby sellers could have their offsets inspected, certified, and deposited for 
future sale. In 1981, only Louisville, San Francisco, and the Puget Sound had established 
banks, though Levin noted that twenty other areas were in the process of adopting banking 
regulations. Toward that end, the Regulatory Reform Staff distributed model banking rules and 
other technical guides to control authorities across the country.83 In at least one case, Levin’s 
office offered to provide financial assistance to a local authority to set up a banking system in 
New Brunswick, New Jersey.84  
But here as elsewhere, Gorsuch’s disregard for the foundations of such a banking 
system undercut the work of Levin and his staff. EPA proposed a unified set of banking 
regulations in 1981 but did not finalize them until 1986. Local regulators who had started down 
the road of creating a bank were left hanging as to whether their particular banking systems 
would meet the long-delayed federal rules. Witnessing this, regulators in other areas shied away 
from developing banks. And the businesses that banks needed to function steered clear of an 
uncertain and risky enterprise.85 
 EPA’s Regulatory Reform Staff was also promoting regulatory innovations like the 
bubble policy that gave firms more flexibility on how they met emission standards.86 For reform 
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proponents, the bubble held out the tantalizing possibility of allowing corporate engineers to use 
their knowledge of their company’s production process to figure out where pollution controls 
could be achieved most cheaply. The potential for major savings had attracted several 
prominent firms to experiment with the bubble policy by the time Reagan took office. An article 
in Chemical Week in January 1981 described how the chemical manufacturer Du Pont had 
reached an agreement with EPA to use a bubble to reduce emissions of the volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs) that contributed to ground level smog at its Chambers Works plant in New 
Jersey. Under the original control plan, Du Pont would have had to install controls on every one 
of the Chambers Works 205 sources of VOCs. Meeting EPA’s standards for each of those 205 
sites would have achieved a 85% reduction in VOCs across the plant. Under the new bubble 
policy, Du Pont installed pollution controls on only the five largest sources; yielding a 99.9% 
reduction in pollutants while saving $1 million a month in compliance costs. Those savings and 
Du Pont’s freedom to control emissions on its own terms attracted the attention of other firms in 
the industry.87 Reagan had inherited a regulatory reform program with institutional support at 
EPA, strong enthusiasm from economists, and rising expectations among businesses.  
Under Levin’s direction, EPA’s Regulatory Reform Staff worked hard to expand business 
and regulatory constituencies for market based policies. Working with the consultancy SRI 
International, the now-defunct Regulatory Council had produced technical guides to Marketable 
Rights, Performance Standards, and Monetary Incentives that were eventually published 
throughout Reagan’s first year in office.88 And in the winter of 1981 and spring of 1982, Levin 
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helped organized a series of Regulatory Reform Conferences across the country, each co-
sponsored by EPA and a major corporation like 3M or Armco, Inc.89 In addition to disseminating 
technical information, Levin used these conferences to build a corporate constituency for 
reforms like the bubble policy. Along with reports of the great savings to be had, Levin sent 
business representatives home with personal letters of praise from EPA in the hopes of raising 
the stature of environmental compliance managers within corporate hierarchies.90  
But without the necessary support from EPA’s senior officials, innovations like the 
bubble languished. In Gorsuch’s first month in office, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) met 
with the Administrator to present several opportunities where market approaches could be 
implemented. To their surprise, AEI’s representatives found Gorsuch to be ignorant of and 
totally disinterested in such reforms. As one participant recounted, Gorsuch made it clear that 
she was not interested in better regulation but simply less regulation.91 Ultimately, it took 
Gorsuch nearly fifteen months to issue her Interim Emissions Trading Policy Statement and 
EPA did not release the final version until 1986.92 
 In focusing on deregulation over regulatory reform, Gorsuch followed the example of 
Reagan’s Regulatory Relief program, which could be remarkably blunt its objectives. Reporting 
on the status of the program in November 1981, Reagan advisor Chris DeMuth judged it a 
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success based on the sheer reductions in regulatory proposals – both in absolute numbers 
(which showed a 50% decline in new regulations) and in the number of pages those proposals 
took up in the Federal Register (which had been cut by a third). To these basic measures, 
DeMuth added estimated cost savings of $1.5 billion in annual business expenditures and $3.8-
5.9 billion in one time capital investments.93 A narrow focus on beating back the regulatory state 
limited the Reagan administration’s ability to imagine the new policies that might have created a 
flexible compliance program in which businesses made more of the decisions.  
Disappointment in Reagan’s regulatory reform record was already on display at the 
annual conference of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in December 1981. The policy 
pundits who gathered at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington spared little invective in expressing 
their frustration with the new administration. Antonin Scalia, at the time the editor of AEI’s 
Regulation magazine, described Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 and the resulting regulatory 
review process as “basically meaningless,” according to a Reagan staffer who attended, since 
EPA and other regulatory agencies already selected among potential regulations on the basis of 
costs and benefits. Real change could be made if economists in the Office of Management and 
Budget could use cost/benefit analysis to direct where EPA decided to intervene in the first 
place, Scalia argued, but the White House currently lacked the legal authority to force EPA to do 
so. Robert Crandall, a Senior Fellow at the more liberal Brookings Institution, also expressed his 
dismay in Reagan’s lack of support for marketable emission permits and the administration’s 
failure to amend the Clean Air Act. Reagan had managed “almost no accomplishments,” 
Crandall declared. In Regulation magazine, other policy experts inveighed on Reagan’s lack of 
a coordinated plan for deregulating the communications and transportation industries, reiterating 
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the charge that Reagan suffered from a debilitating failure to develop cohesive strategies for 
deregulation and other ambitions.94  
Throughout the following spring, criticism of Reagan’s disinterest in regulatory reform 
continued to mount.95 The dissatisfied included EPA staff like William Foskett who recalled of 
Reagan’s election and subsequent disappointment: “we had sugar-plum visions dancing in our 
heads of spreading better means of reaching regulatory goals, both administratively and 
technologically. But it became apparent that the new administration was not interested in 
innovative regulatory approaches. Instead it just wanted less regulation, whatever, however.”96 
EPA did finally issue its Emissions Trading Policy Statement in the Federal Register in April 
1982 – nearly a year and a half after the previous administration had promised its imminent 
publication.97 But that formal proposal for expanding market-based regulations did little to quiet 
the critics who were by now convinced that Reagan lacked commitment to substantive reforms.  
 For these various critics, Reagan’s blunt deregulatory approach posed a threat not just 
to fledging initiatives like the bubble policy but to the very project of market-based reform. 
Reformers had long fought to defend themselves against charges from environmental and 
public health advocates that market-based regulation was merely a cloak for deregulation. By 
rhetorically supporting regulatory reform while in practice pursuing deregulation, Reagan 
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threatened to validate those charges and delegitimize reforms like the bubble policy as sincere 
and viable approaches to protecting the environment.  
 In June 1982, regulatory reformers at the Beltway think tank the Council for a 
Competitive Economy organized a dinner to try to convince members of Reagan’s 
administration of the merits of market alternatives they were laying assault to. The dinner 
invitation made the peril of Reagan’s current approach quite clear: 
The administration’s efforts to date have been readily – and to some extent justly – characterized as 
pro-business rather than market approaches to environmental preservation. We have seemed to 
propose reduced regulation and curtailed budgets as ways of reducing/frustrating environmental 
objectives, rather than as a means of shifting toward a more equitable and efficient strategy. As a 
result, the free market perspective has been discredited even though it has not been tried.98 
 
In addition to Brookings’ Robert Crandall, reform proponents at the meeting included 
representatives from the Heritage Foundation, the conservative Pacific Legal Foundation, and 
the Center for Political Economy and Natural Resources at Montana State University. In a 
testament to the preference of many businesses for market-friendly reforms over freewheeling 
deregulation, participants also included representatives from the American Petroleum Institute 
and the National Forest Products Association. Together, these reform proponents tried to 
convince members of the Interior Department, the Council on Environmental Quality, and 
Council of Economic Advisors, and Reagan’s domestic policy staff to actually pursue 
substantive reforms.99 
Regulatory reform proponents were scarcely happier with Reagan’s EO 12291. Despite 
the fanfare with which Reagan had announced EO 12291, many observers agreed with Antonin 
Scalia that meaningful change could not be accomplished simply by requiring regulatory 
agencies to issue only those regulations where the estimated monetary benefits could be shown 
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to exceed the estimated costs. Such a requirement did not address the fundamental question of 
where the government decided to intervene in the first place. In the realm of air pollution, EPA 
continued to enforce national standards for a set pollutants that Congress had determined in the 
1960s. In constructing a new petroleum pipeline, for instance, a refiner would install pollution 
capturing equipment that met EPA’s standards for new sources of ozone emissions. But while 
EPA took costs and feasibility into consideration in deciding what control equipment was 
necessary, the underlying project of protecting public health from any adverse effects of ozone, 
whatever the cost, went unquestioned. Economists and other reform proponents had long 
sought to evaluate the desirability of those underlying standards themselves. If ozone proved to 
be less harmful to human health than sulfur dioxide, reformers wanted EPA to ease up on the 
petroleum refiners and shift attention to the electric utilities. Focused on individual rules, EO 
12291 was proving a poor basis for introducing an efficiency calculus into EPA’s environmental 
governance.   
The perceived limitations of EO 12291 were on display in a 1983 conference at the 
University of North Carolina that brought together economists and policy experts from the White 
House, EPA, and an assortment of think tanks and universities. The proceedings, published in 
1984 as an edited collection, describe EO 12291 as a narrow gesture with as many political 
liabilities as benefits. Ann Fisher, a member of the Benefits Staff of EPA’s Economic Analysis 
Division, recounted how EPA had formed an interagency working group in the summer of 1981 
to develop an internal policy for complying with Reagan’s EO 12291. After more than two years 




the agency had issued a final policy – a lengthy process that nevertheless marked EPA as one 
of only two regulatory agencies that had bothered to come up with a formal compliance plan.100  
Yet for all that investment, EPA’s Fisher conceded, assessing the costs and benefits of 
regulatory interventions remained a frustratingly imprecise process, hamstrung by the basic 
problem that protecting human life and environmental quality had no clear market parallels. 
Since no market existed for human lives, EPA had turned instead to studies of workplace risk 
and commensurate wage premiums. Workers in occupations where the risk of death on the job 
increased by one in a thousand earned an extra $400 to $7,000 a year in wages. A new 
regulation that reduced the risk of death by .001% would save one life in every thousand 
people; thus the monetary benefits of a saved life was somewhere between $400,000 and $7 
million. Establishing the pecuniary benefits of environmental quality improvements required a 
different assortment of estimations, from the straightforward cost savings of reducing damage to 
equipment in removing abrasive chemicals from the air to the more theoretical project of valuing 
national park visibility by how much money people spent in traveling to them.101 Given the 
uncertainty that resulted from these estimates, it is no wonder that Art Fraas, an economist at 
the Office of Management and Budget lamented at the conference that the analyses that arrived 
in his office were generally of debilitating poor quality.102  
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In addition to the challenges of weighing uncertain costs and benefits, EO 12291 failed 
to provide the White House or the regulatory agencies with a basis for the broader shifts that 
reform proponents desired. Robert Crandall, the Brookings Institution economist, articulated a 
common concern among the participants at the University of North Carolina conference. Under 
EO 12291, EPA continued to focus its attention on new sources, which were technologically and 
politically easier to impose strict control upon than preexisting businesses with aging capital and 
embedded support. From the perspective of economic efficiency, EPA’s focus stifled economic 
growth in favor of incumbents. EO 12291 offered no possibility of redirecting the agency’s 
attention. EPA economists, Crandall noted, had considered a fundamental overhaul in a private 
internal study that had subsequently caused embarrassment when it was leaked to the Senate. 
But even with evidence that a shift in regulatory focus could increase monetary benefits at no 
overall increase in costs, EO 12291 lacked any mechanism to compel EPA to do so.103 As Fraas 
also described it, OMB’s only recourse in confronting a rule it did not like was to send the 
regulation wholesale back to the agency for reconsideration – a response that created political 
headaches and so was rarely used.104   
Limited in scope and reliant on uncertain economics, EO 12291 also risked discrediting 
cost/benefit analysis as a cover for deregulation in the minds of many participants at the 1983 
conference. Over Carter’s presidency, more and more people had come to accept the use of 
cost/benefit analysis as a tool to assess the cost effectiveness of proposed regulations. In a 
testament to both that growing acceptance but also the persisting controversy, The New York 
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Times editorialized in 1982 for the virtues of using monetary calculations to weigh new 
regulatory proposals.105 Most environmental advocates still objected to the use of cost/benefit 
analysis as a test, but even many of them had invested in economists and economic expertise 
in an implicit admission that the cost/benefit rubric was there to stay.106 Given that growing 
legitimacy, EO 12291’s exemption of new rulemakings that suspended or eliminated regulations 
was deeply problematic to the conference participants. If the ultimate goal was to devise 
regulatory policy that maximized benefits and minimized costs, deregulatory proposals should 
be subject to the same cost/benefit test as new regulations. Simply giving deregulation a pass 
threatened to undercut the supposed neutrality of cost/benefit analysis and its growing 
acceptance by environmental organizations.107  
By the fall of 1982, criticism of Reagan’s environmental policies finally prompted the 
administration to question whether deregulation was indeed the best policy. In October, 
Reagan’s top advisors gathered for the first meeting of the Working Group on Regulatory 
Reform. As a memo for a later meeting explained the group’s rationale, Reagan’s regulatory 
relief program had begun losing momentum, the memo warned, and was taking on a “stop-gap 
character” because “the Administration had failed to develop and articulate a unified approach 
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to regulation.”108 Developing that unified approach evidently required educating many of those 
advisors on the basics and virtues of market oriented regulations, as an earlier memo circulated 
a reading list to get Working Group members up to speed.109    
Having finally expressed an interest in substantive regulatory reforms as opposed to 
deregulation, Reagan could fall back on the foundation laid by Carter as well as the ongoing 
work of EPA’s Regulatory Reform Staff. In the fall of 1982, Levin took advantage of the Reagan 
administration’s growing interest in regulatory reform to create the Emissions Trading Standing 
Committee to coordinate the development of trading approaches, dispense advice to EPA’s 
regional offices about approving trading programs, and to make EPA’s Air Office responsible for 
incorporating trading schemes into the “main stream” air pollution control program.110 After a 
long period of neglect, the free market president was finally supporting the legwork and new 
regulations needed to create viable alternatives to direct regulations.  
Working knowledge of regulatory reforms had also been kept alive by environmental 
consultants, who had long worked alongside EPA staff and became even more important to the 
policy development process because of Reagan and Gorsuch’s staffing cuts.111 While Gorsuch’s 
budget and personnel cuts left EPA teetering on the edge of disarray, Reagan’s determination 
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to shrink the role of the federal government inadvertently spurred the development of an 
alternative reserve of regulatory knowledge among consulting firms. During the Reagan years, 
EPA Offices increasingly contracted out the work of establishing the theoretical and empirical 
basis for new programs. Such contracts were often large and longstanding, taking advantage of 
a policy change under Carter that let agencies package up to a half-decade’s worth of work in 
so-called Mission Support Contracts. Consultancies competitively bid for such umbrella 
contracts and then functioned as a shadow agency staff. With the Superfund program, for 
example, a group of consulting firms won a three-year, $25 million contract to essentially figure 
out how to implement the law.112 Firms developed longstanding relationships with particular 
programs and offices, creating a critical reserve of regulatory knowledge accessible to EPA 
staff.   
Yet Reagan’s earlier neglect continued to present obstacles. Though Gorsuch eventually 
countenanced reforms like Emissions Trading, her focus on limiting regulatory action prevented 
EPA from developing the theoretical and empirical support needed to protect such rule changes 
from environmentalists’ legal challenges. In August 1982, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
rejected EPA’s expansion of the bubble policy to the many industrialized and polluted areas of 
the country that did not have approved plans toward compliance. The justices explained in their 
ruling that Gorsuch’s EPA changed critical definitions in the rule without producing a single 
study or other piece of supporting evidence.113 For those who did support substantive reforms 
among Reagan’s administration, the ruling represented a significant setback.114 Chris DeMuth 
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angrily denounced the Second Circuit’s “liberal Democratic judges” in a letter to Vice President 
Bush and OMB Director Stockman.115 But in reality, Reagan had only himself to blame for 
appointing EPA officials consumed with deregulation at all costs.   
 
Taking Down the Lightning Rods 
 
 As Reagan moved to placate disappointed proponents of regulatory reform, he faced 
growing public ire over Gorsuch’s mismanagement of EPA and the conduct of other officials like 
Secretary of the Interior James Watt. Reagan’s advisors warned of an environmental backlash 
stoked by politically powerful environmental organizations.116 Or maybe Americans really did 
oppose Reagan’s attack on regulatory protections. In any case, Reagan’s alliance with the 
Sagebrush Rebellion was turning out to be a political liability. 
 At EPA, Gorsuch’s abrasive administration and her clear disinterest in the agency’s 
mission led to acrimony and extraordinary attrition among career staff. From the beginning of 
her tenure, Gorsuch isolated herself and her top officials from EPA’s civil service bureaucracy. 
This detachment and Gorsuch’s forthright pursuit of budget and staffing cuts soon earned her 
the moniker “The Ice Queen.”117 Stories circulated of career staff transferred across the country 
against their will because of their supposed disloyalty to Gorsuch. Perceiving their jobs to be 
insecure and their mission deliberately hobbled, career staff quit in droves. By the end of 
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Gorsuch’s first year in office, attrition was running at nearly thirty percent – three times as many 
people as had quit in a typical year during the Carter administration.118    
In dramatically scaling back EPA’s activities, Gorsuch risked more than just her staff’s 
displeasure. Gorsuch had a legal obligation to enforce statutes like the Clean Air Act and her 
abdication of that responsibility carried risks that she might not have understood at the outset of 
her time as Administrator. The Toxic Substances Control Act (better known as Superfund), had 
been signed into law at the very end of the Carter presidency and Gorsuch took every possible 
measure to avoid prosecuting businesses that illegally dumped waste. EPA attorneys recounted 
Gorsuch’s deputies threatening that each case they brought against an offending business 
would be a “black mark” against them. In Gorsuch’s first year, the number of toxic substances 
enforcement cases referred to the Department of Justice for civil prosecution decreased by over 
ninety percent from the Carter administration.119 In addition, Gorsuch made it extraordinary 
difficult for states to tap into a $1.6 billion trust fund created by Congress to assist with cleanup 
by implementing new policies that required states to front a portion of the funds and restricting 
Superfund designation to only those sites in which a public health emergency could be proven 
to be occurring at that very moment. Gorsuch herself could be dangerously cavalier about her 
attitude, as when she was overheard in December 1982 telling representatives of the Thriftway 
Company gasoline refinery that they need not worry about complying with existing regulations 
under the Clean Air Act’s lead standard because the Reagan administration would soon be 
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easing those requirements – a probably illegal disclosure that Gorsuch and the Reagan 
administration then had to repeatedly apologize for.120 
Seizing on slips like Gorsuch’s Thriftway comments, Save EPA and other critics charged 
that the precipitous decline in EPA’s enforcement was illegal. In fall 1981, armed with leaked 
documents from EPA’s Enforcement Office, Congress and the national press began 
investigating the fall off in EPA’s prosecutions.121 Representative John Dingell’s Subcommittee 
on Investigations and Oversight sent EPA a formal request in June 1982 for agency records 
related to the enforcement of the Superfund program. In a related investigation, members of the 
House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight traveled to an EPA regional office in 
September 1982 to view enforcement records in person. To their surprise, EPA staff rebuffed 
their demands, claiming that Reagan enjoyed executive privilege over the records. At the 
insistence of Reagan advisors, EPA’s General Counsel reiterated that claim of executive 
privilege in a November 1982 letter to Dingell and Congress. Furious, Dingell’s Committee 
subpoenaed Gorsuch and told her to appear before Congress in early December with the 
documents. Gorsuch did appear but continued to refuse to release the records, citing Reagan’s 
instructions to withhold them. In an unusual step, Congress voted to hold Gorsuch in contempt 
of Congress in mid-December, which was followed by the even more remarkable development 
of the Department of Justice filing suit to prevent the enforcement of Congress’s subpoena.122 
Heightening the stakes, accusations swirled that Gorsuch and her deputies had used Superfund 
monies to interfere in the political campaigns of state officials.123 Those charges were soon 
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joined by claims that Rita Lavelle, EPA’s top toxic waste official, had refused to recuse herself 
from a series of Superfund negotiations in California that involved her former employer.124 The 
federal government was at war with itself, and Reagan’s EPA had the makings of a major 
scandal.   
 By early spring 1983, the Reagan administration was scrambling to stem the bleeding. 
After Lavelle refused to resign, Reagan fired her in February.125 But the scandal only worsened 
with new revelations that Lavelle’s office had frantically shredded documents as her firing 
became imminent, followed by Lavelle’s accusations in front of Congress that senior officials 
within the Reagan administration also had ties to the firms involved in the California Superfund 
site.126 February also brought new embarrassing information detailing punitive transfers and 
firings of career staff in EPA’s General Counsel’s Office, the head of which was soon forced to 
resign.127 Making matters worse, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Department 
of Justice’s attempt to block Congressional access to the Superfund records.128 Still under 
contempt of Congress, Gorsuch pleaded with Reagan officials to release the records, prompting 
Reagan’s advisors to make plans for her own resignation or firing.129 On March 9, 1983 Gorsuch 
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resigned.130 That same month, the White House and Congress reached an agreement to 
release the Superfund documents.   
 In July 1983, Reader’s Digest ran an expose on the failures of Reagan’s deregulatory 
policies that validated the alarm his advisors felt over the growing public backlash. Titled “What 
Really Happened at EPA,” James Miller’s article described how Reagan’s had foolishly brought 
the Sagebrush rebels and other anti-environmentalists like Joseph Coors into the nerve center 
of the nation’s regulatory structure. Reagan’s environmental officials had promptly set about 
dismantling the regulatory system from inside, defunding vital programs, transferring or 
demoting professional staff, and generally failing to enforce the laws for which Congress had 
charged them with responsibility. Though Miller lamented that the damage to the regulatory 
structure would take some time to fix, he argued that the blowback for Reagan would be worse. 
The issue had become not how much harm Reagan could do to the environment, but “how 
much damage Ronald Reagan’s environmental policies can do to Ronald Reagan.” Someone 
on Reagan’s domestic policy staff drew a series of brackets around this last point, urging fellow 
advisors to take “NOTE!!” of the warning.131   
 Reagan advisors who feared the growing fallout from the president’s environmental 
policies received a gift in October 1983 when James Watt resigned as Secretary of the 
Interior.132 As The New York Times reported, Watt had proven as polarizing a figure as 
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Gorsuch, creating a significant political headache for Reagan heading into the 1984 election, 
especially since the latest public opinion poll reported that two thirds of Americans believed the 
Democrats would do a better job of protecting the environment. Making the case for moderation, 
a Republican pollster told a reporter, “I used to think that Watt was a lightning rod who deflected 
animus away from the President. But now I think if the lightning rod goes away, the 
environmentalists won’t be able to make as much of an issue out of it.”133  
By the end of 1983, Reagan was ready to abandon the project of dismantling the 
nation’s environmental regulations. After a highly publicized trial, Rita Lavelle was sentenced to 
six months in prison in December 1983 for lying to Congress about her conflicts of interest in the 
Californian Superfund site. Though Lavelle was the only Reagan official to be held criminally 
responsible for her conduct, Gorsuch and twenty other environmental officials were forced to 
resign.134 At the advice of senior advisors, Vice President Bush’s Task Force on Regulatory 
Relief was disbanded as a political liability.135 While Reagan’s controversial regulatory review 
apparatus remained intact, environmental advocates had formed a new watchdog group called 
OMB Watch to police Reagan’s use of that authority. The effectiveness of Reagan’s regulatory 
review was dealt a personal blow with the retirement in 1983 of Jim Tozzi, the OMB economist 
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Perceiving a popular mandate to dramatically scale back the federal government, 
Reagan began his presidency with a broad and sometimes clumsy attack on EPA and the 
nation’s environmental regulations characterized by sweeping budget cuts, an indiscriminate 
rejection of new rules, and abrasive officials who made little effort to hide their hostility toward 
the agencies they managed. But popular support for environmental protection was higher than 
Reagan had estimated. Reagan’s deregulatory program often came across as dangerous and 
vindictive rather than as sensible. By the end of Reagan’s second year in office, EPA’s 
shrunken capabilities had become scandalous. Faced with Congressional investigations and 
popular opprobrium, Reagan backed away from his naked pursuit of deregulation and EPA 
slowly recovered. 
 Reagan’s failure to change the model of federally applied uniform standards begs the 
question of whether he would have been better off embracing the market based reforms that 
Jimmy Carter had initiated. EPA Administrator Gorsuch inherited a regulatory reform program 
with a substantial legal and theoretical foundation and promising real world applications. 
Environmental economists at think tanks and universities overwhelming supported a shift toward 
reforms like the bubble policy and emissions trading. Levin and EPA’s Regulatory Reform Staff 
eagerly sketched out new possibilities. The business community had reservations about the 
legality of such regulations but notable firms like DuPont and 3M had thrown in their support and 
were pulling others along with them. And while environmental advocates remained generally 
opposed to a shift away from directly applied uniform standards, some had warily begun to 
experiment with the ideas. Had Reagan pursed a vast expansion of those reforms, he might 
have transformed how the country controlled pollution and protected the environment.   
 Instead, Reagan let that alternative languish. A shift toward market-based regulation 




any such developments. While Levin and others at the agency kept existing reforms like the 
bubble and emissions offsetting functioning, a lack of investment in expanding the usage or 
legal justification for such reforms meant that they remained curiosities rather than real 
alternatives. In pursuit of a free environment, Reagan missed the chance to develop viable, 
market oriented approaches that might have incentivized businesses to actively reduce their 







































Chapter 7: A Market for Bads 
 
 
 Made to recognize the political costs of attacking popular environmental protections, 
Ronald Reagan grudgingly tempered his deregulatory assault in 1983. In place of Anne 
Gorsuch and other firebrand agency heads lost to scandal, Reagan appointed moderates. At 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Reagan convinced William Ruckelshaus to return 
as Administrator on the condition that the agency’s first head would “be given a free hand in 
determining the needs and directions of [the] agency,” as Ruckelshaus put it in a speech to EPA 
staff. “We’re going back to work,” Ruckelshaus told the audience at his first day back as 
Administrator.1 And by filling the positions around him with credible environmental advocates 
and restoring the agency’s moribund enforcement program, Ruckelshaus slowly revived morale 
and restored functioning to the beleaguered agency. 
 Gorsuch’s discouragement of any and all new regulations had slowed the development 
of emissions offsetting and other market approaches to environmental protection. But with 
support from Ruckelshaus, EPA’s regulatory reform proponents came forward with new ideas, 
including a trading program for removing lead from gasoline. Outside the agency, environmental 
economists remained as enamored as ever with market approaches, recommending tradable 
emissions rights as a solution to new environmental problems like ozone depletion.  
Over the course of the 1980s, environmental advocates warmed to market approaches. 
The Environmental Defense Fund in particular gave new legitimacy to these programs among 
environmentalists. By the end of the decade, President George H.W. Bush could put forward the 
first national pollutant market to take on the menace of acid rain.  
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Market Reforms at a Revived Agency 
 
 Ruckelshaus returned to an agency that had introduced glittering market based 
regulatory alternatives without transforming how most firms controlled their emissions. 
Proponents of market-based reforms had prevailed over environmentalist hostility and internal 
suspicion at EPA to put alternatives like the bubble policy on the books. A report on market 
approaches prepared for Ruckelshaus on his return counted 179 approved bubbles, with 
compliance cost savings of over $600 million.2 But despite the urging of reform champions, most 
firms continued to forego the potential economic savings of novel compliance strategies to stick 
with directly applied uniform standards that offered certainty. 
The experiences of Illinois and San Francisco exemplify the difficulties faced by the 
novel policies. In the early 1980s, the Illinois Chamber of Commerce set about establishing a 
private brokerage service for Emission Reduction Credits. Through mailings, newsletters, media 
coverage, and a telephone hotline, the Chamber contacted approximately 8,000 firms to sell 
them on the new service. But only a small handful showed up to the seminar where the details 
of the brokerage were to be hashed out, leaving the Chamber and other reform proponents no 
closer to seeing emissions trading into practice.3 In the San Francisco Bay Area, local regulators 
reported in 1983 that firms refused to use a new emissions banking system because of 
pervasive uncertainty about the security of emission rights deposited with the bank. With very 
limited trading, prospective sellers were unwilling to part with emission rights that they 
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themselves might need in the future.4 Even where reformers managed to create an institutional 
basis for market alternatives, uncertainty about the legal stability of novel policies like emission 
rights tended to limit their usage such that they may as well have not existed. 
 In addition to Reagan’s failure to invest in the necessary procedural development to get 
market-based compliance strategies off the ground, enduring opposition within EPA and among 
environmental organizations hamstrung such polices. The points of contention for environmental 
advocates were many. Both the Environmental Defense Fund and the Attorney General’s office 
worried about loopholes in emissions trading that let firms off the hook for improving air quality.5 
Citizens for a Better Environment complained in 1982 that regulators in the Bay Area were 
promoting trading that was keeping the region further out of compliance with national air quality 
standards.6 The Natural Resources Defense Council issued a scathing critique in 1984 of a 
proposed bubble in Los Angeles on the grounds that EPA and the firm in question that failed to 
calculate the proper baseline for emissions and thus granted the business far more credits than 
it deserved.7 
One area that especially animated environmentalist opposition concerned “shutdown 
credits.” If a firm closed a factory or production line, did it have a right to use or sell the 
attendant reduction in emissions? Business interests and reform proponents believed that firms 
should receive shutdown credits while environmentalists and many regulators argued instead 
that the improvement in air quality that resulted from a shutdown should be preserved as a boon 
to public health. The two sides waged war on the issue, including a long fight in San Diego over 
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the Merck Corporation’s efforts to upgrade the power generators on a massive kelp processing 
operation that employed about 500 workers. In question was whether Merck could count the 
nitrogen oxide emissions from the old generators against the emissions of the new generators, 
a claim opposed by local California regulators but which Merck insisted was vital in keeping the 
kelp refining plant economically viable.8 In a testament to the stakes involved, Merck’s case was 
taken up by the Chemical Manufacturers Association, which eventually reached a settlement 
with EPA after two years of litigation whereby firms could claim shutdown credits under certain 
stipulations.9 As elsewhere, protracted litigation ate into potential savings and most firms simply 
steered clear.   
 Allowing business to claim and sell emission rights for major pollutants like sulfur dioxide 
also raised the worrisome prospect of shifting emissions of less prevalent but no less dangerous 
toxic pollutants. A new set of environmental advocates coalescing around the framework of 
environmental justice complained that by encouraging such shifts, emissions trading could 
further concentrate environmental hazards in poor neighborhoods and communities of color.10 
Environmental justice advocates tapped into a longstanding revulsion to emissions trading 
among an important contingent of environmentalists, who ethically opposed what they derided 
as selling the right to pollute.11   
																																																						
8 Fittingly, EPA’s first attempt to resolve the issue by amending California’s State Implementation Plan to allow for 
Merck’s generator upgrade ran into Reagan’s ban on new rulemakings during the regulatory freeze. Mary Doyle to W. 
Ernst Minor, February 9, 1981, folder, “EPA: Issues (2),” Box 37, DBF.  
9 The most important constraint was that a firm would receive no credits for plant shutdowns that would have 
occurred regardless of what happened with pollution controls. Daniel Manelli to Danny Boggs, February 16, 1983, 
folder, “Environment – ‘Banking’ [Emissions Reduction Banking],” Box 70, DBF.  
10 Barry Solomon and Russell Lee, “Emissions Trading and Environmental Justice,” Environment 42, no. 8 (2000): 
32-45. 
11 Though many environmentalists came to accept market solutions under certain conditions, there were others who 
believed that pollution was a moral failure, and saw emissions trading as a betrayal of the government’s duty to 
address that failure. These attitudes were explored in works like M. Douglas and A. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture 




Congressional sympathy for those varied environmentalist concerns constrained EPA’s 
development of market-based reforms. As Ruckelshaus describes it, the trauma of Gorsuch’s 
assault on the agency left many members of Congress deeply suspicious of any attempts to 
change how EPA enforced clean air standards.12 Without Congressional support for a 
substantial overhaul of EPA’s air program, advocates of market based policies had to settle for 
the incremental expansion of reforms like the bubble policy, contending all the while with 
persistent skepticism from opponents in the Air Office, as well as in the Regional Offices and at 
the local and state levels.13 The Air Office resisted the expansion of market-based reforms at 
every turn. One of the most important contests was whether bubbling and other novel 
compliance strategies would be allowed in the most polluted areas of the country – where the 
national air quality standards had not been attained. When bubble advocates finally won the 
legal authority to allow bubbles in nonattainment areas, the Air Office quickly moved to restrict 
new bubbles to only those areas that had approved plans to attain the national standards – a 
stipulation which conveniently prohibited the use of the bubble in many of the areas of heaviest 
pollution, where local regulators were most willing to try out the policy.14  
As Chief of EPA’s Regulatory Reform Staff, Mike Levin devoted most of his time to 
assuaging concerns within and without the agency about the efficacy of market based reforms 
in order to remove as many constraining stipulations as he could. Levin’s Standing Committee 
on Emissions Trading met frequently to address specific questions and concerns from the Air 
Office and Regional Offices, and Levin’s staff kept a running list of priority issues for 
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resolution.15 Levin also collected endorsements from outside parties, including respected 
environmental consultancies, with whom Levin contracted for reports and evaluations that found 
economic savings in the instances where the bubble and other market based policies had been 
implemented.16  
While Ruckelshaus and his Deputy Administrator Al Alm lent high level support to the 
development of market-based polices, their priorities lay elsewhere. Ruckelshaus was primarily 
focused on restoring EPA’s integrity in the eyes of the environmental community and Congress. 
Knowing that the Reagan White House had little appetite for further public controversy, 
Ruckelshaus routinely bucked the counsel of Reagan advisors and issued strong new 
regulations.17 In areas where the bubble or emissions trading promised to deliver the same 
pollution reduction at a lower cost to regulated industries, Ruckelshaus embraced such reforms 
as common sense.18 During Ruckelshaus’ tenure, EPA consolidated its various market-based 
programs in the long-awaited Final Emissions Trading Policy Statement. But Ruckelshaus left 
the agency before the Statement was released, setting back reform proponents who now had to 
convince a new Administrator of the policy’s merits.19 
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Aside from restoring EPA’s credibility, Ruckelshaus’ own ambition was to reorient EPA’s 
focus toward the environmental problems that posed the greatest risks to public health and 
which EPA had the best chance of addressing. Ruckelshaus returned to EPA at the same time 
a new paradigm called risk management was ascending in policymaking circles.20 As described 
in a 1983 publication from the National Research Council, risk management called for 
policymakers to prioritize interventions according to the magnitude of the threat and the 
likelihood of successful mitigation. In the 1980s, new scientific understanding of carcinogens 
revealed that such substances could cause cancer even in minute concentrations. A steadily 
expanding roster of suspected carcinogens affirmed a longstanding belief among policymakers, 
including Ruckelshaus, that environmental health threats could never be entirely eliminated. To 
make policy amid such uncertainty, risk management called for experts to provide their best 
estimates of the magnitude of a given risk alongside the actions and economic investment that 
would be required to reduce that risk by varying degrees. Policymakers would then manage all 
known risks, intervening to mitigate the most acute threats as well as where it was most cost 
effective to do so.21 In his first tenure at EPA, Ruckelshaus had sought an analogous rejiggering 
of EPA’s priorities, but statutory mandates had largely prevented him from shifting resources 
within the agency.  
Finding himself once again at the helm of EPA, Ruckelshaus began a long process of 
convincing EPA’s many stakeholders that the agency’s mission and priorities ought to be 
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recalibrated from the perspective of risk management. Ruckelshaus gave a speech before the 
National Academy of Science and published an editorial in Science arguing that EPA needed to 
become more comfortable weighing the costs and benefits of various interventions as well as 
with the reality that absolute certainty on many matters would remain elusive. Ruckelshaus 
declared that the assessment of uncertain risks required a substantial investment in EPA’s 
scientific expertise and the ability to communicate complicated threats to the general public. To 
maintain EPA’s scientific credibility, it was also critical that EPA’s risk assessment remain 
entirely separate from its management of those risks.22  
Though Ruckelshaus believed that the cost effectiveness of various interventions should 
be compared, he did not subscribe to the notion that the value of everything that EPA did could 
be measured in dollars and cents. Ruckelshaus mirthfully recalled one meeting with a group of 
EPA staff in which he was presented with the results of extensive public opinion surveys on the 
dollar amount that the public would purportedly be willing to pay to protect different levels of 
visibility in the nation’s National Parks. The contrived circumstances of such measurements, in 
Ruckelshaus’s opinion, provided little help to policymakers.23  
Though Congress remained skeptical about major changes to EPA’s mission, 
Ruckelshaus generated enough support for risk assessment to launch the Comparative 
Assessment of Environmental Problems project. Over the course of the next three years, EPA 
staff evaluated the entire purview of EPA’s responsibilities according to the risk of various 
problems and the cost effectiveness of EPA’s response, eventually producing a report entitled 
Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems, which advocated 
shifting resources and attention toward problems like toxic chemicals and international issues 
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like acid rain and away from problems like solid waste disposal. Ruckelshaus had left EPA by 
the time the report was released in 1987, but the acceptance of risk management at EPA’s 
senior levels and among environmental advocates led the agency to embrace the 
recommendations.  
 Although Ruckelshaus did not oversee a broad shift toward market-based regulations, 
EPA did develop a successful trading program to remove lead from gasoline during 
Ruckelshaus’s second stint at the agency. Leaded gasoline had been in cars and on the minds 
of public health advocates for a long time.24 Under growing pressure from environmental 
organizations including the Natural Resources Defense Council, EPA developed a National 
Ambient Air Quality Standard for lead in 1978 and finally began a program to phase leaded 
gasoline out of production. Recognizing that small refineries would have a harder time raising 
the capital to invest in the new refining equipment needed to produce high-octane unleaded 
gasoline, EPA set an average lead content limit based on the size of the refinery. Nevertheless, 
small refineries complained bitterly in the early 1980s that they could not meet deadlines for 
achieving the average. In a rare instance of regulatory fortitude during the tenure of 
Administrator Gorsuch, environmental and public health advocates beat back an attempt to 
ease the deadlines, raising the possibility that many small refineries might close.25 A cost/benefit 
analysis conducted by EPA in 1983 found that the cost of lead to society as measured in public 
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health spending dwarfed the cost to manufacturers of removing it. The study concluded that 
EPA should insist on an even steeper and faster phasedown.26   
 Casting about for a means of quickly phasing out lead from gasoline without radically 
disrupting the refining industry, EPA and White House staff lit on the idea of allowing refineries 
to buy and sell emission credits that could be used to meet the reduction deadlines. A large 
refinery with capital on hand could thus reduce the average lead content in its gasoline below 
what was required by EPA and then sell those excess reductions to a small refinery to use as 
credits while it built up the capital to invest in new technology of its own.27 Firms could also bank 
excess reductions for use or sale in the near future. On its promise to quickly remove lead 
without casting the refining industry into turmoil, the trading proposal won the support of 
refineries and White House economists.  
Repaying the trust of its supporters, the phasedown and the trading component proved 
to be a success. The phasedown reduced lead emissions by over half a million tons from 1979 
to 1988, with banking and trading saving firms over $200 million in compliance costs along the 
way.28 Unlike in other early emission trading programs, a robust market for lead credits quickly 
developed. Over half of the leaded gasoline produced in 1987 was manufactured by refineries 
that had bought lead credits to do so. That liquidity drove down transaction costs and made 
buying and selling easy. The program did encounter the unexpected enforcement problem of 
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the roughly 600 “alcohol blenders,” who emerged to buy and dilute supplies of leaded gasoline 
with alcohol and then sell the lead credits to refineries.29 In the case of the blenders and 
elsewhere, monitoring lead credits was made more difficult by small operations that often 
disappeared before EPA could audit their operations.30 But through trial and error, EPA staff 
figured out how to administer trading in a way that eliminated lead emissions while significantly 
lowering the compliance costs for refineries.31 The success of the trading program in the lead 
phasedown soon made it a model for policymakers who looked to emissions trading to address 
the new menace of acid rain.32 
The Silent Plague 
 
 In the mid-1970s, environmental officials and researchers began reporting that fish 
stocks were plummeting in remote lakes in the Adirondack Mountains. The cause was a 
dramatic drop in the pH levels of the water below the point where trout and other species could 
survive. As one New York State official described it, “it was like Death Valley up there.” Lakes 
and streams were turning sterile and the concerned officials and researchers knew what to 
blame: acid rain.33  
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The term acid rain and the basic mechanics of the phenomenon it described had been 
recognized since 1852, when a Scottish chemist noticed that coal-fired industrialization was 
turning rainwater acidic near British cities. For the next hundred years, acid rain remained a 
local curiosity, overshadowed as an environmental concern by more immediate problems like 
smog and the bacterial contamination of drinking water.34 In the 1960s, environmental 
advocates in Norway began complaining that the burning of oil in factories in Germany and 
England generated vast sulfur emissions that blew up away from industrial areas into the 
atmosphere, only to descend hundreds of miles away in Norway as acid rain that killed forests 
and sterilized lakes. Subsequent research identified sulfur dioxide (emitted primarily by industry) 
and nitrogen oxides (emitted by automobiles and industry) as the two primary contributors to 
acid deposition, which came down to earth in the form of rain, snow, and dust.35  
By the late 1960s, environmental advocates in North America had also recognized that 
sulfuric emissions from the Midwest were traveling on prevailing westerly winds to settle in lakes 
and forests in New York, New England, and Canada. In 1972, the United States and Canada 
joined European nations in signing the Stockholm Declaration, which committed its signatories 
to using their domestic natural resources in such a way as to prevent harm to neighboring 
nations.36 But the hopeful accord did little to check soaring consumption of coal and other fossil 
fuels and by the second half of the environmental decade, acid rain had become a serious 
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threat to ecosystems, the object of growing public alarm, and a significant diplomatic issue with 
Canada.37 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, EPA officials tried in vain to come up with a regulatory 
solution to acid rain. Congress had created a National Ambient Air Quality Standard for sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) in the original Clean Air Act of 1970, but achieving that SO2 standard at ground 
level where it was measured proved ineffective against acid rain, since SO2 could concentrate 
higher in the atmosphere even when the standard was being met on the ground. Officials 
considered developing a new national standard for total sulfates in 1975 but ultimately 
abandoned that route. Several states instituted sulfate standards on their own accord, but 
sulfates blew across state borders, out of reach of frustrated state authorities.38 In the Carter 
administration, EPA officials returned to the position that acid rain could only be addressed if 
Congress granted new statutory authority to EPA – an unlikely outcome given that Congress 
had amended the Clean Air Act in 1977 and had little appetite for further reforms.39 Prospects 
for a successful intervention dimmed further during the energy crisis, which Carter addressed in 
part by allowing electric utilities to switch back to burning coal to reduce the nation’s 
dependence on imported oil. Anguished over the worsening problem, EPA Administrator Doug 
Costle went so far as to draft a resignation letter to Carter in 1980 to protest the coal 
conversion. Carter’s commitment to some safeguards on worsening air quality allowed Costle to 
																																																						
37 Researchers in 1974 found that acidity in rain in the eastern United States had increased 100 to 1,000 times from 
normal levels, damaging forests and lakes as well as crops and buildings. Boyce Rensberger, “Acid in Rain Found Up 
Sharply in East; Smoky Curb Cited,” The New York Times, June 13, 1974.  
38 Roger Raufner and Stephen Feldman, Acid Rain and Emissions Trading: Implementing a Market Approach to 
Pollution Control (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987). 
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walk back that threat, but the problem of acid rain only worsened during the subsequent Reagan 
administration.40      
Over the course of the 1970s, acid rain became an increasing contentious issue in 
relations between the United States and Canada. Pollutants, of course, did not recognize 
international borders. Prevailing wind patterns and the geography of American industry 
combined to deposit American sulfates in Canadian lakes and forests. While the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration committed both the United States and Canada in principle to avoid 
damaging each other’s environments, it did not deal with specific issues like acid rain, nor did it 
provide any means of addressing damage when it did occur. After a series of negotiations, the 
two countries joined many European nations in signing the 1979 Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, which directly addressed the problem of acid rain and committed 
the United States to a good faith effort to prevent its sulfates from blowing over the border.41 
Within a year however, the Canadian Embassy filed an official complaint with the United States, 
charging their neighbors to the south with neglecting the 1979 commitment in their scramble to 
convert electric power plants to coal. With no avenue for recourse, the Canadian communiqué 
prevailed upon the Americans to at the very least undertake a study of what such conversion 
might mean for worsening acidification problems north of the border.42  
Reagan’s election cast even these fragile agreements into doubt. In a testament to 
Canadian frustration over the persistent failure of the United States to address the problem, 
																																																						
40 Costle’s resignation letter as well as a series of talking points in which he denied threatening to resign are located 
in Costle’s papers at the Carter Library, folder, “Confidential Correspondence – Miscellaneous [2],” Box 11, DCP. It is 
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Reagan was met with protests in Ottawa’s streets and chants of “acid rain, go home!” when he 
visited Canada on his first official state visit.43 The suspicion was mutual, with an internal 
Reagan memo reporting later that year that Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was using 
acid rain as a “smokescreen” for his own efforts to centralize power over the Provinces and 
possibly nationalize American energy investments.44          
The growing controversy between the United States and Canada over acid rain 
represented a new international dimension to environmental degradation and regulatory policy. 
Sulfates and other pollutants lofted high into the atmosphere connected industrial activity in one 
nation with environmental degradation in another, creating sticky problems of international 
diplomacy. More challenging still were a new set of environmental problems that appeared to be 
truly global in their cause and effect.  
Since the early 1970s, environmental advocates, many scientists, and a few members of 
Congress had warned that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) – in wide use as refrigerants and 
propellants – degraded the protective stratospheric ozone layer that shields earth’s surface from 
harmful ultraviolet rays.45 Environmental and public health advocates warned of a coming 
epidemic of skin cancer and other maladies but struggled to convince Congress or EPA to 
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together as an oxygen atom but the third oxygen molecule is loosely bonded and readily detaches to react with other 
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prohibit the manufacture or use of CFCs.46 Subsequent EPA studies revealed that the current 
rate of growth of CFCs would lead to a 200-300% increase in skin cancer, a shocking threat to 
public health.47 In 1978, the EPA banned the use of CFCs as propellants, while continuing to 
allow their use as refrigerants.48  
But the physical properties of CFCs and their place in global commerce stopped the 
Carter administration from supporting a full ban. CFCs accumulate in the stratosphere, far away 
from their point of origin. Banning their production and usage in the United States would do little 
to reduce American’s risk of skin cancer if CFC producers elsewhere around the world 
continued to manufacture and use them. An American ban without international counterparts 
would disadvantage domestic producers of CFCs and domestic manufacturers of appliances 
like air conditioners and refrigerators that relied on CFCs. Substitute chemicals could no doubt 
be found, but in an era of increasing global trade, the added expense of those substitutes would 
hurt American companies, as business interests repeatedly reminded policymakers.49 It would 
take another decade before environmental advocates managed to forge an international accord 
to eliminate CFCs.       
With growing awareness that pollution transcended national borders, international and 
even global environmental advocacy expanded. Environmental advocates turned to their 
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counterparts abroad for ideas. In 1981, for instance, the Environmental Defense Fund’s Khris 
Hall proposed that her organization hire an economist who could help them reveal the economic 
costs of acid rain, explaining to her colleagues that this was a route that Canadian 
environmentalists had successfully taken to spur state intervention. As Hall described the 
situation, “a general consensus exists that the benefits of control exceed the costs, but no one 
in the environmental community is now in a position to make that case… There is a desperate 
need to start assembling and analyzing economic data and building coalitions with groups such 
as the forest industry which have an economic interest.”50 
In addition to seeking inspiration, environmental advocates also looked abroad with 
dismay as American corporations set up production facilities in countries without strong 
environmental laws – an exportation of environmental degradation with often horrific 
consequences. Late one night in December 1984, a pesticide manufacturing plant in Bhopal, 
India and owned by the American firm Union Carbide, leaked forty tons of deadly methyl 
isocyanate gas, killing nearly four thousand residents in a nearby city. Noting that the plant’s 
operators had failed to maintain even the most basic safety measures required under both 
Indian and United States law, outraged environmental and human rights advocates tried to hold 
Union Carbide and its CEO Warren Anderson criminally liable in American courts.51 Though that 
effort failed, the Bhopal tragedy contributed to the development of a global environmentalism 
that drew connections across borders regarding environmental risk and degradation and held 
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American firms publicly accountable for noxious activities even if those activists largely failed to 
establish liability.52  
 Back in the United States, growing worry over acid rain focused unwelcome attention on 
the electric power industry.53 By the early 1980s, electric utilities were generating sixty percent 
of national sulfur oxide (SO2) emissions and over a third of national nitrogen oxide emissions, 
making them the chief culprits for what environmental advocates warned was a dangerous 
growth in acid deposition.54 Facing the threat of regulatory intervention, the electric power 
industry turned to the reliable shield of scientific uncertainty. In 1980, American Electric Power 
(one of the nation’s largest utilities and a ferocious opponent of environmental regulation) 
contracted with the nonprofit research institution Battelle Columbus Laboratories to conduct a 
survey of all known acid rain research. Allowing that SO2 emissions had increased rapidly, the 
report nonetheless downplayed the problem.55 Demonstrating the political utility of funding such 
research, Ohio Governor James Rhodes sent American Electric Power’s report along to 
Washington as part of an information packet that Rhodes had promised to the recently elected 
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President Reagan.56 Reagan likewise made a shield of scientific uncertainty, insisting to 
Congress time and again that more research was needed before the country could take 
action.57 
 However, rising public alarm about acid rain forced the Reagan administration to take 
some action on the issue, lest it become another environmental political liability.58 Despite the 
efforts of American Electric Power and others to cast doubt on the severity of the issue, 
solidifying scientific consensus declared acid rain to be a major threat. Popular accounts of that 
threat proliferated in television specials and magazine articles like Time’s November 1982 cover 
story – “Acid Rain: The Silent Plague.”59 As a worried internal report by the electric utility trade 
organization the Edison Electric Institute described the situation in 1983, the Democratic Party 
had taken up acid rain as a politically powerful campaign issue, forcing the Reagan 
administration and the Republican Party to do something about the problem.60 With the 
acquiescence of the Reagan administration, William Ruckelshaus prioritized acid rain as a 
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major issue when he returned as EPA Administrator in 1983, assigning a special staff to the 
issue and holding dozens of fact finding meetings.61 In an indication that the Reagan 
Administration and Ruckelshaus did not necessarily share the same objectives, Reagan 
environmental advisor Danny Boggs conducted his own extensive survey of the acid rain issue, 
meeting with nearly thirty different groups including the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 
Canadian government.62     
 While Ruckelshaus and EPA followed the scientific community and environmental 
advocates in calling for electric utilities to reduce their SO2 emissions, the Reagan 
Administration cast about for an alternative response that could avoid disruptions to the electric 
utilities and other industries. By December 1983, Ruckelshaus’ fact-finding mission had settled 
on a SO2 cap for utilities in eastern states, with limits to be considered for midwestern utilities as 
well.63 Allowing for the possibility that Congress would force a major regulatory intervention as 
part of a Clean Air Act overhaul under consideration, Reagan advisors surveyed a wide variety 
of control options including sulfur taxes or emissions fees, transfer payments, capital subsidies 
for scrubbers, and tax credits to help offset SO2 compliance costs that firms might pass along to 
electricity ratepayers.64 In an effort to forestall such measures, Reagan advisors simultaneously 
considered a $10-15 million program in concert with the Canadian government to “lime” lakes 
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that had acidified to toxic pH levels by adding alkaline substances like calcium carbonate. 
Preliminary studies suggested that “liming” could restore pH levels to a normal range without 
any reduction in SO2 emissions, although Reagan advisors acknowledged that the proposal 
would be met with complaints from environmentalists and the Canadian government that the 
United States was avoiding the central issue of reducing emissions from electric power plants.65  
 The Reagan Administration’s toying with miracle cures like lake liming and its repeated 
calls for more research did little to reduce international tensions. In 1983, for instance, the 
United States Department of Justice went so far as to require a Canadian documentary on acid 
rain to be labeled propaganda from an agent of a foreign country.66 But Reagan’s appointment 
of special envoys and other largely symbolic gestures allowed his administration to avoid any 
further controls on SO2 during his presidency, despite acid rain becoming, as a report among his 
advisors described, the major political issue in the relations between the United States and 
Canada.67 
A New Coalition for Emissions Trading 
 
Economists saw the problem of acid rain as an opportunity to develop an emissions 
trading program as the basis for intervention rather than as a later tweak. Previous market-
based strategies like the bubble policy had been grafted on to existing programs as optional 
compliance methods and businesses tended to avoid these post-facto policies because of 
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persistent legal uncertainty. One exception was the lead phasedown, which had been 
redesigned around a trading system to great success.  
 To push a trading program into the forefront, economists and other proponents produced 
detailed thought pieces on how SO2 trading could work. Economists Robert Hahn and Steven 
Noll began work on the technical aspects of such a market in the early 1980s, including possible 
pitfalls a market might encounter.68 Another early sketch came in the Canadian Journal of 
Economics, underscoring the desire north of the border to kick-start a control program.69 By 
1986, the idea of using tradable permits to address acid rain had circulated to the extent that 
Massachusetts’s Division of Air Quality Control conducted an entire report on the experience, 
capabilities, and attitudes of their region toward developing a trading program.70 Later in the 
decade, Hahn and another economist published a retrospective on EPA’s past experience with 
such policies, which positioned a potential “market for bads” in line with EPA programs going 
back to the first 1976 emissions offset policy.71 In 1987, another pair of economists laid out a 
proscriptive book-length plan for instituting a market approach.72  
Critically, the trading approach to acid rain also gained the support of a prominent 
environmental advocate. In a harbinger of changing attitudes in the environmental community, 
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the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) departed from two decades of environmentalist 
resistance to market approaches to take a leading role in devising a viable trading scheme for 
SO2. EDF had previously sought out environmental economists to help them convince policy 
makers that regulatory interventions were sound investments. Along with the ability to assemble 
a case for intervention, environmental economists brought to EDF their longstanding 
enthusiasm for using tradable permits and other market based schemes to lower the cost of 
regulatory compliance. A decade after economists like Thomas Crocker built a constituency for 
market mechanisms at EPA, environmental economists began to do the same at EDF.  
With the acid rain problem worsening in the mid-1980s and no solution in sight, EDF’s 
young president Fred Krupp turned to environmental economists to craft an alternative 
approach. As an undergraduate at Yale University and a law student at the University of 
Michigan, Krupp encountered the field of environmental economics and its promise that markets 
could help reduce the cost of environmental protection. After a short time in private practice in 
New Haven, thirty-year-old Krupp became EDF’s president in 1984 with a promise to work with 
rather than litigate against industry.73 In 1986, Krupp hired Dan Dudek, an environmental 
economist at the University of Massachusetts, to translate the myriad trading schemes then 
circulating among academic economists into a politically viable proposal. Dudek approached 
Democratic Senator Timothy Wirth of Colorado and Republican Senator John Heinz of 
Pennsylvania (both of whom were married to EDF board members) and convinced them to 
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sponsor a wide-ranging report on the possibilities of using markets and economic incentives in 
place of direct regulations.74  
The eventual report, Project 88: Harnessing Market Forces to Protect Our Environment, 
drew on over fifty experts from academic institutions, environmental organizations, industry, and 
government to lay out a blueprint for using marketable permits to address acid rain, water 
quality, and a host of other environmental issues. Project 88 proposed to eliminate acid rain by 
setting a cap on SO2 emissions across the country and then allowing businesses that emitted 
SO2 to buy and sell tradable credits underneath that cap. In this way, a business that could 
easily reduce its emissions to fit under the cap could tighten its emissions even further and 
create a credit to sell to another firm to allow that second firm to exceed its own emissions limit. 
By letting a market decide where the reductions were made, Project 88 predicted that the 
program would save up to $3 billion in annual compliance costs, savings that could be used to 
keep eastern coal mining viable through the development of new pollution control technology.75  
In addition to support for its specific recommendations, Project 88 won praise from 
pundits for using market approaches to reinvigorate environmental protection efforts that had 
bogged down in expensive mandates and partisan rancor. As a New York Times reporter 
described it, the report marked a long overdue embrace of efficacy rather than fairness on the 
part of environmentalists, who for too long had focused on punishing corporations rather than on 
delivering the greatest pollution reductions at the lowest price. This sea change in attitudes, the 
reporter argued, made it possible for Democratic and Republican legislators to forge a new 
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consensus on pollution control programs that promised both environmental quality and 
substantial savings.76  
 New support from the environmental community together with internal changes in 
Congress created the possibility that acid rain would finally be addressed. In the 1980s, 
redistricting reduced the number of Congressional representatives from Detroit and other 
Midwestern and Northeastern manufacturing areas, who had long opposed additional pollution 
control as a threat to already imperiled industries in their districts.77 Additionally, as the trauma 
of the Gorsuch years faded, Democrats proved more willing to contemplate a departure from the 
existing approach of directly enforced uniform standards. When EPA Administrator William 
Ruckelshaus retired from the agency for the second time in 1985, he had gone up to Capitol Hill 
in an unsuccessful attempt to convince legislators of the merits of emissions trading and other 
market approaches.78 Three years later, the changes in Congress together with new support 
from the environmental community opened up new possibilities.   
 The election of George H.W. Bush as president replaced an ardent foe of new regulation 
with a more nuanced supporter of regulatory reform who felt a pressing need to affirm his bona 
fides as an environmentalist and who believed resolving the acid rain issue to be a critical step 
in mending relations with Canada. As Nixon had done two decades before him, Bush followed 
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the advice of Republican pollster and campaign strategist Robert Teeter and committed himself 
to environmental protection in order to prevent the environment from becoming an issue in the 
campaign. Breaking with Reagan’s longstanding derision of the environmental movement, Bush 
declared that he was an environmentalist and promised to address the problem of acid rain if he 
was elected. In states like California, Bush carefully directed environmental appeals to key 
demographics to prevent his Democratic opponent, George Dukakis, from campaigning on 
environmental issues or as the environmentalist candidate.79 On November 8, 1988, Bush won 
California and the national election and set about fulfilling the environmental promises of his 
campaign.  
A few weeks after his election, Bush held a breakfast meeting in the White House with 
leaders from thirty environmental groups. Striking a far more conciliatory posture than his 
predecessor, Bush came across as a marked improvement from Reagan according to the 
environmental advocates who were interviewed about the meeting.80 In an important indication 
that his professed environmentalism was sincere, Bush subsequently appointed the well-
respected William Reilly, who had worked in Nixon’s Council on Environmental Quality before 
serving as president of the Conservation Foundation, as his EPA Administrator. According to a 
contemporaneous account, Bush assured Reilly that his administration was committed to Bush’s 
campaign promises to reduce acid rain, protect wetlands, and address global warming – albeit 
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with the caveat that EPA would have to figure out a way to intervene on these issues without 
significant new sources of funding.81  
The prospects of an acid rain intervention also gained a boost from Bush’s interest in 
international issues and diplomacy and his personal friendship with Canadian Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney. According to contemporary observers, Administrator Reilly chose to prioritize 
acid rain intervention as an area that would be popular with the internationally oriented White 
House.82 North of the border, Canadians greeted Bush’s election as an indication that the 
United States would finally control the sulfur emissions raining down on Canadian lakes and 
forests.83  
The First National Pollutant Market 
 
In the new administration, legal counsel C. Boyden Gray drew on his personal 
experience with market approaches and the Environmental Defense Fund’s policy work to craft 
a bill that satisfied both environmental advocates and Bush’s insistence on minimizing the 
compliance costs of any intervention on acid rain. Gray had been a key advisor to Bush 
throughout his time as Vice President, including on Bush’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, 
which Gray more or less managed. As part of his work on the Task Force, Gray helped 
construct EPA’s lead phasedown as well as the agency’s emission trading program for local air 
basins.84 From these and other experiences, Gray built a familiarity with and enthusiasm for 
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market approaches.85 Gray encountered EDF’s proposal for a trading approach to the acid rain 
problem during the campaign, when EDF’s Dan Dudek approached both candidates with Project 
88. So when Bush asked for an acid rain intervention that would minimize compliance costs, 
Gray and a select group of other advisors saw a trading program as an obvious solution.86  
Following the election, Gray asked EDF to draft the acid rain portions of a proposed 
Clean Air Act amendment.87 During the spring of 1989, Dudek and others at EDF developed a 
proposal that closely followed their recommendations in Project 88. EDF’s proposal used the 20 
million tons of SO2 produced in 1980 as a baseline for cutting emissions from electric utilities 
and other sources in half. Between 1990 and 2000, a limit of 10 million tons of annual SO2 
emissions would be phased in as a national cap. Under that 10 million ton cap, tradable 
emission allowances would be allocated to individual sources proportionate to the amount of 
SO2 they emitted in 1990. Electric utilities and other sources would be free to choose how much 
they wanted to cut. If they went below their share, then they could sell the rights to the resulting 
excess allowances in one-ton increments to other emitters. If they remained above their share, 
they would have to buy allowances to cover the difference. With feedback from EPA and the 
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White House, EDF refined the technical details of its proposal.88 Besides drafting the actual 
legislation, EDF President Fred Krupp advised Gray on public relations matters, including the 
best language to use in describing the trading provision during television interviews.89  
Dudek and other EDF representatives also stumped for the president’s plan to industry, 
environmentalists, and the general public.90 In exchange for sticking out its neck for the Bush 
Administration’s proposal, EDF received Bush’s promise to maintain the fifty percent cut in SO2 
emissions – an ambitious target that Bush might have otherwise shied away from.91 With Bush 
fulfilling his promise, EDF would prove to be a critical ally as the legislation made its way 
through Congress.    
In addition to making the acid rain intervention acceptable to Bush, EDF’S tradable 
allowance provision made an expansion of the Clean Air Act palatable to a Congress that also 
insisted on minimizing compliance costs. A 1989 letter from a bipartisan group of fifty Senators 
to the president demanded that Bush address acid rain in “the most effective and cost efficient 
manner possible.” The letter also urged that states and regulated industries be given “broad 
flexibility to select the combination of fuels and emission control measures that are the most 
appropriate and cost-effective under their individual circumstances,” underscoring a new 
openness in Congress for market approaches.92   
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Furthering its chances for success, EDF’s proposal to create tradable SO2 allowances to 
take on acid rain encountered an EPA that was increasingly comfortable with marketable 
emission rights. At the time Dudek was drafting the bill, EPA was in the midst of implementing a 
tradable permit program to finally bring the chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) problem under control.93 
EPA economists had considered using tradable permits to phase out CFCs as early as 1977 
and they continued to sketch out ideas in the early 1980s.94 The 1987 Montreal Protocol created 
an international schedule to phase out CFCs and EPA officials chose to fulfill the United States’ 
obligation to the 1988 Montreal Protocol by parceling out tradable CFC production rights to 
manufacturers and then slowly phasing those rights out of existence.95 Manufacturers that 
needed to save up capital to finance a switch to a substitute could buy CFC rights from other 
manufacturers and continue producing CFCs a little while longer.96 EPA’s growing comfort with 
tradable permits made the agency amenable to the market approach that EDF and the Bush 
administration offered to address acid rain.  
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Even with the support of EPA, environmentalists, and members of Congress, Bush’s 
proposed Clean Air Act Amendments faced a challenging road. The biggest obstacle was the 
electric utilities, which turned to their trade associations to fight Bush’s bill. Edison Electric 
Institute (EEI) challenged the viability of the tradable allowances that lay at the heart of Bush’s 
proposal, arguing that individual firms would hoard any allowances they acquired in anticipation 
of future growth, killing a market for excess allowances and Bush’s purported compliance cost 
savings along with it.97 Adding credence to EEI’s claims, economists also warned about the 
likelihood of hording.98 EEI also compiled dozens of reports, speeches, and other think pieces 
on acid rain, which the trade association mailed to the president.99  
Large business organizations and conservative think tanks were reliably against 
regulatory expansion and opposed Bush’s bill with the usual tactics. The National Association of 
Manufacturers warned that the proposed amendments failed to “consider the delicate balance of 
protecting our environment and destroying the growth potential for our nation’s small 
businesses.”100 Meanwhile, the Heritage Foundation sought out and amplified remaining 
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scientific uncertainty about the acid rain problem – including the possibility of liming lakes rather 
than reducing SO2 emissions, a solution that most scientists had long ago dismissed.101  
But most businesses also recognized that Bush intended to support the bill through 
Congress and so, in 1988, two hundred of the nation’s largest companies formed the Clean Air 
Working Group to shape rather than defeat the amendments.102 Trade associations and other 
members of the Working Group hired policy insiders like former EPA Regulatory Reform Chief 
Mike Levin and agreed to support Bush’s amendments on the condition that the Working Group 
would be allowed to provide input into the bill to insure that it would not be overly “disruptive.”103 
Given the formidable opposition that any regulatory expansion faced from businesses, the Bush 
Administration saw the Working Group’s support as critical and the President himself met with 
representatives to discuss their suggestions for the legislation.104   
With business divided on Bush’s proposed legislation, electric utilities tried to drag the 
bill into a decades-long fight over coal, charging that it shortsightedly restricted the usage of the 
country’s “most abundant energy resource.”105 Higher sulfur eastern coal mines had long 
depended on regulatory technology mandates like flue gas scrubbers to remain competitive with 
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lower-sulfur western coal.106 In addition to Congressional representatives from eastern states 
like West Virginia where coal mining was an important part of the economy, national labor 
organizations lobbied Bush to require all electric utilities to use scrubbers as part of an effort to 
avoid a shift to nonunionized western mines.107 For Bush advisor C. Boyden Gray, this politically 
messy fight was yet another reason to favor emissions trading, with its ability to “cut through 
these political struggles by asking the marketplace to make the ultimate allocation decisions.”108 
In what would become a hallmark of neoliberal policymaking, Gray and other decision makers 
saw markets as an opportunity to avoid political responsibility for distributional consequences. 
The market, not policymakers, would decide.   
  If emissions trading helped Gray and the Bush Administration to avoid some of the 
thorny politics of economically disruptive regulations, the notion of granting corporate entities 
the right to emit a certain level of pollutants risked opening up the equally contentious issue of 
the ethics of trading. Environmental advocates had long opposed emissions trading not just 
because they believed it was less effective than uniform mandates but because they believed 
that it was unethical for the federal government to give businesses the right to pollute the air.  
An expression of this ethical objection came in a New York Times editorial in July 1989, 
in which a sociology professor sarcastically asked if emission rights would followed by “pesticide 
residue rights” or “fouling rights” in the National Basketball Association. Continuing in a darker 
vein, the editorial imagined a world in which “felony rights” were created for “murder, rape, 
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armed robbery and so forth.” The United Nations might even create “torture rights,” the editorial 
concluded, to be stored in Swiss bank accounts.109 In its dark sarcasm, the editorial voiced a 
popular sentiment that laws existed to do more than promote economic efficiency and that some 
things should remain sacrosanct from the market. The passion of such critiques further 
underscored the importance of the Environmental Defense Fund’s unprecedented support for 
emissions trading.    
In July 1989, Bush sent his bill to Congress, accompanied by an enthusiastic 
endorsement from the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF).110 As EDF had insisted, the bill 
proposed a fifty percent reduction in sulfur dioxide from 1980 levels. Under that cap, electric 
utilities and other emission sources would be granted rights to one-ton emission allowances 
based on historic market share, which they could use themselves or sell to other sources.111 In 
order to help establish a market price for such allowances and prevent existing firms from 
hording allowances and thus creating barriers to entry for new sources, EPA was to hold back 
about two percent of the allowances each year for an annual auction.112 Other provisions of the 
bill addressed air toxics, mobile emissions, and urban smog, taking a moderate approach to 
these environmental concerns.113  
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As Bush’s Clean Air Act bill wound its way through Congress, EDF provided critical 
support in convincing skeptical legislators and environmental advocates that trading would 
produce real emission reductions. EDF President Fred Krupp, economist Dan Dudek, and other 
EDF representatives testified before congressional committees and worked behind the scenes 
to convince key legislators that the trading approach was viable and necessary.114 Preparing a 
list of rebuttals to environmentalist criticisms that the Bush bill did not go far enough in reducing 
SO2 emissions, EPA’s Air Office quoted EDF’s pronouncement that Congress should make 
Bush’s bill “the cornerstone of final acid rain legislation,” as well as EDF’s praise for Bush’s 
“forging an iron linkage between robust market incentives and environmental integrity.”115 EDF’s 
support for Bush’s bill convinced other prominent environmental organizations to express 
support for (or at least consider) the legislation, including the National Wildlife Foundation, the 
Wilderness Society, the Conservation Foundation, the Sierra Club, and the National Audubon 
Society.116 
One matter on which these various environmentalists were adamant was that the trading 
provisions avoid any indication that SO2 allowances amounted to property rights in air. Fulfilling 
that demand even though doing so risked generating uncertainty that firms might shy away 
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from, Bush’s bill explicitly stated that SO2 allowances were not property rights and that EPA 
could withdraw allowances at a later date without being forced to pay compensation.117 
As the legislation moved through Congress, the Bush Administration rolled out support 
to keep the trading program intact. A dozen winners of the Nobel Prize in economics wrote an 
open letter to Congress in 1989 endorsing the tradable allowances approach.118 The 
Chairwoman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Council wrote Representative John Dingell in 
September 1989 to assuage fears that SO2 allowances would lead to anti-competitive behavior 
by incumbent emission sources.119 And the Chairman of Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors 
as well as EDF’s Dudek worked closely with Democratic Congressman Philip Sharp, who 
introduced legislation on emissions trading provisions in the House, to insure that Sharp’s 
legislation protected the mechanics of EDF’s original proposal.120 By May 1990, both the House 
and Senate passed legislation modeled on Bush’s proposal and Congress worked out a 
conference bill in October. On November 15, 1990, Bush signed the first amendments to the 
Clean Air Act in thirteen years, creating as he did so the first national market for a major 
pollutant.  
The trading provisions proved to be every bit the success that their supporters had 
predicted. By 2000, the country had achieved the fifty percent reduction in SO2 emissions, and 
with considerable savings for businesses in complying with the Act. Economists have estimated 
that permitting emission sources to buy and sell allowances saved electric utilities and other 
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businesses between $1 billion and $2 billion in annual compliance costs.121 As the Wall Street 
Journal reported in April 1991, many electric utilities softened their earlier hostility to trading as 
they realized that a thriving market in SO2 allowances allowed for substantial compliance 
savings.122 That critical market liquidity owed to the auction provision as well as EPA’s 
development of banks where allowances could be deposited, freeing firms from the problem of 
finding buyers and sellers.  
Furthermore, by reducing costs to make acid rain intervention palatable to the Bush 
Administration, SO2 trading permitted the country to achieve remarkable monetary benefits in 
reduced mortality from respiratory illness. As it turned out, halving SO2 emissions also 
incidentally reduced particulate emissions, dramatically driving down respiratory afflictions and 
generating some $50 billion in annual public health benefits against roughly $500 million in 
annual costs to industry, according to a 2012 paper.123 Despite complaints from Bush advisors 
that EPA created unnecessary costs in its implementation of the amendments, the updated 
Clean Air Act proved to be an enormous economic boon for the nation.124 
 At the state level, however, there were early signs that SO2 trading was not a universal 
panacea. While the amendments were being drafted, some critics of trading had pointed out 
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that a national market could leave some areas with harmful pollution levels even if the country 
as a whole succeeded in reducing SO2 by fifty percent. These critics warned that trading could 
even exacerbate local pollution issues because existing sources could theoretically buy 
emission rights to expand current emissions. A solution was offered to zone the country 
according to the critical pollutant load a particular area could tolerate (which would become in 
effect a local cap on emissions in that area), but Bush’s bill stuck with the national aggregate 
limit.125 In New York, where the acidification of lakes and streams in the Adirondacks had helped 
uncover the problem of acid rain nearly two decades before, environmental advocates 
complained that trading allowed Midwestern utilities to continue poisoning the state’s water. 
Governor Mario Cuomo threatened to prevent New York sources from selling their allowances 
and eventually sued EPA over the failure to reduce emissions from Ohio’s electric plants, which 
were major buyers of SO2 allowances.126 Though the Adirondacks Council in New York 
managed in a separate lawsuit to get EPA to monitor the contributions of trading to continued 
acidification, New York’s campaign to insert safeguards into the trading program continued for 
fifteen years without success.127  
At the local level, environmental justice advocates complained that trading SO2 
allowances as well as emission rights for other pollutants shifted other toxic pollutants around as 
well. By paying for the right to avoid controls on SO2, an emission source might also be 
maintaining higher levels of rare toxics. In 1999, the National Environmental Justice Advisory 
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Council warned that trading was creating “hot spots” of pollution in poor and minority 
neighborhoods, where the concentration of these environmental hazards showed the ugly side 
of market solutions that promised social benefits only in the aggregate.128           
 
Markets, Climate Change, and Environmentalism 
 
 Before the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 had even begun to take on acid rain, the 
Bush Administration and other observers were suggesting a much larger potential for the 
legislation and its trading program. Facing calls for action on climate change, Gray and other 
proponents of market approaches framed the SO2 trading program as the first step in the 
creation of a new model of environmental governance built on markets rather than regulatory 
standards.  
For more than a decade, environmental advocates around the world had warned that 
carbon dioxide and other gases were accumulating in the earth’s atmosphere, where they 
trapped solar radiation that would otherwise have reflected back into space, changing climates 
and producing an overall warming of the globe. In the 1980s, growing scientific understanding 
and alarm about the contributions of these “greenhouse gases” to climate change led the United 
Nations to call for a global treaty to address the problem. The United States received special 
attention as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Though the Bush Administration 
disputed this primacy, international pressure mounted for the United States to address the 
issue.  
As they drafted the Clean Air Act Amendments, Gray other Bush advisors felt 
themselves under this spotlight and they tried to position the legislation as a demonstration of 
the United States’ leadership on climate change. In doing so, they had to rely considerably on 
																																																						





the ancillary effects of controlling SO2. The biggest benefit came from a switch away from coal, 
which, when burned, releases great quantities of carbon dioxide in addition to the SO2 targeted 
by the amendments. With the help of the consultancy Abt Associates Inc., Bush’s EPA offered 
this fortuitous side effect as a retort to both domestic and international critics who complained 
that the United States was not doing enough to counteract global warming.129 The 
Environmental Defense Fund also celebrated this ancillary benefit in its lobbying of 
Congressional members to support the legislation.130  
Beyond serendipitous carbon reductions, the Bush Administration saw the Clean Air Act 
Amendments’ SO2 trading provisions as a model for addressing climate change through a cap 
and trade approach. Explaining the need for Bush to put his weight behind the passage of the 
Amendments with a viable trading program intact, several of his advisors noted in a December 
1989 memo that SO2 trading could serve “as a tool… [for] a new generation of environmental 
issues, such as global warming.”131 Preparing for what seemed to be an imminent United States 
intervention on climate change, Bush’s EPA produced a 1991 report that laid out a plan for 
setting up an international market for carbon dioxide emission rights.132  
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In addition to reducing the costs of intervention on climate change, the Bush 
Administration saw pollutant markets as a means of insuring that the United States was not 
forced to do more than its share in addressing the problem. As Gray described it, creating a 
market required a clear-eyed assessment of total greenhouse gas emissions, which would 
reveal global warming to be the entire world’s fault. Whereas a politically mandated command 
and control approach would likely focus on countries like England and Germany that relied 
heavily on coal, as well as the United States and its many automobiles, an international market 
for greenhouse gases would recognize the contribution of things like “rice cultivation in the Far 
East,” which Gray noted was “the largest single contributor to methane.” Moreover, controlling 
greenhouse gas emissions through exchangeable rights would allow countries like the United 
States to claim credits for pulling carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere through reforestation 
efforts.133 Thus, a market approach would allow the United States to claim leadership on the 
climate change without assuming responsibility and blame for the problem.  
Like other observers, the Bush Administration saw the SO2 provisions in the Clean Air 
Act as a critical public test of market approaches. Addressing a diverse group of 
environmentalists, business representatives, and other policy makers following the 
Amendments’ passage, Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Michael Boskin remarked that 
“whole world is watching the acid rain program, the first large-scale attempt to use market 
incentives to promote environmental protection…to see if the theoretical promise of this 
approach as a means of reconciling environmental protection and economic growth can be 
realized in practice.”134 By dramatically reducing compliance costs while also controlling SO2, 
the trading provisions passed that test in the minds of most observers. This success, combined 
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with the paucity of other large scale trials have made the Clean Air Act Amendments one of the 
chief examples cited by environmental economists in their campaign for a cap and trade 
approach to climate change.135  
The environmental historian Samuel Hays has correctly argued that the SO2 trading 
program in the 1990 Amendments was a compliance strategy for meeting a reduction set by 
Congress and that the program did not use markets to determine how much sulfur dioxide 
should be emitted in the first place, as many environmental economists advocated.136 But as 
Boskin’s claim that the world was watching, the New York Times editorial foretelling torture 
rights, and the subsequent fascination of economists with the 1990 Amendments variously 
underscore, SO2 trading on a national scale marked a new phenomenon in the minds of nearly 
everyone involved.   
The acid rain trading program came as part and parcel of a giddy flourishing of market 
approaches to environmental protection. Shortly before Bush signed the Clean Air Act 
Amendments, EPA Administrator Reilly promised that, “to the maximum extent made possible 
by the actual statutory language,” his agency would “make use of the flexible, market-based 
strategies that are the hallmark of the President’s successful initiative.”137 Moving beyond 
emission rights, proponents of market approaches identified scores of environmental problems 
that could be addressed with tradable rights. These new trading solutions were as varied as 
their proponents. In 1991, the Environmental Defense Fund proposed that the Bush 
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Administration create wetland mitigation credits whereby a company wishing to build on 
ecologically sensitive area could pay for the conservation of wetlands in an adjacent area to 
replace those being destroyed.138 That same year, the Bush administration reported on a range 
of areas in which markets might be applied, including tropical deforestation.139  
The most radical suggestions came from a new movement that took its name from the 
1991 book Free Market Environmentalism. In the book, co-authors Terry Anderson and Donald 
Leal, laid out a plan for replacing regulations with a vast expansion of property rights and tort 
law. Regulation, the authors argued, was the product of a neo-Malthusian fear that competition 
over resources would lead to degradation and exploitation. But while regulation did curb 
competition, the bureaucrats who ran federal agencies had neither the incentive nor the ability 
to act in the interests of the general welfare of society. As the historian Brian Drake points out, 
free market environmentalists focused especially on western lands and natural resources, which 
they charged federal agencies like the U.S. Forest Service with gifting to special interests to 
meet quotas and appease “clients” in the extractive industries.140  
But environmental protections were no better in the eyes of free market 
environmentalists like Anderson and Leal, who argued that an inevitable bureaucratic creep led 
to a swath of regulations that society would never have chosen to labor under. Environmental 
agencies like EPA catered to their own special interests, favoring environmentalists’ preference 
for things like endangered species conservation at the expense of public welfare. Markets, 
Anderson and Leal argued, offered an objective measure of social preference and values that 
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139 “Environmental Peristroika: The Case for Incorporating Market Incentives in Environmental Management,” 1991, 
attached to Allan Hubbard to Boyden Gray, December 10, 1991, Folder ID Number: 45126-003, JHF.  
140 Brian Drake, Loving Nature, Fearing the State: Environmentalism and Antigovernment Politics Before Reagan 




regulators could never provide. By extending property rights as far as possible (from the land 
underneath the National Parks to the fish swimming in the ocean) and enforcing strong tort 
laws, individual property owners could collectively express real public preferences as they 
pursued their self-interests. Environmentalists who wanted to protect wilderness or conserve 
species would, like the Nature Conservancy, simply buy them.141  
As Anderson and Leal themselves pointed out, the underlying ideas of free market 
environmentalism were not new. Ronald Coase and Tom Crocker had theorized the substitution 
of property rights for torts claims back in the 1960s and Anderson and Leal placed themselves 
in this long intellectual tradition. What was new was the marriage of economists’ insistence on 
the objectivity of markets to the rallying cry that elitist environmentalists had hijacked federal 
policy to force society to go along with their vision. Free market environmentalists were the 
product of a conservative backlash to regulation and the federal government, a backlash that 
business interests had actively cultivated and funded. Beginning in the 1970s, businessmen like 
brewer and mineral rights investor Joseph Coors built up think tanks and legal organizations to 
advance the notion that federally controlled resources should be opened for public use. One of 
these organizations, the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, sponsored Anderson and 
Leal’s book. As with so much of neoliberalism, the vision of the scholars did not need precisely 
cohere with that of their funders to be of use to the latter.142 In theoretically beating back federal 
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control to create a privately owned (and thus vigilantly defended) wilderness preserve, 




Back at the White House, Bush faced a reelection campaign in which he struggled to 
define himself as an environmentalist against an opposing ticket that outflanked him on 
environmental issues. By the 1990s, the political space for a conservative approach to 
environmental protection was vanishingly slim. Issues like whether to protect the forested 
habitat of the endangered Spotted Owl at the expense of the timber industry in the Pacific 
Northwest polarized public opinion.143 In this and other instances, Republicans worked hard to 
portray regulatory protections as the product of elitist Democrats in order to pull working class 
voters away from the Democratic Party.144 But that same intensifying partisanship also worked 
to Bush’s disadvantage, including when he decided to take a “go-slow” approach and avoid 
pledging to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, a stance that 
Democrats derided as revealing antipathy toward environmental protection.145 When Bill Clinton 
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Are You An Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?: Work and Nature,” in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the 
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144 In the case of the spotted owl, Bush’s campaign excitedly described the controversy as a change to “put together 
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Teeter, August 31, 1991, Folder, “Washington/Oregon, 1988-1992 (1),” Box 139, RTP. 
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and his Vice Presidential nominee Al Gore staked a stronger position on environmental issues 
than Bush was willing to take, Bush had little to gain from adopting a moderate position. Bush’s 
status among environmentalists sank further when he enacted a moratorium on new 
regulations, including environmental protections, in January 1992.146  
Even though Bush had created the most extensive emissions market to date, Clinton 
proved the more adroit promoter of the notion that markets saved policymakers from having to 
take a side. As he did throughout his presidency, Clinton skillfully paired neoliberal ideology to 
liberal concerns. Speaking as a candidate at an Earth Day event in 1992, Clinton averred “I 
believe it is time for a new era in environmental protection, which uses the market to help us get 
our environment back on track – to recognize that Adam Smith’s invisible hand can have a 
green thumb.”147 By November, when Clinton became the forty-second president, dawn had 
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Today, the Environmental Protection Agency presides over a national regulatory regime 
that has changed only a little in its basic structure since it was created in the early 1970s. As in 
the agency’s first years of operation, EPA develops and enforces rules specifying the emission 
reductions required of particular industries as well as the acceptable technology for making 
those reductions. Since the late 1970s, EPA has allowed some individual businesses to 
participate in the selection of pollution control technologies as well as to barter with other 
businesses for excess emission rights in limited markets. But most businesses continue to 
simply abide by the national standards laid down in EPA headquarters. Having withstood 
repeated attacks from regulated industries, EPA still does not consider compliance costs in 
setting national standards for the set of pollutants that the agency deems most dangerous to the 
public health.    
The continuity in EPA’s model of environmental governance is the result of forty years of 
deft maneuvering through political and economic upheaval. Facing protests from regulated 
businesses about the costs of compliance, EPA’s first leaders invested in environmental 
economics, helping to foster a field that tended to find that the benefits of regulatory protections 
outweighed their costs. Armed with that information, EPA officials fought back against recurrent 
pressure from both Republican and Democratic presidents to weaken the agency’s regulations, 
including through the mechanisms of regulatory review. Environmental economists brought with 
them to EPA a preference for letting corporate engineers rather than federal regulators decide 
how to reduce pollutant emissions. As the national economy soured in the late 1970s, EPA 
officials in the Carter administration developed new approaches like the bubble policy that 
extended some of that decision making to businesses in order to lower their costs of compliance 




policies as a surrendering of authority to untrustworthy corporations and worked procedural 
constraints into the rules that scared away many risk-averse businesses. Despite Reagan’s 
preference for deregulation over substantive regulatory reform, market approaches gained 
support among think tanks and eventually some environmental organizations. George H.W. 
Bush drew on that support and EPA’s fluency with market approaches to create the nation’s first 
cap and trade system for pollution control in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which 
succeeded in dramatically reducing the sulfur dioxide emissions that were responsible for acid 
rain, at a lower cost to businesses than direct enforcement of the uniform standards. 
The sulfur dioxide trading program marked a remarkable ascendance for the field of 
environmental economics, whose progenitors first suggested both an economic approach to 
environmental value and a market approach to pollution control in the 1960s. In the years 
following the 1990 Amendments, environmental economics became an increasingly popular 
way for environmental advocates to tout the success of their programs. In a major 1997 
retrospective report, for instance, EPA lauded the Clean Air Act for achieving monetary benefits 
that vastly outweighed economic costs. From 1970 to 1990, the report stated, the nation spent 
$523 billion in real dollars on EPA’s implementation of the Act and business investment 
complying with those rules. In return, the nation received an incredible $22.2 trillion in monetary 
benefits, including decreased mortality and reductions in agricultural crop damage.1  
Yet as economics has become the preferred language for describing the outcome of 
regulatory interventions, the use of economics to define the objectives of environmental 
protection remains controversial. A popular 2004 book captured much of what continues to 
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make the application of economics to policymaking objectionable to environmentalists and 
public health advocates. Co-authored by the legal scholar Frank Ackerman and the 
environmental economist Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless critiqued both the techniques and the 
politics of economic analysis. Repeating a complaint voiced in the 1970s, Ackerman and 
Heinzerling argued that cost/benefit analysis inherently elevates the short-term, easily 
quantifiable compliance costs to businesses while downplaying the long-term, more difficult to 
quantify benefits to public health. In addition to this inherent bias, Ackerman and Heinzerling 
charged that free market environmentalists like Terry Anderson who loudly champion the 
supposed neutrality of economic valuation consistently overestimate costs and underestimate 
benefits, revealing themselves to be pro-business rather than pro-efficiency. As well, Ackerman 
and Heinzerling recounted how business groups like the American Enterprise Institute 
frequently trot out examples of economically irresponsible regulations that EPA in reality 
declined to propose after the agency determined the costs to far outweigh the benefits. Biased 
in both method and application and deceptively applied to regulations that never existed, 
cost/benefit analysis raises the political power of business interests at the expense of the public 
health. In addition to these political failings, Ackerman and Heinzerling voiced an ethical 
objection to economic analysis, which the authors wrote “too easily conceals the basic human 
questions that lie at its heart and excludes the voices of people untrained in the field.” In 
decrying the simple inappropriateness of “translating life, health, and nature into dollars,” 
Priceless voiced a sentiment from the earliest days of the environmental movement.2 Even if its 
biases could be corrected, economics could never fully capture environmental value.  
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 EPA’s own experiments with using economics to define regulatory objectives have found 
that public perceptions of environmental value are difficult to translate into monetary terms. In 
2001, EPA hired Abt Associates, a prominent environmental consultancy that had calculated the 
benefits of regulatory protections for EPA in the past, to devise a study to help determine how 
much Americans wanted to spend to improve visible air quality. EPA was considering 
developing a new regulatory standard for visual air quality and agency officials wanted to set the 
emissions limit at a level where the economic benefits of the aesthetic improvement outweighed 
the costs to businesses in reducing emissions of particulate matter and other pollutants.3 Abt 
Associates convened a survey group and showed them a series of slides depicting iconic 
Washington, D.C. visages under varying degrees of degraded visibility, simulated by a computer 
program that translated different concentrations of particulate matter into visual air quality. As 
EPA staff looked on through a one-way mirror, Abt Associates researchers asked participants to 
rank the air quality in each slide on a numerical scale of acceptability and then to state how 
much they would be willing to pay to maintain that quality if they found it acceptable. From those 
answers, Abt Associates and EPA hoped to figure out the monetary value of different levels of 
visual air quality to the average American.4  
 Despite a clinical study design intended to pass a peer-review, Abt Associates could not 
convince participants to isolate aesthetic air quality in determining the acceptability of different 
levels of pollution or in deciding how much they would be willing to pay to avoid that 
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degradation. At the beginning of the study, researchers instructed the participants to avoid 
thinking about the health implications of the visual impairment. Nonetheless, one respondent 
revealed in later discussion that she could not help but think about how her sinuses hurt on the 
hazy days depicted in some slides. Several of the participants did not understand that the 
simulated photographs would not reproduce changes in weather and factored in a hedge for 
natural impairment in their responses. Participants also reported various strategies they had 
developed for reading the images – such as one individual who focused on the distinguishing 
lines between a clump of trees in the foreground.5 The responses revealed to EPA that visibility 
was tied up in subjective experiences inflected with a whole host of confounding factors. 
Following similar studies around the country, EPA ultimately declined to issue a visual air quality 
standard.  
 While regulators and environmental advocates remain wary of economics as a rubric for 
policymaking, the emission rights markets that seemed imminent after the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments have proven slow to arrive. Local regulators have adopted the strategy in a few 
places, including Los Angeles and Chicago. In the Northeast, the success of the acid rain 
program spurred a similar approach to nitrogen oxides.6 Trading expanded into new mediums, 
with the wetland mitigation credit system.7 But the larger sweep of market approaches through 
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environmental policy envisioned by books like 1994’s The Environment Goes to Market has yet 
to occur.8  
 In the United States, market approaches have been stymied by continued 
environmentalist objection to surrendering authority over pollution control decisions to 
businesses as well as strong opposition from the Republican Party to any expansion of 
regulations that would use markets to put a price on environmental degradation that currently 
goes unchecked. Bill Clinton supported the internationalizing of emissions trading as the 
preferred reduction strategy in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, but the United States’ decision not to 
ratify the protocol undercut the development of an international cap and trade approach to 
carbon dioxide control.9 Under George W. Bush and since then the Republican Party has 
followed Reagan in pursuing deregulation over market approaches. Facing resistance from both 
the left and right, Barack Obama could not convince Congress to support a significant regulatory 
expansion to take on climate change through a cap and trade approach to carbon dioxide. 
There has been more progress on the international level, with fledging markets for carbon 
credits and cap and trade systems in place in a number of American states and European 
countries.10 But more than twenty-five years after the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
created the first national cap and trade system, proponents of market approaches are still 
awaiting a comparable success.  
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 Debates about the virtues of market approaches and the ethics of using economics to 
value the environment have taken on added urgency in the face of climate change. In a 
repetition of the 1970s, fears of environmental limits have spurred investigations into the 
sustainability of the underlying economic system. Kenneth Boulding’s famous 1970 essay on 
“The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth” was one of many social commentaries from 
that era that questioned whether finite resources could sustain the basic model of welfare 
enhancement through economic growth.11 Today, awareness of our rapidly changing climate 
has caused many thinkers to once again wonder about the sustainability of capitalism – this 
time, whether the planet can absorb greenhouse gases without severe consequences for 
human life.12 As in the 1970s, scholars debate whether existing economic models can protect 
environmental quality over multiple generations. In a 2009 book, economist Tim Jackson 
echoes Boulding in arguing that growth based economics cannot avoid ruinous environmental 
damage. Like Boulding, Jackson tries to imagine a new economic model focused on maintaining 
human welfare rather than on increasing the gross domestic product.13 
The history of 1970s environmental writing bears directly on contemporary 
conversations. As historian Paul Sabin describes in a recent book, pundits who oppose radical 
political action in the face of climate change often point to humanity’s escape from the supposed 
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resource trap of the 1970s as yet another instance in which technological innovation and human 
ingenuity inevitably made fools out of Malthusian pessimists.14 Many of these authors accept the 
reality and danger of anthropogenic climate change; they oppose radical political action 
because they believe that capitalism itself contains the best mechanisms for controlling carbon 
emissions. Mainstream environmental economics informs this increasingly popular viewpoint: 
climate change is dangerously real but can be met by a global cap and trade system that would 
keep overall emissions below critical thresholds without disrupting existing economic systems 
and at a price that national economies could bear.15  
 Where environmental economists have put their faith in the existing system, the young 
field of ecological economics has emerged to provide the dissenting argument that addressing 
climate change requires a more fundamental reckoning with capitalism.16 Clive Spash, one of 
the field’s foremost practioners, has written a number of articles on the practical and theoretical 
problems of using cap and trade to avoid catastrophic climate change. With an eye to political 
power that is often wanting in economics, Spash argues that business interests have influenced 
the design of fledging European markets to maximize their own profits, yielding insufficient 
reductions of carbon emissions in the process. Moreover, Spash argues that a fixation on 
markets has become a distraction from the real need to create new models for human behavior 
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that value conservation and restraint and deemphasize consumption.17 In other works, Spash 
elaborates an ethical objection to describing environmental value entirely in dollars and cents 
that the authors of Priceless share. Like many environmentalists, Spash and ecological 
economists tend to believe that economic valuation will always be an incomplete way of 
understanding the virtues of environmental protection. At best, economics can be a guide for the 
decisions made by an informed democracy.18   
 In the twenty years after the Clean Air Act of 1970 created the first national air quality 
standards, EPA’s regulations dramatically improved the nation’s air. From 1970 to 1990, electric 
utilities cut their sulfur dioxide emissions by forty percent using flue gas scrubbers and lower 
sulfur coal; control devices on industrial smokestacks reduced fine particulate emissions by 
seventy-five percent; and catalytic converters and other control devices reduced automobile 
carbon monoxide emissions by fifty percent, nitrogen oxides by thirty percent, volatile organic 
compounds by forty-five percent, and lead by nearly one hundred percent.19 All this while the 
nation added over forty million people and nearly five trillion dollars in gross domestic product.20 
Market approaches to regulatory compliance have helped lower the costs of EPA’s standards to 
businesses, in some cases protecting the agency’s robust interventions. But the remarkable 
improvement in environmental quality owes to the standards set and enforced by the federal 
government. 
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 Strong environmental regulations improve aggregate social welfare. Business 
compliance with those rules adds new costs, which inevitably forces some inefficient and 
polluting manufacturers out of business. In the late 1960s, the environmental movement and the 
new field of environmental economics combined to convince Congress and a majority of 
Americans that that trade was worthwhile and perhaps even ethically demanded. Over the last 
forty-five years, that consensus judgment has been tried and tested. So far, it has persevered. 
From both an ethical and an economic perspective, environmentalists and economists continue 
to convince Americans that protecting environmental quality is the responsibility of a democratic 
government. The 2016 presidential election produced an executive with a disdain for that 
responsibility that surpasses Reagan’s and who operates without the Congressional checks that 
Reagan faced. Safeguarding the regulations that have done so much to improve this nation’s 
environmental quality and protect the public health now falls to the career staff at EPA and to 
environmental organizations – both of which will rely on economists to insist on the importance 
of maintaining strong standards. Ultimately, deciding whether the environment should be the 
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